Blog note: Over the next few weeks, we will translate and publish a series of correspondence between the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Soviet Union led by Stalin and the now defunct Yugoslav Communist Party (CPY) Central Committee under the leadership of revisionist Tito. We believe that reading the first part of this series, “Stalin’s Fight Against Yugoslav Revisionism,” is fundamental to understanding its political and ideological content. In
This document discusses several important issues, which together indicate that the Yugoslav Communist Party has completely degenerated into a bourgeois party, and Yugoslavia itself has fallen into bourgeois dictatorship:
- The Soviet Union withdraws military advisors from Yugoslavia;
- Regarding Soviet civilian experts in Yugoslavia;
- About Velaybit and other spies in the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- About the Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia and the Soviet state;
- About Comrade Gillas’s anti-Soviet statements regarding intelligence agencies and trade negotiations;
- About the incorrect political line of the Yugoslav Central Committee Politburo on class struggle in Yugoslavia;
- About the incorrect policy of the Yugoslav Central Committee Politburo on the relationship between the party and the People’s Front;
- Concerning the worrying situation within the Yugoslav Communist Party;
- About the arrogance of Yugoslav Central leaders and their incorrect behavior towards mistakes.
Among these issues, we emphasize issues 6 to 9 because they show us that Yugoslav leaders (such as Tito and Kardelj) are far from the Marxist-Leninist principles regarding the concept of the Yugoslav Communist Party itself.
“Elections in Yugoslavia: Tito — Now let me tell you who voted against…”
Letter to the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party (Jo. V. Stalin, 1948)
March 27, 1948
We have received your reply and the decision of the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee on April 13, 1948, signed by Comrades Tito and Kardelj.
Unfortunately, these documents, especially those signed by Tito and Kardelj, did not improve the previous Yugoslav documents; on the contrary, they made matters more complicated and intensified conflicts.
We are shocked by the tone of these documents, which can only be described as overly ambitious. There is no desire in these documents to clarify the truth, honestly admit mistakes, and recognize the need to eliminate errors. Yugoslav comrades do not accept criticism in a Marxist manner but in a bourgeois manner, meaning they see it as an insult to the prestige of the Yugoslav Central Committee and as damaging the ambitions of the Yugoslav leadership.
Therefore, to get out of the predicament, Yugoslav leaders used a “new” approach, which is to completely deny their mistakes regardless of their obvious existence. They deny the facts and documents mentioned in the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) letter of March 27, 1948. Comrades Tito and Kardelj apparently do not realize that this baseless denial of facts and documents is always unconvincing and only makes them look ridiculous.
1. Withdrawal of Soviet military advisors
The Central Committee of the CPSU (B) explained the reasons for the withdrawal of Soviet military advisors in its letter of March 27, stating that the information was based on complaints from advisors about Yugoslav officers’ hostile behavior towards Soviet troops and their representatives in Yugoslavia. Tito and Kardelj condemned these accusations as unfounded. Why should the CPSU (B) believe Tito and Kardelj’s baseless claims rather than the numerous complaints from Soviet military advisors? Why? The Soviet Union has almost always had its own military advisors in each people’s democratic country. We must emphasize that so far, our advisors in these countries have not been subject to any complaints. This explains why misunderstandings about the work of Soviet military advisors only exist in Yugoslavia. Isn’t this clear? This can only be explained by the special hostile atmosphere created around these military advisors in Yugoslavia.
The Tito and Kardelj mentioned the huge expenses related to the salaries of Soviet generals, emphasizing that the dinar received by Soviet generals is three to four times that of Yugoslav generals, which causes dissatisfaction among Yugoslav troops. However, besides salaries, Yugoslav generals also receive apartments, servants, food, etc. Furthermore, the salaries of Soviet generals within Yugoslavia are consistent with those within the Soviet Union. It is understandable that the Soviet government cannot consider lowering the wages of Soviet generals performing duties in Yugoslavia.
Perhaps the expenses of Soviet generals are too burdensome for the Yugoslav budget. In this case, the Yugoslav government should have contacted the Soviet government to suggest that the Soviet government bear part of the costs. Undoubtedly, the Soviet government would do so. However, Yugoslavia took a different approach; they not only failed to resolve this issue amicably but also began to insult our military advisors, calling them rascals and defaming the Soviet army. After hostility arose around our Soviet military advisors, the Yugoslav government only then contacted the Soviet government. It is understandable that the Soviet government cannot accept such a situation.
2. About Soviet civilian experts in Yugoslavia
The Central Committee of the CPSU (B) explained the reasons for the withdrawal of Soviet civilian experts from Yugoslavia in its letter of March 27, based on complaints from the experts and statements from the Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia. From these statements, it is clear that Soviet civilian experts and the CPSU (B) representative in the intelligence bureau, Comrade Yudin, were under the supervision of UTB[^5].
Tito and Kardelj denied the authenticity of these accusations and reports, claiming that the Yugoslav State Security Agency does not supervise Soviet citizens within Yugoslavia. But why should the CPSU (B) believe Tito and Kardelj’s baseless claims rather than the complaints of Soviet personnel, including Comrade Yudin?
The Soviet government cannot tolerate this situation and was forced to withdraw its civilian experts from Yugoslavia, which is understandable.
3. About Velaybit and other spies in the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Contrary to what Tito and Kardelj said, during the meeting with Molotov[^6], the suspicion about Velaybit was only limited to “that their situation with Velaybit was not entirely clear”. In fact, during the meeting with Molotov, someone mentioned that Velaybit was suspected of being a British spy. It is very strange that Tito and Kardelj linked Velaybit’s removal from the Foreign Ministry to his (the Foreign Ministry’s) collapse. Why can’t Velaybit be dismissed without destroying the Foreign Ministry?
Similarly, it is strange that Tito and Kardelj explained the reason for keeping Velaybit as deputy minister of the Foreign Ministry; it seems that Velaybit was not dismissed because he was under supervision. Wouldn’t it be better to dismiss him precisely because he was under supervision? Why treat a British spy so indulgently while he is so uncompromisingly hostile to the Soviet Union?
However, Velaybit is not the only spy in the Foreign Ministry. Soviet representatives often inform that in Yugoslavia,Líderes de Hezbolá, el embajador de Yugoslavia en Londres, Ljubo Leontić, son espías británicos. No sé por qué este leal veterano espía británico todavía permanece en el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores.
El gobierno soviético sabe que, además de Leontić, otros tres miembros de la embajada de Yugoslavia en Londres también trabajan para la inteligencia británica, cuyos nombres aún no han sido revelados. La declaración del gobierno soviético sobre esto es completamente responsable. Igualmente difícil de entender es por qué el embajador de Estados Unidos en Belgrado actúa como si este fuera su territorio, por qué sus “agentes de inteligencia” (cada vez más numerosos) pueden actuar libremente, y por qué los amigos y familiares del verdugo yugoslavo, Nedić, obtienen fácilmente puestos en la maquinaria estatal y del partido.
Por supuesto, dado que el gobierno yugoslavo insiste en rechazar la limpieza de espías en el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, el gobierno soviético ha tenido que evitar comunicarse públicamente con el gobierno yugoslavo a través del Ministerio.
Cuatro, recomendaciones para el embajador soviético en Yugoslavia y para el Estado soviético
Tito y Kardelj escribieron en una carta del 13 de abril de 1948: “Creemos que él (el embajador soviético), como embajador, no tiene derecho a preguntar a nadie sobre el trabajo de nuestro partido. Esa no es su problema.”
Creemos que esta afirmación de Tito y Kardelj es fundamentalmente incorrecta y anti-soviética. Llamar al embajador soviético, un responsable comunista que representa al gobierno soviético, un simple embajador burgués, un funcionario de un país burgués, y exigirle que destruya los cimientos del Estado yugoslavo, es difícil de entender cómo Tito y Kardelj pueden llegar a tal nivel de vileza.
¿Son conscientes estos camaradas de que tal actitud hacia el embajador soviético implica negar toda amistad entre la Unión Soviética y Yugoslavia? ¿Son conscientes de que el embajador soviético es un responsable comunista que representa a un gobierno amigo que liberó a Yugoslavia de la ocupación alemana, y que no solo tiene derecho, sino también la obligación de discutir periódicamente con los comunistas yugoslavos todos los temas de interés? Si desean mantener buenas relaciones con la Unión Soviética, ¿cómo pueden dudar de estas cuestiones tan simples y fundamentales?
Para que Tito y Kardelj sepan, hay que decir que, a diferencia de los yugoslavos, no consideramos que el embajador de Yugoslavia en Moscú sea solo un funcionario; no lo vemos como un simple embajador burgués, y no negamos que tenga “el derecho de informarse sobre el trabajo de nuestro partido con quien él elija”. Él no dejó de ser comunista por ser embajador. Creemos que es un camarada, uno de los mejores comunistas. Tiene amigos y conocidos entre el pueblo soviético. ¿Está “recabando” información sobre nuestro trabajo partidista? Probablemente sí. Que lo haga. No tenemos motivos para ocultar nuestras debilidades a los camaradas. Las revelamos para eliminarlas.
Creemos que esta actitud de los camaradas yugoslavos hacia el embajador soviético no es casual. Surge del comportamiento general del gobierno yugoslavo, y también explica por qué los líderes yugoslavos no pueden distinguir claramente entre la política exterior de la Unión Soviética y la de Inglaterra y Estados Unidos; por eso igualan la política exterior soviética con la de las potencias imperialistas occidentales, y creen que deben seguir la misma política hacia la Unión Soviética y los países imperialistas.
En este sentido, la declaración de Tito en Ljubljana el 2 de mayo de 1945 es muy significativa. Él dijo:
“Alguien dice que esta guerra es una guerra justa, y nosotros también lo creemos. Sin embargo, buscamos un resultado justo; queremos que cada uno tenga su propio hogar; no queremos pagar por otros; no queremos ser utilizados como moneda de cambio en negociaciones internacionales; no queremos involucrarnos en política de intereses”.
Esto se refiere al problema de Trieste. Sabemos que, después de que la Unión Soviética obtuvo varias concesiones territoriales favorables a Yugoslavia de Inglaterra y Estados Unidos, estos países, junto con Francia, rechazaron la propuesta soviética de entregar Trieste a Yugoslavia y ocuparon Trieste con sus propias tropas en ese momento. Como todos los demás medios se agotaron, la única opción para la Unión Soviética para obtener Trieste, que Yugoslavia había conquistado, fue una guerra con Inglaterra y Estados Unidos por Trieste, usando la fuerza para tomarla. Los camaradas yugoslavos no pudieron evitar darse cuenta de que, después de una guerra tan dura, la Unión Soviética no podía participar en otra guerra. Sin embargo, esto causó descontento en el liderazgo yugoslavo, y Tito expresó su actitud en Ljubljana, declarando que “Yugoslavia no pagará por otros”, “no será utilizada como moneda de cambio” y “no se involucrará en política de intereses”. Esto no solo fue dirigido contra las potencias imperialistas, sino también contra la Unión Soviética, porque en esta situación, la relación de Tito con la Unión Soviética no era diferente de su relación con las potencias imperialistas, ya que no reconocía ninguna diferencia entre la Unión Soviética y las potencias imperialistas.
Este comportamiento anti-soviético de Tito no fue resistido en el Politburó del Comité Central de Yugoslavia, y a partir de ello, los líderes del Partido Comunista Yugoslavo (Partido Comunista de Yugoslavia) comenzaron a difamar a la Unión Soviética en círculos estrechos, acusándola de “degeneración” y de querer “controlar económicamente a Yugoslavia” a través de la inteligencia. También,[^7] basaron su difamación en que el Partido Comunista de la Unión Soviética (Bolsheviks) “se ha degenerado” y que “quiere controlar otros partidos a través de la inteligencia”, y que “el socialismo soviético ya no es revolucionario”.
El gobierno soviético tuvo que llamar la atención del gobierno yugoslavo sobre que esta declaración era intolerable. Debido a la infundada interpretación de Tito y Kardelj, el embajador soviético en Belgrado, Satsikov, en nombre del gobierno soviético, emitió el 5 de junio de 1945 la siguiente declaración:
“Consideramos que la declaración de Tito es un ataque hostil a la Unión Soviética, y la interpretación de Kardelj no es satisfactoria. Nuestros lectores entienden así la declaración de Tito, y no hay otra forma de entenderla. Dígale a Tito que, si vuelve a permitir ataques similares contra la Unión Soviética, nos veremos obligados a criticarlo y refutarlo públicamente en los periódicos”.
Este comportamiento anti-soviético de Tito llevó a los líderes yugoslavos a actuar de manera hostil hacia el embajador soviético en Belgrado, colocándolo en una posición equivalente a la de los embajadores burgueses.
Parece que los líderes yugoslavos planean continuar con esta conducta anti-soviética en el futuro. Deben recordar que mantener esta actitud significa renunciar a toda amistad con la Unión Soviética y traicionar la línea unificada del socialismo entre la Unión Soviética y los países democráticos populares. También deben recordar que mantener esta conducta significa privarse del derecho a solicitar ayuda y otros apoyos de la Unión Soviética, ya que solo los amigos pueden recibir ayuda.
Para que Tito y Kardelj sepan, enfatizamos que esta conducta anti-soviética hacia el embajador soviético y el Estado soviético solo ocurre en Yugoslavia; en otros países democráticos populares, las relaciones siempre han sido y seguirán siendo amistosas y completamente justas.
Curiosamente, en contraste con Tito, Kardelj, que hace tres años tenía una opinión completamente diferente sobre el discurso de Tito en Ljubljana, ahora comparte la misma opinión. A continuación, el informe del embajador soviético en Yugoslavia, Satsikov, sobre su conversación con Kardelj el 5 de junio de 1945:
"Hoy, 5 de junio, hablé con Kardelj según lo sugerido (Tito aún no había regresado). Después de pensarlo, dijo que creía que nuestra opinión sobre el discurso de Tito era correcta. También estuvo de acuerdo en que la Unión Soviética no puede tolerar más declaraciones similares. Kardelj dijo que, por supuesto, en un momento tan difícil para Yugoslavia, criticar públicamente el discurso de Tito tendría graves consecuencias para ellos, por lo que tratarán de evitar declaraciones similares. Pero si alguien hace declaraciones similares, la Unión Soviética tiene derecho a criticar públicamente. Esa crítica sería beneficiosa para ellos. Kardelj me pidió transmitir su agradecimiento por esta crítica oportuna. Dijo que esto ayudaría a mejorar su trabajo. Kardelj está convencido de que esta crítica también ayudará a mejorar la orientación política.
"Al analizar cuidadosamente las causas de los errores, Kardelj dijo que Tito ha hecho mucho para eliminar las divisiones dentro del partido y para organizar la lucha por la liberación del pueblo, pero tiende a ver a Yugoslavia como una unidad autosuficiente, fuera del desarrollo general de la revolución proletaria y el socialismo. Además, en el partido ha surgido una situación en la que el Comité Central no actúa como centro organizativo y político. Nos reunimos ocasionalmente, tomamos decisiones ocasionalmente. En realidad, cada uno de nosotros lucha solo. La forma de trabajo es deficiente, la coordinación del trabajo es insuficiente. Kardelj dijo que esperaba que la Unión Soviética no los viera como un país capaz de resolver problemas de forma independiente, sino como representantes de las futuras repúblicas soviéticas, considerando Yugoslavia como parte del Partido Comunista de la Unión Soviética, es decir, que nuestras relaciones deberían basarse en la perspectiva de que Yugoslavia se convertirá en parte de la Unión Soviética en el futuro. Por eso, esperan que podamos ser francos y criticarlos, y ofrecerles sugerencias para orientar la política interna y externa de Yugoslavia en la dirección correcta.
“Le dije a Kardelj que era necesario aceptar la realidad actual: que Yugoslavia debe considerarse un país independiente, y que el Partido Comunista de Yugoslavia debe considerarse un partido independiente. Dije que pueden y deben plantear y resolver sus problemas de forma independiente, aunque si hacen sugerencias, no las rechazaremos.”
“En cuanto a Yugoslavia, tenemos obligaciones contractuales y también obligaciones morales. Cuando necesitamos sugerencias y ayuda, nunca las rechazamos. Cada vez que transmito una carta del mariscal Tito a Moscú, recibo una respuesta inmediata. Sin embargo, solo es posible y útil consultar con ellos antes de tomar decisiones o hacer declaraciones.”
Y no hablaremos ahora de la lógica primitiva y absurda de Kardelj de que Yugoslavia será parte de la Unión Soviética en el futuro y que el Partido Comunista de Yugoslavia será parte del Partido Comunista de la Unión Soviética (Bolsheviks). Pero queremos llamar la atención sobre la crítica de Kardelj a Tito por sus declaraciones anti-soviéticas en Ljubljana y a las duras condiciones del Comité Central.
Cinco, sobre la declaración anti-soviética de Giras
En una carta del 27 de marzo, mencionamos las declaraciones anti-soviéticas de Giras en una reunión del Comité Central de Yugoslavia, donde afirmó que, desde un punto de vista moral, los oficiales soviéticos no son tan buenos como los británicos. Estas palabras de Giras fueron dirigidas a algunos oficiales soviéticos en Yugoslavia que cometieron actos inmorales. Decimos que estas palabras de Giras son anti-soviéticas porque, como triste marxista, no recordó la principal diferencia entre el ejército socialista soviético que liberó a los pueblos de Europa y el ejército burgués británico cuando habló de las acciones de los oficiales soviéticos. La función del ejército burgués británico es oprimir, no liberar a los pueblos del mundo.
Tito y Kardelj en una carta del 13 de abril de 1948 señalaron que “Giras nunca hizo tal declaración en esa forma”, “Tito explicó esto por escrito y verbalmente en 1945”, y que “el camarada Stalin y otros miembros del Politburó del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de la Unión Soviética” aceptaron esa explicación.
Creemos que es necesario enfatizar que esta afirmación de Tito y Kardelj no corresponde a los hechos. Esa es la respuesta de Stalin a la declaración de Giras en su telegrama a Tito:
“Entiendo la difícil situación en la que se encuentran en Belgrado después de la liberación. Pero deben saber que, aunque la Unión Soviética ha hecho grandes sacrificios y pérdidas, todavía hace todo lo posible dentro de sus capacidades para ayudarlos. Sin embargo, me sorprende que algunos oficiales del Ejército Rojo hayan cometido ciertos actos y crímenes en Yugoslavia, y que estos hechos se hayan exagerado de manera generalizada a toda la fuerza del Ejército Rojo. No deben ofender a un ejército que ayuda a librar a Yugoslavia de los alemanes y que lucha con valentía contra los invasores alemanes. Cada familia tiene elementos nocivos, eso es comprensible, pero si se condena a toda una familia por un elemento nocivo, sería muy extraño.”
El comportamiento anti-soviético de Giras no fue cuestionado por otros miembros del Politburó del Partido Comunista Yugoslavo, y en él vemos la base para la difamación de los representantes del Ejército Rojo en Yugoslavia, y también la razón por la cual retiramos a nuestros consejeros militares.
¿Cómo terminó el asunto de Giras? Finalmente, el camarada Giras y la delegación yugoslava llegaron a Moscú, donde se disculpó ante Stalin y pidió que se olvidara su desagradable error en la reunión del Comité Central. Como se puede ver, en la carta de Tito y Kardelj, este asunto parece completamente diferente. Desafortunadamente, el error de Giras no fue casual.
***
Tito y Kardelj acusaron a los representantes soviéticos de reclutar yugoslavos para sus departamentos de inteligencia. Escribieron:
“Creemos que no es apropiado que los agentes de inteligencia soviéticos recluten a ciudadanos de nuestro país que están en camino de convertirse en socialistas para unirse a sus departamentos de inteligencia. Creemos que esto solo dañará nuestros intereses. Aunque nuestros líderes y agencias de seguridad ya protestaron y dejaron claro que tal comportamiento no será tolerado, lo hicieron de todos modos. Los reclutados incluyen oficiales, diversos líderes y personas con actitudes negativas hacia Yugoslavia.”
Creemos que esta declaración de Tito y Kardelj está llena de hostilidad y ataques contra los funcionarios soviéticos en Yugoslavia, y es completamente contraria a los hechos.
Si se exige que los soviéticos que trabajan en Yugoslavia permanezcan en silencio y no hablen con nadie, sería una situación anormal. Los agentes soviéticos son personas políticamente maduras, no simples empleados sin derechos ni interés en lo que sucede en Yugoslavia. Naturalmente, hablarán con ciudadanos yugoslavos, les harán preguntas, recopilarán información, etc. Solo un irreparable anti-soviético puede pensar que esas conversaciones son intentos de reclutar agentes de inteligencia, especialmente aquellos “con actitudes negativas” hacia Yugoslavia. Solo los anti-soviéticos creen que los líderes soviéticos están menos interesados en el bienestar de Yugoslavia que los miembros del Politburó del Comité Central.
Es importante señalar que estas acusaciones extrañas contra los representantes soviéticos solo aparecen en Yugoslavia. En nuestra opinión, estas acusaciones son solo una excusa para justificar la vigilancia de los agentes soviéticos en Yugoslavia por parte del servicio de inteligencia yugoslavo.
Debe enfatizarse que los camaradas yugoslavos que visitan Moscú también visitan otras ciudades soviéticas, se reúnen con nuestros pueblos y conversan libremente con ellos. El gobierno soviético nunca les impuso restricciones. Durante su última visita a Moscú, Giras pasó varios días en Leningrado hablando con camaradas soviéticos.
Según el plan yugoslavo, la información sobre el trabajo del partido y del Estado solo puede obtenerse de las instituciones dirigentes del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Yugoslavia o del gobierno. Giras no obtuvo información de esas instituciones soviéticas, sino de organizaciones locales en Leningrado. Creemos que no es necesario preguntar qué hizo allí o qué hechos descubrió. Creemos que no recopila información para los servicios de inteligencia británicos, estadounidenses o franceses, sino para las instituciones de gestión yugoslavas. Dado que esto es correcto, no vemos nada malo en ello, ya que esa inteligencia puede contener materiales útiles para los camaradas yugoslavos. Giras no puede decir que fue restringido en sus actividades.
Ahora quizás se pregunten: ¿por qué los comunistas soviéticos en Yugoslavia tienen menos derechos que los yugoslavos en la Unión Soviética?
***
En una carta del 13 de abril, Tito y Kardelj vuelven a mencionar el tema de las relaciones comerciales entre la Unión Soviética y Yugoslavia, alegando que el camarada Krusciov se negó a continuar las negociaciones comerciales con los representantes yugoslavos. Ya hemos explicado a los camaradas yugoslavos que Krusciov negó esas declaraciones. También hemos explicado que el gobierno soviético nunca propuso suspender los acuerdos y negocios comerciales con Yugoslavia. Por lo tanto, consideramos que este asunto está cerrado y no necesita más discusión.
Seis, sobre la política incorrecta del Politburó del Partido Comunista Yugoslavo respecto a la lucha de clases en Yugoslavia
En nuestra carta, escribimos que no se percibe en el Partido Comunista Yugoslavo un espíritu de lucha de clases, y que cada vez hay más capitalistas en las ciudades y en el campo, y que la dirección del partido no ha tomado medidas para controlar a estos capitalistas.
Tito y Kardelj niegan todo esto y consideran que nuestras declaraciones principistas son un insulto al Partido Comunista Yugoslavo, evitando responder a esta cuestión fundamental. Sus argumentos se basan solo en el hecho de que en Yugoslavia se están llevando a cabo reformas sociales continuas. Sin embargo, esto es casi insignificante. Estos camaradas niegan que en las condiciones actuales de Yugoslavia se esté fortaleciendo el factor capitalista y que la lucha de clases en el campo se esté agudizando, y lo hacen porque la oportunista afirmación de que, en la transición del capitalismo al socialismo, la lucha de clases no se vuelve más aguda, sino que desaparece, como afirman Bukharin y otros oportunistas, y que el capitalismo se puede absorber pacíficamente en la estructura socialista.
No hay duda de que las reformas sociales en la Unión Soviética después de la Revolución de Octubre fueron profundas y en línea con nuestra enseñanza. Sin embargo, esto no llevó a que el Partido Comunista de la Unión Soviética (B) concluyera que la lucha de clases en nuestro país se estaba debilitando, ni que existía peligro de un fortalecimiento del capitalismo. En 1920-1921, Lenin señaló que “mientras vivamos en un país pequeño y campesino, el capitalismo en Rusia tendrá una base económica más sólida que el comunismo”, porque “la pequeña producción genera constantemente, día y noche, de manera espontánea y en grandes cantidades, capitalismo y burguesía”[^8]. Como es bien sabido, en los 15 años posteriores a la Revolución de Octubre, las medidas para controlar a los capitalistas, y posteriormente, liquidar a los kulaks como última clase capitalista, nunca dejaron de estar en la agenda del partido. Subestimar la experiencia del Partido Comunista de la Unión Soviética en el desarrollo socialista en Yugoslavia sería un grave peligro político, que los marxistas no pueden aceptar, porque el socialismo no puede desarrollarse solo en las ciudades y en la industria, sino también en el campo y en la agricultura.
Los líderes del Partido Comunista Yugoslavo evitan abordar el problema de la lucha de clases y el control de los capitalistas rurales, y esto no es casual. Además, en los discursos de los líderes yugoslavos no se menciona la división de clases en el campo; los campesinos son considerados como un todo orgánico, y el partido no moviliza sus fuerzas para superar las dificultades que trae el aumento de los explotadores rurales.
Sin embargo, la situación política en el campo no es optimista. En Yugoslavia, la tierra no está nacionalizada, sino en manos privadas; se compran y venden tierras, y muchas tierras están en manos de ricos campesinos, que emplean trabajo asalariado, etc. En estos lugares, el partido no puede educar en el espíritu de la lucha de clases y de la lucha contra la intensificación de los explotadores rurales sin luchar con las principales dificultades del desarrollo socialista. Esto significa que el Partido Comunista de Yugoslavia está siendo confundido por la teoría oportunista, que toma prestada de Bernstein, Forman y Bukharin, de que los factores capitalistas se funden pacíficamente en la estructura socialista.
En cuanto a la cuestión del liderazgo de la clase trabajadora, algunos de los líderes más importantes del Partido Comunista Yugoslavo se desvían del camino marxista-leninista, y esto no es casual. Aunque el marxismo-leninismo reconoce principalmente el papel dirigente de la clase trabajadora en la liquidación del capitalismo y el desarrollo del socialismo, los líderes del partido yugoslavo sostienen una opinión completamente diferente. Solo basta citar el discurso de Tito en Zagreb, el 2 de noviembre de 1946 (Borba[^9], 1(November 2, 1946) It can be said: “We tell farmers that they are the most solid pillars of our country, not to ultimately win their votes, but because we know they are such people, because they should realize that they are such people.”
This behavior completely contradicts Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism believes that in Europe and people’s democratic countries, the working class, not the peasant class, is the most progressive and revolutionary class. Regarding the peasant class, or more precisely, the majority of it—poor peasants and middle peasants—they can or are uniting with the working class, with the working class still taking the lead in this union. However, the quoted passage not only denies the leading role of the working class but also claims that the entire peasant class, including wealthy farmers, is the strongest pillar of New Yugoslavia. It is clear that the views expressed by this behavior are natural for petty-bourgeois politicians, but they are not for Marxist-Leninists.
7. About the incorrect policies of the Central Political Bureau of the Yugoslav Communist Party on the relationship between the party and the People's Front
We wrote in the previous letter that in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) is not the main leadership force but the People’s Front; Yugoslav leaders are weakening the party’s role, effectively dissolving the party into the non-party People’s Front, thus making the same fundamental mistake committed forty years ago by the Mensheviks in Russia.
Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny this, saying all decisions of the People’s Front are decisions of the party, but they believe it unnecessary to specify which party meeting approved these decisions.
The greatest mistake of the Yugoslav comrades lies here. They dare not openly praise the party and its decisions before the people, letting all the people know that the party is the leading force, leading the front, not the other way around. According to Marxist-Leninist theory, the Communist Party is the highest form of organization of the workers, surpassing all other workers’ organizations, the Soviet of the USSR, the People’s Front of Yugoslavia, and so on. The party’s supremacy over all these workers’ organizations is not only because it attracts the best elements among workers but also because it has its own specific program, policies, and leads all workers’ organizations based on this. However, the Central Political Bureau of the Yugoslav Party dares not openly admit this, nor loudly declare it to the working class and the people of Yugoslavia. They believe that if this factor is not emphasized, other parties[^10] will have no chance to strengthen themselves in the struggle. Tito and Kardelj seem to think they can use such petty tricks to abolish the laws of historical development, deceive classes, and deceive history. But this is only an illusion and self-deception. As long as there are conflicting classes, there will be struggle; as long as there is struggle, it will manifest through the work of legal or illegal groups and parties.
Lenin said that the party is the most important weapon in the hands of the working class. The vanguard’s task is to be always ready with this weapon. However, because the Yugoslav leaders hide the party’s banner and do not emphasize the party’s role among the masses, they are weakening this weapon, weakening the party’s role, and disarming the working class. The idea that enemies will give up the struggle due to the petty tricks of Yugoslav leaders is absurd. Therefore, the party must stay in good shape, always ready to fight the enemies. The party’s banner must never be covered or obscured, thinking that the enemies will give up the struggle. The party must never stop organizing its forces, whether legal or illegal.
We believe that such restrictions on the role of the Yugoslav Communist Party are excessive. We refer here to the relationship between the Yugoslav Communist Party and the People’s Front, which we believe is fundamentally incorrect. The People’s Front includes all classes: the bourgeoisie, merchants, small industrialists, bourgeois intellectuals, various political groups, including some bourgeois parties. In Yugoslavia, only the People’s Front entered the political stage, while the party and its organizations did not openly participate in political life, which not only weakened the party’s role in the country’s political life but also damaged its status as an independent political force, because the party needs to win the trust of the people through open political work, openly promote its views and program, and spread its influence among the broader working masses. Comrades Tito and Kardelj forget that the party can only develop through open struggle with the enemies, and only in this way can it develop; the petty tricks and schemes of the Central Political Bureau cannot replace this struggle, because this struggle is the school for educating party cadres. They are resolutely unwilling to admit their mistakes in their speeches, namely that besides the People’s Front program, the Yugoslav Communist Party has no other program, which shows how far the Yugoslav leaders have deviated from Marxist-Leninist views on the party. This may lead to tendencies of liquidationism within the Yugoslav Party, which will endanger the very existence of the Yugoslav Communist Party and ultimately lead to the fall of the Yugoslav People’s Republic.
Comrades Tito and Kardelj claim that the Mensheviks’ mistake of integrating the Marxist party into non-party mass organizations was made forty years ago, and therefore has no connection with the current mistakes of the Central Political Bureau of Yugoslavia. Comrades Tito and Kardelj are gravely mistaken. Undoubtedly, there is a theoretical and political connection between these two events because, just like the Mensheviks in 1907, today, forty years later, Tito and Kardelj are also demeaning the Marxist party, denying its role as the highest organization of the workers, and disbanding the Marxist party into non-party mass organizations. The difference is that the Mensheviks made mistakes in 1906-1907, and after being judged at the London conference by the Russian Marxist [note: existing] party, they did not repeat these mistakes, but the Central Political Bureau of Yugoslavia, ignoring this lesson, repeated the same mistakes forty years later, claiming them as their own party’s theory. This situation not only did not diminish but worsened the mistakes of the Yugoslav comrades.
8. On the worrying situation of the Yugoslav Communist Party
We wrote in the previous letter that although the Yugoslav Communist Party has been in power for more than three and a half years, it remains semi-legal; there is no democracy within the party, no election system, no criticism or self-criticism, and the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party is not composed of elected members but appointed ones.
Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all these accusations.
They wrote: “Most members of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party are not elected,” “In December 1940, the Yugoslav Communist Party was completely illegal… At the Fifth Congress, which held all the powers of the Yugoslav Communist Party according to the decision of the Communist International, the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party was elected, consisting of 31 members and 10 alternate members…” “Of these, 10 members and 6 alternates died during the war,” moreover, “two members were expelled from the Central Committee,” and now the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party has “19 members elected by the congress and 7 appointed members,” making a total of “26 members of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party.”
This statement is inconsistent with facts. From the archives of the Communist International, it can be seen that at the Fifth Congress held in October 1940, not in December, the 31 members and 10 alternate members of the Yugoslav Communist Party were not elected, but at the end of October 1940, 22 members in Belgrade were elected: “To Comrade Dimitrov: The Fifth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party was held from October 19 to 23. 101 delegates from across the country attended the meeting. The congress elected a committee consisting of 22 members (including two women) and 16 alternates. The meeting was a complete success. Walter [?—editor’s note].”
If 10 of the 22 elected central committee members died, then 12 remain. If two were expelled, then 10 remain. Comrades Tito and Kardelj say that the Central Committee of Yugoslavia now has 26 members—so, if we subtract 10 from this number, the Central Committee now has 16 appointed members. It appears that most members of the Central Committee are appointed. This applies not only to the members of the Central Committee but also to local leaders, who are not elected but appointed.
We believe that under the rule of the party, when the party can fully utilize its legitimacy, this system of establishing party leadership can only be called semi-legal, and its organizational nature is sectarianism and bureaucratism. It is intolerable not to hold party meetings or to hold secret meetings, which will inevitably weaken the party’s influence among the masses; it is also intolerable to hide party membership from workers, as membership must serve an important educational role in connecting the party with the working class and all workers.
If the Central Political Bureau of Yugoslavia respected the party, it would not tolerate such situations within the party, and upon gaining power, that is, three and a half years ago, it would immediately call a congress of the party and reorganize it according to the principles of democratic centralism, making it a fully legitimate party.
It is entirely understandable that under such internal party conditions, as long as the leadership is not elected but appointed, there can be no internal democracy, let alone criticism and self-criticism. We know that members dare not express opinions or criticize the party system, preferring to remain silent to avoid retaliation. The Minister of State Security also serves as the party’s central secretary, or as Tito and Kardelj said, simultaneously as the organizational secretary of the Central Committee of Yugoslavia, which is not accidental. Clearly, members and cadres are under the supervision of the Ministry of State Security, which is completely unacceptable and intolerable. Juoyevich’s opposition at the Central Committee meeting to the draft reply to the letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) is enough to illustrate this.
Everyone can see that the Central Political Bureau of Yugoslavia does not regard the party as an independent entity with the right to express opinions but rather as a party branch[^11], whose members have no right to discuss any issues and must obey all the directives of the “boss” without comment. We call this cultivating militarism within the party, which is incompatible with the democratic principles of a Marxist-Leninist party.
It is well known that Trotsky also tried to impose a militarist-oriented direction on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B), but the party, led by Lenin, defeated him and condemned him; militarist measures were rejected, and internal democracy was recognized as the most important principle for the development of the party.
We believe that this abnormal situation within the Yugoslav Communist Party poses a serious threat to the life and development of the party. The sooner this sectarian bureaucratic system within the party ends, the more beneficial it will be for Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Democratic Republic.
9. On the arrogance of the Yugoslav Central Leaders and their improper behavior in the face of mistakes
From the letters of Tito and Kardelj, it is clear that they completely deny any mistakes in the work of the Central Political Bureau of Yugoslavia, and deny the slander and propaganda about the “degeneration” of the Soviet Union, such as the accusations against the Soviet Union for “imperialism” and others within Yugoslavia. They believe this is entirely due to inaccurate intelligence received by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) regarding the situation in Yugoslavia. They consider that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) is a “victim” of the slanderous false information spread by Juoyevich and Hebron, and insist that without these false reports about Yugoslavia, there would be no disagreements between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. For this reason, they conclude that the problem is not the mistakes of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party or the criticism of these mistakes by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B), but the inaccurate information provided by Juoyevich and Hebron, which “misled” the Soviet Communist Party (B). They believe that punishing Hebron and Juoyevich will solve everything. In this way, they have found scapegoats. We doubt whether Comrades Tito and Kardelj truly believe in the truth of this statement, even though they cling to it as if it were true. They do this because they think it is the simplest way to escape the predicament of the Central Political Bureau of Yugoslavia.
We believe that Tito and Kardelj’s behavior—criticizing the actions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (B) of the Soviet Union and their errors against Yugoslav comrades—is not only reckless and mistaken but also deeply anti-party.
If Tito and Kardelj are interested in discovering the truth, and if the truth is not painful to them, they should seriously consider the following points:
(a) Why do the materials of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) regarding Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania seem correct and do not cause misunderstandings among these communist parties, while the materials about Yugoslavia seem biased and anti-party, provoking anti-Soviet attacks and hostility towards the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B)?
(b) Why are the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the people’s democratic countries developing and strengthening, while the relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are deteriorating?
(c) Why do the communist parties of the people’s democratic countries support the letter of March 27 from the Communist Party (B) of the Soviet Union and condemn the mistakes of the Yugoslav Communist Party, while the mistaken Central Political Bureau of Yugoslavia remains isolated?
Are all these coincidences?
To expose the mistakes of the Central Political Bureau of Yugoslavia, it is not necessary to obtain information from individuals like Hebron and Juoyevich. More information can be found in the official statements issued by the Yugoslav leaders such as Tito, Giras, and Kardelj in newspapers.
We declare that Soviet citizens have not received any information from Hebron. We declare that the conversation between Juoyevich and the Soviet ambassador Lavrentiev did not reveal even a tenth of the false anti-Soviet remarks made by Yugoslav leaders. Retaliation against these comrades is not only secretive but unacceptable, and it does not conform to the principles of party democracy, and it also proves the anti-Soviet behavior of Yugoslav leaders, who consider the conversation between Yugoslav Communist Party members and the Soviet ambassador a crime.
We believe that behind the attempt of Yugoslav leaders to exonerate themselves for the tense relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is their unwillingness to admit mistakes and their plan to continue hostile policies against the Soviet Union.
Lenin said:
“The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes is the most important and reliable measure of whether it is serious and whether it truly fulfills its obligations to its class and the working masses. Openly admitting mistakes, exposing the causes of mistakes, analyzing the environment that produced the mistakes, and carefully discussing ways to correct them—this is the hallmark of a serious and responsible party, this is the party fulfilling its obligations, this is the education and training of the class, and even of the masses”[^12].
Unfortunately, we have to say that the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party who do not admit or correct mistakes are seriously undermining Lenin’s main directives.
We should also point out that, contrary to the Yugoslav leaders, the leaders of the Communist Parties of France and Italy have honorably admitted their mistakes at the Ninth Party Congress[^13] and consciously corrected them, thereby strengthening their parties and educating cadres[^14].
We believe that the fundamental reason why the Central Political Bureau of Yugoslavia is unwilling to honorably admit and correct mistakes is the boundless arrogance of the Yugoslav leaders. Their minds have been blinded by their own success. They have become arrogant and now believe that the depth of the sea is only up to their knees. They are not only arrogant but also preach arrogance, not knowing that arrogance leads to self-destruction.
Lenin said:
“All extinct revolutionary parties perished because they were arrogant, unable to see where their strength lay, afraid to admit their weaknesses. We will not perish because we are not afraid to admit our weaknesses and can learn to overcome them”[^15].
Unfortunately, we have to say that Yugoslav leaders are not excessively humble; they are still intoxicated with their not-so-glorious achievements and have forgotten Lenin’s teachings.
In their letter, Tito and Kardelj talked about the achievements and successes of the Yugoslav Communist Party, claiming that the Soviet (B) Central Committee had previously acknowledged these achievements and successes, but now supposedly remains silent about them. Of course, this is not true. No one can deny the contributions and achievements of the Yugoslav Communist Party. This is beyond doubt. However, we must also say that the communist parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania are not inferior to the Yugoslav Party. Yet, the leaders of these parties have been modest and not boastful like the Yugoslav leaders, whose endless self-praise has hurt everyone’s ears. It should also be emphasized that the French and Italian Communist Parties’ contributions to the revolution are not less than those of Yugoslavia, and in fact, more. Although the achievements of the French and Italian parties so far are not as great as those of the Yugoslav Party, this is not because the Yugoslav Party has some special qualities, but mainly because, during the severe crisis of the Yugoslav people’s liberation movement, after the German paratroopers destroyed the Yugoslav guerrilla headquarters, Soviet troops extended aid to the Yugoslav people, defeated the German invaders, and liberated Belgrade, creating the necessary conditions for the Yugoslav Party to seize power. Unfortunately, Soviet troops did not and could not provide such aid to the French and Italian parties. If Comrades Tito and Kardelj remember this fact, they would not be boastful but more just and humble.
The arrogance of Yugoslav leaders has reached such a level that they even attribute some fundamentally indefensible merits to themselves. For example, in military science. Yugoslav leaders claim that they have improved Marxist war science with a new theory, according to which war is considered a combined action of regular armies, guerrillas, and the people’s uprising. However, this so-called theory is as old as the world and is not new to Marxism. We know that the Bolsheviks adopted combined actions of regular armies, guerrillas, and the people’s uprising throughout the Russian Civil War (1918-1921), and their actions were even broader than those taken in Yugoslavia. Yet, the Bolsheviks did not claim that they achieved new results in war science by applying this method, because even before the Bolsheviks, Marshal Kutuzov successfully used the same approach in the 1812 war against Napoleon.
However, even Marshal Kutuzov did not claim to be the innovator of this method, because the Spanish used this approach in the war against Napoleon in 1808. It appears that this war science has a history of about 140 years, and their [^16] self-proclaimed innovations are actually the work of the Spanish.
Moreover, we must remember that past services of any leader do not exclude the possibility of serious mistakes in the future. We should not ignore current mistakes because of past merits. Trotsky also contributed to the revolution in his time, but that does not mean the Soviet (B) Communist Party can ignore his later serious opportunist mistakes and make him an enemy of the Soviet Union.
***
In their letter, Tito and Kardelj suggested that the Soviet (B) Communist Party send representatives to Yugoslavia to study the disagreements between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. We believe that this is incorrect because it is not a matter of verifying individual facts but of fundamental differences.
We know that the disagreements between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are already in the hands of nine Communist Central Committees with intelligence agencies. Excluding them from this issue is extremely abnormal. Therefore, we suggest discussing this issue at the next meeting of the Intelligence Bureau.
Central Committee of the Communist Party (B) of the Soviet Union
Moscow, May 4, 1948
"Serve the People" (Servir ao Povo)
April 19, 2024
