Biography of Hong Rengan — Tempered by Wind and Frost, Preserving a Noble Spirit
The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was the prelude to China’s modern democratic revolution, the most thorough democratic revolution led by the peasant class in modern China, and also the highest peak of peasant wars throughout Chinese history. In the Taiping Revolution, the utopian communist ideas expressed by Chinese peasant revolutionaries shone with the brilliance of the struggle and wisdom of the Chinese nation’s people. It embodied the highest achievements of peasant revolutions in China over two thousand years, making particularly outstanding contributions in politics, economy, military, and ideology. The revolutionary spirit of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom has always been a treasured spiritual legacy of our association. Recently, I have studied many historical materials about the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, especially focusing on the experiences and thoughts of the important military and political leader in its later period — King Gan Hong Rengan, and have gained some detailed understanding. After the restoration of capitalism by the Qing, they began to vigorously promote a idealist heroic history view, heavily emphasizing the history of emperors and generals, elevating their ancestors — Confucianists, murderers, and reactionaries. Particularly reactionary is that the reactionary restoration group maliciously denigrates and insults heroic figures of the exploited classes, even tarnishing those who historically played progressive roles, mainly the legalist landlord class. Today’s Chinese society still popularizes the praise of emperors, generals, talented scholars, and beautiful women. However, world history is created by the people, by the hundreds of millions of oppressed and exploited classes. Many names of heroic peasant revolutionaries have been buried, but as Marxists who adhere to historical materialism, we must turn this page, restore the honor to the heroes who created our great Chinese civilization!
Preface
The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom revolution was the first democratic revolution in modern Chinese history, the highest peak of peasant revolution, and a great practice of the utopian communist ideals of revolutionary peasants. Hong Rengan (1822-1864) was a great leader of this revolution, an important leader in its later stages, and one of the core figures of the Taiping government. The “Zi Zheng Xin Pian” (New Essays on Political Economy) promulgated by Hong Rengan was China’s earliest capitalist reform program. Hong Rengan’s reforms marked the first attempt by modern Chinese to develop capitalism independently. Not only was Hong Rengan a great politician, but also a great thinker, philosopher, educator, and military strategist. He was the earliest member of the “Bai Shang Di Jiao” (God Worshipping Sect), the peasant revolutionary ideological organization created by Hong Xiuquan. Later, he absorbed Western scientific and cultural knowledge in Hong Kong, further developing revolutionary ideas during the struggle, and proposed the great ideal of “New Heaven, New Earth, New People, New World.” In philosophy, Hong Rengan played various roles in the revolutionary thought of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, inheriting Hong Xiuquan’s line from pantheism to atheism, vigorously opposing religious superstition and idol worship that maintained feudal rule with militant atheism; he emphasized the subjective initiative of people, inheriting Hong Xiuquan’s revolutionary dialectic from darkness to light, and especially stressing that the conditions for contradictions and change depend on human subjective effort; he particularly emphasized ideological struggle, especially in the ideological transformation of intellectuals, focusing on the dictatorship in the realm of ideology, and authored articles such as “Ying Jie Gui Zhen” (Heroes Return to Truth), “Ke Di You Huo Lun” (On Temptation to the Enemy), and “Quan Jie Shi Zi Wu Yao” (Five Essentials for Advising Scholars). Hong Rengan advocated revolutionary reform in education, like Hong Xiuquan, vigorously promoting literary reform, and he himself left a large number of poems expressing revolutionary aspirations, making him a pioneer of China’s modern vernacular movement. He believed that reading should serve the practical struggle, and that both education and literature should serve politics. In military affairs, Hong Rengan also made outstanding contributions to the Taiping revolution. Although he joined the revolution relatively late and lacked military experience, he grew rapidly through military activities in the later stages, playing a significant role. He devised strategic plans for the second campaign against Jiangnan and the second Western expedition, personally led troops in combat, and later led reinforcements during the Anqing relief battle. During the Tianjing crisis, Hong Rengan risked his life multiple times traveling to various places to summon troops and lift the siege of Tianjing. Despite holding high positions, he never sought personal enjoyment, remained loyal to the revolution, focused on uniting revolutionary cadres, and had a deep friendship with King Ying — Chen Yucheng. Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng continually proposed strengthening centralization and opposing tendencies toward division during the later reforms of the Taiping government. They formed the two major pillars of the late Taiping regime, one civil and one military.
Same Aspiration as Southern King, Enduring Through Time
Hong Rengan, from Huaxian County, Guangdong, was born into a poor peasant family in Guanlu Bu Village. He was a cousin of the Taiping Heavenly King Hong Xiuquan. At age eight, Hong Rengan entered a private school, later studied with Hong Xiuquan for a year, and at twenty-two, became a school teacher. Like Hong Xiuquan, Hong Rengan grew up in a poor rural area, interacted deeply with impoverished farmers from a young age, and lived a frugal life. Even while studying and teaching, he participated in agricultural labor and maintained close ties with the common farmers.
Hong Rengan’s hometown was on the outskirts of Guangzhou, where people had long suffered from the brutal exploitation by Qing landlords and the oppression of foreign capitalist invaders rampant everywhere. Class and national contradictions were extremely sharp. During the Opium War, the Qing government conscripted troops and forcibly requisitioned grain in the regions of Liangguang and Hunan, causing great damage to the local economy and further burdening the people’s lives. Many peasant families were torn apart by conscription or bankrupted by forced silver and grain requisitions, with wives separated from husbands and families destroyed. After the Opium War, the shameful Qing government, to pay indemnities of 21 million silver dollars to Britain and the war expenses of over 70 million taels of silver, intensified exploitation of impoverished farmers. The long-standing opium trade led to large outflows of silver, and after the war, the Qing government was forced to fully open opium trade, worsening the disparity between silver and copper coins—silver became more expensive, and copper coins cheaper. The exchange rate between silver and copper coins reached 1 liang of silver to 2,300 wen of copper, 130% higher than the official ratio of 1:1000 set by the Qing. Farmers had to pay taxes in silver, and the grains they painstakingly harvested had to be sold for copper coins, which were then converted into silver to pay taxes to the government. In other words, the tax burden on farmers increased by 130% (and actually much more). Meanwhile, the decayed Qing regime maintained heavy exploitation of farmers and promoted Confucian doctrines to uphold the reactionary feudal hierarchy of “respect for elders and obedience to superiors,” enforcing the four shackles of regime, divine authority, clan authority, and husband authority to control the people, aiming to maintain the stability of feudal society—an evil act of “killing with reason!”
Growing up and studying in impoverished rural areas, witnessing these dark phenomena firsthand, Hong Rengan deeply felt the suffering of the people living on the brink of death and harbored profound sympathy for the farmers. Filled with rage against the reactionary and corrupt Qing government, he was soon influenced by his elder brother Hong Xiuquan’s revolutionary ideas, accepted the revolutionary principles of the God Worshipping Sect, and recognized that “When chaos reaches its extreme, order will follow; when darkness is at its peak, light will come! This is the way of Heaven!” \[①\]. The darkness and decay of Qing rule were the last frenzy of reactionary landlords. A bright world could only be created by revolutionary farmers’ own hands! Hong Rengan immediately joined Hong Xiuquan’s actions, destroying the Confucian altar in their village and openly declaring war on the feudal order under the rule of Confucianism and filial piety.
The revolutionary actions of Hong Rengan and Hong Xiuquan shocked the local landlords and gentry of Guanlu Bu. These landlords and wealthy gentry attacked the revolutionary forces, forcing Hong Rengan and Hong Xiuquan to rewrite poetry or couplets to praise idols \[②\], which was sternly rejected. Enraged and ashamed, the gentry used their “bowl” (threats) to pressure them, resulting in Hong Rengan and Hong Xiuquan being expelled from their teaching positions. Hong Rengan, after destroying the Confucian altar, lost his teaching job, was beaten with sticks by his own brother, torn clothes, and even expelled from his family. However, Hong Rengan was not defeated by the feudal forces and old family hardships; he continued to fight alongside Hong Xiuquan, refused to yield to oppression, abandoned his teaching career, left his hometown, and went out to propagate revolutionary ideas and develop revolutionary organizations.
After leaving home, Hong Rengan spread revolutionary principles while continuing to teach, preparing for the subsequent peasant revolutionary movement led by Hong Xiuquan. During the Jintian uprising, Hong Xiuquan planned to support Hong Rengan’s arrival at the base for joint uprising. Unfortunately, due to heavy Qing military blockades, Hong Rengan missed the Taiping uprising, and Qing forces also deployed troops to hunt down Hong Xiuquan’s family, forcing Hong Rengan to hide and flee. Nevertheless, Hong Rengan never gave up participating in the revolution, always seeking opportunities to join the Taiping revolutionary forces. In 1852, King Hong Xiuquan sent Jiang Longchang back to Guangdong to support the unaccompanied members of the God Worshipping Sect to meet at Yong’an with the main army. Later, Jiang Longchang and local members decided to hold a local uprising to expand the force and respond to the Taiping revolution. Hong Rengan also participated in mobilization and preparations. However, due to the urgent situation, Jiang Longchang led over two hundred people to initiate an uprising without sufficient preparation, which was quickly suppressed by the Qing army. When Hong Rengan arrived with a handful of followers, the uprising had already failed, and he and others were arrested by reactionary Qing officials. After escaping from detention, Hong Rengan, with the help of the masses, endured many hardships and eventually reached Hong Kong, where he was cared for by Swedish missionary Han Shanwen.
However, foreign missionaries were the vanguard of imperialist invasion of China—they came mainly to spy, collude with Qing traitors, spread religion, and lull the people into complacency, experts in cultural invasion. When they learned that Hong Rengan was the cousin of Taiping Heavenly King Hong Xiuquan, they paid special attention to him, trying to indoctrinate him with Western culture, especially Christianity that protected the interests of the exploiting classes, hoping he could help disintegrate the revolution within the Taiping regime or even turn it into a puppet government for Western imperialists. Because Hong Rengan separated from the revolutionary forces early and lacked experience in revolutionary struggles, especially in fighting foreign invaders, and lacked a scientific understanding of foreign missionaries, he was influenced by Western bourgeois culture while studying Western natural sciences and political systems. In 1853, Hong Rengan was baptized by foreign missionaries in Hong Kong and became a Christian. At that time, he still naïvely believed that the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom shared the same faith in God as Western countries and opposed feudal rule, pursuing civilization. Under the influence of missionaries, he regarded them as friends and told them many early stories of the Taiping revolution, hoping they would support the revolution.
Though based in Hong Kong, Hong Rengan’s heart was with his revolutionary homeland. Day and night, he longed to go to Tianjing to serve the revolution. In 1854, with the help of missionary Han Shanwen, Hong Rengan set out from Hong Kong by sea to Shanghai, aiming to further enter Taiping territory. However, at that time, the Taiping could not break the Qing siege, and the routes through Suzhou and Changzhou to Tianjing were controlled by Qing forces, so the road was blocked. Moreover, foreigners were unwilling to risk taking Hong Rengan to Tianjing. He had to seek help from the Xiaodaohui (Knife Society) uprising in Shanghai, but they did not believe he was the cousin of the Heavenly King, and the plan failed. After hitting a wall, Hong Rengan stayed in a Western-style building in Shanghai, studying astronomy and calendar reform, laying the foundation for future calendar reforms in the Taiping regime. That winter, Hong Rengan returned to Hong Kong to continue learning Western sciences, preparing to serve the Taiping revolution. He believed that Heavenly King Hong Xiuquan “started the revolution before, I can continue it afterward,” and always believed he could make a great contribution to the revolution someday. During his visit to Shanghai, he heard many developments of the Taiping revolution, was full of ambition, and on the return voyage, composed a poem praising the revolution:
Sails like arrows, fighting fierce waves,
The wind follows, ambitions more grand.
The sea becomes a battlefield, waves arrayed,
Stars and moon reflect the banners’ brand.
Driving fiercely across islands, flying thousands of miles,
Angrily battling the fierce beasts, the six dragons flee.
Triumph in four days, joy in victory,
The army’s roar still loud and lively.
In June 1858, during the second Opium War entering its second phase, the corrupt and incompetent Qing government was retreating step by step. British colonizers aimed to divide and weaken China’s resistance, trying to implement “using Chinese to control Chinese” and “divide and conquer,” to realize their colonial ambitions. The British invaders hoped Hong Rengan would help them, believing that his exposure to Western culture and his devout Christianity could help them influence the Taiping regime from within, and even turn it into a puppet for Western colonization, so they “funded” his return to Tianjing. History proved that reactionaries always shoot themselves in the foot; the British colonizers’ intentions to harm others ultimately harmed themselves. Hong Rengan not only refused to fulfill the invaders’ wishes but also carried out bold reforms in the Taiping regime, resisting foreign pressure and leading the soldiers to decisively defeat Qing traitor armies and foreign devils.
Finally, Hong Rengan, eager to realize his return to his revolutionary homeland, embarked on his journey home with passionate resolve. Before leaving, he composed a poem to express his ambitions to make a great contribution to the revolution:
Farewell in Hong Kong \[③\]_ftn3)
Lying by the pillow, I hear the wild geese southward flying; I rise to see the sails on both banks shining bright. Not yet taking up the pipa to bid farewell, I just recite poetry to bolster my resolve.
Deep meaning in spring grass, waves of color arise; the land separated by mountains and passes, yet the geese have feelings. Wave your sleeve and set sail, do not look back; heroes are free to roam from now on.
Hong Rengan set out from Hong Kong, passing through Guangdong, Jiangxi, Hubei, Anhui, and continued in disguise as a merchant within the Qing Dynasty’s domain. After nine months of hardships and dangers, he finally arrived at Tianjing in March 1859.
At this time, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom had experienced several storms and heavy rains, suffering attacks from internal and external enemies, especially from internal traitors and factions seeking division. Politically and militarily, it was in crisis. In 1856, the Eastern King Yang Xiuqing, driven by greed and ambition in the revolutionary war, influenced by Confucian and Mencian doctrines, launched a coup (forcing Hong Xiuquan to personally crown him “Wansui”). Traitor Wei Changhui took advantage of this, claiming to “support the emperor,” and murdered Yang Xiuqing and his family, along with many officials loyal to the Eastern King. The Northern King Wei Changhui also exploited his armed forces to expand chaos, dreaming of seizing power in one stroke, slaughtering over thirty thousand revolutionary officials within Tianjing, causing enormous damage to the revolution, damage that external enemies could not have inflicted.
In the critical moment, Hong Xiuquan mobilized the Tianjing revolutionary army and civilians to resist Wei Changhui’s counterrevolutionary riot and executed this traitor. However, another ambitious man, King Shi Dakai, who had seized high positions within the Taiping government, took advantage of this opportunity to rush back to Tianjing, aiming to oust the King and monopolize the government. At that time, Shi Dakai spread reactionary Confucian ideas of benevolent governance, colluding with the reactionary landlord class under revolutionary dictatorship, attempting to bribe and co-opt revolutionary officials with titles, salaries, and virtue, planning a coup to overthrow the Taiping revolutionary regime!
Hong Xiuquan, wise and perceptive, uncovered Shi Dakai’s conspiracy, personally presiding over military and political affairs, denying him military power, and keeping him in the city to prevent him from splitting the movement. Shi Dakai’s ambitions failed, and he resorted to despicable deception, posting notices insulting Hong Xiuquan as “jealous of meritorious ministers,” undermining central authority, and inciting splitism; meanwhile, he claimed to be loyal to the Taiping revolution, claiming he would split off to repay “Heaven’s grace.”
Under the temptation of this treacherous, scheming Shi Dakai, many unaware soldiers and revolutionaries were deceived, and over 100,000 elite Taiping troops defected to him as his private army!
After the Tianjing Incident, the military situation rapidly deteriorated, with Qing forces from both east and west attacking. The Qing emperor Xianfeng issued arrogant orders to “take advantage of internal chaos and subdue them one by one.” Under the stronger enemy and weaker ourselves, key military strongholds fell one after another: Wuchang and Hanyang in Hubei, Jiujiang in the middle reaches, Anqing in An province was besieged, and loyal soldiers sacrificed one after another. Despite victories such as the Battle of Sanhe and the second victory at Jiangbei, the military situation remained passive. Jiujiang’s fall left Anqing as the only fortress defending Tianjing in the west, with the enemy establishing a camp near Xiaolingwei, surrounding Tianjing with trenches, putting the revolution at great risk.
Supreme Advisor of the Heavenly Kingdom, Prime Minister of State Affairs
At this critical juncture, Hong Rengan overcame difficulties and hurried to Tianjing to save the dying kingdom. Hong Xiuquan personally received this learned and loyal brother and comrade, overjoyed. After meeting Hong Rengan, Hong Xiuquan talked with him extensively, repeatedly explaining his analysis of the revolution’s situation and plans for future reforms.
Hong Rengan, having participated in peasant revolts, with firm stance, and possessing deep knowledge of Chinese culture as well as Western scientific knowledge, gained high recognition and appreciation from Hong Xiuquan for his foresight. As a result, Hong Rengan was rapidly promoted within a month. On March 13, he was granted the title of Gan Tian Fu; on March 29, promoted to Gan Tian Yi, and appointed as the commander of the Imperial Guard of the Nine Gates; on April 1, he was specially appointed as the chief military advisor to the court and top supporter of the imperial line.
Hong Rengan was granted the title of Gan Wang (Duke of Gan) and served as military advisor, holding the position of Supreme Advisor of the Heavenly Kingdom, responsible for overseeing national affairs. Hong Xiuquan personally issued an imperial decree “to decree to the world, requiring all officials to obey his system”[⑤], commanding officials at all levels to follow the orders of Gan Wang. Hong Xiuquan trusted Hong Rengan immensely, disregarding Li Xiucheng’s opposition, and specially appointed him as Gan Wang and military advisor, praising him in the “Decree of Enfeoffment of Gan Wang” as “truly sharing the same will as the Southern King, enduring forever” and “Loyal ministers in chaos, a model for eternity”[⑥].
Meanwhile, on Hong Rengan’s advice, Hong Xiuquan also enfeoffed Chen Yucheng as Ying Wang (Hero King), who by then was the highest-ranking general fighting outside, effectively commanding the entire Taiping army. This was a deep realization by Hong Xiuquan after the Tianjing Incident of the seriousness of internal factional struggle, and an important step to strengthen central authority and suppress the reactionary restoration forces represented by Li Xiucheng. Hong Xiuquan placed great hopes on Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, considering them the backbone of the revolutionary regime, personally issuing orders: “Matters within the capital not decided shall be asked of Gan Wang; outside the capital, matters not decided shall be asked of Ying Wang.”
However, the faction led by Li Xiucheng and others, representing feudalism, had already seized some power within the Taiping regime, constantly seeking to expand landlord privileges and restore feudalism, fiercely opposing the revolutionary faction represented by Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, and attempting to weaken central authority. Before Hong Rengan’s enfeoffment, Li Xiucheng spread false rumors among generals, strongly opposing Hong Xiuquan’s decision, criticizing Hong Rengan for being disconnected from the revolution and for not having achieved merit before being enfeoffed. After Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng were enfeoffed, Li Xiucheng remained discontent, with traitorous thoughts growing wildly, secretly communicating with traitors like Li Shouzhao, preparing to rebel at any moment.
Hong Xiuquan, sensing Li Xiucheng’s abnormality, considering the urgent revolutionary situation and Li Xiucheng’s armed independence, aimed to stabilize him and save his political life, giving him a chance to reform. Hong Xiuquan specially promoted Li Xiucheng to Zhong Wang (Loyal King), indicating his loyalty to the revolution. To limit Li Xiucheng’s power, Hong Xiuquan also adopted the strategy of “building vassal princes to weaken their strength,” granting many enfeoffments, which backfired, weakening central authority instead.
This was not due to personal mistake by Hong Xiuquan but rooted in profound political and economic causes. Although the Taiping revolutionary government attempted to establish a land public ownership economy, it was incompatible with feudal society. After the revolution’s establishment, external enemies and internal traitors kept the military situation tense. The fight against feudal land ownership was incomplete, and internal corrupt elements seized military power amidst the chaos, forming an unstoppable trend.
While the Taiping revolution fought against landlord land ownership and redistributed land to poor farmers, the peasant class did not represent new productive relations and could not transition to capitalism or socialism. On the basis of small landholdings, polarization resumed, and new feudalism and landlord classes emerged. These conditions created fertile ground for feudal restoration, enabling traitor groups like Li Xiucheng to expand. Hong Xiuquan, as a revolutionary intellectual of the peasant class, lacked a scientific worldview, unable to transcend the limitations of his era and class to understand the class nature of internal factional struggles, and could not properly analyze the political and economic roots, thus failing to restrict the rise of feudalists.
Before Hong Rengan returned to China, Hong Xiuquan had begun planning “reform and renewal”—comprehensive reforms of the military and political system—to restore national strength, boost morale, eliminate Qing enemies, and realize the ideal of Taiping unification. Promoting Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, reestablishing the core leadership of the Taiping military and government, and strengthening revolutionary forces was the first step in this reform. Hong Xiuquan’s trust in Hong Rengan was not only because of his loyalty but also because of his Western learning, political vision, and profound understanding of Taiping revolutionary philosophy. The hope for comprehensive reform was placed on Hong Rengan.
“Entrusted in the face of defeat, given orders in peril.”[⑧] Hong Rengan indeed lived up to expectations, proposing a series of comprehensive reforms with capitalist characteristics shortly after returning to Tianjing, summarized in a series of writings, most notably China’s first modern reform plan—“New Political Treatise” (Zizheng Xin Pian). In this work, Hong Rengan clearly states that his purpose in returning to Tianjing was not for personal gain but to propose reforms for Hong Xiuquan’s reference and decision, aiming to restore national governance. The principle of reform in the “New Political Treatise” is “to adapt to the times, assess the situation, and act accordingly”[⑩], which at that time meant referencing Western political systems and science, leading the revolution with Taiping philosophy, and combining Chinese national characteristics to reform politics, economy, military, diplomacy, and culture, aspiring to realize the ideal of “new heaven, new earth, new people, new world”[⑪].
First, in the “New Political Treatise,” Hong Rengan proposed to rectify thoughts, strengthen discipline, centralize authority, and eliminate factionalism, consolidating the peasant revolutionary regime. He was deeply concerned about the laxity and disorganization in the Taiping revolutionary forces after the Tianjing Incident, sharply pointing out: the Taiping army in early revolution “expanded territory rapidly, with a momentum of a hundred miles a day”; but later, it suffered setbacks, with “advancing an inch and retreating a foot, losing the glory of victory”. The problem was that the early Taiping was “at will, like fingers on a hand,” but later, it was “dying and reborn, with command divided among various armies”[⑫]. He recognized clearly that the core issue was the resurgence of feudal and separatist forces, severely weakening central authority.
Regarding some ambitious leaders forming factions and sects, Hong Rengan strongly opposed and warned sharply:
“If there are alliances and factions, it is a skill for the lower to secure themselves, relying on private backing, and externally pretending to serve the public while secretly exploiting weaknesses for personal gain. This makes it difficult for generals to follow military law; for ministers, it undermines the ruler’s authority. Good citizens may wish to rely on the ruler sincerely, but are helplessly isolated, which must be carefully examined.”[⑬]
In other words, if figures like Li Xiucheng seize military and political power and secretly form factions, they will develop personal political and military strength to oppose central authority, leading to chaos and weakening the revolution. Such behavior would hinder military operations and allow ambitious officials to usurp power. When this happens, even loyal soldiers and civilians would be controlled and isolated by traitors, posing grave danger. Hong Rengan’s foresight in predicting the betrayal of Li Xiucheng and others was wise.
To counter this, Hong Rengan proposed specific measures to strengthen centralization and limit personal power. “From the great to the small, from top to bottom, authority should be unified in one, ensuring internal and external harmony and broad participation.” Power should be centralized, prohibiting dual commands; “Establish provincial, prefectural, and county treasuries… aside from salaries, any embezzlement or bribery should be punished by law,” and “Establish markets and tax management… any private enrichment or embezzlement should be punished.” Local taxes and tariffs should be managed by state institutions, with strict laws against private appropriation.
In construction, “buildings should not be carved or ornate, resembling imperial palaces or temples,” and if luxurious or beyond regulation, “complaints should be filed, and officials dismissed and punished.” Private visits and gatherings should be banned to prevent corruption and the sale of official titles, with strict penalties for violations.
Hong Rengan also advocated establishing a national postal system, newspapers, and independent news agencies, allowing the public to freely express opinions and monitor government, achieving “public opinion openly, from the masses to officials, with no obstruction or corruption.”[⑭]
Regarding some Taiping soldiers and officials pursuing fame, profit, and power, Hong Rengan pointed out that some “seek promotion as a badge of honor, changing titles multiple times in a year without satisfaction”[⑮].
Because the Taiping regime was based on small land private ownership, it could not prevent polarization and feudal relations from developing further. The peasant class’s limitations as small producers meant feudal legal rights persisted within the revolutionary army, with bureaucratic and noble privileges. This created fertile ground for feudal restoration, allowing traitors like Li Xiucheng to expand. Hong Xiuquan, as a revolutionary intellectual of the peasant class, lacked a scientific worldview, unable to see the class nature of internal struggles, and failed to properly analyze the roots, thus unable to restrict the rise of feudalists.
Before Hong Rengan’s return, Hong Xiuquan had begun planning “reform and renewal”—comprehensive reforms of the military and political system—to restore strength, morale, eliminate Qing enemies, and realize the unification of Taiping. Promoting Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, reestablishing the core leadership, and strengthening revolutionary forces was the first step. Hong Xiuquan’s trust in Hong Rengan was not only because of his loyalty but also because of his Western knowledge, political vision, and deep understanding of revolutionary philosophy. The hope for reform was placed on Hong Rengan.
“Entrusted in the face of defeat, given orders in peril.”[⑧] Hong Rengan, true to expectations, soon proposed a comprehensive reform plan with capitalist features, summarized in a series of writings, most notably China’s first modern reform plan—“New Political Treatise” (Zizheng Xin Pian). In it, he explicitly states that his purpose in returning is not for personal gain but to suggest reforms for Hong Xiuquan’s decision, aiming to restore governance. The principle of reform is “to adapt to the times, assess the situation, and act accordingly”[⑩], which at that time meant referencing Western political systems and science, leading the revolution with Taiping philosophy, and combining Chinese characteristics to reform politics, economy, military, diplomacy, and culture, aspiring to realize the ideal of “new heaven, new earth, new people, new world”[⑪].
First, in the “New Political Treatise,” Hong Rengan proposed to rectify thoughts, strengthen discipline, centralize authority, and eliminate factionalism, consolidating the peasant revolutionary regime. He was deeply worried about the laxity and disorganization after the Tianjing Incident, sharply pointing out: the Taiping army in early revolution “expanded territory rapidly, with a momentum of a hundred miles a day”; but later, it suffered setbacks, with “advancing an inch and retreating a foot, losing the glory of victory”. The core issue was that early Taiping was “at will, like fingers on a hand,” but later, it was “dying and reborn, with command divided among various armies”[⑫]. He recognized clearly that the problem was the rise of feudal and separatist forces, severely weakening central authority.
Regarding ambitious leaders forming factions, Hong Rengan strongly opposed and issued a warning:
“If there are alliances and factions, it is a skill for the lower to secure themselves, relying on private backing, and externally pretending to serve the public while secretly exploiting weaknesses for personal gain. This makes it difficult for generals to follow military law; for ministers, it undermines the ruler’s authority. Good citizens may wish to rely on the ruler sincerely, but are helplessly isolated, which must be carefully examined.”[⑬]
In essence, if figures like Li Xiucheng seize military and political power and secretly form factions, they will develop personal strength to oppose central authority, leading to chaos and undermining the revolution. Such behavior would hinder military operations and allow ambitious officials to usurp power. When this happens, even loyal soldiers and civilians would be controlled and isolated by traitors, posing grave danger. Hong Rengan’s foresight in predicting this was wise.
To counteract, Hong Rengan proposed specific measures to strengthen centralization and limit personal power. “From the great to the small, from top to bottom, authority should be unified in one, ensuring internal and external harmony and broad participation.” Power should be centralized, prohibiting dual commands; “Establish provincial, prefectural, and county treasuries… aside from salaries, any embezzlement or bribery should be punished by law,” and “Establish markets and tax management… any private enrichment or embezzlement should be punished.” Local taxes and tariffs should be managed by state institutions, with strict laws against private appropriation.
In construction, “buildings should not be carved or ornate, resembling imperial palaces or temples,” and if luxurious or beyond regulation, “complaints should be filed, and officials dismissed and punished.” Private visits and gatherings should be banned to prevent corruption and the sale of official titles, with strict penalties for violations.
Hong Rengan also proposed establishing a national postal system, newspapers, and independent news agencies, allowing the public to freely express opinions and monitor government, achieving “public opinion openly, from the masses to officials, with no obstruction or corruption.”[⑭]
Regarding some Taiping soldiers and officials pursuing fame, profit, and power, Hong Rengan pointed out that some “seek promotion as a badge of honor, changing titles multiple times in a year without satisfaction”[⑮].
Because the regime was based on small land private ownership, it could not prevent polarization and feudal relations from developing further. The peasant class’s limitations as small producers meant feudal legal rights persisted within the revolutionary army, with bureaucratic and noble privileges. This created fertile ground for feudal restoration, allowing traitors like Li Xiucheng to expand. Hong Xiuquan, as a revolutionary peasant intellectual, lacked a scientific worldview, unable to see the class nature of internal struggles, and failed to analyze roots properly, thus unable to restrict feudalists.
Before Hong Rengan’s return, Hong Xiuquan had begun planning “reform and renewal”—comprehensive reforms of the military and political system—to restore strength, morale, eliminate Qing enemies, and realize unification. Promoting Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, reestablishing core leadership, and strengthening revolutionary forces was the first step. Hong Xiuquan’s trust in Hong Rengan was not only because of loyalty but also because of his Western knowledge, political vision, and deep understanding of revolutionary philosophy. The hope for reform was placed on Hong Rengan.
“Entrusted in the face of defeat, given orders in peril.”[⑧] Hong Rengan, true to expectations, soon proposed a comprehensive reform plan with capitalist features, summarized in a series of writings, most notably China’s first modern reform plan—“New Political Treatise” (Zizheng Xin Pian). In it, he explicitly states that his purpose in returning is not for personal gain but to suggest reforms for Hong Xiuquan’s decision, aiming to restore governance. The reform principle is “to adapt to the times, assess the situation, and act accordingly”[⑩], which at that time meant referencing Western political systems and science, leading the revolution with Taiping philosophy, and combining Chinese characteristics to reform politics, economy, military, diplomacy, and culture, aspiring to realize the ideal of “new heaven, new earth, new people, new world”[⑪].
First, in the “New Political Treatise,” Hong Rengan proposed to rectify thoughts, strengthen discipline, centralize authority, and eliminate factionalism, consolidating the peasant revolutionary regime. He was deeply worried about the laxity and disorganization after the Tianjing Incident, sharply pointing out: the Taiping army in early revolution “expanded territory rapidly, with a momentum of a hundred miles a day”; but later, it suffered setbacks, with “advancing an inch and retreating a foot, losing the glory of victory”. The core issue was that early Taiping was “at will, like fingers on a hand,” but later, it was “dying and reborn, with command divided among various armies”[⑫]. He recognized clearly that the problem was the rise of feudal and separatist forces, severely weakening central authority.
Regarding ambitious leaders forming factions, Hong Rengan strongly opposed and issued a warning:
“If there are alliances and factions, it is a skill for the lower to secure themselves, relying on private backing, and externally pretending to serve the public while secretly exploiting weaknesses for personal gain. This makes it difficult for generals to follow military law; for ministers, it undermines the ruler’s authority. Good citizens may wish to rely on the ruler sincerely, but are helplessly isolated, which must be carefully examined.”[⑬]
In essence, if figures like Li Xiucheng seize military and political power and secretly form factions, they will develop personal strength to oppose central authority, leading to chaos and undermining the revolution. Such behavior would hinder military operations and allow ambitious officials to usurp power. When this happens, even loyal soldiers and civilians would be controlled and isolated by traitors, posing grave danger. Hong Rengan’s foresight in predicting this was wise.
To counteract, Hong Rengan proposed specific measures to strengthen centralization and limit personal power. “From the great to the small, from top to bottom, authority should be unified in one, ensuring internal and external harmony and broad participation.” Power should be centralized, prohibiting dual commands; “Establish provincial, prefectural, and county treasuries… aside from salaries, any embezzlement or bribery should be punished by law,” and “Establish markets and tax management… any private enrichment or embezzlement should be punished.” Local taxes and tariffs should be managed by state institutions, with strict laws against private appropriation.
In construction, “buildings should not be carved or ornate, resembling imperial palaces or temples,” and if luxurious or beyond regulation, “complaints should be filed, and officials dismissed and punished.” Private visits and gatherings should be banned to prevent corruption and the sale of official titles, with strict penalties for violations.
Hong Rengan also proposed establishing a national postal system, newspapers, and independent news agencies, allowing the public to freely express opinions and monitor government, achieving “public opinion openly, from the masses to officials, with no obstruction or corruption.”[⑭]
Regarding some Taiping soldiers and officials pursuing fame, profit, and power, Hong Rengan pointed out that some “seek promotion as a badge of honor, changing titles multiple times in a year without satisfaction”[⑮].
Because the regime was based on small land private ownership, it could not prevent polarization and feudal relations from developing further. The peasant class’s limitations as small producers meant feudal legal rights persisted within the revolutionary army, with bureaucratic and noble privileges. This created fertile ground for feudal restoration, allowing traitors like Li Xiucheng to expand. Hong Xiuquan, as a revolutionary peasant intellectual, lacked a scientific worldview, unable to see the class nature of internal struggles, and failed to analyze roots properly, thus unable to restrict feudalists.
Before Hong Rengan’s return, Hong Xiuquan had begun planning “reform and renewal”—comprehensive reforms of the military and political system—to restore strength, morale, eliminate Qing enemies, and realize unification. Promoting Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, reestablishing core leadership, and strengthening revolutionary forces was the first step. Hong Xiuquan’s trust in Hong Rengan was not only because of loyalty but also because of his Western knowledge, political vision, and deep understanding of revolutionary philosophy. The hope for reform was placed on Hong Rengan.
“Entrusted in the face of defeat, given orders in peril.”[⑧] Hong Rengan, true to expectations, soon proposed a comprehensive reform plan with capitalist features, summarized in a series of writings, most notably China’s first modern reform plan—“New Political Treatise” (Zizheng Xin Pian). In it, he explicitly states that his purpose in returning is not for personal gain but to suggest reforms for Hong Xiuquan’s decision, aiming to restore governance. The reform principle is “to adapt to the times, assess the situation, and act accordingly”[⑩], which at that time meant referencing Western political systems and science, leading the revolution with Taiping philosophy, and combining Chinese characteristics to reform politics, economy, military, diplomacy, and culture, aspiring to realize the ideal of “new heaven, new earth, new people, new world”[⑪].
First, in the “New Political Treatise,” Hong Rengan proposed to rectify thoughts, strengthen discipline, centralize authority, and eliminate factionalism, consolidating the peasant revolutionary regime. He was deeply worried about the laxity and disorganization after the Tianjing Incident, sharply pointing out: the Taiping army in early revolution “expanded territory rapidly, with a momentum of a hundred miles a day”; but later, it suffered setbacks, with “advancing an inch and retreating a foot, losing the glory of victory”. The core issue was that early Taiping was “at will, like fingers on a hand,” but later, it was “dying and reborn, with command divided among various armies”[⑫]. He recognized clearly that the problem was the rise of feudal and separatist forces, severely weakening central authority.
Regarding ambitious leaders forming factions, Hong Rengan strongly opposed and issued a warning:
“If there are alliances and factions, it is a skill for the lower to secure themselves, relying on private backing, and externally pretending to serve the public while secretly exploiting weaknesses for personal gain. This makes it difficult for generals to follow military law; for ministers, it undermines the ruler’s authority. Good citizens may wish to rely on the ruler sincerely, but are helplessly isolated, which must be carefully examined.”[⑬]
In essence, if figures like Li Xiucheng seize military and political power and secretly form factions, they will develop personal strength to oppose central authority, leading to chaos and undermining the revolution. Such behavior would hinder military operations and allow ambitious officials to usurp power. When this happens, even loyal soldiers and civilians would be controlled and isolated by traitors, posing grave danger. Hong Rengan’s foresight in predicting this was wise.
To counteract, Hong Rengan proposed specific measures to strengthen centralization and limit personal power. “From the great to the small, from top to bottom, authority should be unified in one, ensuring internal and external harmony and broad participation.” Power should be centralized, prohibiting dual commands; “Establish provincial, prefectural, and county treasuries… aside from salaries, any embezzlement or bribery should be punished by law,” and “Establish markets and tax management… any private enrichment or embezzlement should be punished.” Local taxes and tariffs should be managed by state institutions, with strict laws against private appropriation.
In construction, “buildings should not be carved or ornate, resembling imperial palaces or temples,” and if luxurious or beyond regulation, “complaints should be filed, and officials dismissed and punished.” Private visits and gatherings should be banned to prevent corruption and the sale of official titles, with strict penalties for violations.
Hong Rengan also proposed establishing a national postal system, newspapers, and independent news agencies, allowing the public to freely express opinions and monitor government, achieving “public opinion openly, from the masses to officials, with no obstruction or corruption.”[⑭]
Regarding some Taiping soldiers and officials pursuing fame, profit, and power, Hong Rengan pointed out that some “seek promotion as a badge of honor, changing titles multiple times in a year without satisfaction”[⑮].
Because the regime was based on small land private ownership, it could not prevent polarization and feudal relations from developing further. The peasant class’s limitations as small producers meant feudal legal rights persisted within the revolutionary army, with bureaucratic and noble privileges. This created fertile ground for feudal restoration, allowing traitors like Li Xiucheng to expand. Hong Xiuquan, as a revolutionary peasant intellectual, lacked a scientific worldview, unable to see the class nature of internal struggles, and failed to analyze roots properly, thus unable to restrict feudalists.
Before Hong Rengan’s return, Hong Xiuquan had begun planning “reform and renewal”—comprehensive reforms of the military and political system—to restore strength, morale, eliminate Qing enemies, and realize unification. Promoting Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, reestablishing core leadership, and strengthening revolutionary forces was the first step. Hong Xiuquan’s trust in Hong Rengan was not only because of loyalty but also because of his Western knowledge, political vision, and deep understanding of revolutionary philosophy. The hope for reform was placed on Hong Rengan.
“Entrusted in the face of defeat, given orders in peril.”[⑧] Hong Rengan, true to expectations, soon proposed a comprehensive reform plan with capitalist features, summarized in a series of writings, most notably China’s first modern reform plan—“New Political Treatise” (Zizheng Xin Pian). In it, he explicitly states that his purpose in returning is not for personal gain but to suggest reforms for Hong Xiuquan’s decision, aiming to restore governance. The reform principle is “to adapt to the times, assess the situation, and act accordingly”[⑩], which at that time meant referencing Western political systems and science, leading the revolution with Taiping philosophy, and combining Chinese characteristics to reform politics, economy, military, diplomacy, and culture, aspiring to realize the ideal of “new heaven, new earth, new people, new world”[⑪].
First, in the “New Political Treatise,” Hong Rengan proposed to rectify thoughts, strengthen discipline, centralize authority, and eliminate factionalism, consolidating the peasant revolutionary regime. He was deeply worried about the laxity and disorganization after the Tianjing Incident, sharply pointing out: the Taiping army in early revolution “expanded territory rapidly, with a momentum of a hundred miles a day”; but later, it suffered setbacks, with “advancing an inch and retreating a foot, losing the glory of victory”. The core issue was that early Taiping was “at will, like fingers on a hand,” but later, it was “dying and reborn, with command divided among various armies”[⑫]. He recognized clearly that the problem was the rise of feudal and separatist forces, severely weakening central authority.
Regarding ambitious leaders forming factions, Hong Rengan strongly opposed and issued a warning:
“If there are alliances and factions, it is a skill for the lower to secure themselves, relying on private backing, and externally pretending to serve the public while secretly exploiting weaknesses for personal gain. This makes it difficult for generals to follow military law; for ministers, it undermines the ruler’s authority. Good citizens may wish to rely on the ruler sincerely, but are helplessly isolated, which must be carefully examined.”[⑬]
In essence, if figures like Li Xiucheng seize military and political power and secretly form factions, they will develop personal strength to oppose central authority, leading to chaos and undermining the revolution. Such behavior would hinder military operations and allow ambitious officials to usurp power. When this happens, even loyal soldiers and civilians would be controlled and isolated by traitors, posing grave danger. Hong Rengan’s foresight in predicting this was wise.
To counteract, Hong Rengan proposed specific measures to strengthen centralization and limit personal power. “From the great to the small, from top to bottom, authority should be unified in one, ensuring internal and external harmony and broad participation.” Power should be centralized, prohibiting dual commands; “Establish provincial, prefectural, and county treasuries… aside from salaries, any embezzlement or bribery should be punished by law,” and “Establish markets and tax management… any private enrichment or embezzlement should be punished.” Local taxes and tariffs should be managed by state institutions, with strict laws against private appropriation.
In construction, “buildings should not be carved or ornate, resembling imperial palaces or temples,” and if luxurious or beyond regulation, “complaints should be filed, and officials dismissed and punished.” Private visits and gatherings should be banned to prevent corruption and the sale of official titles, with strict penalties for violations.
Hong Rengan also proposed establishing a national postal system, newspapers, and independent news agencies, allowing the public to freely express opinions and monitor government, achieving “public opinion openly, from the masses to officials, with no obstruction or corruption.”[⑭]
Regarding some Taiping soldiers and officials pursuing fame, profit, and power, Hong Rengan pointed out that some “seek promotion as a badge of honor, changing titles multiple times in a year without satisfaction”[⑮].
Because the regime was based on small land private ownership, it could not prevent polarization and feudal relations from developing further. The peasant class’s limitations as small producers meant feudal legal rights persisted within the revolutionary army, with bureaucratic and noble privileges. This created fertile ground for feudal restoration, allowing traitors like Li Xiucheng to expand. Hong Xiuquan, as a revolutionary peasant intellectual, lacked a scientific worldview, unable to see the class nature of internal struggles, and failed to analyze roots properly, thus unable to restrict feudalists.
Before Hong Rengan’s return, Hong Xiuquan had begun planning “reform and renewal”—comprehensive reforms of the military and political system—to restore strength, morale, eliminate Qing enemies, and realize unification. Promoting Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, reestablishing core leadership, and strengthening revolutionary forces was the first step. Hong Xiuquan’s trust in Hong Rengan was not only because of loyalty but also because of his Western knowledge, political vision, and deep understanding of revolutionary philosophy. The hope for reform was placed on Hong Rengan.
“Entrusted in the face of defeat, given orders in peril.”[⑧] Hong Rengan, true to expectations, soon proposed a comprehensive reform plan with capitalist features, summarized in a series of writings, most notably China’s first modern reform plan—“New Political Treatise” (Zizheng Xin Pian). In it, he explicitly states that his purpose in returning is not for personal gain but to suggest reforms for Hong Xiuquan’s decision, aiming to restore governance. The reform principle is “to adapt to the times, assess the situation, and act accordingly”[⑩], which at that time meant referencing Western political systems and science, leading the revolution with Taiping philosophy, and combining Chinese characteristics to reform politics, economy, military, diplomacy, and culture, aspiring to realize the ideal of “new heaven, new earth, new people, new world”[⑪].
First, in the “New Political Treatise,” Hong Rengan proposed to rectify thoughts, strengthen discipline, centralize authority, and eliminate factionalism, consolidating the peasant revolutionary regime. He was deeply worried about the laxity and disorganization after the Tianjing Incident, sharply pointing out: the Taiping army in early revolution “expanded territory rapidly, with a momentum of a hundred miles a day”; but later, it suffered setbacks, with “advancing an inch and retreating a foot, losing the glory of victory”. The core issue was that early Taiping was “at will, like fingers on a hand,” but later, it was “dying and reborn, with command divided among various armies”[⑫]. He recognized clearly that the problem was the rise of feudal and separatist forces, severely weakening central authority.
Regarding ambitious leaders forming factions, Hong Rengan strongly opposed and issued a warning:
“If there are alliances and factions, it is a skill for the lower to secure themselves, relying on private backing, and externally pretending to serve the public while secretly exploiting weaknesses for personal gain. This makes it difficult for generals to follow military law; for ministers, it undermines the ruler’s authority. Good citizens may wish to rely on the ruler sincerely, but are helplessly isolated, which must be carefully examined.”[⑬]
In essence, if figures like Li Xiucheng seize military and political power and secretly form factions, they will develop personal strength to oppose central authority, leading to chaos and undermining the revolution. Such behavior would hinder military operations and allow ambitious officials to usurp power. When this happens, even loyal soldiers and civilians would be controlled and isolated by traitors, posing grave danger. Hong Rengan’s foresight in predicting this was wise.
To counteract, Hong Rengan proposed specific measures to strengthen centralization and limit personal power. “From the great to the small, from top to bottom, authority should be unified in one, ensuring internal and external harmony and broad participation.” Power should be centralized, prohibiting dual commands; “Establish provincial, prefectural, and county treasuries… aside from salaries, any embezzlement or bribery should be punished by law,” and “Establish markets and tax management… any private enrichment or embezzlement should be punished.” Local taxes and tariffs should be managed by state institutions, with strict laws against private appropriation.
In construction, “buildings should not be carved or ornate, resembling imperial palaces or temples,” and if luxurious or beyond regulation, “complaints should be filed, and officials dismissed and punished.” Private visits and gatherings should be banned to prevent corruption and the sale of official titles, with strict penalties for violations.
Hong Rengan also proposed establishing a national postal system, newspapers, and independent news agencies, allowing the public to freely express opinions and monitor government, achieving “public opinion openly, from the masses to officials, with no obstruction or corruption.”[⑭]
Regarding some Taiping soldiers and officials pursuing fame, profit, and power, Hong Rengan pointed out that some “seek promotion as a badge of honor, changing titles multiple times in a year without satisfaction”[⑮].
Because the regime was based on small land private ownership, it could not prevent polarization and feudal relations from developing further. The peasant class’s limitations as small producers meant feudal legal rights persisted within the revolutionary army, with bureaucratic and noble privileges. This created fertile ground for feudal restoration, allowing traitors like Li Xiucheng to expand. Hong Xiuquan, as a revolutionary peasant intellectual, lacked a scientific worldview, unable to see the class nature of internal struggles, and failed to analyze roots properly, thus unable to restrict feudalists.
Before Hong Rengan’s return, Hong Xiuquan had begun planning “reform and renewal”—comprehensive reforms of the military and political system—to restore strength, morale, eliminate Qing enemies, and realize unification. Promoting Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, reestablishing core leadership, and strengthening revolutionary forces was the first step. Hong Xiuquan’s trust in Hong Rengan was not only because of loyalty but also because of his Western knowledge, political vision, and deep understanding of revolutionary philosophy. The hope for reform was placed on Hong Rengan.
“Entrusted in the face of defeat, given orders in peril.”[⑧] Hong Rengan, true to expectations, soon proposed a comprehensive reform plan with capitalist features, summarized in a series of writings, most notably China’s first modern reform plan—“New Political Treatise” (Zizheng Xin Pian). In it, he explicitly states that his purpose in returning is not for personal gain but to suggest reforms for Hong Xiuquan’s decision, aiming to restore governance. The reform principle is “to adapt to the times, assess the situation, and act accordingly”[⑩], which at that time meant referencing Western political systems and science, leading the revolution with Taiping philosophy, and combining Chinese characteristics to reform politics, economy, military, diplomacy, and culture, aspiring to realize the ideal of “new heaven, new earth, new people, new world”[⑪].
First, in the “New Political Treatise,” Hong Rengan proposed to rectify thoughts, strengthen discipline, centralize authority, and eliminate factionalism, consolidating the peasant revolutionary regime. He was deeply worried about the laxity and disorganization after the Tianjing Incident, sharply pointing out: the Taiping army in early revolution “expanded territory rapidly, with a momentum of a hundred miles a day”; but later, it suffered setbacks, with “advancing an inch and retreating a foot, losing the glory of victory”. The core issue was that early Taiping was “at will, like fingers on a hand,” but later, it was “dying and reborn, with command divided among various armies”[⑫]. He recognized clearly that the problem was the rise of feudal and separatist forces, severely weakening central authority.
Regarding ambitious leaders forming factions, Hong Rengan strongly opposed and issued a warning:
“If there are alliances and factions, it is a skill for the lower to secure themselves, relying on private backing, and externally pretending to serve the public while secretly exploiting weaknesses for personal gain. This makes it difficult for generals to follow military law; for ministers, it undermines the ruler’s authority. Good citizens may wish to rely on the ruler sincerely, but are helplessly isolated, which must be carefully examined.”[⑬]
In essence, if figures like Li Xiucheng seize military and political power and secretly form factions, they will develop personal strength to oppose central authority, leading to chaos and undermining the revolution. Such behavior would hinder military operations and allow ambitious officials to usurp power. When this happens, even loyal soldiers and civilians would be controlled and isolated by traitors, posing grave danger. Hong Rengan’s foresight in predicting this was wise.
To counteract, Hong Rengan proposed specific measures to strengthen centralization and limit personal power. “From the great to the small, from top to bottom, authority should be unified in one, ensuring internal and external harmony and broad participation.” Power should be centralized, prohibiting dual commands; “Establish provincial, prefectural, and county treasuries… aside from salaries, any embezzlement or bribery should be punished by law,” and “Establish markets and tax management… any private enrichment or embezzlement should be punished.” Local taxes and tariffs should be managed by state institutions, with strict laws against private appropriation.
In construction, “buildings should not be carved or ornate, resembling imperial palaces or temples,” and if luxurious or beyond regulation, “complaints should be filed, and officials dismissed and punished.” Private visits and gatherings should be banned to prevent corruption and the sale of official titles, with strict penalties for violations.
Hong Rengan also proposed establishing a national postal system, newspapers, and independent news agencies, allowing the public to freely express opinions and monitor government, achieving “public opinion openly, from the masses to officials, with no obstruction or corruption.”[⑭]
Regarding some Taiping soldiers and officials pursuing fame, profit, and power, Hong Rengan pointed out that some “seek promotion as a badge of honor, changing titles multiple times in a year without satisfaction”[⑮].
Because the regime was based on small land private ownership, it could not prevent polarization and feudal relations from developing further. The peasant class’s limitations as small producers meant feudal legal rights persisted within the revolutionary army, with bureaucratic and noble privileges. This created fertile ground for feudal restoration, allowing traitors like Li Xiucheng to expand. Hong Xiuquan, as a revolutionary peasant intellectual, lacked a scientific worldview, unable to see the class nature of internal struggles, and failed to analyze roots properly, thus unable to restrict feudalists.
Before Hong Rengan’s return, Hong Xiuquan had begun planning “reform and renewal”—comprehensive reforms of the military and political system—to restore strength, morale, eliminate Qing enemies, and realize unification. Promoting Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, reestablishing core leadership, and strengthening revolutionary forces was the first step. Hong Xiuquan’s trust in Hong Rengan was not only because of loyalty but also because of his Western knowledge, political vision, and deep understanding of revolutionary philosophy. The hope for reform was placed on Hong Rengan.
“Entrusted in the face of defeat, given orders in peril.”[⑧] Hong Rengan, true to expectations, soon proposed a comprehensive reform plan with capitalist features, summarized in a series of writings, most notably China’s first modern reform plan—“New Political Treatise” (Zizheng Xin Pian). In it, he explicitly states that his purpose in returning is not for personal gain but to suggest reforms for Hong Xiuquan’s decision, aiming to restore governance. The reform principle is “to adapt to the times, assess the situation, and act accordingly”[⑩], which at that time meant referencing Western political systems and science, leading the revolution with Taiping philosophy, and combining Chinese characteristics to reform politics, economy, military, diplomacy, and culture, aspiring to realize the ideal of “new heaven, new earth, new people, new world”[⑪].
First, in the “New Political Treatise,” Hong Rengan proposed to rectify thoughts, strengthen discipline, centralize authority, and eliminate factionalism, consolidating the peasant revolutionary regime. He was deeply worried about the laxity and disorganization after the Tianjing Incident, sharply pointing out: the Taiping army in early revolution “expanded territory rapidly, with a momentum of a hundred miles a day”; but later, it suffered setbacks, with “advancing an inch and retreating a foot, losing the glory of victory”. The core issue was that early Taiping was “at will, like fingers on a hand,” but later, it was “dying and reborn, with command divided among various armies”[⑫]. He recognized clearly that the problem was the rise of feudal and separatist forces, severely weakening central authority.
Regarding ambitious leaders forming factions, Hong Rengan strongly opposed and issued a warning:
“If there are alliances and factions, it is a skill for the lower to secure themselves, relying on private backing, and externally pretending to serve the public while secretly exploiting weaknesses for personal gain. This makes it difficult for generals to follow military law; for ministers, it undermines the ruler’s authority. Good citizens may wish to rely on the ruler sincerely, but are helplessly isolated, which must be carefully examined.”[⑬]
In essence, if figures like Li Xiucheng seize military and political power and secretly form factions, they will develop personal strength to oppose central authority, leading to chaos and undermining the revolution. Such behavior would hinder military operations and allow ambitious officials to usurp power. When this happens, even loyal soldiers and civilians would be controlled and isolated by traitors, posing grave danger. Hong Rengan’s foresight in predicting this was wise.
To counteract, Hong Rengan proposed specific measures to strengthen centralization and limit personal power. “From the great to the small, from top to bottom, authority should be unified in one, ensuring internal and external harmony and broad participation.” Power should be centralized, prohibiting dual commands; “Establish provincial, prefectural, and county treasuries… aside from salaries, any embezzlement or bribery should be punished by law,” and “Establish markets and tax management… any private enrichment or embezzlement should be punished.” Local taxes and tariffs should be managed by state institutions, with strict laws against private appropriation.
In construction, “buildings should not be carved or ornate, resembling imperial palaces or temples,” and if luxurious or beyond regulation, “complaints should be filed, and officials dismissed and punished.” Private visits and gatherings should be banned to prevent corruption and the sale of official titles, with strict penalties for violations.
Hong Rengan also proposed establishing a national postal system, newspapers, and independent news agencies, allowing the public to freely express opinions and monitor government, achieving “public opinion openly, from the masses to officials, with no obstruction or corruption.”[⑭]
Regarding some Taiping soldiers and officials pursuing fame, profit, and power, Hong Rengan pointed out that some “seek promotion as a badge of honor, changing titles multiple times in a year without satisfaction”[⑮].
Because the regime was based on small land private ownership, it could not prevent polarization and feudal relations from developing further. The peasant class’s limitations as small producers meant feudal legal rights persisted within the revolutionary army, with bureaucratic and noble privileges. This created fertile ground for feudal restoration, allowing traitors like Li Xiucheng to expand. Hong Xiuquan, as a revolutionary peasant intellectual, lacked a scientific worldview, unable to see the class nature of internal struggles, and failed to analyze roots properly, thus unable to restrict feudalists.
Before Hong Rengan’s return, Hong Xiuquan had begun planning “reform and renewal”—comprehensive reforms of the military and political system—to restore strength, morale, eliminate Qing enemies, and realize unification. Promoting Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, reestablishing core leadership, and strengthening revolutionary forces was the first step. Hong Xiuquan’s trust in Hong Rengan was not only because of loyalty but also because of his Western knowledge, political vision, and deep understanding of revolutionary philosophy. The hope for reform was placed on Hong Rengan.
“Entrusted in the face of defeat, given orders in peril.”[⑧] Hong Rengan, true to expectations, soon proposed a comprehensive reform plan with capitalist features, summarized in a series of writings, most notably China’s first modern reform plan—“New Political Treatise” (Zizheng Xin Pian). In it, he explicitly states that his purpose in returning is not for personal gain but to suggest reforms for Hong Xiuquan’s decision, aiming to restore governance. The reform principle is “to adapt to the times, assess the situation, and act accordingly”[⑩], which at that time meant referencing Western political systems and science, leading the revolution with Taiping philosophy, and combining Chinese characteristics to reform politics, economy, military, diplomacy, and culture, aspiring to realize the ideal of “new heaven, new earth, new people, new world”[⑪].
First, in the “New Political Treatise,” Hong Rengan proposed to rectify thoughts, strengthen discipline, centralize authority, and eliminate factionalism, consolidating the peasant revolutionary regime. He was deeply worried about the laxity and disorganization after the Tianjing Incident, sharply pointing out: the Taiping army in early revolution “expanded territory rapidly, with a momentum of a hundred miles a day”; but later, it suffered setbacks, with “advancing an inch and retreating a foot, losing the glory of victory”. The core issue was that early Taiping was “at will, like fingers on a hand,” but later, it was “dying and reborn, with command divided among various armies”[⑫]. He recognized clearly that the problem was the rise of feudal and separatist forces, severely weakening central authority.
Regarding ambitious leaders forming factions, Hong Rengan strongly opposed and issued a warning:
“If there are alliances and factions, it is a skill for the lower to secure themselves, relying on private backing, and externally pretending to serve the public while secretly exploiting weaknesses for personal gain. This makes it difficult for generals to follow military law; for ministers, it undermines the ruler’s authority. Good citizens may wish to rely on the ruler sincerely, but are helplessly isolated, which must be carefully examined.”[⑬]
In essence, if figures like Li Xiucheng seize military and political power and secretly form factions, they will develop personal strength to oppose central authority, leading to chaos and undermining the revolution. Such behavior would hinder military operations and allow ambitious officials to usurp power. When this happens, even loyal soldiers and civilians would be controlled and isolated by traitors, posing grave danger. Hong Rengan’s foresight in predicting this was wise.
To counteract, Hong Rengan proposed specific measures to strengthen centralization and limit personal power. “From the great to the small, from top to bottom, authority should be unified in one, ensuring internal and external harmony and broad participation.” Power should be centralized, prohibiting dual commands; “Establish provincial, prefectural, and county treasuries… aside from salaries, any embezzlement or bribery should be punished by law,” and “Establish markets and tax management… any private enrichment or embezzlement should be punished.” Local taxes and tariffs should be managed by state institutions, with strict laws against private appropriation.
In construction, “buildings should not be carved or ornate, resembling imperial palaces or temples,” and if luxurious or beyond regulation, “complaints should be filed, and officials dismissed and punished.” Private visits and gatherings should be banned to prevent corruption and the sale of official titles, with strict penalties for violations.
Hong Rengan also proposed establishing a national postal system, newspapers, and independent news agencies, allowing the public to freely express opinions and monitor government, achieving “public opinion openly, from the masses to officials, with no obstruction or corruption.”[⑭]
Regarding some Taiping soldiers and officials pursuing fame, profit, and power, Hong Rengan pointed out that some “seek promotion as a badge of honor, changing titles multiple times in a year without satisfaction”[⑮].
Because the regime was based on small land private ownership, it could not prevent polarization and feudal relations from developing further. The peasant class’s limitations as small producers meant feudal legal rights persisted within the revolutionary army, with bureaucratic and noble privileges. This created fertile ground for feudal restoration, allowing traitors like Li Xiucheng to expand. Hong Xiuquan, as a revolutionary peasant intellectual, lacked a scientific worldview, unable to see the class nature of internal struggles, and failed to analyze roots properly, thus unable to restrict feudalists.
Before Hong Rengan’s return, Hong Xiuquan had begun planning “reform and renewal”—comprehensive reforms of the military and political system—to restore strength, morale, eliminate Qing enemies, and realize unification. Promoting Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, reestablishing core leadership, and strengthening revolutionary forces was the first step. Hong Xiuquan’s trust in Hong Rengan was not only because of loyalty but also because of his Western knowledge, political vision, and deep understanding of revolutionary philosophy. The hope for reform was placed on Hong Rengan.
“Entrusted in the face of defeat, given orders in peril.”[⑧] Hong Rengan, true to expectations, soon proposed a comprehensive reform plan with capitalist features, summarized in a series of writings, most notably China’s first modern reform plan—“New Political Treatise” (Zizheng Xin Pian). In it, he explicitly states that his purpose in returning is not for personal gain but to suggest reforms for Hong Xiuquan’s decision, aiming to restore governance. The reform principle is “to adapt to the times, assess the situation, and act accordingly”[⑩], which at that time meant referencing Western political systems and science, leading the revolution with Taiping philosophy, and combining Chinese characteristics to reform politics, economy, military, diplomacy, and culture, aspiring to realize the ideal of “new heaven, new earth, new people, new world”[⑪].
First, in the “New Political Treatise,” Hong Rengan proposed to rectify thoughts, strengthen discipline, centralize authority, and eliminate factionalism, consolidating the peasant revolutionary regime. He was deeply worried about the laxity and disorganization after the Tianjing Incident, sharply pointing out: the Taiping army in early revolution “expanded territory rapidly, with a momentum of a hundred miles a day”; but later, it suffered setbacks, with “advancing an inch and retreating a foot, losing the glory of victory”. The core issue was that early Taiping was “at will, like fingers on a hand,” but later, it was “dying and reborn, with command divided among various armies”[⑫]. He recognized clearly that the problem was the rise of feudal and separatist forces, severely weakening central authority.
Regarding ambitious leaders forming factions, Hong Rengan strongly opposed and issued a warning:
“If there are alliances and factions, it is a skill for the lower to secure themselves, relying on private backing, and externally pretending to serve the public while secretly exploiting weaknesses for personal gain. This makes it difficult for generals to follow military law; for ministers, it undermines the ruler’s authority. Good citizens may wish to rely on the ruler sincerely, but are helplessly isolated, which must be carefully examined.”[⑬]
In essence, if figures like Li Xiucheng seize military and political power and secretly form factions, they will develop personal strength to oppose central authority, leading to chaos and undermining the revolution. Such behavior would hinder military operations and allow ambitious officials to usurp power. When this happens, even loyal soldiers and civilians would be controlled and isolated by traitors, posing grave danger. Hong Rengan’s foresight in predicting this was wise.
To counteract, Hong Rengan proposed specific measures to strengthen centralization and limit personal power. “From the great to the small, from top to bottom, authority should be unified in one, ensuring internal and external harmony and broad participation.” Power should be centralized, prohibiting dual commands; “Establish provincial, prefectural, and county treasuries… aside from salaries, any embezzlement or bribery should be punished by law,” and “Establish markets and tax management… any private enrichment or embezzlement should be punished.” Local taxes and tariffs should be managed by state institutions, with strict laws against private appropriation.
In construction, “buildings should not be carved or ornate, resembling imperial palaces or temples,” and if luxurious or beyond regulation, “complaints should be filed, and officials dismissed and punished.” Private visits and gatherings should be banned to prevent corruption and the sale of official titles, with strict penalties for violations.
Hong Rengan also proposed establishing a national postal system, newspapers, and independent news agencies, allowing the public to freely express opinions and monitor government, achieving “public opinion openly, from the masses to officials, with no obstruction or corruption.”[⑭]
Regarding some Taiping soldiers and officials pursuing fame, profit, and power, Hong Rengan pointed out that some “seek promotion as a badge of honor, changing titles multiple times in a year without satisfaction”[⑮].
Because the regime was based on small land private ownership, it could not prevent polarization and feudal relations from developing further. The peasant class’s limitations as small producers meant feudal legal rights persisted within the revolutionary army, with bureaucratic and noble privileges. This created fertile ground for feudal restoration, allowing traitors like Li Xiucheng to expand. Hong Xiuquan, as a revolutionary peasant intellectual, lacked a scientific worldview, unable to see the class nature of internal struggles, and failed to analyze roots properly, thus unable to restrict feudalists.
Before Hong Rengan’s return, Hong Xiuquan had begun planning “reform and renewal”—comprehensive reforms of the military and political system—to restore strength, morale, eliminate Qing enemies, and realize unification. Promoting Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, reestablishing core leadership, and strengthening revolutionary forces was the first step. Hong Xiuquan’s trust in Hong Rengan was not only because of loyalty but also because of his Western knowledge, political vision, and deep understanding of revolutionary philosophy. The hope for reform was placed on Hong Rengan.
“Entrusted in the face of defeat, given orders in peril.”[⑧] Hong Rengan, true to expectations, soon proposed a comprehensive reform plan with capitalist features, summarized in a series of writings, most notably China’s first modern reform plan—“New Political Treatise” (Zizheng Xin Pian). In it, he explicitly states that his purpose in returning is not for personal gain but to suggest reforms for Hong Xiuquan’s decision, aiming to restore governance. The reform principle is “to adapt to the times, assess the situation, and act accordingly”[⑩], which at that time meant referencing Western political systems and science, leading the revolution with Taiping philosophy, and combining Chinese characteristics to reform politics, economy, military, diplomacy, and culture, aspiring to realize the ideal of “new heaven, new earth, new people, new world”[⑪].
First, in the “New Political Treatise,” Hong Rengan proposed to rectify thoughts, strengthen discipline, centralize authority, and eliminate factionalism, consolidating the peasant revolutionary regime. He was deeply worried about the laxity and disorganization after the Tianjing Incident, sharply pointing out: the Taiping army in early revolution “expanded territory rapidly, with a momentum of a hundred miles a day”; but later, it suffered setbacks, with “advancing an inch and retreating a foot, losing the glory of victory”. The core issue was that early Taiping was “at will, like fingers on a hand,” but later, it was “dying and reborn, with command divided among various armies”[⑫]. He recognized clearly that the problem was the rise of feudal and separatist forces, severely weakening central authority.
Regarding ambitious leaders forming factions, Hong Rengan strongly opposed and issued a warning:
“If there are alliances and factions, it is a skill for the lower to secure themselves, relying on private backing, and externally pretending to serve the public while secretly exploiting weaknesses for personal gain. This makes it difficult for generals to follow military law; for ministers, it undermines the ruler’s authority. Good citizens may wish to rely on the ruler sincerely, but are helplessly isolated, which must be carefully examined.”[⑬]
In essence, if figures like Li Xiucheng seize military and political power and secretly form factions, they will develop personal strength to oppose central authority, leading to chaos and undermining the revolution. Such behavior would hinder military operations and allow ambitious officials to usurp power. When this happens, even loyal soldiers and civilians would be controlled and isolated by traitors, posing grave danger. Hong Rengan’s foresight in predicting this was wise.
To counteract, Hong Rengan proposed specific measures to strengthen centralization and limit personal power. “From the great to the small, from top to bottom, authority should be unified in one, ensuring internal and external harmony and broad participation.” Power should be centralized, prohibiting dual commands; “Establish provincial, prefectural, and county treasuries… aside from salaries, any embezzlement or bribery should be punished by law,” and “Establish markets and tax management… any private enrichment or embezzlement should be punished.” Local taxes and tariffs should be managed by state institutions, with strict laws against private appropriation.
In construction, “buildings should not be carved or ornate, resembling imperial palaces or temples,” and if luxurious or beyond regulation, “complaints should be filed, and officials dismissed and punished.” Private visits and gatherings should be banned to prevent corruption and the sale of official titles, with strict penalties for violations.
Hong Rengan also proposed establishing a national postal system, newspapers, and independent news agencies, allowing the public to freely express opinions and monitor government, achieving “public opinion openly, from the masses to officials, with no obstruction or corruption.”[⑭]
Regarding some Taiping soldiers and officials pursuing fame, profit, and power, Hong Rengan pointed out that some “seek promotion as a badge of honor, changing titles multiple times in a year without satisfaction”[⑮].
Because the regime was based on small land private ownership, it could not prevent polarization and feudal relations from developing further. The peasant class’s limitations as small producers meant feudal legal rights persisted within the revolutionary army, with bureaucratic and noble privileges. This created fertile ground for feudal restoration, allowing traitors like Li Xiucheng to expand. Hong Xiuquan, as a revolutionary peasant intellectual, lacked a scientific worldview, unable to see the class nature of internal struggles, and failed to analyze roots properly, thus unable to restrict feudalists.
Before Hong Rengan’s return, Hong Xiuquan had begun planning “reform and renewal”—comprehensive reforms of the military and political system—to restore strength, morale, eliminate Qing enemies, and realize unification. Promoting Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, reestablishing core leadership, and strengthening revolutionary forces was the first step. Hong Xiuquan’s trust in Hong Rengan was not only because of loyalty but also because of his Western knowledge, political vision, and deep understanding of revolutionary philosophy. The hope for reform was placed on Hong Rengan.
“Entrusted in the face of defeat, given orders in peril.”[⑧] Hong Rengan, true to expectations, soon proposed a comprehensive reform plan with capitalist features, summarized in a series of writings, most notably China’s first modern reform plan—“New Political Treatise” (Zizheng Xin Pian). In it, he explicitly states that his purpose in returning is not for personal gain but to suggest reforms for Hong Xiuquan’s decision, aiming to restore governance. The reform principle is “to adapt to the times, assess the situation, and act accordingly”[⑩], which at that time meant referencing Western political systems and science, leading the revolution with Taiping philosophy, and combining Chinese characteristics to reform politics, economy, military, diplomacy, and culture, aspiring to realize the ideal of “new heaven, new earth, new people, new world”[⑪].
First, in the “New Political Treatise,” Hong Rengan proposed to rectify thoughts, strengthen discipline, centralize authority, and eliminate factionalism, consolidating the peasant revolutionary regime. He was deeply worried about the laxity and disorganization after the Tianjing Incident, sharply pointing out: the Taiping army in early revolution “expanded territory rapidly, with a momentum of a hundred miles a day”; but later, it suffered setbacks, with “advancing an inch and retreating a foot, losing the glory of victory”. The core issue was that early Taiping was “at will, like fingers on a hand,” but later, it was “dying and reborn, with command divided among various armies”[⑫]. He recognized clearly that the problem was the rise of feudal and separatist forces, severely weakening central authority.
Regarding ambitious leaders forming factions, Hong Rengan strongly opposed and issued a warning:
“If there are alliances and factions, it is a skill for the lower to secure themselves, relying on private backing, and externally pretending to serve the public while secretly exploiting weaknesses for personal gain. This makes it difficult for generals to follow military law; for ministers, it undermines the ruler’s authority. Good citizens may wish to rely on the ruler sincerely, but are helplessly isolated, which must be carefully examined.”[⑬]
In essence, if figures like Li Xiucheng seize military and political power and secretly form factions, they will develop personal strength to oppose central authority, leading to chaos and undermining the revolution. Such behavior would hinder military operations and allow ambitious officials to usurp power. When this happens, even loyal soldiers and civilians would be controlled and isolated by traitors, posing grave danger. Hong Rengan’s foresight in predicting this was wise.
To counteract, Hong Rengan proposed specific measures to strengthen centralization and limit personal power. “From the great to the small, from top to bottom, authority should be unified in one, ensuring internal and external harmony and broad participation.” Power should be centralized, prohibiting dual commands; “Establish provincial, prefectural, and county treasuries… aside from salaries, any embezzlement or bribery should be punished by law,” and “Establish markets and tax management… any private enrichment or embezzlement should be punished.” Local taxes and tariffs should be managed by state institutions, with strict laws against private appropriation.
In construction, “buildings should not be carved or ornate, resembling imperial palaces or temples,” and if luxurious or beyond regulation, “complaints should be filed, and officials dismissed and punished.” Private visits and gatherings should be banned to prevent corruption and the sale of official titles, with strict penalties for violations.
Hong Rengan also proposed establishing a national postal system, newspapers, and independent news agencies, allowing the public to freely express opinions and monitor government, achieving “public opinion openly, from the masses to officials, with no obstruction or corruption.”[⑭]
Regarding some Taiping soldiers and officials pursuing fame, profit, and power, Hong Rengan pointed out that some “seek promotion as a badge of honor, changing titles multiple times in a year without satisfaction”[⑮].
Because the regime was based on small land private ownership, it could not prevent polarization and feudal relations from developing further. The peasant class’s limitations as small producers meant feudal legal rights persisted within the revolutionary army, with bureaucratic and noble privileges. This created fertile ground for feudal restoration, allowing traitors like Li Xiucheng to expand. Hong Xiuquan, as a revolutionary peasant intellectual, lacked a scientific worldview, unable to see the class nature of internal struggles, and failed to analyze roots properly, thus unable to restrict feudalists.
Before Hong Rengan’s return, Hong Xiuquan had begun planning “reform and renewal”—comprehensive reforms of the military and political system—to restore strength, morale, eliminate Qing enemies, and realize unification. Promoting Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng, reestablishing core leadership, and strengthening revolutionary forces was the first step. Hong Xiuquan’s trust in Hong Rengan was not only because of loyalty but also because of his Western knowledge, political vision, and deep understanding of revolutionary philosophy. The hope for reform was placed on Hong Rengan.
“Entrusted in the face of defeat, given orders in peril.”[⑧] Hong Rengan, true to expectations, soon proposed a comprehensive reform plan with capitalist features, summarized in a series of writings, most notably China’s first modern reform plan—“New Political Treatise” (Zizheng Xin Pian). In it, he explicitly states that his purpose in returning is not for personal gain but to suggest reforms for Hong Xiuquan’s decision, aiming to restore governance. The reform principle is “to adapt to the times, assess"The communist revolution is the most thorough break with traditional ownership relations; unsurprisingly, it must also carry out the most thorough break with traditional ideas in its own development process."** [21] The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, as a peasant revolutionary regime, was sharply opposed to the Qing feudal landlord class in politics, economy, and military affairs, and naturally also engaged in fierce ideological struggles. Ideology possesses relative independence; after completing reforms in politics and economy, the intense struggles in the cultural sphere have just begun, and class struggle in this domain will inevitably be sharp, complex, long-lasting. Since entering a class society, mental labor has become a privilege of the exploiting classes, who monopolize the cultural domain as their hereditary territory, “creating heretical doctrines to deceive the world, establishing heresies to confuse people’s spirits,” achieving their malicious goal of “tempting people’s hearts and disturbing the true way.” [22] In the early stages of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom revolution, there was a severe crackdown on feudal Confucian doctrines such as those of Confucius and Mencius, but as the landlord class’s legal rights in politics and economy gradually developed, feudal ideas also made a comeback under the propaganda of reactionary counter-revolutionaries. Wei Changhui and Shi Dakai, who had infiltrated the revolutionary ranks as class enemies, carried feudal landlord class customs, indulging in hospitality and bribery to win people’s hearts, and strongly promoted Confucian doctrines in thought. As for Yang Xiuqing, a corrupt and degenerate element within the Taiping revolution, he was also heavily influenced by Confucianism, even staging grotesque rituals venerating Confucius. The outbreak of the Tianjing Incident was the result of the flood of landlord class legal rights and feudal ideas. Under this situation, cultural revolution became an important part of the effort to reform and renew. To fundamentally resolve feudal ideological remnants, besides technical means in politics and economy, Hong Rengan emphasized the importance of ideological struggle and changing customs—“eliminating all heretical and heterodox teachings” [23]—to achieve organizational unity through ideological unity.
“How captivating the customs are,” Hong Rengan pointed out in the first article of Zi Zheng Xin Pian (New Essays on Political Governance), highlighting the harmful effects of old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits, which he identified as the root of China’s centuries-long decline. “Look at the current rivers and mountains—whose realm is it? It is none other than us, the Chinese, who forget our identity as Chinese, willingly submit to the yoke of the barbarians, neglect practical learning, and indulge in superficial writing, which is truly lamentable.” Hong Rengan exposed a major problem in Chinese society—the “barbarians” (referring to the Manchu Qing) caused severe national and class oppression, yet the “Chinese people,” especially intellectuals, willingly endured dual oppression under the Qing, even to the point of abandoning genuine learning beneficial to society in favor of pursuing superficial literary forms for personal gain, which is lamentable. He then analyzed the ideological outlook of various classes within feudal society: “Try to speak of it: scholars’ short and long essays are nothing but empty words and falsehoods; lower officials’ reports and memorials are full of flattery and praise; merchants’ talk is full of deceit and greed; all kinds of heretical sects and heterodox teachings are fabricated out of nothing; all reactionary officials and their agents confuse right and wrong, deceive and harm people everywhere.” Here, Hong Rengan clearly stands on the side of the peasantry, criticizing Confucianism’s accusations that farmers are “foolish women and foolish men,” condemning reactionary ideas that belittle farmers, and affirming that farmers are diligent, thrifty, honest, and reliable social forces. Hong Rengan valued and relied on farmers, viewing them as the real force capable of transforming the material world—this reflects his class stance as a revolutionary peasant leader, something that all exploitative intellectuals in history could not achieve. On the other hand, Hong Rengan sharply criticized all classes spreading reactionary ideas in old society: he sternly pointed out that writings by scholars, whether short or long, are all empty talk and falsehoods; reports and memorials from lower officials are full of flattery; merchants’ business talk is full of treachery; various heretical sects and heterodox teachings are fabricated from nothing; reactionary officials and their agents confuse right and wrong, deceive and harm people everywhere. Hong Rengan exposed that the entire old society was full of thorns and pitfalls—“everywhere is a trap.” Reactionary ideas run rampant, ghosts and monsters dominate, and everywhere are traps set by reactionary classes and ideas. Confronted with this situation, Hong Rengan boldly proposed: “If we have sincere strength and united will, how difficult is it to witness the scene of peace, and become heroes of eternity, and see a new heaven, new earth, and new world again?” As long as we are sincere and united, breaking through the web of old society and customs, we can fully realize the unification of Taiping, become eternal heroes, and create a new heaven, new earth, and new world! Here, “heroes” refers to the united revolutionary masses, and the new heaven and new earth are created and witnessed by the people themselves—this is the materialist view of history, the people’s view of creating history, and Hong Rengan’s concept of revolutionary heroism. Hong Rengan despised the reactionary hierarchical ideas of Confucianism, such as the distinctions of rank and fixed roles of the superior and inferior, criticizing the core of the doctrine of the Doctrine of the Mean: “Confucianism values moderation, but it is blind to the difficulty of human effort,” exposing that Confucian followers are even more blind than the blind, unable to see the power of the masses to create the world. [24]
Hong Rengan inherited and carried forward Hong Xiuquan’s revolutionary spirit, fiercely criticizing Confucian doctrines and feudal divine authority. While serving as the editor of banned books, he authored many articles explaining the principles of ideological struggle—such as Kedi Yaohuan Lun (On Overcoming Temptation), Quan Jie Shizi Wu Yao (Five Essentials for Scholars), Yingjie Gui Zhen (Heroes Return to Truth), Jie Fuwen Qiao Yan Yu (Warning Against Superficial Writing and Flattering Words), Qinding Jun Ci Shilu (Imperially Approved Military Record), etc.—making outstanding contributions to ideological field revolution. As one of the earliest members participating in Hong Xiuquan and Feng Yunshan’s revolutionary activities under the God Worshipping Church, Hong Rengan further developed Taiping revolutionary theory during his return to the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Although the Taiping revolution was carried out under the guise of religion, its ideas had nothing in common with feudal religious superstitions. The worship of “Heavenly Father and Heavenly Sovereign” in the Taiping religion centered on the worship of the natural gods worshiped by the people before the “Three Dynasties” (Xia, Shang, Zhou), not a personal deity. This idea of equating gods (“Heavenly Father”) with natural and social laws is fundamentally pantheistic and denies all theistic beliefs, approaching a form of naive materialism and atheism. This materialist atheistic worldview, combined with revolutionary dialectics, served as the philosophical basis for mobilizing the peasant class and modern democratic revolution. “Chaos leads to order; darkness leads to light,” the philosophical starting point of the Taiping revolution, ultimately directed against all religious superstitions and ghost worship. Hong Rengan launched a fierce critique of the superstitions born from Confucian idealism, stating: “Wood and stone, clay sculptures and paper images—these are all carved by human hands,” implying that all idols are just human-made objects without spiritual essence, serving only to “fool the foolish”—deceiving and confounding the people, maintaining the reactionary feudal rule. [25] Hong Rengan pointed out that people’s belief in ghosts and superstitions is not due to scientific ignorance but is caused by selfish and evil thoughts: “They are blinded by greed and desire, so demons and devils enter their hearts, causing them to fear blessings and curses.” [26] He believed that this reactionary religious superstition not only makes people ignorant but also harms society and the state, and must be eradicated—“all kinds of strange, ghostly, and evil images.” [27] Hong Rengan even composed a poem to satirize idol worship, urging people to abandon superstition and embrace the Taiping revolution:
Ban idol worship of mud puppets [28]
Worldly folk worship idols, clay, mud, and stone are false forms. Shape and form, how can they perceive? Temples are merely elaborate, false displays.
Carved by human hands, they are vain and absurd, with no spirit to be seen. I have a conscience, and I will not fall for them.
Mice build nests, ants crawl in chests, spiders spin webs, gathering dust. Many idols and charms have no future, praying for blessings is a waste of lips.
Performing rituals and ceremonies only brings disaster, wasting wealth and effort, leading to poverty. Better to repent, worship the Heavenly Emperor, return to the source, and seek true principles.
Hong Rengan, adhering to the “natural order of heaven, which operates ceaselessly,” held a materialist view of the universe, overseeing the reform of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom calendar—the Tianli (Heavenly Calendar)—based on the laws of natural law and celestial movements. He inherited the spirit of criticizing the superstitions of the old calendar, which propagated auspicious and inauspicious predictions, and made more rational adjustments. On one hand, based on astronomical knowledge, he proposed a method of reducing thirty days every forty years (“Forty-Year Rotation”) to correct the inaccuracies of the old calendar and the solar calendar. More importantly, motivated by the desire to “correct agricultural timing and harmonize the seasons,” he modified the calendar according to the actual needs of agricultural production while rejecting superstitions associated with the calendar. He instructed officials to record annual data on plant sprouting, farming dates, and climate changes, attaching these notes to the next year’s calendar as “Sprouting Monthly Regulations,” providing farmers with practical guidance. This approach made the calendar more suitable for agricultural needs and distinguished the Taiping regime from feudal rulers.
After assuming the role of chief state affairs, Hong Rengan also served as the chief of civil and scholarly affairs, overseeing examinations, and vigorously reformed education. He pointed out that since the Ming and Qing dynasties, feudal literature focused only on ornate diction, merely attaching to the Four Books and Five Classics, with hollow language—“Eight-legged essays and six-rhyme poetry, merely empty talk,” and the old customs of the Six Dynasties, which were useless. He proposed opposing the academic style of “neglecting practical learning and focusing solely on superficial writing,” advocating that essays should “record facts” and that writing style should be “simple and clear,” initiating a major literary reform—“implementing the right path, preserving truth, and eliminating falsehood,” predating the modern Chinese vernacular movement by fifty or sixty years. Hong Rengan emphasized that literature should serve the reality of class struggle and political struggle, not just be formalistic or ornamental. He believed that the old feudal literature was either empty talk about Confucius and Laozi or superficial poetry about flowers and willows, spiritually empty. Such cultural trash, “rather than reading it to be constrained by words and sentiments, it is better not to read at all,” he argued. He stressed “reading is not about collecting beautiful sentences but about seeking the spirit and essence of books that resonate with heavenly feelings,” asserting that “true knowledge emerges from within.” [29] This means that reading and learning should absorb all truths that support the Taiping revolutionary movement, ultimately enabling one to write articles that “accurately reflect the heavenly teachings and truths, and elaborate on the grand view of the new heaven, new earth, and new world.” [30] This reflects the revolutionary ideas of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and the ideal of creating a new society of equality and freedom.
Hong Rengan also further reformed the imperial examination system within the Taiping regime, issuing the Qinding Shijie Tiaoli (Imperial Ordinance on the Examination System), changing the three-level examination to a five-level system, involving local officials in education and examination work, expanding the ranks of revolutionary intellectuals, and strengthening local democratic political forces. He also added a policy essay component, focusing on practical political and economic knowledge, far surpassing the old-style rote memorization and classical copying exams.
Hong Rengan paid special attention to ideological education of intellectuals, urging them to “serve the country with integrity and uphold justice,” and transform their thoughts to serve the Taiping revolution. Heroes Return to Truth was an ideological struggle article based on a story of officials surrendering and defecting. When educating officials who surrendered to the Qing and old-style scholars, Hong Rengan emphasized clarifying the way forward and giving them a way out, urging them not to “follow customs blindly,” to recognize the “heavenly feelings,” and to “return early and escape the confusion.” If they “abandon darkness and turn to the light, help eliminate the remaining demons, and assist the Heavenly Dynasty,” they could still be patriotic “Chinese of the Middle Earth.” Hong Rengan also emphasized that these old scholars must abandon the learning method of “copying books day and night,” understand the “heavenly principles,” and recognize the great achievements of the Taiping revolution to sincerely support it; otherwise, “how can they understand the new Taiping?” In other words, if their thoughts cannot be renewed, they cannot truly understand the new Taiping revolution. However, due to their class background, most of these old scholars could not support the Taiping revolution.
Hong Rengan not only proposed a series of reforms in politics, economy, thought, literature, and education but also authored The Four Military Essentials as a supplement to military insights. Although Hong Rengan lacked direct military combat experience, he humbly said, “Hopefully not to be laughed at as armchair generals.” [32] Yet, many of his ideas were insightful, reflecting his understanding of military affairs. In this article, Hong Rengan explained that a military leader must possess four qualities: knowledge, morality, law, and strategic foresight. He pointed out that commanding troops requires understanding astronomy and geography, being familiar with battlefield weather and terrain, and preparing carefully for campaigns, rather than relying solely on surprise tactics. He also recognized that the key to military success lies in morale and public support; thus, the moral requirement is to implement the Taiping revolutionary route, enforcing principles of equality and unity among officers and soldiers—“eating together at the same table, sleeping in the same bed”—and practicing democracy within the army. Only with unity and discipline can they defeat the enemy. Moreover, the morality he emphasized also meant that the army must strictly observe military discipline and clarify the political purpose of overthrowing feudal rule and alleviating people’s suffering. Hong Rengan wrote a poem Yu Bing (Order to Soldiers): “Advise soldiers not to act rashly, for the common people have long suffered. Crimes of adultery and arson cause heartbreak; discipline and purity are the true teachings of the Holy Lord.” [33] It is evident that Hong Rengan maintained strict discipline and paid special attention to distinguishing the revolutionary army from the old feudal armies. At the end of this article, Hong Rengan emphasized the importance of strengthening the combat effectiveness of the revolutionary army, insisting that “The ‘army wins when united,’ if not united, morale will disperse; if morale disperses, how can there be readiness for battle?” [34] If the generals and commanders are not harmonious, and local commanders do not obey central command, the troops will be disorganized, making combat impossible.
As a knowledgeable and loyal revolutionary intellectual, Hong Rengan, upon returning to Tianjing, was entrusted with the important task of managing state affairs, playing a significant role in the late-stage reform and renewal movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. However, due to his long exile abroad and lack of experience in prolonged revolutionary struggle, combined with the influence of Western science and culture, he did not sufficiently focus on the most critical land issues of the democratic and peasant regimes. Lacking a scientific worldview, Hong Rengan failed to understand that the transformation of modes of production is the most fundamental aspect of social revolution, which caused his reform policies to lack a practical foundation. His reforms aimed to develop capitalist modes of production while still retaining utopian communist elements, which were inherently contradictory. Due to class and historical limitations, Hong Rengan could not genuinely promote capitalism’s exploitative relations within the Taiping regime. Furthermore, after the Tianjing Incident, the military situation rapidly deteriorated; although Chen Yucheng achieved several victories, the failure of the second Western expedition and the fall of Anqing made the situation increasingly dire. After the fall of Anqing and the death of the King of the Sea, the Taiping regime was in a precarious state. Since Hong Rengan’s return, the Taiping regime had been fighting a life-and-death struggle against Qing reactionary forces, with no stable external conditions to fully implement his reforms. Ultimately, internal conflicts within the Taiping camp, especially the resistance from the feudal-path faction led by Li Xiucheng, who even disobeyed the Emperor’s edicts, made it impossible to carry out Hong Rengan’s reforms locally. After the death of the English King, the Gan King lost an important political ally, and control over traitors like Li Xiucheng was impossible.
Nevertheless, Hong Rengan’s series of reform proposals marked the first attempt at modern reform in China. Most were based on realistic possibilities and avoided utopianism. They continued and developed the early revolutionary policies of the Taiping, temporarily bringing about a revival. Hong Rengan’s modernization efforts represented the direction of the five hundred million revolutionary Chinese people. His reforms reflected the spirit of self-reliance of the Chinese nation and the wisdom and backbone to stand among the world’s nations. The Chinese people refused to accept the so-called “modernization” imposed by foreign invaders and rejected the so-called “Self-Strengthening Movement” (Yangwu Movement) promoted by traitorous Westernizers; instead, they believed in relying on their own strength to independently forge a new society and a new China!
Strategic Planning, Decisive Victory from Afar
During Hong Rengan’s return to Tianjing to manage state affairs and implement reforms, the military situation of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was also constantly changing. Since Chen Yucheng’s brilliant victories in 1858—defeating the Jiangbei camp twice and achieving the Three Rivers victory at the end of that year—the siege of Anqing was lifted without fighting. In 1859, Chen Yucheng launched a series of important battles in northern Anhui, recapturing key military towns and annihilating numerous Qing reactionaries, significantly changing the passive military situation of the Taiping, and creating a favorable situation. In June 1859, Chen Yucheng was recommended by Hong Rengan and was granted the title of King of the English for his merits. However, “causing chaos, failing, causing chaos again, and failing again until destruction,” [35] was the logic of the Qing reactionaries—they would never abandon this logic and continued to struggle desperately. In October 1859, Qing reactionaries regrouped remnants to retake Pukou in Jiangbei, pressing toward the Six Harmonies, attempting to encircle Tianjing from the north. Meanwhile, Zeng Guofan and Hu Lin-ying led armies to attack Anqing from four directions during the Taiping army’s distraction, and the Jiangnan camp of Qing reactionaries also besieged Tianjing, digging trenches desperately to cut off contact with the outside world. For a time, Tianjing was in danger. Chen Yucheng’s forces first defeated the enemy occupying Jiangbei under the Emperor’s orders, then returned to Anhui to fight the so-called ace army of the Qing reactionaries led by Bao Chao, aiming to annihilate the main Qing forces on the western battlefield and lift the siege of Anqing. However, Zeng and Hu, being cunning, immediately sent reinforcements to support Bao Chao’s nearly defeated forces, intending to drag the main Taiping forces into a protracted and positional war to achieve the malicious goal of long-term encirclement of Tianjing from the east. In December 1859, the Jiangnan camp dug the so-called “Ten-Thousand-Mile Long Trench” near Tianjing to intensify the siege. Clearly, the military strategy shifted focus to Tianjing. To break the enemy’s encirclement of Tianjing, the Taiping army decided to launch the campaign to break the Jiangnan camp twice, mobilizing the entire elite army for this purpose. Although Hong Rengan lacked direct combat experience, he had unique strategic insights. In late January 1860, Hong Rengan analyzed the military situation and proposed the strategy of “Besieging Wei to Rescue Zhao,” stating: “At this time, the siege of Tianjing is difficult to attack directly; we must focus on the rear of the enemy’s positions at Huzhou and Hangzhou, luring them to rescue their bases there. They will then retreat to aid Huzhou and Hangzhou; when they withdraw, we can pursue and strike, surely achieving victory.” [36] Hong Rengan believed that the enemy had already dug long trenches and deep ditches near Tianjing, making direct assault difficult; their supplies came from Jiangsu and Zhejiang, which were the Qing reactionaries’ logistical bases, prosperous and of great political importance. If they attacked these bases to lure the enemy into aid, and then divided their forces, they could quickly counterattack and annihilate the enemy.
The Emperor approved Hong Rengan’s strategic plan, immediately dispatching the Taiping army to attack Huzhou and Hangzhou, and mobilized Chen Yucheng’s forces in Anhui to support, aiming to crush the Jiangnan camp of the Qing reactionaries. The Taiping army moved swiftly; on March 19, they captured Hangzhou, shocking Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and dealt a blow to the Qing reactionaries there. The Qing reactionaries in Jiangnan camp hurriedly sent troops, with Zhang Yuliang leading 13,000 soldiers to rescue Hangzhou. Seeing the plan succeeded, the Taiping army immediately withdrew from Hangzhou, turning south through southern Anhui back to Tianjing. Meanwhile, Chen Yucheng and others fought through enemy lines, arriving near Tianjing by the end of April and joining forces with other armies. Soon after, the Taiping army launched a large-scale attack on the Jiangnan camp, fighting the so-called “Ten-Thousand-Mile Long Trench.” On May 2, the Taiping army launched a general attack from five routes, beginning the decisive battle. On May 4, amidst wind and rain, Chen Yucheng led the army across the river from Shanghe and Maogong, building floating bridges to assault the Jiangnan camp walls, while the Taiping inside also launched fire attacks, attacking from inside and outside. In an instant, the Qing defenses collapsed; over fifty fortifications were destroyed, and tens of thousands of Qing reactionaries were annihilated. Early morning on the sixth, the various Taiping forces united to besiege the Jiangnan camp, and the enemy was completely defeated. Zeng Guofan awoke from his dream, dressed quickly, mounted his horse, and fled in disgrace, with Zhang Guoliang also fleeing. This victory completely destroyed the Jiangnan camp, ending the three-year Tianjing siege, and seized “more than 100,000 taels of silver stored in the camp, as well as countless guns, cannons, gunpowder, and lead stored in the armory.” [37] This battle greatly boosted the morale of the Taiping army, inflicted a devastating blow on the enemy forces in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and created favorable conditions for subsequent advances into Jiangsu and Zhejiang.
On May 11, 1860, five days after the victory of the Tianjing relief battle, Taiping generals gathered in Tianjing to celebrate, and Hong Xiuquan presided over a military meeting. The generals discussed the next military strategy. At the meeting, three main opinions were proposed. Chen Yucheng suggested immediately moving the main force back to Anhui Province, the main battlefield on the western front, especially the strategic city of Anqing at the middle of the Yangtze River. Hong Rengan also believed that “if Anqing remains safe for a day, Tianjing remains safe for a day.” [38] Moreover, since the previous campaign to lift the Tianjing siege, the main forces in Anhui had all been redeployed, and the situation in Anqing was more dangerous. If they did not quickly send troops back, losing Anqing would have disastrous consequences. The Prince of the Servant, Li Shixian, suggested “taking Fuzhou and Zhejiang,” aiming to seize the opportunity to advance into the prosperous Jiangsu and Zhejiang regions in the southeast. Hong Rengan considered more comprehensively and proposed: “The current plan, from Tianjing, is that the north is distant from Sichuan and Shaanxi, the west from the Great Wall, and the south from Yunnan, Guizhou, and the two Guangdong provinces—each over five or six thousand miles away. But eastward, toward Suzhou, Hangzhou, and Shanghai, it is less than a thousand miles. The strategic advantage is different; taking advantage of victory, it is easier to seize these areas. Once the southern route is secured, we can buy twenty fire wheels (steam engines) and transport them along the Yangtze River; send one army to the south to advance into Jiangxi; send another northward into Qihuang, uniting and capturing Hubei, so that both sides of the Yangtze are under our control, which can fundamentally ensure long-term stability!” Hong Rengan pointed out that currently, Jiangsu and Zhejiang are the closest to Tianjing, and after several major battles, the enemy’s strength was weak, making it easier to take. The Jiangsu-Zhejiang region is located southeast of Tianjing, serving as the rear base for the previous Jiangnan camp, rich in resources. Occupying Jiangsu and Zhejiang would not only eliminate future worries and serve as a southeastern barrier for Tianjing but also supply large amounts of materials, consolidating the peasant regime and reversing the situation. After the success of the southeastern campaign, the plan was to focus on the western expedition, advancing along the Yangtze River in two directions—north and south—to seize Hubei and Jiangxi, thereby recovering the Taiping’s territory along both sides of the Yangtze. Hubei, as a transportation hub and the material base for Qing reactionaries in central China, would be key; if the western expedition succeeded, the siege of Anqing would naturally be lifted. In fact, Hong Rengan’s strategic plan combined the Jiangsu-Zhejiang campaign with the second western expedition, demonstrating great foresight. This plan, considering the defense of Tianjing, abundant resources, territorial recovery, and lifting the siege of Anqing, was a four-bird-one-stone approach. If successful, the military situation of the Taiping would change dramatically. The Emperor considered all options and approved Hong Rengan’s “first east, then west” strategy.On May 15th, the various Taiping armies simultaneously launched an east-southeast advance, officially igniting the Jiangsu-Zhejiang campaign. The Taiping army took Chen Yucheng’s brave general Jingdong commander Liu Ruilin as the vanguard, advancing with unstoppable momentum toward Danyang. After Zhang Guoliang was defeated in the second battle at the Jiangnan camp, he gathered remaining soldiers and defeated generals in Danyang, attempting to resist stubbornly here to hinder the Taiping army’s attack on Jiangsu-Zhejiang. At dawn on the 19th, the Taiping army split into troops in thick fog and launched a fierce charge, causing the Qing army to collapse immediately. Zhang Guoliang fell into the water and died, and Danyang was retaken. Still shaken, He Chun fled to Changzhou to avoid the Qing army’s defeat, hoping to hold out there. The two Jiang provinces’ governor He Guiqing, who retreated to Changzhou, used 20,000 troops but dared not confront the Taiping army directly, as he “saw He Chun arrive, then his soul and courage fled, and he immediately thought of escape” [39]. The next dawn, He Guiqing and He Chun unexpectedly fled Changzhou together with their troops. He Guiqing escaped to Shanghai to save his life, and He Chun, upon hearing the news of Zhang Guoliang’s death when fleeing to Hushu Pass, felt completely despairing and committed suicide by poison. Thus, the Qing forces in Jiangnan completely disintegrated, collapsing in disarray, with remnants burning, killing, and looting along the way, fleeing to the Suzhou area to continue hiding. The people of Suzhou had long hated these Manchu demons to the bone, and further enraged by the banditry of Qing devils killing and setting fires in Suzhou, they actively cooperated with the Taiping army’s offensive to jointly strike the Qing forces. On June 2nd, with the support of the local people in Suzhou, the Taiping army successfully recaptured Suzhou. The Suzhou residents, still unable to vent their hatred, actively pursued the defeated Qing remnants, “wanting to kill the cowardly generals and defeated soldiers on the road, and seize their looted supplies” [40], killing these bandits and reclaiming their own property. Jiangsu Provincial Governor Xu Youren, seeing the situation was hopeless, committed suicide in despair. Over the following fifty days, the Taiping army successively occupied major towns in southern Jiangsu, with Chen Yucheng and Li Shixian defeating Zhang Yuliang’s army and lifting the siege of Jiaxing. Soon after, Li Shixian led a large army to capture Hangzhou, and Zhejiang Governor Wang Youring, despairing, committed suicide, leading to the liberation of the entire Zhejiang province. The Qing devils’ rule in the southeastern region collapsed, and faced with this situation, the Manchu court and officials issued a desperate cry: “The common people are disheartened, the three armies disintegrate; given the current situation, there is no hope of salvation” [41].
In September 1860, after achieving an initial victory in the Jiangsu-Zhejiang campaign, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom’s generals once again gathered in Tianjing to prepare for a second western expedition. The meeting reaffirmed the plan mentioned in the May conference for the western campaign, but it was fiercely opposed by Li Xiucheng. Li Xiucheng opposed the rescue of Anqing, believing that once they controlled Jiangsu and Zhejiang, they could rest easy and focus on managing the prosperous “Southeast Scenic Land,” opposing “laborious campaigns and forced levies,” revealing his traitorous nature. Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng firmly rejected Li Xiucheng’s plan and reestablished the strategy of advancing along both sides of the Yangtze River to ultimately meet at Wuhan, which was approved by the Heavenly King. The meeting decided that Chen Yucheng would lead the northern army from Anhui into Hubei to attack Wuchang from the north; Li Xiucheng would lead the southern army from Jiangxi via Hunan Yuezhou to attack Wuchang from the west; and additionally, Li Shixian and Yang Fuqing would be reinforced to attack Wuchang from the east and south. The final decision was for the entire army to meet at Wuchang in April 1861. The second western expedition was the second step of Hong Rengan’s “first east then west” strategy; once successful, it would not only lift the siege of Anqing but also threaten Qing rule in South China, potentially disrupting Qing forces entirely and even ending Zeng Guofan’s regime. Even Zeng Guofan, seeing the Taiping army dispatch a large force for the second westward campaign toward Wuhan, expressed concern: “This bandit’s rescue of Anqing is beyond a thousand miles… The bandit’s skill in warfare seems even more cunning and fierce than in previous years.”
After the meeting, Chen Yucheng immediately implemented the plan, withdrawing his troops from Zhejiang back to Tianjing in late March, crossing the Yangtze River along the northern bank through Anhui into Hubei, “rushing forward like the wind and rain, traveling day and night,” advancing with unstoppable momentum. Chen Yucheng’s army captured Huangzhou in March 1861, reaching the outskirts of Wuhan a month ahead of schedule. At that time, Wuchang’s garrison was less than 3,000, with no way to retreat. Hubei Governor Hu Linyi, who was besieging Anqing in Anhui, was so anxious upon hearing the news that he vomited blood and scolded himself as a “foolish person playing chess, ignoring his family’s safety” [42]. Just as Wuhan was about to be retaken, British envoy Bashali immediately appeared to obstruct. On one hand, he threatened the Taiping army, claiming to protect the interests of the British Empire in China, and warned against allowing the Taiping army to attack Wuhan, or it would affect the peace and commerce of the British concessions. On the other hand, Bashali spread rumors and deceived Chen Yucheng, claiming that the Qing army still had strength, and that the southern army had not yet reached Jiangxi; attacking at this time would result in being encircled by Wuhan’s defenders and Anhui reinforcements. Unaware of the enemy’s true strength, Chen Yucheng was deceived, sending a messenger back to Tianjing to consult the Heavenly King about retreating, while continuing to occupy towns around Wuhan and besieging the city. In late April, Zeng Guofan’s forces intensified the siege of Anqing, which was in urgent danger, while Li Xiucheng’s southern army, which was supposed to meet them, was delayed. Chen Yucheng decided to immediately lead his army to reinforce Anqing.
It turned out that Li Xiucheng, responsible for the southern army, had been passive from the start regarding the second western expedition, repeatedly disobeying orders. In early October 1860, Chen Yucheng had already set out into Anhui, but Li Xiucheng still expressed unwillingness to participate in the second westward campaign to the Heavenly King, who angrily rebuked him. Since establishing his base in Jiangsu-Zhejiang, Li Xiucheng had become enamored with the wealth and prosperity of the south, “taking root” there and unwilling to leave. After recapturing Suzhou, Li Xiucheng indulged in luxury, treating Suzhou as his own nest of bandits and managing it as such. This fellow eagerly began building the Zhong Wang residence in August, even incorporating the “World’s Number One Garden,” Zhuozheng Yuan, and nearby wealthy landlords’ mansions into the expansion, “with forty or fifty rooms inside and outside, decorated entirely with gold and silver” [43], employing thousands of craftsmen over three years, but it was not completed before Suzhou fell. Li Xiucheng regarded the Jiangsu-Zhejiang base as his own territory, viewing Taiping soldiers as his private troops, showing no regard for the overall situation of the Heavenly Kingdom, delaying deployment repeatedly, and causing missed opportunities, committing heinous crimes against the revolution! Hong Rengan was furious about this and wrote a letter criticizing him: “Having pacified Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, believing oneself to be at ease, and not worrying about the northern bank and the capital”, pointing out that after occupying Suzhou and Hangzhou, he only indulged in enjoyment, neglecting the safety of Tianjing, and warning him “The Yangtze River is called the Long Snake; Hubei is its head, Anqing its middle, and Jiangnan its tail. If Hubei is lost before the head, then the tail will be broken, and Jiangnan will not be safe.” [44] That is to say, if Anqing falls, it is like the snake being broken in the middle, and the Jiangnan region will also be lost. Unexpectedly, Li Xiucheng not only refused to accept criticism but also stubbornly insisted, even sarcastically replying to Hong Rengan: “Your high insight is truly startling and terrifying to read, but now the enemy has no chance of defeat. If one eats fruit before its time, the taste will be bitter; in the future, I will carefully follow your advice.” [45] This fellow, citing the enemy’s strength as unbeatable, claimed that the timing was not right and refused to deploy troops, saying “we will discuss it later.” Such defiance was extremely arrogant. In reality, Li Xiucheng had been recruiting soldiers and avoiding battle to preserve strength, and had developed a force of 300,000 troops, so he was not lacking in strength. But he regarded his troops as private soldiers, unwilling to serve the Heavenly Kingdom. Only because “the Heavenly King’s imperial decree was issued” [46] did he reluctantly obey orders in November, more than a month after Chen Yucheng set out. However, Li Xiucheng’s participation in the western campaign was entirely indifferent to the rescue of Anqing, and he even had no intention of completing the original plan to seize Wuhan. His purpose was merely to loot grain and recruit soldiers along the way, especially to absorb the uprising masses from Jiangxi and Hunan to strengthen his personal forces. He dragged on the road and arrived in Yixian, Anhui in early December, only sixty miles from Zeng Guofan’s Hunan Army camp at Qimen. Qimen was surrounded by Taiping forces, and Zeng Guofan was so terrified that he couldn’t sleep at night, claiming to be “residing at Qimen, in constant fear of the turbulent waves” [47], even writing farewell letters prepared for death. But because Li Xiucheng was extremely afraid of the enemy and wanted to preserve strength, fearing Zeng Guofan’s heavy troops, he refused to help break the siege of Anqing and refused to attack the Hunan Army camp as planned, even letting Zeng Guofan escape from the deadlock. Li Xiucheng, with his 300,000 troops, let Zeng Guofan’s remnants escape, which was a legendary event in military history, and once again committed heinous crimes against the revolution! In June 1861, Li Xiucheng finally arrived at the outskirts of Wuchang two months late. But at that time, Anqing had not yet fallen, and the Taiping forces were fully engaged in the battle to lift the siege. If Li Xiucheng had led his army to attack Wuchang then, he could have captured Wuchang and lifted the siege of Anqing. Even if he could not take Wuchang, he would have contained the enemy in Hubei, forcing the besiegers of Anqing to withdraw and reinforce. But Li Xiucheng had no intention of worrying about the siege of Anqing. After recruiting hundreds of thousands of uprising masses in southern Hubei, he suddenly withdrew from the siege in July, without attempting to rescue Anqing, instead retreating to Jiangxi and then returning to the Jiangsu-Zhejiang base! Such behavior shocked even the enemy. After Li Xiucheng was captured, Zeng Guofan’s aide Zhao Liewen asked him why, with his large army, he did not attack Hubei, which would have caused the entire Qing rear to collapse and the siege of Anqing to end naturally. Li Xiucheng replied: “It’s because the troops are insufficient.” Zhao Liewen asked again: “Your troops are everywhere, how can they be insufficient?” [48] Li Xiucheng finally admitted the truth: “At that time, I only had Suzhou, but no Hangzhou, like a bird without wings, so I returned to plan.” [49] That’s how it was! Li Xiucheng’s entire mind was focused on managing his small circle, and he paid no regard to the safety of Anqing. At that time, all the Taiping forces participating in the western campaign, except Li Shixian’s isolated return to Zhejiang, were fighting to rescue Anqing, but Li Xiucheng simply watched without helping. As a result, the siege of Anqing grew more intense, and enemies in Hubei seized the opportunity to reconquer Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi, and dispatched large armies to reinforce the forces surrounding Anqing, worsening the situation for our army. Li Xiucheng once again committed heinous crimes against the revolution! After the Battle of Sanhe, the Taiping army temporarily gained the initiative and seized the opportunity to launch the second attack on the Jiangnan camp and the Jiangsu-Zhejiang campaign, achieving significant results. If Hong Rengan’s plan for the second western campaign had proceeded smoothly, the Taiping army could have regained control of Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, and Anhui, not only lifting the siege of Anqing but also gaining the initiative to defeat the Qing forces at every turn, completely disrupting their formations, and possibly ending Zeng Guofan’s regime altogether. However, due to Li Xiucheng’s repeated disobedience and failure to fulfill orders, the long-standing strategic plan was severely damaged. As a result, the Taiping army’s carefully planned and years-long campaigns along the Yangtze River’s banks were completely thwarted, and Anqing faced imminent danger!
Under Imperial Orders, Defying Heaven to Save the Nation
Hong Rengan, as the chief military advisor and head of state affairs, held multiple positions and bore great responsibility. He should have remained in Tianjing to handle government affairs, but when Anqing was in urgent danger and King Chen Yucheng and others were fighting desperately on the front lines, he urgently sought to save the Heavenly Kingdom’s peril. After consulting with the Heavenly King, in February 1861, he was ordered to set out, initially to Anhui and western Zhejiang to rally troops, then personally lead the army to join Chen Yucheng.
In fact, although Hong Rengan was one of the earliest members of the God Worshipping Church and participated in the Taiping revolutionary activities with Hong Xiuquan from the beginning, he was unable to join the revolutionary ranks early on due to the initial chaos of the Taiping uprising. His long detachment from practical revolutionary struggles, combined with later residence in Hong Kong and influence from missionaries, even accepting baptism and joining Christianity, resulted in ideological characteristics such as detachment from revolutionary reality, lack of scientific understanding of Western religion, and wavering faith in the God Worshipping Church. Before returning to Beijing, he once mistakenly propagated Christianity as a reactionary religion that divorced itself from practice and struggle, and dulled the people’s consciousness. However, as a representative of revolutionary peasants, the needs of the overall revolution soon made him realize the reactionary nature of Christianity. After intense ideological struggle, Hong Rengan completely abandoned reactionary Christian ideas, and on a higher level, deeply understood and developed the revolutionary theory of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, further strengthening his faith in the revolution. Practice produces true knowledge, and struggle develops ability. This imperial order to set out was a test and training for Hong Rengan, who lacked military experience, and was also a major event related to the future fate of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Hong Rengan fulfilled his duties diligently and fought hard, making significant contributions in breaking idol worship, strengthening military discipline, uniting the revolutionary forces, strengthening ideological struggle, and propagating revolutionary principles. During the arduous journey, he wrote many articles and poems on revolutionary work, compiled into the “Imperially Approved Military Records,” becoming a valuable spiritual asset. Hong Rengan, committed to the revolutionary cause of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, persisted in ideological struggle, transformed into a firm revolutionary, and ultimately fulfilled his vow to sacrifice himself for the revolution. This demonstrated the importance of ideological struggle. There is no innate revolutionary spirit; only through revolutionary struggle can one transform oneself thoroughly, achieving eternal revolution and never changing.
Although Hong Rengan presided over the formulation of the strategic plans for the second Jiangnan camp and the second western campaign, he lacked personal combat experience. Before this expedition, the Heavenly King specially bestowed upon him a gold pen and other items. Hong Rengan himself attached great importance to this, recording in the “Imperially Approved Military Records”: “Our military advisor Hong was honored with the great favor of the Holy Lord and the Savior’s young Lord, bestowed with a gold pen, dragon robe, boots, and hat before setting out.” [50] Among these items, the imperial gift of the gold pen held special significance. Because Hong Rengan was leading troops for the first time, the Heavenly King encouraged him by giving the gold pen, symbolizing “both civil and military responsibilities,” hoping he could both manage Tianjing’s affairs and command the heavenly troops, becoming the backbone of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, reflecting the Heavenly King’s trust and reliance. Therefore, Hong Rengan wrote two poems to commemorate this:
First
One branch stands like a spear, how to sweep a thousand armies?
After the fierce contest in the literary field, the ink and paper are spread;
Full of ink, singing victory songs.
The dragon leaps, the tiger crouches, returning to the tip of the brush;
Fish leap, eagles fly into the prosperity.
Fortunate that I follow this treasured hand all my life,
Today’s heaven and earth are at my command.
Second
The tip of the pen is sharp as a spear, wielding freely as I wish;
Anger breeds suspicion, sorrow sighs;
Joy inspires singing, happiness makes me sing.
It can reveal the mysteries of creation, capturing the essence;
All situations are depicted accurately, like a mirror.
No matter how strong the strong, they pierce the iron inkstone;
Heaven’s decree is to recklessly scheme and plan. [51]
These two poems revolve around the “golden pen” imagery, narrating the unity of revolutionary political work and military work, emphasizing “both civil and military,” and embodying the spirit of “writing to assist the country and fighting to eradicate demons” [52]. Both are exemplary combinations of political and artistic qualities, full of revolutionary romanticism. Politically, the gold pen symbolizes revolutionary authority, implying the Heavenly King’s entrusted mission to Hong Rengan: to both rectify discipline and promote ideological struggle (civil), and to mobilize troops, organize the army, and join Chen Yucheng to lift the siege of Anqing (military). Artistically, both are seven-character regulated poems, rhyming with “ge” (歌), with strict parallelism, concise and powerful language, and artistic level, with the “golden pen—spear” metaphor serving as the overarching symbol: the gold pen is both a spiritual weapon and a military weapon.
First, from civil to military, expressing Hong Rengan’s strong desire to abandon the pen and take up arms, determined to eradicate Qing devils and repay the country on the battlefield, and his confidence in the victory of the Taiping military struggle. Second, from military to civil, highlighting the importance of theoretical struggle, boldly declaring that no Qing demon can withstand the advance of Taiping revolutionary thought.
During his journey to Anhui and western Zhejiang to rally troops, Hong Rengan deeply felt the rampant stubborn forces of old culture and customs. To promote the revolutionary principles of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and eliminate reactionary Confucian ideas everywhere, he engaged in extensive theoretical creation work. “King Gan was ordered to rally troops, passing through counties and towns, many of which still harbor evil customs and shapes of demons.”
“I, King Gan, was deeply shocked by what I saw; I hurriedly wrote at the military headquarters to save the situation, using strict judgment to distinguish right from wrong.” [53] During the campaign, Hong Rengan repeatedly wrote poetry, edicts, essays, and copied Hong Xiuquan’s poetry and writings, hoping to educate the people and change customs. The previously mentioned poem “Prohibition of Worshiping Clay Figures” was written by Hong Rengan during this march. Additionally, to address the widespread sectarianism and factionalism among the Taiping forces, he patiently persuaded some officials to abandon their localist ideas, dedicate themselves to the revolution, and serve the Heavenly Kingdom. Hong Rengan also wrote three poems during the expedition to give to Taiping generals Fang Yongnian, urging him to select talents carefully, uphold high moral standards, and serve the revolutionary cause.
“Imperial reply to Fang Yongnian’s poem (Part 1)” [54]
Heroic and upright, a noble man, welcoming others with high righteousness.
Shame on my own ignorance and rudeness, achievements still shameful compared to Xiao and Cao.
Since ancient times, famous people’s names and titles are signs, not about showing off wisdom or merit.
Uphold the justice to serve the country, that is the highest virtue and talent.
In the first couplet, Hong Rengan praises the ideal revolutionary hero: someone with noble demeanor and broad-mindedness, and high moral standards. This is both self-motivation and a requirement for the revolutionary team. It addresses sectarianism and factionalism within the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, emphasizing that revolutionaries must prioritize the greater cause. In the second couplet, Hong Rengan modestly describes himself as straightforward and not tactful, not adept at flattery or diplomacy. But he does not see this as shameful; instead, he disdains serving feudal monarchs like Xiao He and Cao Shen, emphasizing his clear revolutionary stance: not serving feudal monarchy, but dedicating himself to the “Great Unity and Bright World” of the Heavenly Kingdom. In the third couplet, Hong Rengan criticizes the so-called “famous people” throughout history as merely dependent on feudal imperial power, relying on scheming and deception, exploiting virtuous people for fame. He exposes the reactionary nature of these “famous officials,” pointing out that their “merit” built on exploitation is worthless. The last line is the core of the poem: “Uphold the justice,” which is the vow to defend the revolutionary ideals of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom at all costs; “justice” is the fundamental principle of the Heavenly Kingdom—everyone is equal, the world is one family, and peace is shared. Hong Rengan believed that the highest standard for measuring a person’s talent, strategy, and virtue was not personal status or fame, but whether they uphold “justice” and implement revolutionary principles to the end.
Besides informing the military and people, motivating officials, and propagating the Heavenly King’s revolutionary ideas, Hong Rengan often expressed his inner thoughts, both to encourage himself and to inspire the entire army with a strong revolutionary sense of responsibility and perseverance. Facing the Qing devils’ encirclement and the severe setbacks of the revolution, Hong Rengan firmly declared: “I would rather sacrifice my life to die for the country than hide and survive in shame” [55]. He repeatedly emphasized the justice of the Taiping revolution and his determination to fight to the end. He first angrily pointed out: “The Manchu devils annually plunder hundreds of millions of Chinese resources,” and “spend tens of millions of silver on opium and tobacco every year,” causing Chinese people’s poverty. Hong Rengan believed that as a proud Chinese, it was his duty to rally the people and lead the Taiping soldiers to overthrow the reactionary Qing rule, saying: “I, the military advisor, have no knowledge, how could I endure repeated suffering in campaigns? I sincerely grow in the midst of China’s growth, and there are things I cannot bear,” [56] showing his patriotic resolve.
In a proclamation to the entire Taiping army and officials, Hong Rengan once again expressed: “I, the military advisor, have traveled for ten years, deeply understanding the evil and deception of demons. I have traveled across the lakes and rivers, knowing the hardships of the common people.” This means he traveled extensively over the years, deeply understanding the darkness and corruption of Qing society; seeing the suffering of the people, he was eager to serve the revolution and contribute to the Heavenly Kingdom. “I am willing to serve loyally for the Heavenly Kingdom, regardless of crossing water or climbing mountains,” risking all dangers, just to contribute a little to the Heavenly Kingdom. Finally, Hong Rengan patiently advised the Taiping military and civilians: “Be self-loving, to embody the benevolence of Heavenly Father and Heavenly Brother; also work together to comfort the hopes of the Holy Lord and the common people.” Maintaining integrity, working hard, and uniting as one are essential to not shame the revolutionary cause; only by working together can they fulfill the Heavenly King’s and the people’s expectations [58].
To eradicate the growing “power to seize the throne, end the revolution, put weapons into storage, and let horses graze in the south” mentality of seeking comfort and luxury within the revolutionary ranks, Hong Rengan again emphasized the importance of ideological struggle, calling on Taiping soldiers to resist temptations and maintain revolutionary integrity. He wrote an essay titled “On Overcoming Temptation.” First, he pointed out that selfish thoughts are caused by feudal social systems: “Children learn evil words first, parents rejoice at their first words; young adults indulge in evil intentions, and villagers praise them as capable.” From birth, everyone is influenced by old ideas, culture, customs, and habits. Children are indoctrinated with reactionary Confucian thoughts from an early age, such as “The Three Bonds: ruler and minister, parent and child, husband and wife,” and “Promote fame, honor parents, shine in front, and benefit behind” [59]. Parents do not oppose these heresies and even rejoice when their children recite Confucian classics. As they grow older, the hypocritical and scheming style of Confucianism becomes more ingrained, and the community praises such people as capable. Society becomes corrupt, honest people are considered fools, and cunning and deceitful people are praised everywhere. Private ownership ideas flourish, leading to “temptations everywhere, hearts full of desire at all times.” Then, Hong Rengan emphasized the importance of establishing revolutionary faith and persisting in ideological struggle: “Without a firm belief, the heart is easily shaken by temptations,” and “Desires for material things gradually erode conscience and cause loss,” ultimately leading to “the conscience perishing within” and “material desires imprisoning the heart.” To overthrow Qing rule and achieve final victory, one must resist temptations, defeat selfish desires, and persist in ideological struggle, with the motto: “Guard your mind like a city wall; conquer temptation to defeat the enemy.” [60] Finally, Hong Rengan praised those who could overcome temptations and conquer selfishness as true heroes: “Those who can conquer temptation are heroes; can heroes fail to conquer the enemy?” In his “Five Essentials for Encouraging Scholars,” Hong Rengan also emphasized: “Strengthen resolve and endure hardships, maintain integrity, and never change until death,” [61] demonstrating that a scholar’s backbone lies in enduring tests, resisting temptations, and remaining forever revolutionary. “The outcome of affairs—success or failure—is unpredictable; encountering prosperity or adversity is uncertain. It is much easier to be at ease, but difficult to face hardships. Only those who can endure hardships can demonstrate virtue and talent.” [62]
Never Give Up, Stay True to the End
In late April 1861, Hong Rengan completed his rallying mission and quickly set out from Tianjing toward Anqing to support the front-line battle to lift the siege. At this time, King Chen Yucheng also withdrew from Hubei to aid Anqing due to Li Xiucheng’s failure to meet commitments and the urgent situation in Anqing, stationing his forces near Jixian Pass north of Anqing. Hong Rengan and King Lin Shaozhang led 20,000 troops southward to join Chen Yucheng, but were temporarily blocked by Qing forces and suffered a setback. In this critical situation, Chen Yucheng, eager to rescue Anqing, left Liu Ruilin and 4,000 elite troops to defend Jixian Pass, personally leading the army north to break through and join Hong Rengan and Lin Shaozhang. At that time, Qing forces had besieged Anqing for nearly a year, building deep trenches and high fortifications, and had captured towns around Anqing. Jixian Pass was the only route for the Taiping army to rescue Anqing and was extremely important. The brave general Liu Ruilin, commander of Jingdong, was under King Chen Yucheng’s command and was the most courageous officer, along with his 1,000 elite troops, all loyal Guangxi “old brothers” who had followed the Heavenly Kingdom since the Jintian uprising, loyal and brave, never retreating, with formidable combat strength.After the cunning Qing army scouts detected this movement, they decided to fly in reinforcements from all directions to encircle and attack Jixian Pass, mainly consisting of 6,000 troops from Bao Chao’s division, known as the ace of the Hunan Army, with a total of over 10,000 men, attempting to eliminate the most elite troops of the Taiping Army. Zeng Guofan, fearing the combat effectiveness of the Taiping Army, dared not order the Hunan Army to attack even when they had the advantage in force, instead resorting to treacherous surrender tactics, which were firmly rejected by Liu Lanlin. Over 10,000 Hunan soldiers besieged Jixian Pass, cutting off the Taiping Army’s food and water supplies, and took the opportunity of their difficulties to launch fierce assaults on the second, third, and fourth barricades, resulting in the sacrifice of over 3,000 soldiers, leaving Liu Lanlin’s forces completely isolated and helpless. Subsequently, the Hunan Army used new-style artillery obtained from foreign masters to fiercely bombard Liu Lanlin’s garrison at the first barricade, creating a breach in the fortifications. However, Liu Lanlin was determined to fight to the end, leading his soldiers to charge out through the breach and engage in fierce combat with the Hunan Army. Facing over 10,000 Hunan troops, the 1,000 Taiping soldiers fought bravely, killing many Qing soldiers and causing them to flee in panic, including the deputy general Su Wenbiao, and killing over 3,000 Qing soldiers. But Liu Lanlin’s forces were outnumbered and, under the Qing army’s blockade of food supplies, they held out for more than twenty days, “the camp had no gunpowder, no cannons, and no rice”[63]. Liu Lanlin was forced to lead the remaining soldiers to break out, but upon reaching Ma Ta Shi area, they were hindered by the rising river water and could not cross the river, being intercepted by the Qing navy and pursued by the land forces. Coupled with artillery bombardment, they were ultimately defeated, with over 700 soldiers sacrificing their lives heroically. Afterwards, the fortifications on both the north and south banks of Lingnan were also captured by the Qing army. As a result, the Taiping Army’s land and water routes aiding Anqing were completely cut off.
Last year (1860), the Qing government signed the humiliating and traitorous “Treaty of Beijing” with Britain and France. From then on, foreign devils began to shed their “neutral” mask and started assisting Qing traitors to suppress the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom revolution, including dispatching foreign gun teams to attack the Taiping Army during subsequent battles in Shanghai. In July of that year (1861), the Qing traitor Aisin Gioro Yizhu (Xianfeng) died suddenly in Rehe, leading to a confrontation between the so-called regency of the Eight Elders representing the conservative landlord class and the two empress dowagers representing the major landlords and foreign comprador faction. The former represented the stubborn faction of the landlord class, while the latter represented the major landlords and the foreign comprador faction. With the end of the Second Opium War last year and the intensification of the struggle between the Taiping Army and the Qing dynasty, the comprador forces rose rapidly, and the reactionary Qing government increasingly prepared to align with foreign invaders. In November of that year, Empress Dowager Cixi launched the Beijing coup, killing Zaiyuan, Duanhua, and Sushun, eliminating the regency group of the Eight Elders, seizing power, and installing the foreign-leaning officials. From then on, the reactionary Qing government adopted the so-called “borrowing foreign aid to suppress” policy, shamelessly importing foreign invaders to crush the Taiping revolution. Facing the joint attack of domestic and foreign reactionaries, the situation of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom became increasingly critical!
However, “Only heroes drive away tigers and leopards, no heroes fear bears and tigers”[64], no difficulty or obstacle could scare the soldiers of the Taiping Army. After Chen Yucheng and Hong Rengan, along with Lin Shaozhang, united forces, they mobilized all troops to attack the outskirts of Anqing, engaging in repeated tug-of-war with the Qing army, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, though the Taiping Army also suffered heavy losses. Hong Rengan personally participated in the front-line battles, fighting bravely alongside allies. But because an important diplomatic event occurred in the Heavenly Kingdom, Hong Rengan had to return to Tianjing for negotiations. After the departure of the Crown Prince, Chen Yucheng joined forces with Crown Prince Yang Fucheng, and in August launched a full-scale attack on the Qing positions, finally defeating the Qing army in late August, recapturing Jixian Pass, building more than forty fortresses, and achieving a major victory. The day after capturing Jixian Pass, on August 25th, Chen Yucheng and Yang Fucheng personally led the entire Taiping army to attack from behind the enemy to encircle the Xiang Army’s long trench defending Anqing. On August 27th, the battle was extremely fierce, with Chen Yucheng and Yang Fucheng commanding soldiers to charge with bundles of grass, breaking through the Xiang Army’s defenses amid gunfire and filling the trenches with grass, quickly filling the long trench and breaking through the first line of defense. The Xiang Army’s leader Zeng Guoqian was so frantic that he personally fought shirtless, beating drums to rally troops, and concentrated all foreign guns and cannons to bombard the Taiping Army. Chen Yucheng led a fierce attack on the Qing trench, but the Qing traitors used their weapon advantages to fire continuously, causing huge casualties. Despite this, the Taiping soldiers continued to charge forward, risking their lives over the bodies of fallen comrades. Chen Yucheng fought for an entire day and night, launching twelve fierce assaults, reaching the outskirts of Anqing. Ye Yulai also led the garrison to sortie and cooperate with the encirclement of the Xiang Army from behind. However, due to the enemy’s strong fortifications and the heavy use of foreign guns and cannons, the Taiping casualties were severe, with over 3,000 soldiers sacrificed in one day, and they could not break through the Qing defenses, only forced to cease the attack. After this failed breakout, Anqing was tightly blockaded by the Qing army, with soldiers and civilians running out of supplies, forced to eat dry grass, and many soldiers fainted from hunger but still struggled to continue fighting.
On September 5th, the cunning Zeng Guoqian took advantage of the city’s supply shortage and the Taiping army’s inability to support outside, launching a general assault on Anqing and detonating the explosives in the pre-dug tunnels, collapsing a section of the city wall dozens of zhang long. Wu Dingcai led soldiers to defend the breach to the death, but they were vastly outnumbered and all heroically sacrificed. After the fierce invasion by the vicious Manchu army, the starving soldiers, under Ye Yulai’s leadership, fought back fiercely in the narrow streets, engaging in intense street battles. Over 20,000 troops fought to the death for the revolution, shedding their last drops of blood and sacrificing heroically. After the fall of Anqing, the reactionary Xiang Army implemented brutal “Three Light” policies, looting all wealth, killing over 40,000 civilians, raping more than 10,000 women, and committing unprecedented war crimes!
In the defense of Anqing, the Taiping Army fought for over a year under extremely unfavorable circumstances, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, but ultimately failed because Li Xiucheng’s forces stood by and did not rescue, resulting in a defeat. This failure caused the elite of the Taiping Army on the western front to be wiped out, and the vital military stronghold of Anqing fell into enemy hands, plunging the entire Anhui battlefield into an irreversible crisis. Shortly after losing Anqing, towns across Anhui fell one after another, exposing Tianjing to the threat of enemy forces, and the situation became even more critical. Upon hearing of Anqing’s fall, Hong Rengan was deeply grieved and said: “The greatest loss of our army is that Anqing fell into the hands of the Qing army. This city is the key to Tianjing’s safety; once lost to the demons, it becomes the basis for their attack on us. With the fall of Anqing, the route to Tianjing along the way also fell one after another, and it cannot be defended anymore.”[65]
This failure in the defense of Anqing was entirely caused by the traitor Li Xiucheng. Li Xiucheng arrived two months late for the second western expedition, and after arriving, he did not attack Wuhan but withdrew his troops back to Zhejiang, not only ruining the western expedition plan but also allowing the enemy to send heavy troops from Hubei to support the encirclement of Anqing by the Xiang Army. During the most intense moments of the defense, King Chen Yucheng and others risked their lives to reinforce Anqing, nearly involving all the western front troops, with over half injured. But the damned traitor Li Xiucheng, with an army of 500,000, refused to send troops to support and instead focused on developing his personal territory in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, playing a role that external enemies could not, committing heinous crimes! Li Xiucheng owed a blood debt to the soldiers and civilians of Anqing!
After Anqing fell, King Chen Yucheng had to retreat to Luzhou, planning to hold the Anhui base there and continue defending Tianjing’s north. To support Tianjing and prevent Anhui from falling into a passive situation, King Chen sent subordinate King Fu Chen Dekai and King Zun Lai Wenguang northward to meet the Nian Army, developing bases and armies in North and Northwest China, attacking Qing forces from behind, and supporting the Heavenly Kingdom, preparing to recapture Anqing at any time. King Chen only left 4,000 troops in Luzhou to defend against the Qing and to campaign in northern Anhui, continuing to develop the Anhui base and preparing supplies for Tianjing. However, the Qing army was too numerous, and after three months of stubborn defense, supplies ran out, and no reinforcements arrived, forcing him to abandon the city and break out. However, the cunning general Miao Peilin in Shouzhou used treacherous means to deceive King Chen into entering Shouzhou city, where he was captured and handed over to the Qing leader Sheng Bao. After King Chen’s capture, Miao Peilin dared not meet him personally but sent his nephew Miao Jingkai to persuade him to surrender. King Chen sternly rebuked him: “Your uncle is truly a scoundrel, a grass on the wall, swayed by the wind from both sides. Dragon helps dragon, tiger helps tiger, and in the end, he won’t even keep his own name as a traitor. I can only kill you, not humiliate you. Let’s see how you are dealt with!” Facing danger without fear, he maintained his integrity and heroism. King Chen despised those who sought to save their own lives at the expense of the revolution. Although he was captured by the enemy, he still maintained the demeanor of a great general of the Heavenly Kingdom. According to the “Record of Captivity,” “Miao Bao sent King Chen Yucheng to Sheng Bao. Bao sat in the camp tent, with flags and cannons arrayed strictly, calling King Chen to come forward. When King Chen went up, he was ordered to kneel. He cursed loudly: ‘You little kid Sheng Bao, in the demon court, you are just a first-class traitor and incompetent! I am a founding hero of the Heavenly Dynasty, having fought in Hubei three times and in Jiangnan nine times. You run at the sight of battle. On Baishi Mountain, you led twenty-five battalions, and the entire army was wiped out. You took more than ten horses and fled, I spare your life. How dare you kneel before me? You shameless thing!’” After being cursed, Sheng Bao fell silent, then ordered his subordinates to untie the ropes and invite King Chen to the seat of honor, attempting to persuade him with high official titles and wealth. King Chen, seeing this, cursed loudly: “A real man dies, no need for this!”[66] [66] Prosperity cannot corrupt, power cannot bend. Truly a heroic spirit shining through the ages! Under enemy threats and temptations, King Chen Yucheng remained unwavering, maintaining the heroic spirit of a revolutionary leader. On June 4, 1862, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom’s King Chen Yucheng heroically died in Yanjin, Henan, at age 26.
With his unwavering loyalty and heroic spirit, King Chen inspired a group of steadfast revolutionaries. His subordinates almost all remained loyal, sacrificing themselves for the revolution, such as Liu Lanlin, Wu Dingcai, Ye Yulai, and others, who fought to the death at Anqing and heroically perished. After King Chen’s death, generals like Dao Wang Chen Shirong and Cong Wang Chen Delong also refused to surrender and heroically died. Later, the old troops of King Chen—Zun Wang Lai Wenguang, Fu Wang Chen Dekai, Qi Wang Liang Chengfu, and Hu Wang Zeng Chengchun—also persisted in the revolution, fighting in the south and north, all sacrificing without surrendering. This sharply contrasted with the large number of traitors who surrendered or defected under Li Xiucheng’s command.
The sacrifice of King Chen Yucheng was a major loss to the Taiping revolution. His death not only deprived the revolution of one of its most outstanding military leaders but also greatly weakened the revolutionary forces, causing King Gan to fall behind in the political struggle against Li Xiucheng’s traitor group. After his death, Hong Rengan mourned deeply, saying: “If King Chen Yucheng had not died, the siege of Tianjing would have been very different… Once he was gone, the military momentum and prestige collapsed simultaneously, and everything disintegrated”[67].
After King Chen’s death, Li Xiucheng’s influence began to grow, and the Jiangsu-Zhejiang area became entirely his personal territory. He gradually plotted to usurp the military and political power of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, turning the kingdom’s territory into his own domain. Although Li Xiucheng was born a poor farmer and joined the revolution early, he was extremely obsessed with personal gain, eager for fame and wealth, and fond of hypocritical Confucian morality. After the Taiping Army broke through Yong’an, Li Xiucheng, still an ordinary soldier, secretly kept a copy of Confucian heretical books, often reciting them in his sleep, and kept them close at hand day and night. When discovered, according to the discipline of the Taiping revolution, he should have been executed, but the commander Shi Dakai, instead of punishing him, appreciated and promoted him, elevating him to a subordinate general. After occupying Suzhou in 1860, he established de facto control over Jiangsu and Zhejiang, further restoring feudal systems and turning his base into a “state within a state.” He openly hung “moral maxims of the Chinese classics” in his “Loyal King’s Residence,” allowing feudal scholars to run amok and spread Confucian heresy. He became increasingly arrogant after ascending the loyal king’s throne, openly promoting nonsense such as “benevolent government” and “the three bonds and five constants,” claiming that “only by loving kin and relatives can one be benevolent to the people, and loving the people and caring for things is the urgent task of the age”[70], opposing the revolutionary peasant dictatorship of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and advocating kindness toward landlords. Hong Rengan sharply rebuked Li Xiucheng’s reactionary rhetoric, pointing out that the struggle between the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and the Manchu Qing traitors was a “life-and-death battle.” “The armies of Xianfeng have no compassion for us… We cannot show them kindness either.”[71] But Li Xiucheng paid no heed, disregarding the revolutionary discipline of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, and even scorned the large number of revolutionary books compiled by King Chen himself, “disdainfully ignoring them”[72].
Li Xiucheng sought to establish an independent kingdom, engaging in all sorts of reactionary acts within his domain, fully restoring feudalism. Economically, he openly opposed the Taiping regulations of the “Heavenly Dynasty Land System” and the “Heavenly Code,” issuing land certificates to landlords, allowing them to continue collecting rent and taxes as before, and even implementing reactionary landlord dictatorship against resisting farmers, deploying local militia to suppress them, and demanding that farmers “pay rent,” threatening to arrest those who refused. Landlords cheered wildly: “With the might of the long-haired (Qing), we’re not afraid of not paying rent!” In Li Xiucheng’s territory, landlords behaved even more arrogantly than in Qing-controlled areas. His so-called “benevolent governance and loving the people” clearly favored which class of “people”? It was obvious. Politically, he favored corrupt Qing officials and promoted local landlords and gentry. When capturing Hangzhou, he personally rode into the city to order the protection of Qing Zhejiang Governor Wang Youling. When he found Wang had committed suicide, he was grief-stricken and ordered a grand funeral, sending him back to his hometown for burial. No wonder Jiangnan landlords were grateful and praised him, even erecting “praise arches” for him. Li Xiucheng also established “Recruitment Halls” in Hangzhou to attract Qing officials and gentry, offering special favors; at the same time, he called on “gentry and officials to quickly submit and surrender”[73], recruiting many wealthy landlords. For a time, the Jiangsu-Zhejiang base became Li Xiucheng’s personal stronghold of landlords and bandits. Culturally and educationally, he built feudal schools and promoted the Eight-legged essay, using Confucianism to pollute the revolutionary ranks of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Li Xiucheng sent his agents to hold feudal imperial examinations across Jiangsu and Zhejiang, openly using the “Four Books and Five Classics” as exam topics, recruiting large numbers of reactionary landlords and gentry officials. His confidant Qian Guiren even used the name of the Taiping’s “talking about principles” to promote the “Three Bonds and Five Constants,” and harshly exploited farmers, forcing them to pay land rent “at a rate of 2,060 wen per mu,” and punishing those who could not pay, “beating them on the spot.”[74] Li Xiucheng also allowed feudal gentry to open schools and set up “studies” within their domains, restoring feudal education, but violently suppressed the revolutionary acts of burning Confucian temples and banning Confucianism among Taiping soldiers. Once, he even ordered the execution of over forty Taiping soldiers who had destroyed temples in Suzhou’s Mudou town, showing the face of a landlord executioner![75] Militarily, Li Xiucheng repeatedly disobeyed orders, deliberately supported traitors to surrender to the Qing, and even incited internal strife among the revolutionaries. In 1859, Chen Yucheng clashed with the surrendering Wei Jun in Tianjing, and Li Xiucheng sent troops to help Wei Jun massacre thousands of revolutionary soldiers under Chen Yucheng’s command![76] Soon after, Wei Jun surrendered to the Qing and changed his name to Wei Zhijun, actively attacking the Taiping Army during the Anqing campaign and earning Qing rulers’ praise.
Why could such a traitor like Li Xiucheng run rampant within the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom? We cannot hold a naive and dogmatic view that removing Li Xiucheng alone would solve everything. In fact, the internal revolutionary team of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was constantly breeding traitors aiming to restore feudalism, reflecting the limitations of the peasant class. Although peasants had long suffered under landlord oppression and harbored rebellious and egalitarian aspirations, their dispersed small-scale production and private ownership ideas created narrow-mindedness and fragmentation. These private ideas, combined with regional and clan-based loyalties, formed sectarianism and regionalism that undermined revolutionary unity. Especially as the revolution progressed, some wavering elements grew ambitious and sought comfort and pleasure, and with the corruption of landlord culture, they rapidly degenerated into feudal factions eager to split and divide. Of course, there were revolutionaries like Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng who remained committed to peasant revolution and refused to be corrupted. Concerning corrupt elements like Li Xiucheng, the revolutionaries took measures: the Heavenly King repeatedly summoned Li Xiucheng, rebuking his disloyalty, and issued imperial edicts in the name of the young emperor Hong Tiansui, affirming “Guan Shu Zuo, still as before,” strengthening Hong Rengan’s revolutionary faction. But because the peasant class lacked a scientific worldview, they could not understand the class, practical, and historical roots of the opposing worldviews, nor implement the Communist Party’s mass rectification campaigns to purge internal corruption and evil, nor carry out a thorough “Cultural Revolution” to expose darkness from below, so the infiltration of internal traitors continued. The heroic peasants had naive revolutionary enthusiasm and strong loyalty, but their lack of understanding of ideological struggles and their feudal clan-based methods of unity—calling each other brothers and uncles—masked class contradictions and gave opportunists like Li Xiucheng a chance. As a result, many officers followed Li Xiucheng’s path into degeneration, engaging in sectarianism and regionalism, severely damaging revolutionary unity and causing great losses to the revolution.
After the fall of Anqing, Qing traitors and foreign devils attacked the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom from both sides. On the western front, Zeng Guofan led the Xiang Army across the river to encircle Tianjing; on the eastern front, foreign gun teams and Qing forces jointly attacked Suzhou, Changzhou, and Shanghai. At this critical moment, the Heavenly King Hong Xiuquan urgently ordered Li Xiucheng to return and reinforce Tianjing, aiming to annihilate Zeng Guofan’s forces before they stabilized. But Li Xiucheng, on one hand, was infatuated with the prosperity of Suzhou, and on the other, afraid of battle, proposed delaying for two years before fighting, fully aligning with Zeng Guofan’s “defend first, attack later” strategy. The Heavenly King was furious and sent an envoy to reprimand Li Xiucheng for “disloyalty,” warning: “If you do not obey the imperial edict, the law of the state will not tolerate you!” Under this pressure, Li Xiucheng was forced to decide to support Tianjing, but he repeated his previous delaying tactics, dragging from June to mid-September before setting out, and only reaching the outskirts of Tianjing in mid-October, by which time Zeng Guofan had besieged the city for five months, with a very strong position that was difficult to attack. The Taiping Army fought fiercely against the Xiang Army, inflicting heavy casualties, and the battle was extremely tense. At this critical juncture, Li Xiucheng, because his own territory in Suzhou was attacked by Qing forces, withdrew in late November, leading to the failure of the first Tianjing relief campaign. The damned traitor Li Xiucheng committed a heinous crime again! The frontal assault failed, and the Heavenly King decided to implement the “siege Wei to rescue Zhao” strategy again, ordering Li Xiucheng to execute the “advance north and attack south” plan—crossing the river northward to attack Anhui and Hubei from behind, emptying the enemy’s rear and cutting off Zeng Guofan’s supply lines, aiming to annihilate Zeng’s forces. But Li Xiucheng, wanting to preserve his personal territory, procrastinated again, sending a small part of his troops across the river in early December, while he himself only began crossing in March, four months late. By then, Zeng Guofan had already broken the Taiping strategic plan, setting up layered defenses in northern Anhui. After several minor battles, Li Xiucheng abandoned the promising situation and retreated south to his old hometown in Suzhou and Hangzhou! This ultimately led to the failure of the Tianjing relief campaign. Meanwhile, under Li Xiucheng’s rampant support, his generals defected one after another, with Changshu’s Xiong Wanquan surrendering the entire city to Qing forces, and Gao Yongkuan of Suzhou killing the Prince of the Crown and surrendering to Qing. The Jiangsu-Zhejiang base of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom also disintegrated.
By this point, the siege of Tianjing had become an irretrievable situation. The traitor Li Xiucheng repeatedly urged the Heavenly King to abandon Tianjing and escape, partly to save his own life, and partly to facilitate “holding the Son of Heaven to command the princes,” and possibly sell out the Heavenly King to save himself. But the Heavenly King sternly rejected Li Xiucheng’s “advice,” personally issuing an edict titled “Rebuke Li Xiucheng for Cowardice and Fear of Death,” stating: “I, the Emperor, have received the divine mandate from the Holy Lord and Jesus Christ, and am the only true king in the world. Why fear anything!” “My empire is as solid as an iron bucket; if you do not support, someone else will. You say there are no troops, but my heavenly soldiers are more than water, so what is there to fear from the demons!” “If you fear death, then you will die.” “Political affairs are not to be handled by you.”[77] This embodied Hong Xiuquan’s fearless spirit as a great revolutionary leader. On June 4, 1862, King Hong Xiuquan heroically died in Yanjin, Henan, at age 26.
With his unwavering loyalty and heroic spirit, King Hong inspired a group of steadfast revolutionaries. Almost none of his subordinates betrayed, all sacrificing themselves for the revolution, such as Liu Lanlin, Wu Dingcai, Ye Yulai, and others, who fought to the death at Anqing and heroically perished. After King Hong’s death, generals like Dao Wang Chen Shirong and Cong Wang Chen Delong also refused to surrender and heroically died. Later, King Hong’s old troops—Zun Wang Lai Wenguang, Fu Wang Chen Dekai, Qi Wang Liang Chengfu, and Hu Wang Zeng Chengchun—also persisted in the revolution, fighting in the south and north, all sacrificing without surrendering. This sharply contrasted with the large number of traitors who surrendered or defected under Li Xiucheng’s command.
The sacrifice of King Hong Xiuquan was a major loss to the Taiping revolution. His death not only deprived the revolution of one of its most outstanding military leaders but also greatly weakened the revolutionary forces, causing King Gan to fall behind in the political struggle against Li Xiucheng’s traitor group. After his death, Hong Rengan mourned deeply, saying: “If King Hong had not died, the siege of Tianjing would have been very different… Once he was gone, the military momentum and prestige collapsed simultaneously, and everything disintegrated”[67].
After King Hong’s death, Li Xiucheng’s influence began to grow, and the Jiangsu-Zhejiang area became entirely his personal territory. He gradually plotted to usurp the military and political power of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, turning the kingdom’s territory into his own domain. Although Li Xiucheng was born a poor farmer and joined the revolution early, he was extremely obsessed with personal gain, eager for fame and wealth, and fond of hypocritical Confucian morality. After the Taiping Army broke through Yong’an, Li Xiucheng, still an ordinary soldier, secretly kept a copy of Confucian heretical books, often reciting them in his sleep, and kept them close at hand day and night. When discovered, according to the discipline of the Taiping revolution, he should have been executed, but the commander Shi Dakai, instead of punishing him, appreciated and promoted him, elevating him to a subordinate general. After occupying Suzhou in 1860, he established de facto control over Jiangsu and Zhejiang, further restoring feudal systems and turning his base into a “state within a state.” He openly hung “moral maxims of the Chinese classics” in his “Loyal King’s Residence,” allowing feudal scholars to run amok and spread Confucian heresy. He became increasingly arrogant after ascending the loyal king’s throne, openly promoting nonsense such as “benevolent government” and “the three bonds and five constants,” claiming that “only by loving kin and relatives can one be benevolent to the people, and loving the people and caring for things is the urgent task of the age”[70], opposing the revolutionary peasant dictatorship of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and advocating kindness toward landlords. Hong Rengan sharply rebuked Li Xiucheng’s reactionary rhetoric, pointing out that the struggle between the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and the Manchu Qing traitors was a “life-and-death battle.” “The armies of Xianfeng have no compassion for us… We cannot show them kindness either.”[71] But Li Xiucheng paid no heed, disregarding the revolutionary discipline of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, and even scorned the large number of revolutionary books compiled by King Chen himself, “disdainfully ignoring them”[72].
Li Xiucheng sought to establish an independent kingdom, engaging in all sorts of reactionary acts within his domain, fully restoring feudalism. Economically, he openly opposed the Taiping regulations of the “Heavenly Dynasty Land System” and the “Heavenly Code,” issuing land certificates to landlords, allowing them to continue collecting rent and taxes as before, and even implementing reactionary landlord dictatorship against resisting farmers, deploying local militia to suppress them, and demanding that farmers “pay rent,” threatening to arrest those who refused. Landlords cheered wildly: “With the might of the long-haired (Qing), we’re not afraid of not paying rent!” In Li Xiucheng’s territory, landlords behaved even more arrogantly than in Qing-controlled areas. His so-called “benevolent governance and loving the people” clearly favored which class of “people”? It was obvious. Politically, he favored corrupt Qing officials and promoted local landlords and gentry. When capturing Hangzhou, he personally rode into the city to order the protection of Qing Zhejiang Governor Wang Youling. When he found Wang had committed suicide, he was grief-stricken and ordered a grand funeral, sending him back to his hometown for burial. No wonder Jiangnan landlords were grateful and praised him, even erecting “praise arches” for him. Li Xiucheng also established “Recruitment Halls” in Hangzhou to attract Qing officials and gentry, offering special favors; at the same time, he called on “gentry and officials to quickly submit and surrender”[73], recruiting many wealthy landlords. For a time, the Jiangsu-Zhejiang base became Li Xiucheng’s personal stronghold of landlords and bandits. Culturally and educationally, he built feudal schools and promoted the Eight-legged essay, using Confucianism to pollute the revolutionary ranks of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Li Xiucheng sent his agents to hold feudal imperial examinations across Jiangsu and Zhejiang, openly using the “Four Books and Five Classics” as exam topics, recruiting large numbers of reactionary landlords and gentry officials. His confidant Qian Guiren even used the name of the Taiping’s “talking about principles” to promote the “Three Bonds and Five Constants,” and harshly exploited farmers, forcing them to pay land rent “at a rate of 2,060 wen per mu,” and punishing those who could not pay, “beating them on the spot.”[74] Li Xiucheng also allowed feudal gentry to open schools and set up “studies” within their domains, restoring feudal education, but violently suppressed the revolutionary acts of burning Confucian temples and banning Confucianism among Taiping soldiers. Once, he even ordered the execution of over forty Taiping soldiers who had destroyed temples in Suzhou’s Mudou town, showing the face of a landlord executioner![75] Militarily, Li Xiucheng repeatedly disobeyed orders, deliberately supported traitors to surrender to the Qing, and even incited internal strife among the revolutionaries. In 1859, Chen Yucheng clashed with the surrendering Wei Jun in Tianjing, and Li Xiucheng sent troops to help Wei Jun massacre thousands of revolutionary soldiers under Chen Yucheng’s command![76] Soon after, Wei Jun surrendered to the Qing and changed his name to Wei Zhijun, actively attacking the Taiping Army during the Anqing campaign and earning Qing rulers’ praise.
Why could such a traitor like Li Xiucheng run rampant within the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom? We cannot hold a naive and dogmatic view that removing Li Xiucheng alone would solve everything. In fact, the internal revolutionary team of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was constantly breeding traitors aiming to restore feudalism, reflecting the limitations of the peasant class. Although peasants had long suffered under landlord oppression and harbored rebellious and egalitarian aspirations, their dispersed small-scale production and private ownership ideas created narrow-mindedness and fragmentation. These private ideas, combined with regional and clan-based loyalties, formed sectarianism and regionalism that undermined revolutionary unity. Especially as the revolution progressed, some wavering elements grew ambitious and sought comfort and pleasure, and with the corruption of landlord culture, they rapidly degenerated into feudal factions eager to split and divide. Of course, there were revolutionaries like Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng who remained committed to peasant revolution and refused to be corrupted. Concerning corrupt elements like Li Xiucheng, the revolutionaries took measures: the Heavenly King repeatedly summoned Li Xiucheng, rebuking his disloyalty, and issued imperial edicts in the name of the young emperor Hong Tiansui, affirming “Guan Shu Zuo, still as before,” strengthening Hong Rengan’s revolutionary faction. But because the peasant class lacked a scientific worldview, they could not understand the class, practical, and historical roots of the opposing worldviews, nor implement the Communist Party’s mass rectification campaigns to purge internal corruption and evil, nor carry out a thorough “Cultural Revolution” to expose darkness from below, so the infiltration of internal traitors continued. The heroic peasants had naive revolutionary enthusiasm and strong loyalty, but their lack of understanding of ideological struggles and their feudal clan-based methods of unity—calling each other brothers and uncles—masked class contradictions and gave opportunists like Li Xiucheng a chance. As a result, many officers followed Li Xiucheng’s path into degeneration, engaging in sectarianism and regionalism, severely damaging revolutionary unity and causing great losses to the revolution.
After the fall of Anqing, Qing traitors and foreign devils attacked the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom from both sides. On the western front, Zeng Guofan led the Xiang Army across the river to encircle Tianjing; on the eastern front, foreign gun teams and Qing forces jointly attacked Suzhou, Changzhou, and Shanghai. At this critical moment, the Heavenly King Hong Xiuquan urgently ordered Li Xiucheng to return and reinforce Tianjing, aiming to annihilate Zeng Guofan’s forces before they stabilized. But Li Xiucheng, on one hand, was infatuated with the prosperity of Suzhou, and on the other, afraid of battle, proposed delaying for two years before fighting, fully aligning with Zeng Guofan’s “defend first, attack later” strategy. The Heavenly King was furious and sent an envoy to reprimand Li Xiucheng for “disloyalty,” warning: “If you do not obey the imperial edict, the law of the state will not tolerate you!” Under this pressure, Li Xiucheng was forced to decide to support Tianjing, but he repeated his previous delaying tactics, dragging from June to mid-September before setting out, and only reaching the outskirts of Tianjing in mid-October, by which time Zeng Guofan had besieged the city for five months, with a very strong position that was difficult to attack. The Taiping Army fought fiercely against the Xiang Army, inflicting heavy casualties, and the battle was extremely tense. At this critical juncture, Li Xiucheng, because his own territory in Suzhou was attacked by Qing forces, withdrew in late November, leading to the failure of the first Tianjing relief campaign. The damned traitor Li Xiucheng committed a heinous crime again! The frontal assault failed, and the Heavenly King decided to implement the “siege Wei to rescue Zhao” strategy again, ordering Li Xiucheng to execute the “advance north and attack south” plan—crossing the river northward to attack Anhui and Hubei from behind, emptying the enemy’s rear and cutting off Zeng Guofan’s supply lines, aiming to annihilate Zeng’s forces. But Li Xiucheng, wanting to preserve his personal territory, procrastinated again, sending a small part of his troops across the river in early December, while he himself only began crossing in March, four months late. By then, Zeng Guofan had already broken the Taiping strategic plan, setting up layered defenses in northern Anhui. After several minor battles, Li Xiucheng abandoned the promising situation and retreated south to his old hometown in Suzhou and Hangzhou and fled! This ultimately led to the failure of the Tianjing relief campaign. Meanwhile, under Li Xiucheng’s rampant support, his generals defected one after another, with Changshu’s Xiong Wanquan surrendering the entire city to Qing forces, and Gao Yongkuan of Suzhou killing the Prince of the Crown and surrendering to Qing. The Jiangsu-Zhejiang base of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom also disintegrated.
By this point, the siege of Tianjing had become an irretrievable situation. The traitor Li Xiucheng repeatedly urged the Heavenly King to abandon Tianjing and escape, partly to save his own life, and partly to facilitate “holding the Son of Heaven to command the princes,” and possibly to betray the Heavenly King to save himself. But the Heavenly King sternly rejected Li Xiucheng’s “advice,” personally issuing an edict titled “Rebuke Li Xiucheng for Cowardice and Fear of Death,” stating: “I, the Emperor, have received the divine mandate from the Holy Lord and Jesus Christ, and am the only true king in the world. Why fear anything!” “My empire is as solid as an iron bucket; if you do not support, someone else will. You say there are no troops, but my heavenly soldiers are more than water, so what is there to fear from the demons!” “If you fear death, then you will die.” “Political affairs are not to be handled by you.”[77] This embodied Hong Xiuquan’s fearless spirit as a great revolutionary leader. On June 4, 1862, King Hong Xiuquan heroically died in Yanjin, Henan, at age 26.
With his unwavering loyalty and heroic spirit, King Hong inspired a group of steadfast revolutionaries. Almost none of his subordinates betrayed, all sacrificing themselves for the revolution, such as Liu Lanlin, Wu Dingcai, Ye Yulai, and others, who fought to the death at Anqing and heroically perished. After King Hong’s death, generals like Dao Wang Chen Shirong and Cong Wang Chen Delong also refused to surrender and heroically died. Later, King Hong’s old troops—Zun Wang Lai Wenguang, Fu Wang Chen Dekai, Qi Wang Liang Chengfu, and Hu Wang Zeng Chengchun—also persisted in the revolution, fighting in the south and north, all sacrificing without surrendering. This sharply contrasted with the large number of traitors who surrendered or defected under Li Xiucheng’s command.
The sacrifice of King Hong Xiuquan was a major loss to the Taiping revolution. His death not only deprived the revolution of one of its most outstanding military leaders but also greatly weakened the revolutionary forces, causing King Gan to fall behind in the political struggle against Li Xiucheng’s traitor group. After his death, Hong Rengan mourned deeply, saying: “If King Hong had not died, the siege of Tianjing would have been very different… Once he was gone, the military momentum and prestige collapsed simultaneously, and everything disintegrated”[67].
After King Hong’s death, Li Xiucheng’s influence began to grow, and the Jiangsu-Zhejiang area became entirely his personal territory. He gradually plotted to usurp the military and political power of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, turning the kingdom’s territory into his own domain. Although Li Xiucheng was born a poor farmer and joined the revolution early, he was extremely obsessed with personal gain, eager for fame and wealth, and fond of hypocritical Confucian morality. After the Taiping Army broke through Yong’an, Li Xiucheng, still an ordinary soldier, secretly kept a copy of Confucian heretical books, often reciting them in his sleep, and kept them close at hand day and night. When discovered, according to the discipline of the Taiping revolution, he should have been executed, but the commander Shi Dakai, instead of punishing him, appreciated and promoted him, elevating him to a subordinate general. After occupying Suzhou in 1860, he established de facto control over Jiangsu and Zhejiang, further restoring feudal systems and turning his base into a “state within a state.” He openly hung “moral maxims of the Chinese classics” in his “Loyal King’s Residence,” allowing feudal scholars to run amok and spread Confucian heresy. He became increasingly arrogant after ascending the loyal king’s throne, openly promoting nonsense such as “benevolent government” and “the three bonds and five constants,” claiming that “only by loving kin and relatives can one be benevolent to the people, and loving the people and caring for things is the urgent task of the age”[70], opposing the revolutionary peasant dictatorship of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and advocating kindness toward landlords. Hong Rengan sharply rebuked Li Xiucheng’s reactionary rhetoric, pointing out that the struggle between the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and the Manchu Qing traitors was a “life-and-death battle.” “The armies of Xianfeng have no compassion for us… We cannot show them kindness either.”[71] But Li Xiucheng paid no heed, disregarding the revolutionary discipline of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, and even scorned the large number of revolutionary books compiled by King Chen himself, “disdainfully ignoring them”[72].
Li Xiucheng sought to establish an independent kingdom, engaging in all sorts of reactionary acts within his domain, fully restoring feudalism. Economically, he openly opposed the Taiping regulations of the “Heavenly Dynasty Land System” and the “Heavenly Code,” issuing land certificates to landlords, allowing them to continue collecting rent and taxes as before, and even implementing reactionary landlord dictatorship against resisting farmers, deploying local militia to suppress them, and demanding that farmers “pay rent,” threatening to arrest those who refused. Landlords cheered wildly: “With the might of the long-haired (Qing), we’re not afraid of not paying rent!” In Li Xiucheng’s territory, landlords behaved even more arrogantly than in Qing-controlled areas. His so-called “benevolent governance and loving the people” clearly favored which class of “people”? It was obvious. Politically, he favored corrupt Qing officials and promoted local landlords and gentry. When capturing Hangzhou, he personally rode into the city to order the protection of Qing Zhejiang Governor Wang Youling. When he found Wang had committed suicide, he was grief-stricken and ordered a grand funeral, sending him back to his hometown for burial. No wonder Jiangnan landlords were grateful and praised him, even erecting “praise arches” for him. Li Xiucheng also established “Recruitment Halls” in Hangzhou to attract Qing officials and gentry, offering special favors; at the same time, he called on “gentry and officials to quickly submit and surrender”[73], recruiting many wealthy landlords. For a time, the Jiangsu-Zhejiang base became Li Xiucheng’s personal stronghold of landlords and bandits. Culturally and educationally, he built feudal schools and promoted the Eight-legged essay, using Confucianism to pollute the revolutionary ranks of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Li Xiucheng sent his agents to hold feudal imperial examinations across Jiangsu and Zhejiang, openly using the “Four Books and Five Classics” as exam topics, recruiting large numbers of reactionary landlords and gentry officials. His confidant Qian Guiren even used the name of the Taiping’s “talking about principles” to promote the “Three Bonds and Five Constants,” and harshly exploited farmers, forcing them to pay land rent “at a rate of 2,060 wen per mu,” and punishing those who could not pay, “beating them on the spot.”[74] Li Xiucheng also allowed feudal gentry to open schools and set up “studies” within their domains, restoring feudal education, but violently suppressed the revolutionary acts of burning Confucian temples and banning Confucianism among Taiping soldiers. Once, he even ordered the execution of over forty Taiping soldiers who had destroyed temples in Suzhou’s Mudou town, showing the face of a landlord executioner![75] Militarily, Li Xiucheng repeatedly disobeyed orders, deliberately supported traitors to surrender to the Qing, and even incited internal strife among the revolutionaries. In 1859, Chen Yucheng clashed with the surrendering Wei Jun in Tianjing, and Li Xiucheng sent troops to help Wei Jun massacre thousands of revolutionary soldiers under Chen Yucheng’s command![76] Soon after, Wei Jun surrendered to the Qing and changed his name to Wei Zhijun, actively attacking the Taiping Army during the Anqing campaign and earning Qing rulers’ praise.
Why could such a traitor like Li Xiucheng run rampant within the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom? We cannot hold a naive and dogmatic view that removing Li Xiucheng alone would solve everything. In fact, the internal revolutionary team of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was constantly breeding traitors aiming to restore feudalism, reflecting the limitations of the peasant class. Although peasants had long suffered under landlord oppression and harbored rebellious and egalitarian aspirations, their dispersed small-scale production and private ownership ideas created narrow-mindedness and fragmentation. These private ideas, combined with regional and clan-based loyalties, formed sectarianism and regionalism that undermined revolutionary unity. Especially as the revolution progressed, some wavering elements grew ambitious and sought comfort and pleasure, and with the corruption of landlord culture, they rapidly degenerated into feudal factions eager to split and divide. Of course, there were revolutionaries like Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng who remained committed to peasant revolution and refused to be corrupted. Concerning corrupt elements like Li Xiucheng, the revolutionaries took measures: the Heavenly King repeatedly summoned Li Xiucheng, rebuking his disloyalty, and issued imperial edicts in the name of the young emperor Hong Tiansui, affirming “Guan Shu Zuo, still as before,” strengthening Hong Rengan’s revolutionary faction. But because the peasant class lacked a scientific worldview, they could not understand the class, practical, and historical roots of the opposing worldviews, nor implement the Communist Party’s mass rectification campaigns to purge internal corruption and evil, nor carry out a thorough “Cultural Revolution” to expose darkness from below, so the infiltration of internal traitors continued. The heroic peasants had naive revolutionary enthusiasm and strong loyalty, but their lack of understanding of ideological struggles and their feudal clan-based methods of unity—calling each other brothers and uncles—masked class contradictions and gave opportunists like Li Xiucheng a chance. As a result, many officers followed Li Xiucheng’s path into degeneration, engaging in sectarianism and regionalism, severely damaging revolutionary unity and causing great losses to the revolution.
After the fall of Anqing, Qing traitors and foreign devils attacked the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom from both sides. On the western front, Zeng Guofan led the Xiang Army across the river to encircle Tianjing; on the eastern front, foreign gun teams and Qing forces jointly attacked Suzhou, Changzhou, and Shanghai. At this critical moment, the Heavenly King Hong Xiuquan urgently ordered Li Xiucheng to return and reinforce Tianjing, aiming to annihilate Zeng Guofan’s forces before they stabilized. But Li Xiucheng, on one hand, was infatuated with the prosperity of Suzhou, and on the other, afraid of battle, proposed delaying for two years before fighting, fully aligning with Zeng Guofan’s “defend first, attack later” strategy. The Heavenly King was furious and sent an envoy to reprimand Li Xiucheng for “disloyalty,” warning: “If you do not obey the imperial edict, the law of the state will not tolerate you!” Under this pressure, Li Xiucheng was forced to decide to support Tianjing, but he repeated his previous delaying tactics, dragging from June to mid-September before setting out, and only reaching the outskirts of Tianjing in mid-October, by which time Zeng Guofan had besieged the city for five months, with a very strong position that was difficult to attack. The Taiping Army fought fiercely against the Xiang Army, inflicting heavy casualties, and the battle was extremely tense. At this critical juncture, Li Xiucheng, because his own territory in Suzhou was attacked by Qing forces, withdrew in late November, leading to the failure of the first Tianjing relief campaign. The damned traitor Li Xiucheng committed a heinous crime again! The frontal assault failed, and the Heavenly King decided to implement the “siege Wei to rescue Zhao” strategy again, ordering Li Xiucheng to execute the “advance north and attack south” plan—crossing the river northward to attack Anhui and Hubei from behind, emptying the enemy’s rear and cutting off Zeng Guofan’s supply lines, aiming to annihilate Zeng’s forces. But Li Xiucheng, wanting to preserve his personal territory, procrastinated again, sending a small part of his troops across the river in early December, while he himself only began crossing in March, four months late. By then, Zeng Guofan had already broken the Taiping strategic plan, setting up layered defenses in northern Anhui. After several minor battles, Li Xiucheng abandoned the promising situation and retreated south to his old hometown in Suzhou and Hangzhou and fled! This ultimately led to the failure of the Tianjing relief campaign. Meanwhile, under Li Xiucheng’s rampant support, his generals defected one after another, with Changshu’s Xiong Wanquan surrendering the entire city to Qing forces, and Gao Yongkuan of Suzhou killing the Prince of the Crown and surrendering to Qing. The Jiangsu-Zhejiang base of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom also disintegrated.
By this point, the siege of Tianjing had become an irretrievable situation. The traitor Li Xiucheng repeatedly urged the Heavenly King to abandon Tianjing and escape, partly to save his own life, and partly to facilitate “holding the Son of Heaven to command the princes,” and possibly to betray the Heavenly King to save himself. But the Heavenly King sternly rejected Li Xiucheng’s “advice,” personally issuing an edict titled “Rebuke Li Xiucheng for Cowardice and Fear of Death,” stating: “I, the Emperor, have received the divine mandate from the Holy Lord and Jesus Christ, and am the only true king in the world. Why fear anything!” “My empire is as solid as an iron bucket; if you do not support, someone else will. You say there are no troops, but my heavenly soldiers are more than water, so what is there to fear from the demons!” “If you fear death, then you will die.” “Political affairs are not to be handled by you.”[77] This embodied Hong Xiuquan’s fearless spirit as a great revolutionary leader. On June 4, 1862, King Hong Xiuquan heroically died in Yanjin, Henan, at age 26.
With his unwavering loyalty and heroic spirit, King Hong inspired a group of steadfast revolutionaries. Almost none of his subordinates betrayed, all sacrificing themselves for the revolution, such as Liu Lanlin, Wu Dingcai, Ye Yulai, and others, who fought to the death at Anqing and heroically perished. After King Hong’s death, generals like Dao Wang Chen Shirong and Cong Wang Chen Delong also refused to surrender and heroically died. Later, King Hong’s old troops—Zun Wang Lai Wenguang, Fu Wang Chen Dekai, Qi Wang Liang Chengfu, and Hu Wang Zeng Chengchun—also persisted in the revolution, fighting in the south and north, all sacrificing without surrendering. This sharply contrasted with the large number of traitors who surrendered or defected under Li Xiucheng’s command.
The sacrifice of King Hong Xiuquan was a major loss to the Taiping revolution. His death not only deprived the revolution of one of its most outstanding military leaders but also greatly weakened the revolutionary forces, causing King Gan to fall behind in the political struggle against Li Xiucheng’s traitor group. After his death, Hong Rengan mourned deeply, saying: “If King Hong had not died, the siege of Tianjing would have been very different… Once he was gone, the military momentum and prestige collapsed simultaneously, and everything disintegrated”[67].
After King Hong’s death, Li Xiucheng’s influence began to grow, and the Jiangsu-Zhejiang area became entirely his personal territory. He gradually plotted to usurp the military and political power of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, turning the kingdom’s territory into his own domain. Although Li Xiucheng was born a poor farmer and joined the revolution early, he was extremely obsessed with personal gain, eager for fame and wealth, and fond of hypocritical Confucian morality. After the Taiping Army broke through Yong’an, Li Xiucheng, still an ordinary soldier, secretly kept a copy of Confucian heretical books, often reciting them in his sleep, and kept them close at hand day and night. When discovered, according to the discipline of the Taiping revolution, he should have been executed, but the commander Shi Dakai, instead of punishing him, appreciated and promoted him, elevating him to a subordinate general. After occupying Suzhou in 1860, he established de facto control over Jiangsu and Zhejiang, further restoring feudal systems and turning his base into a “state within a state.” He openly hung “moral maxims of the Chinese classics” in his “Loyal King’s Residence,” allowing feudal scholars to run amok and spread Confucian heresy. He became increasingly arrogant after ascending the loyal king’s throne, openly promoting nonsense such as “benevolent government” and “the three bonds and five constants,” claiming that “only by loving kin and relatives can one be benevolent to the people, and loving the people and caring for things is the urgent task of the age”[70], opposing the revolutionary peasant dictatorship of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and advocating kindness toward landlords. Hong Rengan sharply rebuked Li Xiucheng’s reactionary rhetoric, pointing out that the struggle between the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and the Manchu Qing traitors was a “life-and-death battle.” “The armies of Xianfeng have no compassion for us… We cannot show them kindness either.”[71] But Li Xiucheng paid no heed, disregarding the revolutionary discipline of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, and even scorned the large number of revolutionary books compiled by King Chen himself, “disdainfully ignoring them”[72].
Li Xiucheng sought to establish an independent kingdom, engaging in all sorts of reactionary acts within his domain, fully restoring feudalism. Economically, he openly opposed the Taiping regulations of the “Heavenly Dynasty Land System” and the “Heavenly Code,” issuing land certificates to landlords, allowing them to continue collecting rent and taxes as before, and even implementing reactionary landlord dictatorship against resisting farmers, deploying local militia to suppress them, and demanding that farmers “pay rent,” threatening to arrest those who refused. Landlords cheered wildly: “With the might of the long-haired (Qing), we’re not afraid of not paying rent!” In Li Xiucheng’s territory, landlords behaved even more arrogantly than in Qing-controlled areas. His so-called “benevolent governance and loving the people” clearly favored which class of “people”? It was obvious. Politically, he favored corrupt Qing officials and promoted local landlords and gentry. When capturing Hangzhou, he personally rode into the city to order the protection of Qing Zhejiang Governor Wang Youling. When he found Wang had committed suicide, he was grief-stricken and ordered a grand funeral, sending him back to his hometown for burial. No wonder Jiangnan landlords were grateful and praised him, even erecting “praise arches” for him. Li Xiucheng also established “Recruitment Halls” in Hangzhou to attract Qing officials and gentry, offering special favors; at the same time, he called on “gentry and officials to quickly submit and surrender”[73], recruiting many wealthy landlords. For a time, the Jiangsu-Zhejiang base became Li Xiucheng’s personal stronghold of landlords and bandits. Culturally and educationally, he built feudal schools and promoted the Eight-legged essay, using Confucianism to pollute the revolutionary ranks of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Li Xiucheng sent his agents to hold feudal imperial examinations across Jiangsu and Zhejiang, openly using the “Four Books and Five Classics” as exam topics, recruiting large numbers of reactionary landlords and gentry officials. His confidant Qian Guiren even used the name of the Taiping’s “talking about principles” to promote the “Three Bonds and Five Constants,” and harshly exploited farmers, forcing them to pay land rent “at a rate of 2,060 wen per mu,” and punishing those who could not pay, “beating them on the spot.”[74] Li Xiucheng also allowed feudal gentry to open schools and set up “studies” within their domains, restoring feudal education, but violently suppressed the revolutionary acts of burning Confucian temples and banning Confucianism among Taiping soldiers. Once, he even ordered the execution of over forty Taiping soldiers who had destroyed temples in Suzhou’s Mudou town, showing the face of a landlord executioner![75] Militarily, Li Xiucheng repeatedly disobeyed orders, deliberately supported traitors to surrender to the Qing, and even incited internal strife among the revolutionaries. In 1859, Chen Yucheng clashed with the surrendering Wei Jun in Tianjing, and Li Xiucheng sent troops to help Wei Jun massacre thousands of revolutionary soldiers under Chen Yucheng’s command![76] Soon after, Wei Jun surrendered to the Qing and changed his name to Wei Zhijun, actively attacking the Taiping Army during the Anqing campaign and earning Qing rulers’ praise.
Why could such a traitor like Li Xiucheng run rampant within the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom? We cannot hold a naive and dogmatic view that removing Li Xiucheng alone would solve everything. In fact, the internal revolutionary team of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was constantly breeding traitors aiming to restore feudalism, reflecting the limitations of the peasant class. Although peasants had long suffered under landlord oppression and harbored rebellious and egalitarian aspirations, their dispersed small-scale production and private ownership ideas created narrow-mindedness and fragmentation. These private ideas, combined with regional and clan-based loyalties, formed sectarianism and regionalism that undermined revolutionary unity. Especially as the revolution progressed, some wavering elements grew ambitious and sought comfort and pleasure, and with the corruption of landlord culture, they rapidly degenerated into feudal factions eager to split and divide. Of course, there were revolutionaries like Hong Rengan and Chen Yucheng who remained committed to peasant revolution and refused to be corrupted. Concerning corrupt elements like Li Xiucheng, the revolutionaries took measures: the Heavenly King repeatedly summoned Li Xiucheng, rebuking his disloyalty, and issued imperial edicts in the name of the young emperor Hong Tiansui, affirming “Guan Shu Zuo, still as before,” strengthening Hong Rengan’s revolutionary faction. But because the peasant class lacked a scientific worldview, they could not understand the class, practical, and historical roots of the opposing worldviews, nor implement the Communist Party’s mass rectification campaigns to purge internal corruption and evil, nor carry out a thorough “Cultural Revolution” to expose darkness from below, so the infiltration of internal traitors continued. The heroic peasants had naive revolutionary enthusiasm and strong loyalty, but their lack of understanding of ideological struggles and their feudal clan-based methods of unity—calling each other brothers and uncles—masked class contradictions and gave opportunists like Li Xiucheng a chance. As a result, many officers followed Li Xiucheng’s path into degeneration, engaging in sectarianism and regionalism, severely damaging revolutionary unity and causing great losses to the revolution.
After the fall of Anqing, Qing traitors and foreign devils attacked the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom from both sides. On the western front, Zeng Guofan led the Xiang Army across the river to encircle Tianjing; on the eastern front, foreign gun teams and Qing forces jointly attacked Suzhou, Changzhou, and Shanghai. At this critical moment, the Heavenly King Hong Xiuquan urgently ordered Li Xiucheng to return and reinforce Tianjing, aiming to annihilate Zeng Guofan’s forces before they stabilized. But Li Xiucheng, on one hand, was infatuated with the prosperity of Suzhou, and on the other, afraid of battle, proposed delaying for two years before fighting, fully aligning with Zeng Guofan’s “defend first, attack later” strategy. The Heavenly King was furious and sent an envoy to reprimand Li Xiucheng for “disloyalty,” warning: “If you do not obey the imperial edict, the law of the state will not tolerate you!” Under this pressure, Li Xiucheng was forced to decide to support Tianjing, but he repeated his previous delaying tactics, dragging from June to mid-September before setting out, and only reaching the outskirts of Tianjing in mid-October, by which time Zeng Guofan had besieged the city for five months, with a very strong position that was difficult to attack. The Taiping Army fought fiercely against the Xiang Army, inflicting heavy casualties, and the battle was extremely tense. At this critical juncture, Li Xiucheng, because his own territory in Suzhou was attacked by Qing forces, withdrew in late November, leading to the failure of the first Tianjing relief campaign. The damned traitor Li Xiucheng committed a heinous crime again! The frontal assault failed, and the Heavenly King decided to implement the “siege Wei to rescue Zhao” strategy again, ordering Li Xiucheng to execute the “advance north and attack south” plan—crossing the river northward to attack Anhui and Hubei from behind, emptying the enemy’s rear and cutting off Zeng Guofan’s supply lines, aiming to annihilate Zeng’s forces. But Li Xiucheng, wanting to preserve his personal territory, procrastinated again, sending a small part of his troops across the river in early December, while he himself only began crossing in March, four months late. By then, Zeng Guofan had already broken the Taiping strategic plan, setting up layered defenses in northern Anhui. After several minor battles, Li Xiucheng abandoned the promising situation and retreated south to his old hometown in Suzhou and Hangzhou and fled! This ultimately led to the failure of the Tianjing relief campaign. Meanwhile, under Li Xiucheng’s rampant support, his generals defected one after another, with Changshu’s Xiong Wanquan surrendering the entire city to Qing forces, and Gao Yongkuan of Suzhou killing the Prince of the Crown and surrendering to Qing. The Jiangsu-Zhejiang base of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom also disintegrated.
By this point, the siege of Tianjing had become an irretrievable situation. The traitor Li Xiucheng repeatedly urged the Heavenly King to abandon Tianjing and escape, partly to save his own life, and partly to facilitate “holding the Son of Heaven to command the princes,” and possibly to betray the Heavenly King to save himself. But the Heavenly King sternly rejected Li Xiucheng’s “advice,” personally issuing an edict titled “Rebuke Li Xiucheng for Cowardice and Fear of Death,” stating: “I, the Emperor, have received the divine mandate from the Holy Lord and Jesus Christ, and am the only true king in the world. Why fear anything!” “My empire is as solid as an iron bucket; if you do not support, someone else will. You say there are no troops, but my heavenly soldiers are more than water, so what is there to fear from the demons!” “If you fear death, then you will die.” “Political affairs are not to be handled by you.”[77] This embodied Hong Xiuquan’s fearless spirit as a great revolutionary leader. On June 4, 1862, King Hong Xiuquan heroically died in Yanjin, Henan, at age 26.
With his unwavering loyalty and heroic spirit, King Hong inspired a group of steadfast revolutionaries. Almost none of his subordinates betrayed, all sacrificing themselves for the revolution, such as Liu Lanlin, Wu Dingcai, Ye Yulai, and others, who fought to the death at Anqing and heroically perished. After King Hong’s death, generals like Dao Wang Chen Shirong and Cong Wang Chen Delong also refused to surrender and heroically died. Later, King Hong’s old troops—Zun Wang Lai Wenguang, Fu Wang Chen Dekai, Qi Wang Liang Chengfu, and Hu Wang Zeng Chengchun—also persisted in the revolution, fighting in the south and north, all sacrificing without surrendering. This sharply contrasted with the large number of traitors who surrendered or defected under Li Xiucheng’s command.
The sacrifice of King Hong Xiuquan was a major loss to the Taiping revolution. His death not only deprived the revolution of one of its most outstanding military leaders but also greatly weakened the revolutionary forces, causing King Gan to fall behind in the political struggle against Li Xiucheng’s traitor group. After his death, Hong Rengan mourned deeply, saying: “If King Hong had not died, the siege of Tianjing would have been very different… Once he was gone, the military momentum and prestige collapsed simultaneously, and everything disintegrated”[67].
After King Hong’s death, Li Xiucheng’s influence began to grow, and the Jiangsu-Zhejiang area became entirely his personal territory. He gradually plotted to usurp the military and political power of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, turning the kingdom’s territory into his own domain. Although Li Xiucheng was born a poor farmer and joined the revolution early, he was extremely obsessed with personal gain, eager for fame and wealth, and fond of hypocritical Confucian morality. After the Taiping Army broke through Yong’an, Li Xiucheng, still an ordinary soldier, secretly kept a copy of Confucian heretical books, often reciting them in his sleep, and kept them close at hand day and night. When discovered, according to the discipline of the Taiping revolution, he should have been executed, but the commander Shi Dakai, instead of punishing him, appreciated and promoted him, elevating him to a subordinate general. After occupying Suzhou in 1860, he established de facto control over Jiangsu and Zhejiang, further restoring feudal systems and turning his base into a “state within a state.” He openly hung “moral maxims of the Chinese classics” in his “Loyal King’s Residence,” allowing feudal scholars to run amok and spread Confucian heresy. He became increasingly arrogant after ascending the loyal king’s throne, openly promoting nonsense such as “benevolent government” and “the three bonds and five constants,” claiming that “only by loving kin and relatives can one be benevolent to the people, and loving the people and caring for things is the urgent task of the age”[70], opposing the revolutionary peasant dictatorship of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and advocating kindness toward landlords. Hong Rengan sharply rebuked Li Xiucheng’s reactionary rhetoric, pointing out that the struggle between the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and the Manchu Qing traitors was a “life-and-death battle.” “The armies of Xianfeng have no compassion for us… We cannot show them kindness either.”[71] But Li Xiucheng paid no heed, disregarding the revolutionary discipline of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, and even scorned the large number of revolutionary books compiled by King Chen himself, “disdainfully ignoring them”[72].
Li Xiucheng sought to establish an independent kingdom, engaging in all sorts of reactionary acts within his domain, fully restoring feudalism. Economically, he openly opposed the Taiping regulations of the “Heavenly Dynasty Land System” and the “Heavenly Code,” issuing land certificates to landlords, allowing them to continue collecting rent and taxes as before, and even implementing reactionary landlord dictatorship against resisting farmers, deploying local militia to suppress them, and demanding that farmers “pay rent,” threatening to arrest those who refused. Landlords cheered wildly: “With the might of the long-haired (Qing), we’re not afraid of not paying rent!” In Li Xiucheng’s territory, landlords behaved even more arrogantly than in Qing-controlled areas. His so-called “benevolent governance and loving the people” clearly favored which class of “people”? It was obvious. Politically, he favored corrupt Qing officials and promoted local landlords and gentry. When capturing Hangzhou, he personally rode into the city to order the protection of Qing Zhejiang Governor Wang Youling. When he found Wang had committed suicide, he was grief-stricken and ordered a grand funeral, sending him back to his hometown for burial. No wonder Jiangnan landlords were grateful and praised him, even erecting “praise arches” for him. Li Xiucheng also established “Recruitment Halls” in Hangzhou to attract Qing officials and gentry, offering special favors; at the same time, he called on “gentry and officials to quickly submit and surrender”[73], recruiting many wealthy landlords. For a time, the Jiangsu-Zhejiang base became Li Xiucheng’s personal stronghold of landlords and bandits. CulturallyBefore the fall of Tianjing, the traitor Li Xiucheng secretly opened the gates of Tianjing City, allowing more than ten thousand people to escape outside the city to surrender to Zeng Guofan. After Tianjing fell, Li Xiucheng’s army was defeated and fled in all directions. But this damned traitor, during his escape, still did not forget to carry a large bag of gold, silver, and jewels, wearing his prince’s golden crown, which led the local militia and militia groups along the way to identify him as the prince of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, capturing and escorting him to Zeng Guofan’s headquarters of the Qing army. After being captured by the enemy, Li Xiucheng lost all dignity, wagging his tail and begging for mercy like a lapdog, in an attempt to save his life, writing a treacherous confession slandering the Heavenly Kingdom and praising the enemy — “Li Xiucheng’s Self-Confession.” At the beginning of his “Self-Account,” he shamelessly showed the demeanor of a groveling dog, saying, “Last night, I was transferred by the old Chancellor to be interrogated before the throne, and I was shown mercy, truly grateful. My sins have been wrongfully committed, I have not met enlightened and good people, now I see the old Chancellor’s kindness and generosity, my sins will surely be settled first to repay the kindness. Last night, the deep and generous kindness, I am willing to die happily, returning joyfully to the阴 (spirit/afterlife).” Since he was deeply grateful for the torture by Zeng Guofan, he also wanted to pass on secrets to “repay his kindness,” shamelessly claiming that such would bring “joyful return to the阴.” Then, in his confession, he wildly praised the Qing Dynasty and slandered the Taiping Revolution. He claimed Zeng Guofan was “deeply benevolent and broad-minded, with a heart to save the people… benevolent and kind to the four directions, with a heart of virtue and moral influence, worthy of deep admiration,” saying Zeng Guofan was “a man of virtue, deeply admirable, a savior of the people,” and repeatedly called him “Chancellor” and “Nine Marshals,” showing no shame. Subsequently, he cursed the Taiping Revolution as “violating the Mandate of Heaven, acting against Heaven… wicked righteousness,” “harming the people and the masses,” defaming King Hong Xiuquan as “unvirtuous in governance,” “not caring for the soldiers and civilians,” “using people unjustly.” More viciously, this traitor, in order to save his life, advised Zeng Guofan and wrote in his confession the “Ten Mistakes of the Heavenly Dynasty” and “Ten Key Strategies for Surrender,” summarizing ten weaknesses of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and proposing ten plans to dismantle it. However, this traitor exhausted his brains but could not save his own life; Zeng Guofan, after reading his confession, highly praised it and especially applied to the Qing court to exempt him from being executed by slow slicing, instead ordering his beheading for public display. On August 7, 1864, this traitor finally ended his sinful life.
On the other hand, when Tianjing fell, the King of Gan, Hong Rengan, was still rallying troops in Huzhou to prepare to lift the siege of Tianjing. After receiving news of Tianjing’s fall, he led his army to迎接 the scattered young King, and continued to fight in the south and north, hoping to break through the Qing army’s encirclement. Because of being outnumbered and weak, Hong Rengan originally planned to meet with Li Shixian, who had an army of 200,000, in Jianchang and Fuzhou, Jiangxi. But after heading to Jiangxi, Li Shixian’s army had already moved south to Guangdong, so Hong Rengan and others fell into the heavy encirclement of the Qing army. On October 9, Hong Rengan and others were unfortunately captured after a night attack by the enemy near Shicheng, Jiangxi. After being captured, the enemy used both soft and hard tactics on him, sometimes诱之 with high official and monetary rewards, sometimes subjecting him to severe torture, but Hong Rengan remained steadfast and refused to surrender. He cursed the Jiangxi巡抚 Shen Baozhen, accusing him of being a Han traitor of the Song Dynasty, comparing himself to the national hero Wen Tianxiang, saying “I am only following Wen Tianxiang’s example.”[80] The Qing demons tried to repeat their old tricks, hoping Hong Rengan would write a confession to understand the military and political situation of the Taiping Army and to disintegrate their morale. Hong Rengan took this opportunity to write a lengthy autobiography of tens of thousands of words, angrily refuting the slander of traitor Li Xiucheng, and recording many heroic deeds of Hong Xiuquan’s early divine mission and his leadership in revolution after descending to the mortal world. Moreover, Hong Rengan summarized one major reason for the failure of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, “The source of our calamity is the aid of foreigners to the妖 (demons)… But if foreigners did not assist the enemy, we could surely support ourselves for a long time.”[81] He pointed out that洋鬼子 (foreign devils) are “pretending to be friendly, secretly aiding the满妖 (Manchu demons),” drawing a correct conclusion from blood lessons and recognizing the true face of foreign invaders. Hong Rengan did not fail the expectations of the King of Heaven who regarded him as “志同南王，历久弥坚” (aspiring to be like the Southern King, enduring steadfastly), and proved his vow of “sacrificing himself for the country” through actions. Before execution, Hong Rengan still maintained an unyielding revolutionary will and unwavering confidence in the revolutionary cause, leaving a death poem:
Demon妖 beasts, wicked and beastly, with malicious intent, dividing my kin, exhausting my resources. For a thousand years and ten thousand generations, this hatred is engraved in my heart.
Now I shall perish forever, leaving a word for future sages, though the Heavenly Dynasty’s throne is cut off, restoration awaits another year![82]
On November 23, 1864, the revolutionary hero of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, King of Gan Hong Rengan, calmly sacrificed his life at the age of forty-three. “The deeply suffering Chinese nation, for a hundred years, its outstanding figures have fought and sacrificed, successive generations, exploring the truth of saving the country and saving the people, which is truly heroic and moving.”[83] Hong Rengan had his flaws, but he fought to the end with sincere patriotism, love for the people, and loyalty to the revolution, striving to find a way to save China. He always maintained the integrity and stance of a peasant revolutionary, demonstrating the backbone of revolutionary intellectuals, forming a sharp contrast with traitors like Li Xiucheng. The ultimate failure of the Taiping Revolution was not due to a lack of heroes but because of the historical limitations of the peasant class. The revolutionary heroes of the peasantry could unleash astonishing power in struggle, but they lacked a scientific worldview, a unified proletarian party to lead the revolution, and the ideological weapon to thoroughly purge internal腐败 (corruption), so the revolutionary成果 (成果) were ultimately usurped and betrayed. From victory to defeat, from glory to灭亡 (destruction), the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom left profound lessons in history. However, the blood of the martyrs of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was not spilled in vain. They awakened the fighting spirit of hundreds of millions of laborers with their blood, opened the prelude to China’s modern anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution, and their blood lessons inspired later advanced elements, teaching people that only by following the path of new民主主义革命 (new democratic revolution) led by the proletariat can the three mountains be truly overthrown and a new China where the people are masters established. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was the highest peak of China’s peasant revolutionary war. Though it failed, the spirit of its martyrs will forever inspire future revolutionaries.
Hong Rengan’s death poem left to future generations has profound political and historical significance: “Though the Heavenly Dynasty’s throne is cut off, restoration awaits another year!” He predicted the victory of future revolutions with heroic revolutionary optimism. Indeed, decades after his death, a new revolutionary tide rose across China, with the proletariat and advanced revolutionary intellectuals raising the banner of Marxism, finally leading the Chinese people onto the bright path of overthrowing imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism.
Today, when we commemorate Hong Rengan, we should not only praise him but also inherit his unwavering revolutionary spirit, surpass the limitations of his era, and forge a more thorough and scientific revolutionary path. Only under the leadership of a proletarian party, with scientific Marxist theory, and relying on mass mobilization and reliance on the masses, can the ultimate victory of the revolution be ensured.
