Qu Qiubai Since he surrendered, why does Chiang Kai-shek’s bandit gang still want to kill him?
Even a traitor might not be spared. Wasn’t Qu Qiubai a traitor? He was also killed by the enemy.
—— Speech by Qi Benyu on July 16, 1967, at the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Building of the Central Propaganda Department
Many comrades have written asking: “Since Qu Qiubai has already surrendered, why does Chiang Kai-shek’s bandit gang still want to kill him?”
Regarding this question, from a general perspective, we believe it must be viewed from the standpoint of class struggle. Qu Qiubai’s surrender was needed by the reactionary Kuomintang, and whether he was killed or not was also based on the interests of Chiang Kai-shek’s reactionary ruling class, determined by their class interests. Specifically, based on the materials we now have, the main reasons Chiang Kai-shek’s bandit gang decided to kill Qu Qiubai are twofold:
1. To implement its treacherous policy of selling out the country and collaborating with enemies
In June 1935, it was the time when the Red Army was conducting its famous 25,000-li Long March—resisting Japan from the north and fighting bloody battles with Chiang’s bandits.
June 1935 was also when Japanese imperialism sought to turn China into its colony and launched a new invasion into North China. In May, Japanese invaders made unreasonable demands to Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang government for control over North China. In June, the reactionary government representatives He Feng and He Xin held treacherous negotiations with the Japanese army commander in North China, Maejima, signing the “He-Mei Agreement” which sold most of China’s sovereignty in Hebei and Chahar.
June 1935 was also when Qu Qiubai was detained by Chiang’s bandits in Changting, Fujian.
The news of Qu Qiubai’s capture was of course not hidden from Japanese imperialist secret agents. At that time, Japanese imperialists also valued Qu Qiubai as a “Komintern official” and, driven by their imperialist aggression, hoped Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang would kill Qu Qiubai as soon as possible. They were dissatisfied that Chiang’s government did not execute Qu Qiubai promptly after capturing him, doubting Chiang’s sincerity in selling out the country. The master’s eyes, how dare the servant neglect? This led to debates among senior reactionary officials of the Kuomintang about Qu Qiubai.
It is said that in meetings debating Qu Qiubai, some advocated leaving this “good seed” for the Kuomintang to utilize, while the Japanese imperialist puppet Dai Jitao insisted on killing Qu Qiubai immediately. He said:
“The Japanese side has been very concerned about Qu Qiubai being in captivity for a long time without execution, so it is better to kill him early to prevent the Japanese from having an additional suspicion of us, which could hinder diplomatic matters…”
After hearing this, Chiang Kai-shek thought that leaving Qu Qiubai would “hinder the Japanese,” while killing him would gain the trust of the Japanese and help implement his treacherous policy of selling out the country. This treacherous thief and traitor, weighing the pros and cons of counterrevolutionary interests, decided to immediately order Song Xilian, commander of the 36th Army, to:
“Order to shoot Qu Qiubai on the spot and report with photos.”
2. Chiang Kai-shek’s agents went to Fujian Changting to “talk” with Qu Qiubai, learned that Qu Qiubai had already left the Political Bureau, “had long lost influence within the Communist Party,” and knew all about our Party and our Army’s secrets, which he had written and spoken about. They believed they could no longer gain much from him and decided to execute him on the spot (as instructed by Song Xilian), because “he cannot play any role” (as per Song Xilian’s instructions).
The details are as follows:
When Qu Qiubai was captured and brought to the 36th Army’s headquarters in Changting, after admitting his true identity and name, the enemy was overjoyed, considering it a major victory in their counterrevolutionary “encirclement and suppression” and believed they could learn many important secrets about our Party and our Army from him.
Therefore, the 36th Army immediately sent telegrams to Chiang Kai-shek and the reactionary leaders, while also giving Qu Qiubai “preferential treatment,” isolating him in a room within the army headquarters.
High-ranking reactionary officers like Commander Song Xilian, Chief of Staff Xiang Xianju, and Military Law Director Wu Songtao actively engaged in activities such as “talks,” offering drinks, and casual chats to bribe him; simultaneously, secretaries like Chen Ding, staff officers Peng Mai, army doctor Chen Zhigang, and Chen Yanbing, who cared about his well-being and health, often visited and chatted with him, attempting to persuade him to defect, aiming to extract important secrets of our Party and Army through soft means.
The enemy’s counterrevolutionary schemes did not go to waste. To beg for mercy, Qu Qiubai revealed during “talks” the main objectives of the Northward Red Army, total troop numbers, marching plans, the number and distribution of those who remained fighting in Fujian, Jiangxi, and Guangdong, leadership and activities, why he stayed, his plans, his personal background and history, health status, ideological condition, and his work as People’s Education Commissioner in the Central Soviet Area, thus betraying the Party and the Red Army’s vital secrets.
He also wrote some poems expressing remorse, lamenting the future, with a low tone, seeking pity, and voluntarily wrote a self-confession of betrayal—“Superfluous Words”.
After obtaining these crucial secrets, the 36th Army reported them to Chiang Kai-shek to boast of their achievement.
Chiang Kai-shek was still not satisfied and wanted more secrets from Qu Qiubai. In early June 1935, he ordered Chen Fuli, Minister of the Central Organization Department of the Kuomintang, to send someone to Changting.
Chen Fuli and the secret agent Xu Fuen studied and decided to send an “experienced” secret agent—Wang Feifu, head of the secret training section—to Changting. Before departure, Chen Fuli personally summoned him, gave instructions, and Xu Fuen also doubted Wang Feifu’s capability, so he assigned Chen Jianzhong, a defector turned Kuomintang agent, to “assist”.
Chen Fuli instructed Wang Feifu to focus on understanding our Party’s infiltration plans in the Central Soviet Area, the organizational situation in Shanghai and Hong Kong, to facilitate cracking them, and to have Qu Qiubai issue a public anti-Communist statement to promote anti-Communist propaganda internationally and domestically, expanding reactionary influence; also to verify the true purpose of the Northward Red Army (since Chiang Kai-shek did not believe the Red Army was going north to resist Japan but thought it was to open an international route to the Soviet Union).
Wang and Chen hurried to Fujian by land and water. The Fujian Kuomintang also sent two senior secret agents (one of whom was a traitor) to Changting.
The secret agents had several “talks” with Qu Qiubai in Changting but gained no new secrets, feeling disappointed. However, during the “talks,” Qu Qiubai asked whether they would transfer him to Nanjing. He hoped to be transferred to Nanjing.
Wang Feifu, upon hearing this, dared not decide and immediately reported to Chen Fuli, informing him of the situation in Changting.
Chen Fuli, upon receiving the report, felt that Qu Qiubai was indeed “useless” and “could no longer serve any purpose.” He immediately ordered Wang Feifu to return. The next day, Wang left Changting with Chen Jianzhong and others.
As they departed, Chiang Kai-shek’s order to kill was immediately issued.
Why did Chiang Kai-shek issue the order to kill Qu Qiubai immediately when he begged to be transferred to Nanjing? According to Song Xilian and other materials:
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- The purpose of the “talks” by Chiang’s agents had been achieved; the secrets of our Party and Army had been obtained from Qu Qiubai; he “could no longer play any role,” and his remaining was “valueless”;
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- Leaving him would cause many troubles, but killing him would settle everything;
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- Killing him would gain the trust of Japanese imperialism and facilitate the implementation of the policy of selling out the country and collaborating with enemies;
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- Chiang Kai-shek had long suspected Qu Qiubai; seeing that he neither wanted to “persuade” the Party and the Red Army as a “central official” nor wanted to “publicly” oppose the Communist Party, and fearing he might “return” to revolution, killing him was the best option.
Later, Song Xilian confessed: “Due to the arrival of Wang Feifu and others, I was greatly enlightened. After they left, I immediately telegraphed Chongqing to ask whether to transfer him to the provincial capital or elsewhere outside the province. Unexpectedly, I received Chiang’s order to execute Qu Qiubai. I carried out the order and reported everything in detail to Chiang…”
From this material, we can clearly see that Qu Qiubai’s betrayal of the revolution was needed by the enemy and the reason they “preferentially treated” him. But even after betraying the revolution, the enemy was not reluctant to kill him; traitors who sell out the revolution and their souls are killed when the enemy no longer needs them.
This is the fundamental reason why Chiang Kai-shek wanted to kill the surrendered traitor Qu Qiubai.
Conclusion: The Iron Law of History—Traitors Have No Good End
On June 18, 1935, Song Xilian faithfully carried out Chiang Kai-shek’s order and executed the major traitor Qu Qiubai.
“A cunning rabbit has no burrow to hide in, and a running dog is cooked,” this is a trick used by all reactionary rulers in history, and all traitors have no good end.
However, some promoters of the great traitor Qu Qiubai, based solely on Chiang Kai-shek killing Qu Qiubai or him humming a song at death, insist he was “steadfast and unyielding” and a “glorious martyr,” deserving “commemoration.”
We believe that, besides those with ulterior motives, some are simply trapped in formalism, only seeing the surface of things and not understanding their essence.
In history, are there not many who were betrayed and killed by the enemy? Li Xiucheng is another typical example.
Regarding Li Xiucheng’s death, many also call him “loyal,” “faithful to death,” “calmly sacrificed,” and “resolute in spirit.” These are all formalistic views and are mistaken.
“If someone insists on calling Li Xiucheng’s death ‘loyalty’ and ‘faithfulness,’ then they must first exonerate the eight rebel generals of Suzhou who betrayed their leader and surrendered the city, because these eight also fought against foreign and domestic reactionaries, and after surrendering, they were killed by the enemy within three days. Secondly, they must exonerate the traitor Chen Defeng, who communicated with the Qing Dynasty, because he was also killed by the enemy for failing to surrender. Thirdly, they must exonerate all traitors and turncoats in history who were killed by the enemy during the struggle against class oppression and national oppression, because they suffered the same fate as Li Xiucheng.”
Those who try to whitewash the great traitor Qu Qiubai should stop!
“History moves forward. All those who dedicate their strength and lives in the righteous and revolutionary struggle, even if they fail, will be immortal; all those who betray the righteous and revolutionary cause, even if they survive temporarily, will ultimately be condemned by history.”
—— Comrade Qi Benyu
Qu Qiubai wrote his confession “Superfluous Words” in the enemy’s prison, composed many poems and lyrics of repentance and begging for life, spoke many flattering words to Chiang Kai-shek, but ultimately still fell under the reactionary blade.
The ruthless historical fact once again tells us: Joining reactionary forces leads to no good end.
Source note
The above “Why does Chiang Kai-shek’s bandit gang still want to kill Qu Qiubai after he surrendered?” was published in:
- “Report on the Fight Against Qu” Issue 13
- Organized by: Capital Red Generation Committee, Beijing Political and Legal College Political and Legal Commune, Beijing Court Red Revolutionary Counterattack Headquarters
- Published on: September 10, 1967
