Is it Ningde's era, or the era of Ningde?

Theoretical Struggle
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Originally published at: 是宁德的时代，还是时代的宁德？ – 曙光

A View on China's National Monopoly Capitalism Policy and the Uneven Development of Imperialist Political Economy from the History of CATL

Editorial Board of League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Proletariat

Editorial Board of League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Proletariat

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The current era is the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution. Imperialism "in its economic essence, is monopoly capitalism."[1] As the degree of monopoly deepens, the inherent contradictions of capitalist society are unprecedentedly intensified, and the contradictions between the chaos of social production and organized enterprise production become increasingly fierce. Lenin said: "Monopolies that grow out of free competition do not eliminate competition, but dominate it and coexist with it, thus producing many particularly sharp and intense contradictions, frictions, and conflicts."[2] Despite the dominance of monopolistic organizations, there are still a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises in society. The development of monopolistic organizations themselves is also unbalanced. Due to the monopolistic nature of capital in the imperialist era, competition between capitals has taken on new forms, including competition within monopolistic organizations, between monopolistic organizations, and between monopolistic organizations and free capital.

Monopolistic organizations continuously acquire and merge other enterprises through competition, accumulating extraordinarily strong capital, enabling them to inject large amounts of capital into emerging industrial sectors—"virgin lands"—to establish new monopolies and reap monopoly profits. However, possessing this ability does not mean monopolistic organizations are willing to withdraw capital from their traditionally "deeply cultivated" sectors. Old monopolistic organizations, deeply entrenched in outdated fixed capital, face difficulties "digesting" these assets. Injecting large capital into new sectors could lead to depreciation of their accumulated fixed assets, and if this depreciation exceeds the profits from investments in new sectors, they will not invest any money there. Conversely, new monopolistic organizations, having been established recently and not burdened with large fixed capital stocks, can freely inject capital into emerging sectors—these sectors are not only prime locations for obtaining monopoly profits but also excellent tracks to break through old monopolies.

"Differences are contradictions"[3] The differences between old and new monopolistic organizations determine their contradictions. Old monopolies will not sit idly as new competitors capable of rivaling them emerge, often restricting capital flow into emerging sectors and blocking the realization of goods; new monopolies, on the other hand, will seize every opportunity to capture monopoly profits, encouraging capital investment in emerging sectors and providing various subsidies for their production and realization. The current competition among imperialist countries in the new energy industry sector is a manifestation of the contradictions between old and new monopolistic organizations.

"New energy" refers to various energy forms beyond traditional energy sources (such as coal, oil, natural gas, etc.), namely renewable energy developed and utilized based on new technologies. This industry was originally a "self-rescue" measure proposed by old imperialist countries in response to crises caused by insufficient imports of oil-based fuel raw materials amidst colonial resistance. However, with China's capitalist restoration, these old imperialist countries have reasserted their dominance over colonies. For example, the United States, over the following thirty years, exploited its strong capabilities to recklessly sell off its colonial oil resources for huge profits. Investing in the new energy industry requires not only substantial capital for fixed capital renewal but also significantly increases the organic composition of the entire energy sector, causing existing oil reserves and their extraction and processing equipment to depreciate, greatly reducing profit margins. [4] This situation makes it nearly impossible for U.S. imperialism to resist when new rising imperialist countries adopt advanced production technologies to break its monopoly status.

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Besides the general rule of the leapfrog development of emerging imperialist countries, the high integration of Chinese imperialist monopoly capital with the state apparatus and its control over the sources of raw materials for new energy accelerate its dominance in this sector. As a social imperialist state transformed from socialist China, its bureaucratic monopoly bourgeoisie directly controls the state power and the lifeline of the entire national economy. The bureaucratic monopoly oligarchy itself signifies state monopoly. For China, occupying the new energy industry not only continuously provides monopoly profits for the bureaucratic monopoly bourgeoisie, enhancing its economic strength, but also significantly reduces civilian oil consumption, directly strengthening its military expansion and war readiness, preparing for imminent imperialist conflicts. Since 2009, China has used state orders, policy subsidies, and other forms to treat the entire new energy industry as a weapon in its international offensive against old imperialist powers. The export of electric passenger vehicles, lithium batteries, and solar cells, known as the "New Three" in foreign trade, totaled 1.06 trillion yuan in 2023[5], with new energy vehicles accounting for 1.203 million units exported, representing over 60% of the global share[6]. Meanwhile, China also controls upstream industries related to new energy, supplying large quantities of raw materials needed for industry development through colonial domination in Africa, Southeast Asia, and other third-world countries. Statistics show that 95% of manganese, 75% of cobalt, 70% of graphite, 67% of lithium, and 63% of nickel are refined in China; 99% of anodes, 82% of electrolytes, 77% of cathodes, 74% of separators, and 66% of battery components are manufactured in China[7]. These are essential raw materials for the new energy industry. Moreover, China controls over 50% of the world's lithium mines and 41% of cobalt mines, with Chinese mining enterprises present on five continents.

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Relying on these two unique advantages, China surpasses old established automotive giants like BMW, Toyota, and Mercedes-Benz, which are burdened with large fixed capital stocks, in the new energy sector. In 2023, BYD captured 21.0% of the global electric vehicle market share, far exceeding Tesla (13.2%), the U.S.-focused monopoly enterprise in new energy vehicles. Other Chinese companies such as SAIC-GM Wuling (3.5%), GAC Aion (3.5%), Li Xiang (2.7%), and Changan (2.6%) follow closely. Overall, China’s new energy vehicle sales account for nearly 30% of the global market, while outside Tesla, no other U.S. carmaker is among the top ten globally. In this sector, Chinese imperialism has already defeated automotive giants from the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Germany.

"The characteristics of imperialism are precisely not only to annex agricultural regions but even to annex regions with highly developed industry"[8]. As China’s new energy sector grows, it has also engaged in subsidy and anti-subsidy trade wars with the European Union, demanding the dumping of cheap domestic new energy vehicles into Europe. In this "imperialist war" to seize monopoly status in emerging industries, China has gained a significant advantage and has already taken the lead.

Power batteries are the "heart" of new energy vehicles, accounting for 40%-60% of the total vehicle cost, and currently, the development and export of new energy vehicles are China’s top priorities. This means the power battery industry is also the "heart" relied upon by China in its global competition with old imperialist countries. Behind the ability of many new energy vehicles to compete for international monopoly status, one name is repeatedly mentioned—CATL.

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This is a true monopoly giant, controlling the lifeblood of various electric vehicle companies. The bourgeois media touts CATL’s success as due to its boss, Zeng Yuqun, who not only possesses extraordinary courage, taking "more resilient gambling" as his motto, but also has a keen market sense and a knack for finding "noble people" in life, as if he single-handedly created "the era of CATL." However, when we look into the history of CATL’s rise, we see that this trillion-yuan empire was built step by step under the support of national monopoly capitalism. Its development is closely linked to China’s new energy subsidy policies. From recruiting "China’s No.1 lithium battery person" Chen Liquan and the support of the Chinese Academy of Sciences at the start, to establishing a foothold in Ningde through government officials’ invitations, to the formation of CATL with the purpose of obtaining national subsidies, and finally to its rise with a dominant position in China’s new energy subsidy "white paper"—it was this "visible big hand" that paved the way for CATL’s ascent. Without the strong policy support of Chinese imperialism, there would be no CATL today. The current monopoly status of China’s power batteries, and the so-called "CATL era," is better described as "the era of CATL," and this history of CATL’s rise is a history of imperialist support for emerging industries and the struggle for global market dominance. CATL is merely a product of imperialist inter-factional struggles. We must recognize the underlying historical laws and thoroughly expose the essence of China’s national monopoly capitalism. At the same time, we should understand that although imperialism can use state investment to rapidly develop emerging industries and reap enormous profits in the short term, such policies cannot and will not change the rotten fundamental nature of imperialism, nor reconcile the basic contradictions between socialized production and private ownership of the means of production, nor reverse the intensifying economic crises. Let us not forget that the imperialist struggle history is also its demise history.

Preliminary Voice: New Energy Technology Co., Ltd. (ATL)—The Path of Technological Struggle in Emerging Industries

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Capitalist development into monopoly stage means that a few giant enterprises, based on highly concentrated production and capital, control the vast majority of production and sales in a sector. The free flow of capital among sectors is somewhat hindered. The monopoly control established by old imperialist countries in traditional industries makes it difficult for emerging imperialist countries to compete, forcing them to focus on defeating old monopoly capital in new industries. Once new industries are opened, these emerging imperialist countries invest heavily, quickly establishing new monopolies through fierce competition. By the late 20th and early 21st centuries, driven by the need for continuous improvement of civilian and military electronic devices and deeper research into electrochemistry and materials science, battery technology has risen sharply. From the 1962 proposal of lithium batteries by the International Society of Electrochemistry to the commercial production of lithium-ion polymer batteries in 1999, lithium battery technology has been increasingly perfected under capitalist competition. This new technology opened a new production sector, a "virgin land" for old and new monopoly capitalists already mired in crisis. The expanding electronics industry convinced them that investing in battery technology would bring enormous profits. As capitalism was fully restored, Chinese capitalists also coveted this unoccupied treasure land. The predecessor of CATL, "New Energy Technology Co., Ltd.," speculated in the battery industry at this critical juncture, relying on stolen advanced technology and attracting investment through shareholding, becoming a powerful "battery giant."

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In 1999, several senior managers from Dongguan Xinke Magnetoelectric Factory—Liang Shaokang, Chen Tanghua, Zhang Yujie, Zeng Yuqun, Huang Shilin—jointly founded "New Energy Technology Co., Ltd." in Hong Kong. Each member of this entrepreneurial team rode the wave of China’s capitalist restoration, embarking on a speculative path to wealth. Chen and Zhang fled with the Kuomintang in 1949, escaping to Taiwan; in the 1960s, they studied in the U.S. After graduating from university, both joined "Hong Kong Xinke Industrial Co., Ltd." In 1995, when Dongguan vigorously introduced foreign investment, they served as senior managers at the local magnetoelectric factory. Zeng and Huang are natives of Ningde; in 1985, they entered university through the restored college entrance exam system, graduated in 1989, and Zeng was assigned to a state-owned enterprise in Fuzhou but soon resigned to work at Xinke Magnetoelectric Factory in Dongguan; Huang returned to Ningde as a grassroots civil servant, and two years later, under Zeng’s influence, also joined Dongguan magnetoelectric factory[9]. Liang Shaokang is the co-founder and executive president of Hong Kong Xinke, the parent company of the magnetoelectric factory. In 1999, he sought to speculate in the upstream battery industry of electronics, but after being rejected by his Japanese parent company "Tokyo Electric," he sought other avenues and co-founded an independent company specializing in batteries, "New Energy Technology Co., Ltd." (hereinafter "ATL").

"Under capitalism, the development and progress of production and technology are means for capitalists to seek profits."[10] Driven by the pursuit of surplus value and the pressure of competition among capitalists, they continuously improve existing production technologies, increase labor productivity, and lower the unit value of commodities to defeat competitors and obtain excess surplus value. From its inception, ATL invested its assets in the supply of batteries for mobile electronic communication devices, starting with $2.5 million in capital, of which $1 million was used to purchase the polymer lithium battery patent from the U.S. "Bell Labs"[11][12]. They aimed to produce versatile soft-pack batteries and become wealthy. However, batteries produced with this technology tend to swell and explode after charge-discharge cycles, resulting in very short lifespan. At that time, large-scale lithium batteries on the market had similar defects, making it difficult for companies holding patents to gain advantageous positions in the battery market. Faced with the temptation of excess profits and the risk of bankruptcy, ATL demanded improvements to battery technology. They recruited lithium battery expert and Chinese Academy of Engineering academician Chen Liquan.

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Chen Liquan is a rapidly rising new academic authority after China’s capitalist restoration. During socialist times, Chen worked at the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Physics, but he had no interest in being a proletarian intellectual and instead sought to profit from his technical skills. After the 1976 capitalist restoration, he quickly went to West Germany in December of the same year to study solid electrolytes. Returning to China in 1978, he was supported by the official bourgeoisie as one of the first scientists serving China’s restoration. In 1987, he was appointed as the chief scientist of the "863" program's "Seven-Five" energy storage materials (polymer lithium batteries) project, holding most of the technical achievements within this project. With certain technical expertise, Chen Liquan relentlessly promoted lithium battery industrialization and commercialization. He once said: “Market marketing is a weak point for our scientific research institutes... We are suitable for incubator work; once the chicks hatch, they are handed over to companies for operation, which is the best model.”[13][14] As a scientist aligned with China’s official restoration, Chen could not directly "go into business," so he had to rally capitalists, leveraging their production lines and management methods to realize technology commercialization and collect profits. Before collaborating with Chen Tanghua and Zeng Yuqun, he had already established "Beijing Xingheng Power Supply Co., Ltd." in 1999, using his role as technical director to first earn a dividend.

Throughout ATL’s development, behind-the-scenes support from China’s imperialist state was evident, initially reflected in the technological backing of academic elites like Chen Liquan. To obtain advanced technology and seek profits, ATL’s team had long planned this. Chen Tanghua used his advantage in age and education to support Zeng Yuqun in obtaining a master’s degree, paving the way for future cooperation in advanced battery technology. When Chen Tanghua and Zeng Yuqun led the ATL startup team to knock on Chen Liquan’s laboratory door, this bourgeois academic immediately seized the profit opportunity, accepting their "olive branch." Before ATL’s founding, Chen Liquan was invited by Chen Tanghua to participate as a special consultant in ATL’s demonstration meeting in Dongguan. In 2002, Zeng Yuqun, simultaneously CEO and president of ATL, was allowed by Chen Tanghua to enter the Institute of Physics at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, becoming the first "on-the-job Ph.D.," with his supervisor being Chen Liquan, who had just earned the title of academician[15]. This transaction between bourgeois academics and private enterprises allowed ATL to acquire urgently needed advanced technology, and Chen Liquan profited greatly from ATL’s success—achieving a "win-win."

With professional technical support, ATL quickly solved the defect of battery swelling, making its lithium battery industrialization technology leap to the world’s leading level. In 2001, just two years after its establishment, ATL’s battery cell shipments reached 1 million units, earning its first big profit. Two years later, ATL entered Apple’s supply chain (even though Apple had not yet achieved a monopoly in electronics), beginning to expand into the global market. The advantages of lithium battery technology made ATL a darling of the capital market. During this period, ATL attracted investments from multiple capital sources, the largest three being: Hanting Asia-Pacific (Taiwan), Carlyle Group (USA), and 3i Group (UK), with total investments reaching $37 million. Due to a large proportion of shares controlled by foreign capital, ATL transformed from a small micro-enterprise into a multinational joint venture, with the original founding team’s shareholding greatly diluted, now mostly controlled by these investment monopolies.

Monopoly eraThe production of enterprises in the emerging industries sector exhibits leapfrogging development because they can immediately utilize advanced technological achievements researched by monopolistic organizations. However, monopoly has not eliminated competition. **"Monopolistic organizations possess a large amount of monopoly capital, fully capable of establishing new large enterprises with advanced technology in an instant, and rapidly developing emerging industrial sectors."** [16] Therefore, even during the imperialist period, enterprises in emerging sectors like ATL still had the possibility of relying on new technological research and development to earn excess profits. But ATL, which had not yet achieved a monopoly in the lithium battery field, would quickly lose all its advantages when faced with giant monopolies that already controlled substantial capital and technology. The facts confirm this. After a large influx of monopoly capital, widespread technological innovation and increases in labor productivity occurred in the battery industry, and other monopolistic giants quickly mastered improved battery production technologies. ATL's lithium batteries lost their original dominant advantage. In 2004, "profit-seeking foreign capitalists" believed that ATL would find it difficult to continue generating excess profits, and proactively withdrew their investments, causing ATL, which had just signed an order to produce over 18 million lithium batteries for Apple’s iPod, to fall into trouble. Faced with no choice, ATL was sold to "Tokyo Electric Chemistry" for 100 million dollars, becoming a company "founded by Chinese and actually controlled by Japanese." This awkward identity hindered ATL from obtaining subsidies from the Chinese government for the new energy industry, but it also forced the company to later spin off its power battery division, forming "CATL" (Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited).When the source automobile enterprise was flourishing, in 2016, the Chinese government relaxed restrictions on foreign-funded battery companies. This was entirely because China's new energy enterprises had already grown significantly and could compete with foreign monopoly capital, necessitating the "going out" of Chinese power batteries to further occupy the global market. Indeed, the opening up of foreign battery companies allowed them to compete freely with domestic battery enterprises, which not only did not lead to the fall of domestic battery companies but also accelerated the mergers of domestic monopoly battery enterprises with small and medium-sized battery companies, and enabled Chinese new energy vehicle enterprises to break into overseas markets. Soon, from 2016 to 2019, China's power battery shipments increased from 30GWh to 71GWh, but the number of power battery companies decreased from 145 to 55, with a sharp increase in the concentration of production and capital. At the same time, due to difficulties in updating fixed capital in other imperialist countries, their new energy vehicle companies had to seek suppliers in China. Many domestic large enterprises, through "cooperative learning," mastered more advanced battery technologies, further consolidating their monopoly positions. In this process, CATL (Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited) seized the opportunity again, leveraging its "home advantage," and signed numerous battery orders with foreign car companies such as BMW, Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz, Hyundai, Tesla, and Stellantis, worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Between 2016 and 2020, its power battery sales grew from less than 20GWh to 46.84GWh, and its share of the global market rose from 17% to 32.6%, reaching the world's number one position. [29]

Starting from the end of March 2021, CATL's stock price continued to rise, and on June 28, its market value surpassed one trillion yuan, rising to a peak of 1.6 trillion yuan, once surpassing the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, becoming the second-largest A-share market stock after Kweichow Moutai. In just three years since listing, CATL reached the peak of A-shares, an achievement that 99% of enterprises dare not dream of, and "Ning Wang" was crowned from then on.

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Hegemony: Trillion-Yuan Empire—How Is Monopoly Position Maintained?

Unlike the complex structure of fuel vehicles, 40% of the cost of new energy vehicle parts is attributed to power batteries, which are like the heart of electric vehicles. Controlling this "heart" production line is the top priority for China to establish a national monopoly in the new energy sector. The subsidies for new energy vehicles issued by four ministries and commissions, with policies continuously updated, are divided into tiers based on pure electric range, battery capacity, charging speed, and other indicators. Through such policies, power battery companies almost hold the lifeline of new energy vehicle enterprises. It can be said that after obtaining subsidies, new energy vehicle companies have to give a large part of their profits to battery oligarchs as "tribute." Among them, CATL, which already held a 30% market share in 2021, is the "heart" of the entire new energy vehicle industry.

"Monopoly restricts free competition, but it cannot eliminate competition; instead, it makes competition more intense. Competition is the law of commodity production based on the private ownership of the means of production." [30]

Many monopolistic giants want a share of this big cake of power batteries. In 2021, besides CATL, companies like LG New Energy, Panasonic, and BYD also held 20.3%, 12.2%, and 8.8% of the global market share respectively, [31] and the pressure on CATL is not to be underestimated. In the past, almost all batteries for some car companies came from CATL, which then raised prices unilaterally, selling at monopoly prices, and even used its dominant position to set various tyrannical terms, arrogantly refusing to take responsibility for incidents like vehicle fires. Even GAC Group Chairman Zeng Qinghong had to admit at the World Power Battery Conference: “GAC has half of its installed capacity and supports CATL... I am now working for CATL.” The existence of monopoly profits does not deny the value law; it only changes the distribution of surplus value among enterprises. As the new energy vehicle capitalists develop, they are reluctant to give nearly half of their income to CATL, losing the residual value they could have kept. Many domestic car companies like NIO, GAC, and Geely have begun "de-CATLing," demanding to develop their own power battery industries; foreign giants like Ford and Tesla are also expanding into power battery production, establishing their own battery factories.

However, how can "Ning Wang" allow the duck that is about to fly away? To maintain its monopoly, it has launched "vertical integration" upstream and downstream of power battery production. Unlike the past reliance solely on China's "white list" for monopoly status in the power battery field, with increasing monopoly competition, CATL also relies on connections with official Chinese authorities, merging upstream companies involved in lithium, cobalt, nickel, and other raw materials needed for power batteries. It frantically uses shareholding systems "to greatly increase the influence of monopolists." [32] The investment projects centered on CATL cover fields such as lithium batteries, energy storage, vehicle manufacturing, parts, semiconductor chips, charging and swapping, intelligent driving, and travel. Investment methods include equity investment, strategic investment, targeted issuance, mergers and acquisitions, and joint ventures. According to statistics, since 2018, CATL has announced about 27 major investment projects with a total investment budget exceeding 400 billion yuan, with 19 projects over 10 billion yuan each, mainly covering power batteries, energy storage batteries, cathode and anode materials, lithium battery recycling, overseas R&D bases, and more. The speed and scale of its investments are unmatched in the industry. Additionally, CATL's capital reach extends to lithium mines, lithium iron phosphate, lithium battery equipment, nickel resources, automotive chips, and other core industries of new energy vehicles, with most invested enterprises being industry leaders or holding a leading position, with a total investment exceeding 60 billion yuan.

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Controlling "Luoyang Molybdenum" is the most important step for CATL to control the raw material supply chain. Using Luoyang Molybdenum's acquisition as an example, we can see how CATL gradually built its "trillion-yuan empire" and attempted to maintain its "perpetual prosperity." As a state-owned giant in rare metals controlled by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), Luoyang Molybdenum controls the two largest cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo (one of which, with 25% shares, was sold to CATL after the 2022 acquisition), holding 22.2% of global cobalt resources, ranking first in the world, and is the second-largest cobalt producer globally; [33] in nickel resources, Luoyang Molybdenum indirectly holds a 30% stake in "Hua Yue Nickel-Cobalt" through equity acquisitions and capital increases in 2019, utilizing its colonial industrial park in Morowali, Indonesia, to produce 60,000 tons of nickel metal annually—metals essential for ternary lithium batteries. [34] In November 2022, CATL reached a deal with the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Luoyang City, Henan Province, to indirectly hold 24.68% of Luoyang Molybdenum's shares, becoming the second-largest shareholder, just 0.01% below the largest shareholder, "Hongshang Group," [35] which has long been closely collaborating with CATL through cross-shareholding. Behind this transaction is a close collusion between private monopoly capitalists and bureaucratic oligarchs. The "Guo Hong Group" originally controlled Luoyang Molybdenum through its wholly owned subsidiary "Luokang Group." In this deal, Guo Hong Group exchanged its stake in Luokang Group, which became a subsidiary of CATL's "Sichuan Times," for a 20.8% stake in "Sichuan Times"; meanwhile, CATL, leveraging its parent, subsidiary, and grandchild company relationships, transferred the shares of Luoyang Molybdenum originally held by Luokang Group into its own hands. After controlling cobalt and nickel resources, CATL greatly consolidated its monopoly position with the support of local bureaucrats, using resource advantages to choke off competitors. After mastering Luoyang Molybdenum, CATL extended its control over raw materials into the lithium mine field. In January 2023, Luoyang Molybdenum and CATL's joint venture obtained development rights for the Uyuni and Oruro salt lakes in Bolivia, building two lithium extraction plants with an expected annual lithium carbonate capacity of 50,000 tons. [36] In this way, CATL completed its "lithium-cobalt-nickel" mineral resource layout, and for a time, "having mines in hand, no worries in the heart."

Continuing to trace back, we can even see that CATL's ability to take the second shareholder position in Luoyang Molybdenum was based on the strategic cooperation agreement signed on June 22, 2022, between the Henan provincial government, Luoyang municipal government, and CATL. Just three months after signing the agreement, CATL's 14 billion yuan investment in the Luoyang new energy battery production base project broke ground, with a promise to start production within three years, "building a nationally competitive 100 billion yuan output value new energy battery base, and driving upstream and downstream supporting industries and related services with an annual output value of nearly 200 billion yuan." [37] The deep intertwining of industrial giants and bureaucratic oligarchs has created this invincible giant enterprise. However, as the capitalist crisis deepens, even bureaucratic monopoly capital is trembling under the blows of the economic crisis. CATL, which relies entirely on government investment, is also teetering as its backers gradually collapse, and the cracks behind its "trillion-yuan empire" are widening.

Epilogue: Toward Globalization—Blood-Caved Crown Will Be Shattered

Will "Ning Wang," who has reached the top through countless capital battles and gone global, truly wear the crown? The fact is, as monopoly levels further increase and capital strength further grows, CATL is becoming "less at ease at the top," and its monopoly position is also shaky. After 2022, the economic downturn caused by the pandemic, the shocks from the Russia-Ukraine war to the global market, and the further surge in upstream raw material prices caught CATL off guard. In the technological field, BYD has also increased investments, from its steadfast focus on lithium iron phosphate since 2008 to launching blade batteries in 2020, with energy density comparable to ternary lithium batteries. In response, CATL has begun seeking new technological solutions, extending into sodium-ion batteries, energy storage, and battery material recycling. According to CATL, the recovery rate of nickel-cobalt-manganese in its batteries has reached over 99%, almost eliminating the need for new mining.

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However, under the capitalist system, technological progress is never for the benefit of the working people, nor does it improve workers' working conditions; it only aims to extract more surplus value. Despite investing heavily in battery recycling technology, CATL is unwilling to spend even a penny on workers' labor protections. This technological progress instead means increased labor intensity and worsened working conditions. In handling waste batteries, harmful metals such as cadmium, lead, mercury, cobalt, and chromium pose long-term poisoning, respiratory issues, and skin diseases. Breakage of lithium-ion batteries can directly cause explosions or fires. Workers handling wires also need to work without protective measures, exposed to large amounts of fiberglass. Many workers suffer irreversible skin damage with no treatment available.

Some say that CATL's base in Ningde has brought wealth to Ningde and improved the living standards of Ningde's workers. After its establishment, Ningde vigorously developed infrastructure and various supporting industries. In the imperialist era, industrial capital always merged with banking capital, and Ningde's real estate speculation rapidly developed, further raising housing prices. The average housing price in Ningde rose from 4,000 yuan per square meter in 2011 to 14,356 yuan at the end of 2023. But "one side accumulates wealth, the other accumulates poverty." [38] While housing prices increased more than 2.5 times, Ningde's urban per capita disposable income only increased from 19,314 yuan to 44,639 yuan, a mere 1.2 times increase. The bourgeoisie has always only counted nominal wages, but the actual wages—what workers can buy with their monetary wages—have decreased due to soaring prices, rising rent, tax burdens, and increasing unemployment. For workers at CATL, the factory has long implemented the "896" work system (working at 8 a.m., leaving at 9 p.m., six days a week), with monthly overtime hours ranking first among power battery companies, reaching 100-150 hours. CATL also enforces strict hierarchy, dividing workers, even specifying "foreign employees (senior engineers) are not required to do overtime." It also uses various tyrannical clauses to trap technical personnel, and if engineers cannot bear the brutal exploitation and want to leave, they are restricted by non-compete clauses with penalties up to 1 million yuan, and the company colludes with local arbitration committees and courts to decide labor disputes according to CATL's agreements. CATL has become the local overlord of Ningde, and Ningde itself has undergone huge changes due to CATL's rise. Continuous shift work causes all CATL workers to be young people aged 18 to 35, who sell their labor power in a shorter period than normal, turning the formerly "quiet" coastal town into a place filled with labor agencies colluding with organized crime, selecting cheap workers from across the country like livestock. Local police are ubiquitous, patrolling every factory entrance to deal with frequent wage disputes. Meanwhile, the disorderly competition during CATL's rise has also damaged the local environment. In 2019, CATL's production base in Ningde experienced excessive wastewater discharge, causing abnormal river colors and odors, leading to protests from residents. The same year, its Guangdong base exceeded VOC (volatile organic compounds) emission standards. CATL's rise is built on the blood and sweat of the proletariat.

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Some say CATL is different from most domestic "turtle-in-the-shell" competitors. Indeed, armed with high subsidies and advanced technology, it has the confidence to aggressively expand overseas, relying on high exploitation rates and labor intensity to go global. "Multinational corporations are an inevitable product of the concentration and monopoly development of capital and production. Monopoly organizations control domestic production and sales and must expand abroad by establishing branches, extending their exploitation from the domestic to the international, becoming international monopolies." [39] With the full takeover by the "state team," CATL began establishing factories overseas. However, these factories, like those in China, write chronicles of blood and fire in countless "Ningdes." Through collusion with state monopoly capital such as Ganfeng Lithium, CATL's lithium projects are spread across Australia, Argentina, Mexico, Ireland, and other countries. Yet, in many mines, especially in third-world countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, miners face extremely high labor intensity. They often work in high-temperature, humid, poorly ventilated environments with severe safety deficiencies. Many Congolese cobalt miners earn wages that meet only 25% of their living needs, far below the value of their labor. Security personnel at cobalt mines work over 200 hours a month but earn only $135. In African mines, there are no taps or fountains, workers cannot drink water during work, and under 12-hour shifts with no lunch breaks, they often go an entire day without eating. [40] "Imperialism not only exports capital to backward countries but also exports capital to advanced capitalist countries." [41] Starting from 2017, CATL has successively established subsidiaries in France, the United States, Canada, Japan, and other countries. Although these are imperialist countries, due to the accumulation of traditional automobile fixed capital, their monopoly bourgeoisie cannot develop power batteries on a scale comparable to China. In that year, CATL's 12GWh of power battery sales propelled it to the top of the world, surpassing Panasonic, LG Chem, and Samsung SDI. Between 2021 and 2022, CATL announced plans to establish overseas factories in Thuringia, Germany; Debrecen, Hungary; Michigan and Nevada, USA, and to cooperate with Ford and Tesla in the US to produce direct supply products. In 2023, a CATL battery factory in Debrecen, Hungary, personally promoted by Hungarian Prime Minister Orban, a loyal servant of Chinese imperialism, attempted to settle there. In response, local residents organized protests against the job losses and environmental pollution caused by CATL.

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The myth of CATL cannot be written forever. Under the increasingly severe economic crisis, although CATL has climbed step by step to the top, it is becoming increasingly difficult to realize surplus value and achieve "the thrilling leap" of commodity value. Relying on exploiting workers' surplus value, continuously improving technological levels, and expanding production scale, the shipment of lithium batteries only increases. However, its relentless pursuit of surplus value conflicts with the means of increasing exploitation and grabbing surplus value. As the economic crisis of Chinese imperialism deepens, government fiscal crises worsen, and workers' ability to pay diminishes, even the meager new car purchase subsidies have been gradually eliminated, ending completely by the end of 2022. The greatest feature of capitalist economic crises—overproduction—is vividly reflected in the power battery industry, one of the "new three" of the "new trio" proudly promoted by the Chinese ruling class. In 2023, due to overcapacity, prices of ternary lithium batteries fell by 55%, and lithium iron phosphate batteries by 63%. In the same year, global electric vehicle battery installations reached 705.5GWh[42], while China's battery capacity reached 1860GWh[43], enough to replace batteries in all electric vehicles worldwide twice. This oversupply and low profit margin force power battery companies like CATL to continue lowering costs, and the best way is to increase exploitation. CATL's ruthless exploitation of absolute surplus value even extends to its headquarters' engineers, with slogans like "Strive for 100 days," and besides holiday overtime with a 20 yuan/hour bonus, all employees above level 7 (engineers) are required to work overtime voluntarily. Such measures are only a bitter pill, with increasing exploitation and broader scope, deepening workers' poverty—making the commodities of China's new energy industry, led by CATL, even harder to realize and edging closer to bankruptcy.

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Ningde Times' rise is backed by the tangible hands of Chinese imperialism, which still looms over the new energy industry like a giant. According to investigations, Ningde Times received 5.72 billion RMB in subsidies in 2023, more than double the previous year. This has made Ningde Times the Chinese company receiving the most government subsidies, surpassing the state-owned oil companies previously supported by Chinese imperialism. Among the top ten in subsidy amounts, four are related to electric vehicles. Trillions of subsidies have flooded the global market with millions of domestically produced new energy vehicles, launching an attack on established car companies. However, old imperialist countries are not willing to be cut by Chinese imperialism and have launched countermeasures. In June 2024, the European Union announced tariffs up to 48.1% on Chinese electric vehicles, [44] and the United States increased tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles to 100% in May of the same year. [45] New energy is a tool for Chinese imperialism to surpass old imperialist countries, but the struggle between imperialist groups cannot be forever peaceful. Chinese imperialism's attempt to use companies like Ningde Times to become the world's hegemon will not be smooth sailing. Trade wars and territorial division conflicts among imperialist powers are inevitable. The Ningde Times, once invincible and known as "Ning Wang," which was supported by Chinese imperialism to dominate the new energy industry, is now struggling amid the sharpening contradictions of capitalism, facing overproduction crises. The support from state monopoly capitalism for Ningde Times does not mean revival but only a fleeting resurgence. The bankruptcy of Ningde Times, like the demise of China’s bureaucratic monopoly capitalism, is an unstoppable historical trend.
  • Lenin: “Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism,” Collected Works of Lenin, Vol. 22, First Chinese Edition, People’s Publishing House, 1958. ↑
  • Same as above. ↑
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