Che Guevara and José Martí—A Discussion on Two Different Tendencies and Futures of the Democratic Faction

Originally published at: http://sg.lsepcn.com/archives/976

Che Guevara and José Martí — A Discussion on Two Different Tendencies and Futures of the Democratic Faction

Editorial Board of League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Proletariat

Editorial Board of League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Proletariat

“The victory of Marxism in theory forces its enemies to pretend to be Marxists; this is the dialectical law of history.”[1] Lenin’s brilliant assertion is not only applicable to the enemies of the proletarian revolution but also to its allies.

Since Marxism was born in the mid-19th century, with the development of capitalism worldwide, the growth of the proletariat, the advance of the international communist movement, and the emergence of socialist states and socialist camp, the proletariat and its vanguard — the Communist Party — have increasingly become a pivotal, even decisive force on the political stage. To gain the support of this powerful class, bourgeoisie, certain democratic elements within the petty bourgeoisie, or opponents of the existing system, often dress themselves as “socialists,” and their claims, platforms, or doctrines as “Marxism,” especially in colonial and semi-colonial countries where national capitalism and the weak but large peasant and working-class masses contain strong revolutionary potential. Since capitalism entered the stage of monopoly, some national bourgeoisie have exploited the banner of “socialism” to unite workers and peasants against imperialism and to fight for national independence. However, they always differ in principle from true proletarian socialism or communism: the former “stalls or even betrays the revolution once the revolution reaches a certain stage”[2], while the latter “advocates continuous revolution”[3] and “never halts halfway”[4]. The former aims to “establish a bourgeois democratic republic exploited by capitalists”[5], while the latter demands “overthrow of the bourgeoisie” and “proletarian dictatorship”[6]. The former’s goal is “to make the existing society as comfortable and satisfying as possible”[7], whereas the latter, for the complete liberation of itself and all humanity, must “abolish private ownership”, “eliminate classes”, and “establish a new society”[8]. Due to such fundamental opposition, all bourgeois and petty bourgeois democrats inevitably clash fiercely with the proletariat, and internal divisions also occur: some “shift into the proletariat’s ranks, abandon their original stance, and stand on the side of the proletariat”[9], while others turn reactionary.

This article will take Che Guevara and José Martí, two figures related to Cuban independence, as examples to analyze their different tendencies and futures as representatives of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeois democratic factions. It is hoped that this will have some significance in understanding the principled differences between bourgeoisie, petty bourgeois democratic factions, and the proletarian revolutionary faction, and in understanding under what conditions the former can transform into the latter.

19th and early 20th century Cuba and Latin America

Before analyzing Che Guevara and José Martí, we need to understand the historical background of their lives and activities, namely Cuba and Latin America in the approximately one and a half centuries following the independence revolution.

The Latin American independence revolutions from the late 18th to early 19th centuries were incomplete; they did not fulfill the tasks of bourgeois national democratic revolution, especially because the leadership of the revolution was held by the creole landowning class. Feudal large landownership was not only not abolished but was expanded and consolidated compared to before independence. Throughout Latin America, “in the 19th century, land incorporated into large estates in one century equaled the land incorporated in the previous three centuries.”[10] The large landowning class (about 10% of the population) and foreign big corporations owned almost all the land, while small farms accounted for only one-tenth of Latin American agriculture[11]. The extreme poverty of small farmers, tenant farmers, and agricultural workers led to a narrow domestic market. The dependence of farmers on landlords caused a lack of free labor. The large landowning class relied on cheap imported industrial goods and was unwilling to develop domestic transportation or implement protective tariffs. Imperialism — first Britain, later the US and Germany —’s export of goods and capital greatly displaced Latin American national capital. Under these factors, the development of capitalism in Latin America remained very slow. Not only did the majority of the population (about 70%) remain agricultural, but until 1939, before World War II, “the average annual productive value per worker in American industry was $6,340, while in Latin America it was only $1,380.”[12]

The above situation determined the characteristics of Latin American national bourgeoisie: on one hand, they demanded the development of their own capitalism, restricted foreign goods and capital, and in varying degrees advocated land reform, the abolition of feudal relations, and the expansion of the domestic market; on the other hand, their economic strength was weak, and before their markets and capital developed to a certain extent, they often depended on foreign markets and investments. They also maintained close ties with feudal large landownership while opposing it. These economic features made Latin American national bourgeoisie politically weak, and their struggle to establish bourgeois democratic systems and oppose “Cádiz-style” military dictatorship was inevitably powerless. Cádiz, meaning “leader,” was a military dictator relying on large landowners and imperialist support, using the army to impose authoritarian rule, a product of Latin America’s feudal large landownership. Constant wars among large landowner groups led to their representatives’ military coups or usurpation of revolutionary gains, turning them into new Cádiz dictators. Mexico experienced over 200 military coups and changed 31 presidents between 1824 and 1848. Bolivia saw 60 “revolutions” in 1874.[13] From 1810 to 1951, “at least 125 new constitutions were promulgated in twenty Latin American countries.” During these frequent regime changes, only a few times did liberal governments representing the national bourgeoisie come to power, but they dared not touch feudal large landownership or imperialist domination. Their fate was either overthrown by another coup or gradually degenerated into representatives of large landowners.

Outstanding leader of the Mexican peasant uprising Emiliano Zapata. Zapata’s leadership in the “land and freedom” peasant uprising promoted the development of Mexico’s bourgeois democratic revolution and the promulgation of Latin America’s most radical and revolutionary bourgeois constitution.

Due to the weakness of the national bourgeoisie, all political and social progress in Latin America over the past century and a half was achieved by revolutionary workers, peasants, and petty bourgeois masses. Under the oppression of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic comprador capitalism, the lives of Latin American workers and peasants are extremely impoverished and suffering. Industrial workers’ wages are only one-tenth to one-third of those in the US and Canada; a Bolivian miner needs 500 days’ work to buy a set of ordinary clothes, and the situation of agricultural workers, tenant farmers, and small farmers is even worse. “Among the 126 million Latin Americans, no fewer than 85 million are actually starving.”[14] The annual death rate in Latin America is 23‰, more than twice that of the US (11‰), with infant mortality in Colombia reaching 163‰, nearly 3.4 times the US[15]. “In the US, the average lifespan is about 63 years, but in Latin America, in Peru, it drops to only 32 years.” Latin American workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie have been deprived of all means of livelihood and production, especially revolutionary ones. They have fought heroically for the abolition of sharecropping and large landownership, for higher wages, better working conditions, and democratic rights such as unionization and elections, launching dozens of revolutionary uprisings from the late 19th century to the early 20th century.

“The people, only the people, are the driving force behind world history.”[16] Their attitude towards the masses and mass movements has caused ideological divisions. Some, representing the interests of the national bourgeoisie, advocate utilizing the masses to oppose imperialism and feudal comprador forces, establish bourgeois democratic republics, and develop national capitalism. They make many promises about land and freedom but are not prepared to implement them. As a result, they cannot gain genuine support from the masses and often betray them under imperialist and feudal pressure, ultimately turning reactionary. The representative of this bourgeois intellectuals is Che Guevara. Others advocate uniting and relying on the masses, relying on the people’s own strength to overthrow the “Three Mountains,” and establish a truly independent, democratic, and “Laborer’s America.”[17] Some are gradually approaching socialism. The outstanding representatives of these revolutionary intellectuals are José Martí.

Outstanding leader of the Mexican peasant uprising Emiliano Zapata. Zapata’s leadership in the “land and freedom” peasant uprising promoted the development of Mexico’s bourgeois democratic revolution and the promulgation of Latin America’s most radical and revolutionary bourgeois constitution.

19th and early 20th century Cuba and Latin America — The Democratic Bourgeoisie Che Guevara

Formation of Democratic Thought


Zapata (left) with his bourgeois family

Ernesto Che Guevara (1928–1967) came from a bourgeois family in Argentina. As mentioned earlier, this class has close ties with large landowners and comprador bourgeoisie. Guevara’s father, Ernesto Guevara Lynch, belonged to a large landowning family in Argentina—the Guevara and Lynch families—and had operated several construction companies. Guevara’s mother, Celia de la Serna, was a descendant of the last Peruvian governor of Spain, inheriting a large estate and a big tea plantation, on which Guevara’s family practiced mechanized capitalist management. Guevara’s background was entirely disconnected from the common people and unaware of their suffering. In fact, Guevara’s comfortable life was built on the blood and sweat of the working masses. In 1943, in Argentina, the minimum monthly budget for a family of five was 147 pesos, while urban workers’ average monthly wages were only 78 pesos, and agricultural workers’ average monthly income was about 50 pesos. In Buenos Aires, half of the workers lived in single-room accommodations. Agricultural workers’ housing was “just enough to hide in, totally unfit for human habitation. Only four sticks, thatched and mud roofs, with branches as walls.”[17] Yet Guevara’s family lived in a two-story English-style villa. “In Latin America, illiteracy accounts for 75% or more of the population.” Yet Guevara’s family could afford to send five children to higher education. Among Guevara’s four siblings, two are architects, one is a designer, and one is a lawyer. Guevara himself studied medicine at the University of Buenos Aires.

As a bourgeois, Guevara’s family was a supporter of bourgeois democracy, having supported the nationalization of mineral resources, electricity, and railways during his tenure, while also violently suppressing workers’ strikes in Buenos Aires and Patagonia under President Hipólito Yrigoyen, who represented the interests of large landowners and big bourgeoisie, and opposed the domination of the big landlords, big capitalists, and imperialist powers like Germany, Britain, and the US. This initially influenced Guevara’s thinking.

The complete formation of Guevara’s bourgeois democratic ideology was marked by his early travels around Latin America twice. Some say this was when Guevara recognized the poverty and suffering of the people, gradually developing “socialist ideas.” However, Guevara was always detached from the people; he fundamentally did not understand their impoverished lives, nor could he truly represent their revolutionary demands. Regarding Guevara’s highly praised “volunteering” to treat leprosy patients, in reality, he was acting as a “researcher” and “leprosy expert,” an intellectual aristocrat visiting the leprosy village of San Pablo in Peru. There, Guevara received financial and material support from local authorities, often boating, fishing, playing soccer, swimming, and attending banquets[18]. Living above the oppressed masses in such a decadent and detached manner, how could he possibly develop genuine sympathy for the oppressed? His main activities during this period were participating in bourgeois reform activities in various countries and engaging with various bourgeois figures.

In June and July 1952, Guevara traveled to Colombia, where he saw landlords, the church, and big capitalists using police and military to restrict civil liberties. He was briefly arrested as a political activist by the pro-American conservative government[19]. In 1953, Guevara went to Bolivia and witnessed the Pas Estensoro reform of national capitalism[20]. In December, Guevara went to Guatemala to participate in the struggle against the US imperialist-backed armed overthrow of the Arbenz government[21]. During the final moments of the Arbenz government, Guevara supported youth organizations and called for militias to oppose the mercenaries supported by US imperialism.

Traveling around Latin America,Guevara's experience in Guatemala had a profound impact on him. Until 1958, during the so-called "socialist" revolution in Cuba (of course, Guevara did not officially call himself a socialist, communist, or Marxist before 1960-1961), Guevara still stated: "I have always been a firm admirer of the democratic government of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz."[22] What exactly was the "democratic government" that Guevara admired? Jorge Toriello, the Foreign Minister of the Arbenz government, summarized: "All our government policies have not deviated from representative democracy. Its three fundamental goals are: to consolidate and fully respect democratic freedoms; to transform the semi-feudal, semi-colonial economy into a capitalist-type economy to improve the living standards of Guatemalan citizens; to defend national sovereignty and independence."[23] In summary, it aims to achieve national independence, implement bourgeois democracy, and develop a capitalist economy. Such claims are not only non-socialist but also align with "a state that recognizes the task of consolidating capital rule and labor enslavement" and "making bourgeois rule more comprehensive".[24] This indicates that Guevara was a representative of the interests of the national bourgeoisie. Although this class shares temporary and partial common interests with the proletariat and the broad masses of workers on anti-imperialist and anti-feudal issues, its fundamental interests as an exploiting class are completely opposed and in fierce conflict with those of the latter. Guevara's admiration for the Mexican Lazaro Cardenas government also shows that he was not a socialist. He called Cardenas "the greatest president in the history of the republic"[25], yet the Cardenas government did not "collectivize the means of production and the productive tools, did not monopolize foreign trade, and did not turn the state into the owner of factories, houses, land, and commercial enterprises"[26], meaning it was entirely non-socialist in nature. Guevara said: "I only became a revolutionary in Guatemala." This shows that, besides basic bourgeois democratic ideas, Guevara's ideas of armed struggle and anti-Americanism had already taken shape in Guatemala. Although Arbenz held some political power, he never controlled the army and was unable to mobilize the masses to defend the regime until the very end. Faced with a massive insurrection, Arbenz fled abroad. He hoped to exchange resignation for some reforms "retained" by the coup plotters, but these were also lost with the return of confiscated land. Therefore, Guevara believed that in the national democratic revolution, it was necessary to seize and consolidate power through armed struggle.[27] At the same time, U.S. imperialist subversion activities against nationalist governments in various countries made Guevara realize that the United States was the biggest obstacle and most vicious enemy to Latin America's independence cause. No semi-colonial, semi-feudal country could oppose the powerful U.S. imperialism alone. Therefore, it was necessary to strike against its "weak points" throughout the Americas and even the world, especially in areas under U.S. domination. In fact, this idea—that a nation's democratic revolution can only succeed through fighting feudalism and colonialism internationally—is not a "proletarian" "world revolution" theory or an "internationalist" spirit, nor is it new. In Latin America, over a century before Guevara's activities, Bolívar and San Martín had already practiced this idea, though their enemies were Spain, not the U.S. at that time. Moreover, this bourgeois "world revolution" thought is fundamentally different from proletarian internationalism. The bourgeoisie opposes a system of exploitation beyond national borders only to serve its own interests of fighting feudalism together with other bourgeoisies and establishing or consolidating capitalism at home. The proletariat, however, can only finally liberate itself by liberating all of humanity. Its struggle against bourgeoisie worldwide is for the interests of all workers and to eliminate all systems of exploitation.From 1961 to 1965, Guevara served as Cuba's Minister of Industry and advocated for establishing a relatively centralized national capitalist system, implementing rapid industrialization and agricultural diversification. His views sparked a "great debate" on economic policy in Cuba. In 1962, Castro invited "Marxist economists" from various countries to discuss the two main economic propositions within the country: one proposed by former People's Socialist Party member, then Chairman of the National Land Reform Committee, and a former minister in Batista's cabinet, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who called for emulating the Soviet and Chinese "Liberal Reform," expanding enterprise powers, implementing an independent accounting system and material incentives, and vigorously developing sugarcane cultivation in agriculture; the other was proposed by Guevara, who demanded strict budget control over enterprises through national planning and rapid industrialization, promoting "voluntary labor," and implementing diverse management in agriculture.

Although Guevara’s economic stance appeared as a “left” opposition to revisionism, even advocating for “eliminating commodity-money relations and the law of value” and creating a so-called “new man” through “moral incentives” contrary to material incentives, it was in fact a complete and inevitable blueprint for developing a nationalist capitalism doomed to failure. After the victory of the Cuban Revolution, although large-scale “nationalization” was carried out, transforming the means of production into state ownership in form, many enterprises remained under the control of old management, and the Cuban state gradually turned into a bureaucratic bourgeois dictatorship. Due to the government’s lack of control over enterprises, the so-called “state plan” and “budget control” at that time were merely superficial. Without strict accounting systems, cases of wasteful budgets and illegal transactions were serious: “From 1961 to 1963, the national budget was in deficit. During the same three years, enterprises implementing the budget system stopped remitting large sums to the national budget”; “An average of 20,000 violations per week, valued at 20 million Cuban pesos.” Under such laissez-faire conditions, capital was often invested in traditional sugarcane industries due to higher profit margins, making industrialization impossible, especially the concentrated construction of large, costly, and long-cycle heavy industries, and thus the establishment of a relatively independent national economy was unfeasible. Therefore, Guevara advocated strengthening state control over enterprises through budgets and planning. As for his proposal of “voluntary labor,” it was essentially a means for the state to mobilize labor. In the late 1960s, Castro extensively used this “voluntary labor,” even involving the military or organizing workers in semi-militarized forms for sugarcane planting. Moreover, Guevara was not opposed to material incentives; this was merely a misleading expression. In reality, capitalist material incentives were used everywhere in Cuba’s so-called “voluntary labor,” only in different forms, such as converting wages into social security contributions, rewarding collectives rather than individuals, and punishing workers who did not meet production quotas. Guevara’s proposals ultimately failed severely, primarily because of his one-sided emphasis on rapid industrialization detached from agricultural development. Agriculture is the foundation of industry, but Cuba’s land reform was incomplete, and the situation of mainly sugarcane cultivation did not change, making it impossible to provide sufficient raw materials and markets for industry—by 1964, under conditions of very underdeveloped industry, light industry for producing consumer goods still had an excess value of 84 million USD, indicating the low level of people’s consumption capacity. Meanwhile, there was a shortage of basic consumer goods like food, with speculators profiting hugely on the black market, and the anarchic state of capitalist production had not been eliminated by Guevara’s “state plan.” Facing this situation, Guevara even hoped to introduce funds from the Soviet Union and other foreign countries—at the second conference of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization in Algiers in February 1965, he criticized Soviet and Chinese trade plunder while requesting “socialist countries” to provide funds for Cuba—moving in the opposite direction of independent development of the national economy. Additionally, at that time, the agricultural and foreign trade sectors were controlled by Guevara’s opponents Rodriguez and Alberto Mora, who still implemented independent accounting and vigorously promoted sugarcane planting and export. Guevara’s economic measures ultimately failed. Even he had to admit: “We did not gradually start diversified management, but did too much at once… As a result, agricultural production generally declined,” and “Cuba built many factories… Later, we found that many of these factories had poor technical efficiency… and their actual effect on replacing imports was limited.” Furthermore, Guevara compromised with Rodriguez and others, stating that “we must limit our industrial production to the minimum goals,” and increase raw material imports for capital, improve or replace aging equipment, returning to the stance of making Cuba a sugarcane producer and product dumping market for the Soviet Union. In 1964, Castro visited the Soviet Union, accepted the Soviet “theory of international division of labor,” and signed a trade agreement to export 24 million tons of sugar to the USSR over five years in exchange for machinery and equipment. The “Four-Year Plan” proposed by Guevara in 1961 was abandoned ahead of schedule that same year.

Subsequently, due to Castro’s group fully adopting pro-Soviet economic, political, and diplomatic policies, Guevara’s power was gradually stripped away. He attempted to seek support from the Third World and socialist China. From late 1964 to early 1965, Guevara made long visits to China and African countries. In December 1964, Guevara publicly opposed the Soviet and Chinese “peaceful coexistence” policy at the United Nations General Assembly, stating: “As Marxists, we still believe that peace coexistence between states does not include coexistence between oppressors and oppressed, exploiters and exploited.” In Africa, Guevara further denounced the Soviet Union and China as “Marxist revisionists.” Guevara’s actions caused dissatisfaction among domestic pro-Soviet agents; former People’s Socialist Party Secretary-General Bras Roca called him “the apple causing discord within the socialist front,” and Rodriguez criticized his “spiritual stimulation theory” as “a serious mistake born of ignorance or delusional confusion.” After returning to Cuba in March 1965, Guevara virtually disappeared from public activities. In October, Castro broadcast a letter on the radio, reportedly a “farewell letter” written by Guevara to him. In the letter, besides the usual praise for Castro, Guevara expressed his intention to go to other parts of the world “to fight against imperialism,” and officially resigned from his party and ministerial posts, renounced his rank of major and Cuban nationality. By this time, Guevara had been in Congo (Kinshasa) for about five months.

“Guerrilla Center Theory”

Many see Guevara’s departure from Cuba as a sign of his “opposition to revisionism” and “rupture” with Castro’s group, but this plan was actually supported by the latter. On one hand, due to the failure of Cuba’s economic construction and his own power being stripped, Guevara tried to replicate his accidental victory in Cuba years earlier elsewhere in the world, using other countries as bases to continue anti-American activities. He believed that the powerful U.S. imperialism, with abundant resources, technology, and weapons, could only be defeated by creating “second or third Vietnam” across the globe, gradually weakening American imperialist strength. The first chosen location was the Congo (Kinshasa), “because Africa is much farther from the U.S., and the possibility of logistical support from various sources (such as the USSR, China, Arab countries, Algeria) is greater,” and secondly Bolivia. On the other hand, Castro also vigorously promoted “export of revolution” across Latin America and the world. Unlike other pro-Soviet parties, Castro had certain contradictions with the USSR: in the first half of the 1960s, to restore capitalism domestically and suppress national liberation movements internationally, the USSR adopted a “peaceful coexistence” diplomatic policy seeking to ease tensions with U.S. imperialism; meanwhile, Castro strongly supported anti-American armed struggles in other countries to make Cuba the center of anti-imperialist revolution in Latin America and establish regional hegemony. Within months after the Cuban Revolution victory, Castro’s regime organized armed actions in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama, all of which failed. Guevara’s “expeditions” to Congo and Bolivia were also carried out under Castro’s orders, with support from the Cuban government in personnel and weapons. In April 1965, Guevara led about 125 Cuban guerrillas equipped with the latest Soviet weapons to eastern Congo to support local nationalist bourgeois armed groups supporting Lumumba. When, in the fall of that year, Lumumba’s armed forces lost large areas of control due to large-scale attacks by the Congolese government troops and intervention forces from the U.S. and Belgium, Guevara advised Castro to cancel aid to Congo and left in November. In November 1966, Guevara went to the southeastern mountains of Bolivia to organize guerrilla forces. In October 1967, Guevara was captured and killed by Bolivian government troops.

Guevara’s series of military adventures failed because of the theoretical roots of his anti-Marxist “Guerrilla Center Theory.” The philosophical basis of this theory was subjective idealism and narrow empiricism. Marxism holds that armed struggle and violent revolution are conditional: “When the ruling class encounters a crisis and can no longer rule as before”; “When the poverty and suffering of the oppressed classes intensify extraordinarily, and they no longer wish to live as before”; “When the enthusiasm of the masses greatly increases and manifests as revolutionary action.” However, Guevara believed: “It is not necessary to wait for all revolutionary conditions to mature; the revolutionary center can create these conditions,” and that the “minimum necessary condition” for establishing and consolidating a guerrilla center was “people’s dissatisfaction gradually surface, provoking a stronger response, forming a state of rebellion.” In other words, as long as there is imperialism, oppression, and discontent somewhere, guerrilla warfare can be launched there. He sometimes leaned to the “left,” sometimes to the “right,” and also said, “If a government comes to power through the people’s election… guerrilla warfare cannot occur before all legal means are exhausted.” Guevara separated legal and illegal means, believing that armed struggle should not occur during parliamentary struggles, which reflected his bourgeois democratic illusions rooted in his bourgeois class nature. Moreover, when Guevara wrote the systematic summary of his “Guerrilla Center” thought in 1960 with the book “Guerrilla Warfare,” his entire military experience was only two years, and both in scale (battles of hundreds of people) and scope (the eastern half of Cuba), it was quite limited. Yet he regarded such narrow experience as a universal law and tried to promote it across Latin America and even worldwide. We also know that the victory of the Cuban Revolution was not achieved through military means.

[Image: Cuban Revolution, Castro-led guerrilla activities limited to the Maestral Mountains]

The core of the “Guerrilla Center Theory” has three points: “No party leadership,” “No mass base,” “No base area.”

The “Guerrilla Center Theory” advocates a purely military route, claiming “the gun commands the party” and “the gun is the party.” Guevara said: “The guerrilla, as an armed core, is the vanguard of the people’s struggle.” That is, small guerrilla bands composed of young students and intellectuals lead the national democratic revolution, without involving peasants (although Guevara believed “in underdeveloped America, the battlefield of armed struggle should mainly be in rural areas,” but this only meant that guerrillas should fight in the mountains against government troops; he was not genuinely seeking the support of peasants), nor workers (Bolivian miners had a long revolutionary tradition, organized unions, and even had their own armed forces, but Guevara was not sincere in uniting with them; he demanded they give up autonomous struggles and join the “Guerrilla Center”). Such a theory cannot produce a thorough national democratic revolution nor transition to socialist revolution. Under this guidance, it is no wonder that Castro’s military clique seized the leadership of the Cuban revolution.

Engels pointed out: “Mass uprisings, revolutionary wars, organizing guerrilla units everywhere—that is the only way for small nations to defeat larger nations, for less powerful armies to resist better-organized and stronger armies.” However, the “Guerrilla Center Theory” is detached from the masses. How should guerrilla warfare begin? Guevara said: “It must start with secret work. This secret work is carried out by a few founders and has no connection with people’s actions.” How should guerrilla forces expand? Guevara said: “Once they conduct successful raids, their reputation spreads, and some farmers who have been deprived of land or are fighting to defend their land, as well as other idealistic youth from different classes, join the guerrillas.” Guevara placed all hope on the occasional victories achieved by small “expeditions” organized from abroad, believing this could automatically attract peasants to join the guerrillas. Without doing work among the local masses, even during the Congo campaign, his forces could hardly communicate with locals due to language barriers. Not safeguarding the interests of the masses or conducting revolutionary propaganda among them naturally prevents the masses from joining or supporting the guerrillas, from providing information and cover, resulting in alienation from the people. Ultimately, he was betrayed by informants, captured, and killed.

The “Guerrilla Center Theory” is also a form of banditry. Guevara said: “Some contemptuously call guerrilla warfare ‘run-and-gun.’ That is precisely what guerrilla warfare is. Run and gun, wait, spy, then run and gun again—this cycle repeats.” Tactically, he sometimes advocated dividing forces—“When the guerrilla has become quite strong in weapons and numbers, it should organize new columns”—which prevented concentration of revolutionary strength; at other times, he advocated concentrating forces for “regular warfare”—“In this case (attacking heavily guarded enemy-held areas), all columns should gather to form a dense front and conduct positional warfare similar to that of regular armies”—forcing guerrillas, often inferior in numbers and equipment, to undertake tasks beyond their capacity. Moreover, unrestricted mobile warfare without a solid base area makes land reform impossible and alienates the support of the impoverished peasantry. In Latin America, where peasants are numerous and oppressed, they are the decisive force of the national democratic revolution. However, Guevara not only refused to build base areas but also held a very conservative attitude toward land reform, saying: “In the early stages of guerrilla warfare,… harassment of the rich should be minimized,” and “property owners’ rights to their property used for social good, including receiving current payments, should always be respected.” As a bourgeoisie, the bourgeois legal rights of private property and its close ties to feudal land systems are the fundamental reasons for Guevara’s armed struggle failure.

In summary, Guevara’s “Guerrilla Center Theory” is fundamentally wrong in theory and reactionary in practice. It was popular during the intense ideological struggle between Marxism and revisionism in the international communist movement, when revisionists led by the USSR promoted “peaceful coexistence” and parliamentary paths, which had lost favor. However, the “Guerrilla Center Theory” appeared at this time with a “left” and “extreme revolutionary” guise, leading many revolutionaries opposed to revisionism and committed to armed struggle astray, influenced by petty-bourgeois ideas, and unable to find the correct direction, causing ideological confusion, damaging the national liberation and communist movements, and exerting a very negative influence.

From participating in the reform activities of Latin American bourgeoisie, to jointly seizing the fruits of the Cuban revolution with Castro, implementing economic policies aimed at developing capitalism after the revolution, approaching the USSR for support, and then failing in political struggles and establishing military adventurism in Congo and Bolivia, Che Guevara was never truly a Marxist but merely a more radical bourgeois democrat. During the era of imperialist and proletarian revolution, he read some books by Marx and Lenin, used Marxist phrases to appear as a Marxist to achieve bourgeois democratic republics, and to gain support from the broad masses of workers and peasants and socialist countries. However, at his core, he remained a bourgeois prince. Chairman Mao said: “The final dividing line between revolutionary, non-revolutionary, or counterrevolutionary intellectuals is whether they are willing and actually implement the integration with workers and peasants. Their final boundary lies only in this, not in what they mouth… Marxism.” Guevara, because of his detachment from the people—his worldview was subjective idealism and personal heroism, his eyes looking upward, only using the masses as tools to achieve personal goals and unable to truly understand and rely on their strength—gradually descended from opposing imperialism to compromising with social imperialism and feudal comprador forces, ultimately heading toward reaction and demise. This is worth deep reflection for each of us.As for those who admire Guevara, they are no more than using the proletarian movement for personal gain just like their idol. They are a group of false communists. Most of them come from the bourgeoisie, on one hand detaching from labor and the people, on the other feeling oppressed in capitalist society (under the rule of the bourgeoisie bureaucrats, such people are numerous, coming from all classes—proletariat, petty bourgeoisie, and even some from the bourgeoisie)—being oppressed by officials, capitalists, parents, or teachers, dissatisfied with the status quo, demanding certain reforms that benefit themselves, “making the existing society as comfortable and satisfying as possible for them.” [55] Due to the universality and correctness of Marxism, and because Marxism is the doctrine of all oppressed people, they feel that Marxist theory can explain certain phenomena in their lives, and that some phrases against oppression in Marxism suit their taste, thus claiming to be “Marxists,” while at the same time “limiting, splitting, and distorting Marxism in theory and practice” [56] turning it into a tool that merely serves their personal or group interests. They hope to ride the coattails of the proletarian movement or make a quick profit from it. Therefore, they often outwardly advocate continuous revolution but actually disembark at the station, verbally extremism in revolution but practically conservative, and talk about the masses and the proletariat while internally remaining a kingdom of the bourgeoisie. For such people, true revolutionaries should also be vigilant and clearly recognize this.


Guevara who does not work, fat and bloated

It should be particularly pointed out that a person’s lifestyle determines their political outlook. The reason these people fervently worship Guevara is largely just “love for the house and its roof,” but they envy the reputation and power that Guevara gained, and pursue the bourgeois lifestyle he represented, further beautifying him as a symbol of this lifestyle. They dress Guevara as a “Communist fighter,” praise him as an embodiment of “virtue” and “conscience,” claiming he betrayed his class for the laboring people, abandoned his power for “anti-revisionism,” and sacrificed his life for “world revolution”… However, “conscience is determined by a person’s… entire lifestyle” [57], and any virtue or conscience divorced from lifestyle is nonexistent. Guevara’s life was always luxurious and decadent; besides what has been mentioned earlier, he was always depicted with a high-end cigar in his mouth, and after the victory of the Cuban revolution, he quickly moved into the mansions formerly belonging to Batista’s faction [58], enjoying all kinds of privileges through power and status [59], and deceived and played with many women [60]. Such bourgeois figures are fundamentally incapable of having any genuine feelings with the working people, let alone making any real sacrifices for revolution. The fallacy of separating political outlook from lifestyle, pursuing personal opportunism and pleasure as a way of revolution, is something we must oppose.

Unlike Guevara, who maintained close ties with the people and persisted in fighting for national liberation, José Martí stood at another end of the democratic camp.

Great Cuban revolutionary democrat José Martí

Born in 1853 in a very poor family in Havana, Cuba. In 1869, during Cuba’s first war of independence, 16-year-old Martí began participating in the national liberation movement, co-founding the patriotic publication “La Patria Libre” with comrades. That same year, Martí was arrested for anti-Spanish activities, sentenced to six years of hard labor, but later, with the help of friends, was exiled to the mother country. During the years abroad, Martí persisted in writing and speaking, supporting and praising the Cuban revolution. In 1878, Martí returned to his homeland through a political amnesty, appointed as the representative of the Cuban Revolutionary Committee in New York, actively involved in preparing the uprising of 1879–1880. In 1879, Martí was arrested for planning to secretly transport weapons and ammunition into the country, and was again deported to Spain. In 1880, Martí fled to the United States via France, and over the next fifteen years, he traveled extensively, tirelessly working to establish a revolutionary party uniting all classes against imperialism. From 1890 to 1892, under Martí’s promotion, the Cuban Patriotism Alliance and the Cuban Revolutionary Party were successively established. In February 1895, the second Cuban war of independence broke out, and Martí immediately returned to his homeland after more than ten years, engaging in fierce armed struggle. On May 5, under Martí’s leadership, all insurgents decided in a meeting to hold a constitutional convention in the fall to establish a provisional revolutionary government. On May 19, Martí was tragically killed in a heroic charge against the Spanish army, at only 42 years old.

Great Cuban revolutionary democrat and national hero José Martí

Martí’s life was one of sharing life and blood with the people, of insisting on self-transformation for the cause of national independence, and of being a great revolutionary democrat and anti-imperialist fighter. These are his precious qualities and outstanding traits.

Blood and flesh connected with the people

Martí’s family was very poor; his father was originally a farmer, served as an artilleryman in the Spanish army, and later supported his family as a tailor. Due to poverty, Martí did not start primary school until his early teens; before that, he helped his mother with household chores or did odd jobs outside to support the family. Under Spanish colonial rule, the Cuban people, especially Black slaves, lived in dire conditions. In 1817, among the Black population, which accounted for about half of Cuba’s population, two-thirds were slaves [61], suffering brutal exploitation on plantations and mines. Later, the Spanish colonists imported about 600,000 Black slaves and over 140,000 Chinese contract laborers, and the barbaric slave system was only abolished after the 1879–1880 uprising. This left a deep impression on Martí’s young mind, and he began to develop a profound hatred for oppressors, linking his suffering with that of the masses. When Martí later recalled his childhood, he wrote a poem like this:

The red sun pierces through the dense fog,

rising over the desert-like sea.

And high on the branches hangs

a young slave in shackles.

No, a child will never forget:

When the painful tears flow down,

he swore to this corpse,

to avenge all enslaved people.

The first experience of being arrested further deepened Martí’s thoughts. He was sent to a quarry for forced labor, where under the scorching sun and the lashes of the guards, young Martí and other patriots gathered stones in the shallow river, carrying them on their shoulders. However, the heavy labor did not break Martí; instead, it broadened his horizons, intensified his hatred, and strengthened his will. Martí saw that from the elderly—such as the brigadier who once led anti-Spanish uprisings—to children as young as twelve—whose parents were imprisoned for opposing Spanish rule—just because they fought for their nation’s freedom and independence, they suffered the cruelest whippings and abuse from colonists. He said: “In prison, some suffer more than I do, … I am just a link in the chain, … I am just a drop in the blood sea.” [63] “When others suffer more deeply than I do, why should I speak of myself? When others shed blood, what right do I have to cry?” “A few months ago, my life was just a kiss from my mother, my glory was just a dream at school; my worries were only the fear of losing my mother’s kiss forever, my troubles were just losing the dream of school. What does it matter now? I disdainfully remain silent about today’s suffering, for that disdain is more precious than all my past glories.” [64] From then on, Martí was no longer a child or student; he became a fighter for the freedom of his homeland.

In 1870–1875, Martí was sentenced to exile in the mother country. However, he was not bought by the false kindness of colonizers, nor did he forget the suffering and struggle of his people. He studied while entering university to pursue law, philosophy, literature, and linguistics, and supported himself through labor to pay tuition, actively promoting and shouting for the cause of national independence. Despite the hardships, Martí’s health was poor and he was often ill, but he never stopped his work.


Martí with Cuban tobacco workers

From 1880 to 1895, Martí worked in the United States to prepare for the unification of revolutionary parties. During this period, he maintained close contact with the people of his homeland and had in-depth interactions with American workers, women, Black people, and Native Americans, expressing sincere sympathy and support for their struggles for rights. At that time, many Cuban workers resided in the U.S. The newly formed Cuban proletariat actively participated in the national liberation struggle. Despite their poverty, they still contributed one-tenth of their meager wages to support the patriotic movement, which later became a conscious system that persisted throughout the Second War of Independence. Martí saw the great strength contained within the emerging Cuban proletariat and made them one of the main targets of propaganda. The official newspaper of the Cuban Revolutionary Party—“La Patria”—was founded with the support of the tobacco workers’ fundraising. Martí highly praised the patriotic spirit of the Cuban proletariat: “To let the fighters for the nation’s liberation hold weapons, they sacrifice their entire family’s bread and cheap wine, their children’s clothes and medicine,” and “Cuban people who make precious contributions with their calloused hands to the treasury of freedom and justice… those are the people the homeland is proud of.”

Besides promoting among compatriots, Martí also served as a teacher for the Black Workers’ Defense Association, giving free lectures to American workers, enthusiastically supporting their struggles. Although slavery was abolished in the U.S. after the Civil War, due to bourgeois compromise, the reactionary plantation owners did not eliminate their power; they turned newly freed Black people into tenant farmers and exploited them cruelly through a sharecropping system. Martí spoke out for oppressed and discriminated Black masses, firmly opposing racial discrimination. He pointed out: “Slavery does not mean that the enslaved race is inferior,” “Black people are not inferior or superior because of their skin color,” “There is no innate evil or virus in Black people.” Martí believed that skin color was not a standard to distinguish people but their qualities should be considered, “whether white or Black, people are always divided into those who seek luxury and harbor selfishness, and those who are generous and selfless.”

[65] Moreover, Martí especially emphasized the unity of oppressed classes regardless of race. He believed: on one hand, the racial prejudices among Black people at that time were caused by white racial discrimination and oppression; on the other hand, if Black people insisted on racialism, they could not achieve true liberation.

In 1886, American workers nationwide went on strike for an eight-hour workday. The reactionary U.S. government bought off anarchists to incite trouble, fabricated the bloody Haymarket Massacre in Chicago, and sentenced seven workers’ leaders to death. The day after the executions, Martí wrote the “Horrific Tragedy,” condemning the U.S. bourgeoisie’s repression and persecution of workers. In this article, he passionately praised the seven executed workers’ leaders as John Brown-like heroes; exposed the injustice of the American legal and judicial system—victimized workers’ leaders were sentenced to death while the detective dogs that shot children roamed free; and pointed out the hypocrisy of the bourgeois democratic republic—under the rule of monopolistic capitalists, American society was increasingly divided into two extremes: the rich enjoyed privileges and extravagance, while the poor suffered hunger and cold, with no difference from monarchies or European countries.

Martí deeply sympathized with the working class and respected their revolutionary mentors. In an article mourning Marx’s death, he wrote: “Karl Marx has died… not only was he a great awakener of Europe’s workers’ discontent, but also a farsighted prophet of the causes of human poverty and the destiny of mankind… he is the noblest hero and the most visionary thinker in the labor world…” [66]

Additionally, because of Martí’s activities, many Latin American countries such as Argentina and Paraguay appointed him as their consul in New York, and many newspapers and magazines invited him as a correspondent. However, Martí did not use these opportunities to detach from the masses or seek personal success; instead, he used them to promote revolution and had a huge influence on Latin American thought and culture.

During the Second War of Independence, although he was not a military leader, Martí believed that at the decisive moment when the people of the homeland fought bravely with weapons in hand, since he was appointed as a major general of the national liberation army, he must fight on the battlefield like any ordinary soldier. Ultimately, in the Battle of Dos Ríos in May 1895, Martí was tragically killed in the charge, just like the hero Abdulla he portrayed at age 16, dedicating his life to the cause of his homeland’s freedom and liberation:

To prove the noble value of life,

we must fight, even at the cost of sacrifice,

to save others, if necessary,

we can die for righteousness.

...Victory! ... I will die happily.

What does death matter—

I have saved the homeland!

Death is so beautiful when we give ourselves for the homeland,

for the freedom of the homeland!

Martí not only came from the working people, but also maintained close ties with the masses at all times. He regarded himself as a part of the people, rather than any "hero" or "savior" who stands above the masses. He pointed out: "The people, the suffering masses, are the true leaders of the revolution." "The greatness of the leaders does not lie in themselves—although it may seem so on the surface—but in the extent to which they serve the people..." Compared with Guevara's advocacy of personal heroism and the "mass backwardness theory," the difference in stance is clear. ### 坚持进步 Martí was not initially a revolutionary democrat; he started from reformism and only transformed into a revolutionary democrat after a long and arduous ideological struggle. During his exile in Spain, Martí was basically a reformist. This was because Spain experienced a bourgeois revolution in 1868 and established a republic in 1873. Martí hoped that the bourgeois republican faction would promote the principles of "liberty," "equality," and "fraternity" in relation to colonies, and he wrote a series of articles calling on the Spanish ruling class to allow Cuba to become independent. However, on colonial issues, the newly established bourgeoisie was no different from the overthrown feudal aristocracy; they still wanted to plunder raw materials and huge profits from Cuba, and included Cuba in Spain's territory in the republican constitution. Moreover, with the reestablishment of monarchist dictatorship in Spain in 1874, Cuba’s independence war was subjected to even more brutal suppression. Reality made Martí realize that the cause of national liberation could never rely on the ruling class of the colonizer but must be fought for by the people of the nation themselves. Therefore, when the Spanish parliament was filled with reactionary shouts of "Long live Spain’s Cuba!", Martí angrily wrote: "Never!... Long live free Cuba!" The consequences of the Sangonera Agreement made Martí more clearly aware of the reactionary nature of reformism. In 1878, after military defeats, the landlord bourgeoisie within the revolutionary camp took the opportunity to compromise with Spain and signed the Sangonera ceasefire agreement. Cunning Spanish colonizers hypocritically promised to implement "political reforms," allowing Cubans to elect their own representatives to the Spanish parliament, and promised freedom and relaxed economic restrictions for black slaves and contract laborers involved in the independence war, while the revolutionary army surrendered all weapons and ammunition. However, after the ceasefire, none of Spain’s promises were fulfilled. Politically, Cuba’s representatives in the Spanish parliament were actually appointed by the Spanish royal family and colonial authorities, only a quarter of whom were born in Cuba. Election restrictions were strict; only those paying 125 pesos in taxes annually could vote. Economically, the revolutionaries who participated in the ten-year war had their property confiscated. The slavery abolished in 1886 was merely a change in form; former slaves became serfs, still exploited by their former landowning masters, and many former slaves remained slaves. To make up for the huge consumption during the war, Spain intensified economic plunder of Cuba, levying heavy taxes, further impoverishing the Cuban people. Martí thus completely broke with reformism. He, along with patriotic fighters led by General Antonio Maceo and the broad masses, began preparing for armed revolutionary struggle against colonial rule. "Because coming from the old fortress, the situation is clearer; a counterattack is easier to crush the enemy." At that time, some landlord bourgeoisie advocates of autonomy and reformism tried to lure Martí, but Martí called these surrenderists who begged the enemy for "freedom" as "beggars," and firmly declared: "Rights are not begged for; they must be seized by force!" Martí’s perseverance in advancing for the people’s interests is commendable. His path of ideological struggle and self-transformation sharply contrasts with Guevara’s insistence on bourgeois positions and his eventual turn towards reaction. ### 坚决反帝 Martí’s anti-imperialist thought was quite thorough. When Cuba’s main enemy was still Spain, he foresaw that emerging American imperialism was secretly plotting to replace Spain. He called for abandoning illusions that the U.S. might support Cuba’s independence, remaining vigilant and prepared to fight against new colonialists while opposing the old colonizers. History has proven Martí’s foresight correct. His anti-imperialist stance is fundamentally opposed to Guevara’s one-sided opposition to capitalist imperialism and indifference to social imperialism. Initially, Martí also had some illusions about the so-called "democracy" and "freedom" of the United States. However, his experience living in the "heart of the devil" made him thoroughly familiar with its insides. He quickly realized that: the U.S., under the rule of monopoly capital, not only experienced intense class struggles and significant wealth disparity domestically, but its so-called "democratic" elections were merely "driven by the wheels of gold"; its expansionist ambitions kept growing, and it was increasingly aggressively implementing colonial invasion policies internationally. When the U.S. held the first Pan-American Conference, Martí pointed out that "it cannot be believed" that this conference "has nothing to do with" U.S. violations and blatant aggression against Latin America, calling on Latin American countries to "stand in a line like trees and block the road of the giant in big boots!" Meanwhile, Martí’s views on developing independent international trade and national economy were deeper than Guevara’s. He stated: "Who advocates economic union, advocates political union. The buyer commands, and the seller must bow. To ensure freedom, trade balance must be achieved. If a country’s people want to die, let them sell only to one country; if they want to survive, they must sell to more than one..." It must be pointed out that although Martí expressed sincere sympathy for the working class and socialism, he was not a Marxist. The principled distinction between bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democrats and proletarian revolutionaries still existed in him. Firstly, Martí’s political ideal was to establish a democratic republic based on small landownership, not a socialist state based on public ownership of the means of production. Influenced by American petty-bourgeois economist Henry George, he believed that owning small plots of land was the guarantee of independence and freedom, opposed excessive concentration of land and property, and advocated distributing land to farmers for cultivation. On this basis, through the single tax levied by the state for public use, wealth could be gradually equalized and universal happiness achieved. We know that due to the instability of small-scale production and the division of small producers, Martí’s view was merely a utopia, and once implemented, it would become a "land program that promotes the rapid development of capitalism in agriculture." Secondly, Martí lacked a scientific class perspective. Although he recognized the opposition between the poor and the rich, workers and capitalists, he did not understand this as a class contradiction and struggle. Instead, he vulgarized the concept of class, considering it an abstract, moral category rather than an economic, political one. He said: "People can only be divided into two classes: the good class and the bad class," or into "the weak" and "the strong," "the humble" and "the proud." This reflects his humanist ideas. Regarding the evaluation of Marx as a revolutionary leader of the proletariat, Martí believed that Marx was respectable because "he stood on the side of the weak." This shows that Martí did not truly understand the power of the proletariat but mainly sympathized with the most suffering class. At the same time, Martí did not distinguish the proletariat from ordinary workers, failing to see that due to their class position, production practice, and representation of new productive relations, the proletariat possessed a level of discipline and revolutionary potential unmatched by other classes. Instead, he narrowly understood their strength in terms of numbers. It can be seen that Martí’s sympathy for the proletariat and workers was partly rooted in bourgeois humanitarianism. On the other hand, he also thought that Marx "was somewhat eager for quick results" and "should teach people to make amends gently," indicating that although Martí could advocate violent revolution for national independence, his worldview still retained some residual ideas of gradualism and non-violence. Moreover, Martí held ideas of class reconciliation, believing that the Cuban revolution was for "the fair interests of all classes, not just one class." The slogan he proposed—"Together for the benefit of all"—played a progressive role in uniting patriotic forces during the second war of independence but was fundamentally super-class. Due to this super-class perspective, the Cuban Revolutionary Party’s program, which Martí led, did not address land issues—although he personally supported landownership by farmers—and only called for overthrowing Spanish rule and establishing a democratic republic. While some anti-Spanish elements within the landlord class were included, the program overlooked fully mobilizing the peasantry, which was an important reason for the eventual failure of the second independence war, later seized by pro-American forces (despite the main role of American imperialist deception and interference). The contradictions in Martí’s thought stem from his simultaneous sympathy for the working people and his fantasy that Cuba could avoid the social ills and intense class conflicts of developed capitalist countries like the U.S. This was determined by his petty-bourgeois social status and the fact that he had not thoroughly transformed into a proletarian or working-class revolutionary. Of course, his premature sacrifice also prevented him from completing such a transformation. In summary, despite its limitations, Martí remains a great revolutionary democrat and national hero of Cuba. Although he did not claim to be a socialist, he was closer to the masses than Guevara, who called himself a socialist, and played a greater role in Cuba’s national liberation. Some of his valuable qualities are worth our study.It is learned from the standpoint of the proletariat.


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    Lenin: "The Historical Fate of the Marxist Doctrine", Selected Works of Lenin, Volume II, People's Publishing House, 1972.

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  2. >
  3. >

    Mayanzhang: "The Struggle of Marx and Engels Against Bourgeois Democracy", Journal of Peking University, Issue 4, 1976.

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  4. >
  5. >

    Lenin: "The Attitude of the Social Democratic Party Towards the Peasant Movement", Selected Works of Lenin, Volume I, People's Publishing House, 1972.

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  6. >
  7. >

    Mayanzhang: "The Struggle of Marx and Engels Against Bourgeois Democracy", Journal of Peking University, Issue 4, 1976.

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  8. >
  9. >

    Marx: "Class Struggle in France, 1848-1850", Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume I, People's Publishing House, 1972.

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  10. >
  11. >

    Marx and Engels: "The Central Committee's Letter to the Communist League", Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume I, People's Publishing House, 1972.

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  12. >
  13. >

    Marx and Engels: "The Central Committee's Letter to the Communist League", Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume I, People's Publishing House, 1972.

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  14. >
  15. >

    Marx and Engels: "The Communist Manifesto", Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume I, People's Publishing House, 1972.

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  16. >
  17. >

    Dugen: "South and North America", cited from William Foster: "Outline of American Political History", Sanlian Bookstore, 1961.

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  18. >
  19. >

    Peniya's report on the International Economic Conference of the World Federation made in Havana in June 1949, cited from William Foster: "Outline of American Political History", Sanlian Bookstore, 1961.

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  21. >

    William Foster: "Outline of American Political History", Sanlian Bookstore, 1961. (All data in this section, unless otherwise noted, are from this book.)

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  23. >

    Brief World History Compilation Group of Peking University Department of History: "Brief World History", Modern Section, People's Publishing House, 1974.

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  24. >
  25. >

    Kundnira: "An Latin American's Opinion", cited from William Foster: "Outline of American Political History", Sanlian Bookstore, 1961.

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  26. >
  27. >

    Report of the Latin American Labor League Conference held in Cali, Colombia in 1944, cited from William Foster: "Outline of American Political History", Sanlian Bookstore, 1961.

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  29. >

    Mao Zedong: "On United Government", "Selected Works of Mao Zedong", Volume I, People's Publishing House, 1967.

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  30. >
  31. >

    Jose Martí, cited from Wu Jipeng: "Cuban National Hero Jose Martí", 1963, Issue 3, "Historical Education".

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  32. >
  33. >

    Sul, Efran, Nes: "Latin America in the Future World", cited from William Foster: "Outline of American Political History", Sanlian Bookstore, 1961.

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  34. >
  35. >

    Che Guevara: "Motorcycle Diaries".

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  37. >

    Refers to the Loreano Gómez government, which once violently suppressed peasant uprisings.

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    In April 1952, a popular uprising broke out in Bolivia, overthrowing the pro-American military dictatorship of Hugo Balivian, and Estensoro, as a representative of the national bourgeoisie, became president, nationalizing mines and implementing land reforms.

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    Jacobo Arbenz, representing the interests of the national bourgeoisie, pursued a relatively independent foreign policy and more radical land reforms, confiscating 554,000 hectares of land from American United Fruit Company and large landowners. In 1954, under the planning of U.S. imperialism, reactionary military Castillo Armas launched an armed coup to overthrow Arbenz's government.

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  42. >
  43. >

    Joan R. Lafleur: "Che Guevara", People's Publishing House, 1974.

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  44. >
  45. >

    Hong Yuyi: "The Anti-American Liberation Struggles in Brazil, Bolivia, and Guatemala", Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1958.

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  46. >
  47. >

    Marx: "Class Struggle in France, 1848-1850", Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume I, People's Publishing House, 1972.

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  48. >
  49. >

    Che Guevara, cited from Marx: "Che, Armed Struggle and Revolutionary Politics", August 10, 1997, "Voice of Communism".

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  51. >

    Lazaro Cardenas, cited from Alborovitch and Raufrov: "Outline of Modern Mexican History", Sanlian Bookstore, 1974.

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    The idea of his armed struggle, namely the "guerrilla center theory", is non-mass and anti-mass, which we will mention later.

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    The original Cuban Communist Party, founded in 1925, followed the rightist opportunist line of White Labour during World War II, and later degenerated into a revisionist bourgeois social democratic party advocating parliamentary road. During 1940-1944, it supported and participated in Batista's regime, with two senior leaders serving as cabinet ministers. In 1944, it was renamed the People's Socialist Party, allied with the bourgeois party People's Party, and participated in the presidential election. The People's Socialist Party long opposed armed overthrow of Batista's regime, considering Castro's attack on Moncada Barracks in 1953 an "adventurous act", and only formed an alliance with the "July 26 Movement" (Castro faction) and turned to armed struggle just before the victory of the Cuban Revolution. After the victory, the People's Socialist Party became part of Castro's ruling group. In 1961, it joined the United Revolutionary Organization, the predecessor of the Cuban Socialist Revolution Union (1962-1965) and the Communist Party of Cuba (1965-).

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    Li Chunhui: "Outline of the History of Latin American Countries", Commercial Press, 1973.

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  59. >

    Fernando Fureiro, a classmate of Castro at university, cited from Hugh Thomas: "Castro and Cuba", People's Publishing House, 1975.

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  61. >

    Hugh Thomas: "Castro and Cuba", People's Publishing House, 1975.

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    "He (Castro—editor's note) himself has no ill feelings towards Batista, and his father also knew him (Batista—editor's note), and had gratitude towards him". Castro once contacted Batista through his brother-in-law, Diaz Balart, deputy minister of the interior, and said: "If Batista returned with the purpose of armed seizure of power (referring to Batista returning from the U.S. after the 1948 election—editor's note), he could count on his help". (Hugh Thomas: "Castro and Cuba", People's Publishing House, 1975)

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    Later renamed the "July 26th Movement" to commemorate the failed attack on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago, Cuba, led by Castro on July 26, 1953.

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  67. >

    Hugh Thomas: "Castro and Cuba", People's Publishing House, 1975.

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  69. >

    Che Guevara: "Cuba: Pioneer of Anti-Colonial Struggle or Exception in History?", cited from Daniel James: "Che Guevara", People's Publishing House, 1975.

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  71. >

    Primarily the "July 26th Movement" of Castro's faction and the bourgeois pro-American "Second National Front of Escambray", which respectively grew to about 7,000 and 3,000 people before the victory of the December 1958 revolution.

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  73. >

    Che Guevara: "Memoirs of the Cuban Revolutionary War", People's Publishing House, 1975.

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    Anti-Batista student groups, established in 1954, organized a failed attack on Batista's presidential palace on March 13, 1957.

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    Just as Castro was initially not opposed to Batista, in the early days after the revolution's victory, he was also not anti-American. On the contrary, he sought U.S. imperialist support for his regime. In April 1959, without an official invitation, Castro made an eleven-day visit to the U.S., becoming the first country he visited as head of state. During the visit, Castro emphasized that the Cuban revolution "is not red, authoritarian, but olive green, humanitarian", and met with U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon and Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter. However, Castro did not gain favor from U.S. imperialism; Nixon said that Castro "either harbors unbelievable naive ideas about communism or is already under the doctrine of communism". U.S. imperialists, for the following reasons, did not intend to support Castro: the provisional government had not fulfilled its promise of elections, and Castro, controlling the army, was unlikely to become the second Batista; at that time, Castro was gradually approaching the pro-Soviet People's Socialist Party; compared to Castro, they already had more reliable agents in Cuba, such as Urrutia, the first Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, José Miró, former President Prío Socarras, and Gutiérrez Mayeno, leader of the "Second National Front of Escambray".

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  79. >

    1946 "Agricultural Survey", cited from Hugh Thomas: "Castro and Cuba", People's Publishing House, 1975.

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    The second land reform in Cuba in 1963 still allowed private ownership of up to five caballerías, about 1,000 acres, and compensated for expropriated land. It also stipulated that "estates of more than five caballerías that are well-managed and fully cooperate with the state in production and sales will not be expropriated".

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  83. >

    Marx: "Cuba in the 1960s: Bureaucracy Moving Away from Workers Towards 'Communism'", April 20, 1998, "Voice of Communism".

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  85. >

    Che Guevara: "Cuba's Economy—Its Past, Present, and Significance", cited from Daniel James: "Che Guevara", People's Publishing House, 1975.

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  86. >
  87. >

    Daniel James: "Che Guevara", People's Publishing House, 1975.

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  88. >
  89. >

    Daniel James: "Che Guevara", People's Publishing House, 1975.

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  90. >
  91. >

    Same as above.

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  92. >
  93. >

    Che Guevara: "Letter to the People of the World".

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  95. >

    Che Guevara, cited from Daniel James: "Che Guevara", People's Publishing House, 1975.

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  97. >

    In June 1960, the Democratic Republic of the Congo declared independence from Belgium. Patrice Lumumba, representing the national bourgeoisie, was elected as the first Prime Minister, advocating anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, and neutral foreign policies. Between July and September of that year, under armed invasion by U.S. imperialism and its puppet Joseph Mobutu's military coup, Lumumba's government was overthrown, Lumumba was placed under house arrest by the "United Nations forces" manipulated by U.S. imperialism, and later murdered by Moise Tshombe's military group. In August 1961, the U.S. manipulated the establishment of the Cyrille Adoula puppet government, and Lumumba's deputy Antoine Gizenga compromised with imperialist forces, participating in the Adoula regime. In 1963, with the support of the Congolese masses, Lumumba's faction reinitiated armed struggle in eastern and western regions of the country. In November 1965, the main forces of Lumumba's armed faction were jointly suppressed by the Congolese government and U.S. imperialism, but remnants continued fighting for a considerable period.

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  98. >
  99. >

    Peking University Department of International Politics: "History of the International Communist Movement", Volume I, Commercial Press, 1976.

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  101. >

    Che Guevara: "Guerrilla Warfare", People's Publishing House, 1975. (Unless otherwise noted, quotes from Che Guevara in this section are from this book.)

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  103. >

    Funeisu: "Creative Experience of the Modern Revolutionary Opera ."

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  105. >

    Engels: "The Failure of the Piedmont Army", Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume I, People's Publishing House, 1972.

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  106. id="post-976-footnote-54"

    Mao Zedong: "May Fourth Movement," "Selected Works of Mao Zedong," Volume One, People's Publishing House, 1967.

  107. Marx and Engels: "Letter from the Central Committee to the Communist League," "Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Volume One, People's Publishing House, 1972.

  108. Zhang Chunqiao: "On the Comprehensive Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie," 1975, No. 4 of "Red Flag" magazine.

  109. Marx: "Trial of Gotschak and His Comrades," "Collected Works of Marx and Engels," Volume Six, People's Publishing House, 1961.

  110. In March 1959, Guevara, pretending to be ill, moved into a villa formerly owned by a provincial governor from the Batista era. According to his salary as an officer, he could not have rented such a luxurious house. Only after being publicly exposed by political enemies did Guevara have to promise, "Once my health improves a bit, I will move out of this villa." (Józef Rózsa Laffleritzki: "Biography of Guevara," People's Publishing House, 1974)

  111. Cuba implemented a rationing system for food for a period. When a subordinate complained that the food ration was too small, Guevara angrily stated, "His family has never felt that food was insufficient," and it was found that his family enjoyed a higher quota than the average family. (Józef Rózsa Laffleritzki: "Biography of Guevara," People's Publishing House, 1974)

  112. Guevara advocated a reactionary bourgeois water cupism in sexual relations. He once said: "No one has ever stipulated that a man must spend his entire life with the same woman... Marxism is not Puritanism." Guevara had four publicly known wives or lovers, and countless other immoral behaviors such as extramarital affairs. During a visit to Egypt, Guevara even planned to engage in prostitution in front of Egyptian officials, and shamelessly asked security guards afterward to "bring in a few more girls like this." (Shi Yonggang, Zhan Juan: "Caricature of Che Guevara," Writer's Publishing House, 2005)

  113. 1817 population survey data.

  114. José Martí: "Suddenly a Deep Red Light," "Selected Poems of Martí," People's Literature Publishing House, 1958.

  115. José Martí: "Cuba's Political Prison," cited from Chen Jiarong: "José Martí," Commercial Press, 1962. (Unless otherwise noted, the following words by Martí are from this book.)

  116. José Martí: "Cuba's Political Prisoners' Hard Labor." (Different translation of the same article as the previous note.)

  117. José Martí: "My Race."

  118. José Martí: "Mourning Marx," cited from Chen Jiarong: "José Martí," Commercial Press, 1962.

  119. José Martí: "Abdala," "Selected Poems of Martí," People's Literature Publishing House, 1958.

  120. Li Chunhui: "Outline of Latin American Countries," Volume One, Commercial Press, 1973.

  121. Lu Xun: "Written Behind ."

  122. José Martí, cited from Requino Pedroso: "Let Him Continue to Live in the Heart of the Motherland—Speech at the 110th Anniversary Commemoration of Cuban National Hero José Martí."

  123. Vladimir Lenin: "Democracy and Populism in China," "Selected Works of Lenin," Volume Two, People's Publishing House, 1972.

  124. José Martí: "Mourning Marx."

  125. "In this country of many workers (referring to the United States—editor's note), the workers' alliance will be immensely powerful." (José Martí, cited from Requino Pedroso: "Let Him Continue to Live in the Heart of the Motherland—Speech at the 110th Anniversary Commemoration of Cuban National Hero José Martí")

  126. José Martí: "Mourning Marx."

  127. José Martí, cited from "Selected Poems and Writings of José Martí."

15 Likes

Seeing these words, I was truly moved by Marty’s compassion for the oppressed people.

11 Likes

Though the cold stars do not notice, I offer my blood to honor Xuanyuan!

7 Likes

It’s too reactionary, saying “I am also one in fourteen million, why do I not feel oppressed.”

5 Likes