Crimes of Peng Dehuai on the Korean War Front
The resistance to U.S. aggression and aid Korea achieved a great victory, which is a great victory of Mao Zedong Thought! This is a magnificent victory of Mao Zedong’s military thought. However, the great ambitious and warlord Peng Dehuai usurped the credit for himself, boasting that he was a “meritorious figure” in resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea, and the Soviet revisionists also flattered Peng as an “international hero” and “genius strategist,” etc. It is truly confusing black and white! Turning right into wrong.
Let us look at the truth of history!
Before and After Sending Troops
When U.S. imperialists invaded Korea and seriously threatened our national security, Chairman Mao made the wise decision to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea:
“We believe we should participate in the war, we must participate in the war, the benefits of participating are enormous, and the losses of not participating are enormous.”
Premier Zhou solemnly announced to the world according to Chairman Mao’s instructions:
“The Chinese people can never tolerate foreign invasion, nor can they tolerate imperialism’s wanton invasion of their neighbors and remain indifferent.”
The facts have proved that our deployment to Korea and our victory in resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea greatly inspired the world’s revolutionary people, dealt a heavy blow to U.S. imperialism, whose so-called military advantage was thoroughly bankrupt. Once again, it proved the wise judgment of Chairman Mao that “imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers.”
Regarding the deployment of troops, Peng’s rightist capitulationist line was once again exposed to the bright daylight. He opposed Chairman Mao’s decision, nonsensically saying “Don’t go to Korea to fight! My ambition is only to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek.” He even viciously said: “Let it (referring to Korea) perish in two years!” When the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army entered Korea to fight, Peng Dehuai, who usurped the command of the Volunteer Army, went around saying: “I’m not here voluntarily.”
In Korea, the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army fought five major campaigns, and Chairman Mao gave specific instructions for each. However, as the front-line commander, Peng Dehuai often acted arbitrarily and refused to implement the orders and instructions of the great commander Mao Zedong, resulting in some battles failing to eliminate more enemies, failing to achieve greater victories, and failing to avoid avoidable losses.
First Battle (October 25, 1950 – November 25, 1950)
For the first phase of the Korean War, Mao’s instructions were:
“Mainly mobile warfare, combined with some positional warfare and guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.”
He made meticulous arrangements for the first battle. Mao instructed:
“Under the current circumstances, decide to mobilize the XX divisions stationed in North Korea from October 15, to fight the enemy who dares to attack north of the ‘38th Parallel,’ and at the same time, equip ourselves to counterattack with Korean comrades, annihilating the American invaders.”
Because Peng did not carry out Mao’s deployment, the XX divisions did not mobilize on October 15. During this period, the enemy occupying Pyongyang advanced into the Yalu River, attempting to destroy Korea before Thanksgiving.
Based on this situation, Mao decisively decided:
“Complete the battle deployment within a few days, seize the opportunity, and annihilate the enemy.”
He further specifically instructed:
“Decide to abandon the New Yizhou and the east and west coasts, use the northern mountainous areas of Korea to create a battlefield, cut off the enemy’s connections, disrupt their deployment, and systematically annihilate the enemy.”
However, Peng proposed a mistaken plan:
“Strive for time and prepare for counterattack,” and unilaterally emphasized “Three Lives” (life, land, enemy) to deploy from Gucheng to the Chosin Reservoir line, defending in the northern mountainous areas for half a year.
If Peng’s plan had been followed, it would have allowed the enemy to gather their scattered forces. This would have prevented the “cutting off the enemy’s connections and disrupting their deployment,” lost the opportunity for battle, and put our army in a passive position.
At this critical moment, Mao refuted Peng’s errors, pointing out:
“The current issue is to complete the battle deployment within a few days, seize the opportunity, and start fighting to annihilate the enemy, rather than having a period of defensive deployment first and then talking about attack.”
Under Mao’s repeated instructions and strict orders, Peng had no choice but to execute. The war ended as Mao predicted: the enemy’s connections were broken, their deployment was disrupted, our army achieved victory, annihilated many enemies, and won the first campaign brilliantly.
It should be noted that because Peng refused to implement Mao’s instructions, some units fought encounters with the enemy, and although our troops fought bravely and defeated the enemy, they failed to eliminate more of the enemy’s active forces. This is the evil consequence of Peng’s betrayal of Mao Zedong.
Second Battle (November 25, 1950 – December 24, 1950)
The enemy mistakenly judged our army’s code name as a regiment code, greatly underestimating our strength, claiming that our army was “symbolic.” Based on this, MacArthur (the U.S. imperialist commander in Korea at the time) made a wrong judgment and launched the “Christmas Offensive.”
Mao seized the enemy’s critical mistake and made an enlightened decision, adopting the strategy of luring the enemy deep and concentrating superior forces to annihilate the enemy’s active forces. Mao also instructed to transfer one army to the XX area to strengthen the encirclement.
Following Mao’s instructions, the second campaign was victorious again. It shattered the enemy’s “Christmas Offensive,” liberated Pyongyang, and pushed the enemy south of the “38th Parallel.”
However, because Peng did not carry out Mao’s instruction to transfer one army to the XX area to strengthen the encirclement, the result was the expansion of victory was affected, and some enemies escaped.
Third Battle (December 31, 1950 – January 8, 1951)
Mao telegraphed instructions for Peng to prepare seriously and organize the third campaign, emphasizing:
“The third campaign has great political significance.”
But Peng opposed strongly, nonsensically saying:
“It has no political significance.”
And falsely proposed the slogan of “winter rest.”
Under Mao’s four repeated orders and supervision, Peng was forced to agree to fight. As a result, our army broke through the ‘38th Parallel’ overnight, forcing the enemy to retreat to the “37th Parallel,” liberating Seoul, shocking the world, and causing chaos in the United Nations, greatly boosting the morale of the world’s revolutionary people and greatly diminishing U.S. imperial prestige. As Mao said:
“It has great political significance.”
However, because Peng was not proactive in executing Mao’s instructions during the war, the liberation of Seoul was slow, and he arbitrarily withdrew artillery, resulting in the enemy fleeing from Seoul.
Fourth Battle (January 27, 1951 – April 21, 1951)
On January 27, the enemy launched a counterattack. Mao, following the principle of “enemy advances, our retreat,” instructed the troops to withdraw to the “38th Parallel” for adjustments, aiming to lure the enemy in and effectively annihilate their active forces.
Peng again resisted Mao’s instructions, not concentrating forces to eliminate the invading U.S. troops, but instead counterattacking the enemy in Hengcheng area, resulting in the loss of a main force of the U.S. army.
Fifth Battle (April 22, 1951 – May 21, 1951)
Before the battle, Mao instructed:
“Delay the attack a bit.”
And pointed out:
“If we can eliminate 15,000 to 20,000 enemies in this battle, it will be very advantageous for future operations.”
Mao repeatedly emphasized:
“Organize the battle carefully, do not be too ambitious, do not have excessive ambitions, first eliminate the smaller, then the larger.”
But Peng refused to follow Mao’s instructions and arrogantly said:
“Such a large force… still need that small skill, this opportunism.”
Under the influence of his “left” adventurist line, Peng dispersed forces, opened wide mouths, attempting to swallow several enemy divisions (five divisions and three brigades) at once. He even sent a unit deep into enemy territory alone, which was suddenly attacked by the enemy, causing losses to our army (Comrade Mao An-ying, Mao Zedong’s son, heroically sacrificed in this campaign).
After losing the battle, Peng was panic-stricken, reporting to Mao that they could not hold here or there, even complaining to Nie Rongzhen:
“Marx is not responsive in heaven, I hope brother Liang’s wise strategy will teach me.”
In fact, the Volunteer Army fought bravely and tenaciously, and under the enemy’s powerful offensive, even the front line did not break through.
The fact proves that if Peng’s policies had been followed, the entire Korean War would have been a series of defeats.
From both a historical perspective and the battlefield in Korea, Peng is an undeniable loser general, with nothing worth boasting about.
Logistics Work
This loser general who brags about being a “meritorious figure,” also scolds other central comrades supporting the front logistics.
At that time, Premier Zhou worked tirelessly day and night for logistics support, and Comrade Nie Rongzhen was exhausted and fainted from a cerebral hemorrhage. But Peng Dehuai scolded at the front:
“The work of the Military Commission is handed over to Premier Zhou and Nie Rongzhen, you will definitely collapse.”
Even during a return to China, he scolded the Premier in front of him:
“The rear is just eating? You want to behead!”
In contrast, Peng flattered his anti-party clique Gao Gang, nonsensically saying:
“If the meritorious deeds of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea are a hundred, Gao Gang’s merit is sixty.”
Truly despicable.
Distorting History and Attacking Chairman Mao
The victory in the Korean War is a great victory of Mao Zedong Thought, a conclusion of history that no one can distort.
However, Peng, in order to achieve his goal of usurping the party and the army, desperately distorts history, claiming the great achievements of the Korean War as his own, using this as his political capital to usurp the party and the army.
All kinds of ghosts and monsters will inevitably reveal their true faces before Mao Zedong Thought, which is invincible. Therefore, Peng, this stubborn personal ambitious man, will inevitably hate Mao Zedong Thought to the bone, fear to death, and will greatly oppose Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought.
Peng’s Black Goods Against Mao Zedong:
- Peng’s resistance to Mao’s strategic deployment of the first phase of the Korean War, attacking Mao by saying:
“Chairman Mao has always been indecisive.”
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In January 1951, at a People’s Army cadre meeting in Korea, Peng Dehuai made a report and a summary, completely omitting Mao’s leadership. When mentioning the three reasons for victory, he only said it was due to the implementation of correct guiding principles, such as concentrating superior forces and annihilating the enemy one by one, without mentioning that these principles were formulated by Mao. He tried to credit himself with the achievements of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea.
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Peng suffered a defeat in the fifth campaign. After the campaign, Mao criticized Peng:
“He opened his mouth wide, fought far, and fought hastily.”
This criticism was actually in line with Mao’s pre-war instructions and was wise and appropriate. But Peng not only refused to accept it, but maliciously attacked Mao, saying:
“Comrade Mao Zedong, in some issues of handling, talks about possibilities and potentialities, so he will never make mistakes.”
Truly reactionary to the extreme.
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Peng, in documents like “Experience Summary of Resisting U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” and “Volunteer Army War History,” deliberately made insidious edits, personally crossing out all sentences with “under the wise leadership of Mao Zedong,” and putting question marks.
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When the first draft of the “Volunteer Army War History” was submitted for Peng’s review, he viciously slandered and attacked:
“You exaggerate Mao’s role, Mao is brilliant in strategy, but not necessarily in tactics; some I don’t even know, how does he know!”
In fact, in the first to fifth campaigns, Mao gave specific instructions, which the editorial committee studied and recorded, but all were cut by Peng in the final draft. The preface originally contained:
“Mao Zedong’s wise decision, the Chinese people dare to fight the United States…”
— but this part was completely cut by this ambitious man.
Fully Exposing Peng’s Reactionary and Anti-Mao Nature
Peng’s opposition to Mao is consistent, reflecting his bourgeois world outlook, as Mao said:
“A few comrades who make mistakes have never been Marxists, and even now are not Marxists, but fellow travelers of Marxism.”
All anti-party and anti-Mao people will have no good end, their final result will inevitably be picking up stones to smash their own feet.
At the Lushan Conference, Peng’s disgraceful acts of anti-party and anti-Mao reached the peak, they betrayed the Party and the people, and were mercilessly punished by history, turning into a pile of dog shit that is shameful to humanity.
