On errors during the Confucian-Legalist struggle and debates

Let me start by describing my mistake. The cause was that a friend of mine posted a diagram he made, which placed fascist figures like Hitler, Chiang Kai-shek, Deng Xiaoping, and the like alongside Qin Shi Huang. Some people said it was well placed, which made me unhappy. From a Confucian-Legalist historical viewpoint, I thought Qin Shi Huang, being part of an advanced landlord class, shouldn’t be grouped with these reactionaries, so I expressed that idea. Later, someone brought up the fact of Qin Shi Huang’s tyranny, such as building the mausoleum and the Great Wall. I countered that the Great Wall was to resist the Xiongnu, etc., and regarding Qin Shi Huang’s Mausoleum, there’s no defense; indeed it consumed a lot of people, perhaps over 700,000 during his lifetime and after death. Then someone said Zhao Gao’s conflict with Qin Shi Huang was an internal Legalist conflict, which I couldn’t prove much either; I only said Zhao Gao was a eunuch who served the emperor, and good service could lead to elevation. I didn’t remember exactly how he reinstalled (revived) something, so I just stated it simply. I also said Zhao Gao’s reverence for Confucius wasn’t the main point; the main point was whether he eased class tensions, he appointed his own confidant Zhao Cheng and killed many Legalist figures like Li Si. This wasn’t just an internal class struggle; Chinese ancient history describes it that way, but I didn’t have the original texts at the time.

But I couldn’t find the fact that Zhao Gao truly revived the feudal prefecture system, or how he revered Confucianism. So I gave examples of internal strife within the Legalists, such as Li Shimin (Li Shimin) not killing Wei Zheng, to argue that Zhao Gao killing Li Si was an enemy–friend contradiction. At that time, during Qin Shi Huang’s era, it was arguably somewhat better in society because the mausoleum project mobilized about 700,000 people. I also made arguments like this: the positive aspects are that feudal society is cruel by nature; Bai Qi slaughtered 400,000 Zhao soldiers, right? Not that this is justifiable, but this shows the cruelty of feudal wars and annexations.

As the discussion progressed, my theory faltered. Others said we should also discuss Chen Sheng and Wu Guang, so I argued that the peasant uprising during Chen Sheng and Wu Guang’s time was mainly due to Zhao Gao’s reinstatement, and mentioned the strict laws and the Qin law bamboo slip texts of “Sleeping in the Qín tomb.”

But at this point I failed to account for a fact: since the Shang Yang reforms, Qin had entered feudal society for over 200 years; the contradictions between the feudal landlord class and the peasant class began to appear. I claimed that opposing landlords was not good, and then I exposed my own ignorance by not realizing that Chen Sheng and Wu Guang followed conscription service rather than corvée labor. Later I searched myself and looked at the title in the Sleeping in the Qin Tomb bamboo slips, finding no conscription. Baidu also says there was no such execution claim, though I’m not sure about Hu Hai’s period.

In general, the person who placed Qin Shi Huang with fascists on one picture admitted Qin Shi Huang’s progressiveness, but still argued that his political state had limitations and that one should not argue Qin Law was not strict just because Chen Sheng and Wu Guang postponed executions. Later, when I argued with A, he also admitted that Wang Anshi’s reforms had some promotive effects.

Later, a friend of mine appeared (since it’s not convenient to share chat records, I’ll roughly summarize the viewpoints):

A: Old leftists always cling to last century’s rhetoric, saying Legalists are good and Confucians are bad, like brain-damaged people.
Me: There is still a need to discuss, for example, Wang Anshi was praised by Lenin because at that time the goal was to unite the left; we must discuss who is progressive and who is reactionary.
A: We can’t support everything eccentric because of predecessors’ support; otherwise we’re clowns. Then Wang Mang is also advanced in their view, though the actual situation isn’t that simple.
Me: No one says Wang Mang is advanced.
A: Wang Anshi’s reforms were depicted by some scholars as harming someone’s interests and facing resistance; in reality, who was harmed would determine the failure.
That person who claimed Qin Shi Huang’s tyranny also asked, in feudal times, you can’t make him do communism, right? Chinese historians also consider Wang Anshi progressive.
A: Claiming Wang Anshi’s progress is like seeing flowers in fog; this shows a lack of solid historical knowledge. And that so-called “History of the Confucian-Legalist Struggle” article is as absurd as claiming Mao Zedong is a bodhisattva.
In truth, I didn’t understand what “Mao Zedong is a bodhisattva” means; I think it means taking things literally without nuance.
A: No different from today’s dark enlightenment; I have less fondness for it than for Confucianism. They call Legalism a dark enlightenment; under their governance there was no life.
I also don’t know what “dark enlightenment” means, though there are videos on Bilibili.
Me: The Legalist landlord class is like today’s left-wing bourgeoisie. Returning to your point: you claim that reforms delayed the eruption of contradictions and advanced production; would that count as dark enlightenment? Then the ZCJJ-leftists also reformed in this way, thinking to delay contradictions; their existence has its necessity, and surely their progress is not something to scold.
And I said that whether it’s a Legalist landlord or a leftist bourgeois, to succeed one must have a certain mass base. I also said Legalists typically represented the petty landlord class.
A: Where is the delay of contradictions? The social form after Legalist reforms was ruthlessly suppressive toward the proletariat, and you say Legalists do not represent the interests of petty landlords; they represent bureaucrats and the monarch. Then if Confucianism is organized around a synthesis, Legalism would be Nazism and fascism, and you wonder why you treat Legalists as leftists; aren’t they far right? Confucians reconcile contradictions and are left-wing.
Me: Expanding ruling base by recruiting commoners—that is what Legalist landlords should do. The monarch and bureaucrats also discuss class interests; the monarch also represents small and large landowners. It’s just that the emperor is the biggest landlord.
A: Which Legalist represents people who encourage dueling with the monarch? Aren’t all of them subservient and suppress dissent?
I simply replied with a single name: Huang Zongxi. After all, Huang Zongxi harshly attacked monarchial absolutism, and your articles also say Huang Zongxi advocated for industry and commerce, which I think is a modernizing Legalism; it changed the old policy of heavy agriculture and suppression of trade. But at that moment I didn’t think that, nor did I respond that way; I only gave a name. He also told me Huang Zongxi’s relationship with Legalism was unclear; due to Wang Anshi’s issues, I couldn’t answer in detail, which led to continuous back-and-forth with questions and counter-questions, with both sides presenting viewpoints without providing evidence, and even insulting each other. I won’t go into that.

The next day, because I relied too much on AI and couldn’t provide enough historical sources, I asked AI for information on the three major rents and Cao Cao’s incorporation of the Yellow Turban Army. In the second debate, I made another mistake: I treated Confucianism serving the great and powerful as a class struggle against Legalists, turning the dispute into class struggle. This shows my class stance was skewed toward the right; AI also stated that the struggle between the magnates and petty landlords is class struggle. I was too dependent on AI, so I remind myself that theory needs solid grounding. You must be strong to persuade others (here I criticize my friend for focusing on quantity rather than quality, since each change in the three rents is a process from quantity to quality, the Legalist landlords established this framework; but they also know that currency rent was part of Zhang Jizheng’s single whip tax reform, and perhaps he thinks it doesn’t matter because Legalists aren’t the driving force of currency rent. By the way, they don’t think Zhang Jizheng is Legalist. Earlier they asked me if Zhang Jizheng knew he was Legalist; I didn’t respond in detail, just quoted original texts from Chinese ancient history.)

My other friend also sent pictures

He asked what the contributions of Legalist landlords to currency rents were, and what evidence the Confucians had against currency rents. I also couldn’t articulate.

Me: The driving effect, restraining magnates; more people would aim to be petty landlords, some refugees could settle and prosper. During the reign of Emperor Wu of Han, there was an official named Zhao Guo who updated tools, but Emperor Wu did not represent the interests of petty landlords, yet he was particularly harsh on magnates. (Here I might be mistaken again: Emperor Wu was a rising landlord class; I still relied on AI and said the Jing and Jing Two Emperors represented petty landlords, while Emperor Wu seemed to represent more than petty landlords. Then I said restraining magnates also included Cao Cao, the landlord because earlier I used AI to summarize Cao Cao; his base comprised small peasant households.)

A: The Legalists are among the reactionaries who employ brutal methods to accelerate contradictions among the masses.
Me: Then how about Cao Cao letting refugees farm? He recruited the Yellow Turban Army to expand his power. (I think ordering mercy and not annihilating uprisings counts as reconciliation.)
A: Feudal warlords of the time did the same; other strategists had no objections. (There is little knowledge of history; other feudal warlords did indeed incorporate the Yellow Turbans.)

These topics caught the attention of another friend, and we reached a consensus with A.

Regarding A’s previously stated views:
A: Confucianism and Legalism have never been JJ; they never clearly fought in history.
Me: Then what happened at the Gate of Xuanwu? There was bloodshed and sacrifice. (I indeed treated the Xuanwu Gate incident as a revolutionary coup and compared it with the Ji family’s Zhanic coup in Lu. Though I didn’t say it outright, I thought it privately—conflating the struggle between slave owners and the landlord class with the internal struggle between two lines in the landlord class. I even privately told this friend who we reached a consensus with that in feudal society not only peasant uprisings can promote the development of productive forces; the struggle between petty landlords and large landlords can also promote changes in the relations of production, though later I withdrew this view. I also asked a Bilibili content creator whether Legalist landlords could promote productivity; they said pure production力 under any mode of production can promote development. I thought the Legalist landlords’ and Confucian landlords’ struggles could also promote changes in the relations of production, but in fact only peasant uprisings can.)
A: Li Shimin led 800 people representing the broad mass contradictions. (I edited to say it represented the interests of the petty landlord class.) A continued: Most people don’t know what happened, they didn’t participate; what is that class?
Then Li Jiancheng and Li Shimin both belong to the great clan landlords (noble landlords); I think Li Shimin represented the interests of the petty landlord class, but I couldn’t say more. I had previously posted pictures about Li Shimin’s achievements in Chinese ancient history, but I can’t prove whether Li Jiancheng was Confucian; I found on AI that he also implemented light corvée and light taxes, which is a guess that it was a feint; once he came to power he wouldn’t do that, but he had many connections with noble landlords. I also claimed that Li Shimin represented the petty landlord class, but it’s not certain. I also posted a photo:

A also criticized me for focusing on light corvée and light taxes while ignoring land consolidation; only focusing on upper-level policies. Now return to Wang Anshi’s reforms: since I had little reading and didn’t understand classical Chinese, I relied a lot on AI to find classical texts and their translations; A agreed with this way of discussing Wang Anshi’s reforms, as long as content is selectively excerpted. (Much of the following is AI-collected.)

Excerpts from Wang Anshi reforms:

  • Qingmiao Law (green seedlings) to benefit the state, not the gentry; counties and cities burdened with many small loans, without forcing the common people, etc.
    Plain language: The Qingmiao law promoted loans to the people, with high-interest rates for those who cannot repay, but in disaster years the people suffered, and the rich were also harassed by debt collection. The law was intended to help the commoners but ended up harming them; it reduced the burden on magnates to some extent but was harsh on the people, and the officials enforcing it were self-serving.
  1. Conceptions and limits, etc. (AI-generated content)
    I understand now why Wang Anshi’s reforms were perceived as worse for the people: the magnates could consider extensions if they could manage the social situation, but officials could not; they were bureaucrats who cared for their own GPA rather than the people’s welfare. Although the reforms did curb magnates to some extent and made the court richer, the consequences were that petty landlords and large magnates alike faced opposition from the public. The main issue was the forced loans, but Wang Anshi didn’t intend this; his original aim was to moderate the contradictions, but he failed to observe public sentiment, and local officials couldn’t manage it; his reform was not a pure attempt, and yet we should not condemn him as fascist, given that his intentions were good, and his methods were constrained by political reality. The best approach would have been to apply the loan policy more strongly to the magnates rather than to peasants, but officials pursued extreme loan policies, which attracted widespread condemnation, and it is difficult to salvage his policy. If you want evidence, Wang Anshi’s reform initially had support from Sima Guang and Su Shi; later there are dissenters.

AI also claimed that Wang Anshi’s reforms produced Cai Jing’s greed and corruption, and that Sima Guang’s wife’s death led to selling his estates, etc. I don’t know if that’s true, so I did not take a firm stand.

A quoted: Sima Guang and Wang Anshi had a close relationship before reforms, one of the “Four Friends of Jianyou” (Jiayou Si You). He reportedly supported egal tax, corvée, etc.; Qingmiao Law initially supported him.

Images included:




I also raised questions about these images, for example Wang Anshi reportedly had 3,427 mu of land, while Sima Guang had only three qing. Some distortions claimed Wang Anshi had 8 million mu, which we both agreed was likely fabrication; but the 3,427 mu figure we accepted as plausible, and he claimed it came from Fudan University research. (You would likely tell me about the authority of revolutionary vs anti-revolutionary materials, but if such posts appear, how to argue against them? I think disinformation is easy, debunking hard. I don’t know whether Wang Anshi had that much land; but Chinese ancient history portrays Wang Anshi as a minor bureaucrat landlord family, so I trust Chinese ancient history more, and would appreciate recommended Chinese ancient history books if you have time.)

A also claimed that Baojia Law trained 50 guards and 49 were flogged, which is Wang Anshi’s reform effect.

AI: Source notes

Dingzhou Xingle County: 50 Bao-ding, 49 were flogged

  • The official texts do not directly provide that exact number.
  • The earliest is from the Continuation of Zizhi Tongjian Changbian plus Song court ministers’ memorials (Wang Yansou’s “On the Harm of Baojia”); later general histories summarize this line.
  • Modern authoritative compilations: Phoenix History, Song history studies, Middle school history materials frequently cite this.
  1. Original text (Wang Yansou, Song Famous Officials Memorial, Volume 124)
    Their teaching: Bao Zhang trained by flogging, Bao Zheng flogging again, escort and command punishments.
    Dingzhou Xingle Training Field: Bao-ding fifty people, forty-nine were flogged on the buttocks, half the buttocks remained for more flogging.
    Old folks say: Children, empty-handed, cannot enter the training ground.

  2. Plain-language translation
    During Baojia training, officials flogged the peasants repeatedly: the chief of Bao flogged, the deputy Bao flogged, inspectors and officials took turns beating.
    In Dingzhou Xingle County, at one training ground, there were 50 Bao-ding; 49 were flogged on the buttocks; even half of the buttocks were flogged, leaving the other half for the next beating.
    A folk saying: the common people are left with empty hands, so they don’t dare enter the training ground.

  3. Contemporary historical corroboration (Song History, Military Records)
    Original:
    If not satisfied, they would claim “art is not in accord with the law” and beat and humiliate without limit. People would cut fingers, burn skin, flee, abandon their homes to avoid service.

Translation:
If actions were not up to standard, officials would beat and humiliate without restraint; people were driven to cut off fingers, burn their skin, flee, and abandon their homes to avoid Baojia training.

  1. Background
  • Location: Dingzhou, Xingle County, Hebei (Song Dynasty Baojia disaster area)
  • Punishment: buttock flogging (chastisement), the heaviest corporal punishment in the Song era
  • Reason: martial skill not up to standard, tardiness, inability to pay filial piety to Baozheng/military officers; nearly everyone punished

You all in the group did mention that Zizhi Tongjian may have a biased stance, but the Song History: Military Records also records this; is it all deliberate demonization of Wang Anshi? Then I found Zheng Xia’s list of refugees; I also learned that Zheng Xia’s stance rejected government and “the people” competing for profits; I’m not sure which class that “the people” refers to, since Wang Anshi’s reforms indeed faced opposition from many, but Zheng Xia’s refugee picture lacks broader discussion.

Summary:
A’s view: Legalists are reactionaries who brutally suppress the masses to accelerate contradictions, and he regards Legalism as fascism, and treats people as tools; Confucian-Legalist struggles are dog-eat-dog. My mistake was to merge Confucian and aristocratic landlord lines with Legalism and treat their struggle as class struggle; I mistakenly equated bourgeois democracy with fascism, and forcibly applied modern political labels to ancient history. Also, please answer: Was Li Shimin’s coup a revolutionary coup despite moving toward reform? How did Li Jiancheng move toward Confucianism? Do you have any recommended Chinese ancient history books? I recently downloaded Chinese Ancient History Lectures but haven’t started yet.

Whether a coup can succeed and whether it can be maintained after success depends on the balance of forces between both sides. Li Shimin’s ability to succeed shows that his class base was strong, but revolution is a fundamental change of social systems; Li Shimin’s case can only be regarded as a reform, not a “revolutionary coup”—that term is as misused as Lin Biao’s “people’s coup.”

My question is, I treated the coup of the advanced classes as a revolution. Even the strife of the Ji clan (landlord class) against Duke Zhao of Lu (slave-owning class) cannot be considered a coup, and the “cockfight” coup was initiated by Duke Zhao of Lu. I mistakenly thought it was initiated by the Ji clan, and I also treated the partition of Jin into three as a coup, not understanding that the Three Jins partition followed a long struggle.

But I think a monarch must have a certain class basis to rule for a long time. A believes that 800 people cannot represent the middle- and small-landlord class. He also asked me what class Li Shimin belonged to. I said he was a patron of the aristocracy and he directly said that I don’t look at class, and I couldn’t continue the argument. After all, I indeed took a right-leaning position and reinterpreted the Legalist aspects as part of Confucian–Legal struggle as left, but he stubbornly says Legalism represents the monarch plus officials, the most oppressive reaction against the people.

I also broadly argued that Confucianism would not do reforms (would not innovate technology); even if reforms, they would go in the counterrevolutionary direction. Then he asked me what the Self-Strengthening Movement was about, and I couldn’t answer. I also relied on AI to classify which late Qing four most famous ministers were Legalists and which were Confucians; as a result, he classified Li Hongzhang as Legalist.

  1. Core stance: “Confucianism as the body, wealth and power as the use” — use Confucianism to guard the Way, use Legalism to get things done

His famous quote (also the overall program of the Self-Strengthening faction):

“Take the Confucian moral order as the original, supplemented by the science and wealth of other nations.”
(Use Western technology, safeguard Confucian and Mencian principle)

Within the Confucian–Legalist framework:

  • Confucianism = the body (ethics, norm, rank, loyalty to the monarch)
    He fully defends it, never opposes it.
  • Legalism = the use (reform, industry, training the army, utilitarian, practical results)
    He fully implements it, regards it as the only path to save the nation.

Therefore:
Li Hongzhang respects Confucius and Mencius, but only adopts their “norms and ethics”;
He criticizes Confucianism, but only targets its “empty talk and righteousness, prioritizing righteousness over profit, conservatism harmful to the state.”

  1. His three major criticisms of Confucianism (most体现s Legalist tendency)

  2. Harsh critique of Confucian “empty talk of righteousness and principle, not practical”

  • Scolds the “pure scholars”: “Sitting and discussing the Way, unaware of current affairs”
  • Scolds Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism: “Moral principle is empty talk, no salvation for the state”
  • Says Confucians only discuss morality, not wealth, strength, or utility
    → Typical Legalist emphasis on practicality over ceremonial propriety
  1. Opposes Confucian “reverence for Dao, disdain for instruments/techniques”
    Some say “techniques are trivial, the Dao is fundamental,” he retorts:
    “I have yet to see a sage leave behind a few good calculating devices!”
  • Believes Confucians undervalue science, industry, and military, leading China to lag behind

  • Advocates grand Self-Strengthening, making rifles and cannons, building railways, mining
    → Inherits Legalist emphasis on agriculture, war, and production

  1. Critiques Confucian “the ancestral laws cannot be changed” conservatism
    He openly says:
    “Old laws can make us wealthy and strong; China’s strength has endured for long, why wait for today?”
    “When poor, change; when change, open the way”
  • Opposes stubborn factions who cling to Confucius and Mencius’ old system, blindly excluding foreigners
  • Advocates on the premise that Confucian norms remain the same, to comprehensively reform to strengthen
    → Legalist reform path
  1. The point of contradiction: Why doesn’t he completely oppose Confucianism?
  2. Class stance
    He is a big landlord and big official; Confucian normas are the basis of ruling legitimacy.
    He seeks to defend the monarch and maintain feudal order, so he must respect Confucianism.
  3. Confucian–Legalist complementarity (his true structure)
  • Internal governance: use Confucianism (ritual, ethics, loyalty to the ruler)
  • External strength: use Legalism (reforms, utilitarianism, real power)
    → Outer Confucian, inner Legalist, showing Confucian form, Legalist substance
  1. One-sentence summary (recitation version)

Li Hongzhang is a Self-Strengthening faction Legalist who respects Confucianism without being pedantic, upholds Legalist doctrine without extremism.
He preserves Confucian ethical norms (body), but vigorously critiques Confucian empty talk, conservatism, and prioritizes righteousness over instruments;
He pushes Legalist-type reforms, industry, utilitarianism, and practical results (use),
constituting a typical “to defend the Way with Confucianism, to strengthen the nation with Law” reformer of the modern landlord class.

Too abstract

This is basically trying to strike a compromise, treating a bit of technique in form as Legalism, but in reality Li Hongzhang didn’t really engage in technique; it’s all about the comprador act of Westernization and servitude. You can see how the book Modern Chinese History Manuscripts writes it.