The Nazi regime’s “oceanic fishing” private enterprises: contradictions within the bourgeoisie deepen
A front desk of a small private enterprise in an economically developed region of eastern China suddenly encountered two police officers claiming to be from an inland province and city, requesting to see the boss. The receptionist remained vigilant, reported by phone, and upon hearing from the boss that he was out of town, advised him not to return and to let the finance department handle the two uninvited guests. After arranging the meeting, these two “police officers” (here temporarily trusting that they are indeed police rather than scammers or gangsters) did not waste time and straightforwardly produced a stack of documents, each bearing the name of their police station at the top, with signatures and seals complete, only missing the content. They said they brought 100 such blank documents, each worth 100,000 to 200,000 yuan (RMB, 20,000 to 40,000 SGD). Their mission out of the province was heavy: “Our police brothers’ year-end bonuses depend on us.” The face of extortion was unmistakable.
The two police officers claimed they had some basis for their visit: the private enterprise had products sold in their city and had received consumer complaints. However, in China, capitalist enterprises always have “problems.” Therefore, for private bourgeoisie, the Nazi regime can always find reasons to trouble them.
Recently, in Chinese media, “oceanic fishing” no longer refers to fishermen working in distant oceans but to police departments illegally arresting private entrepreneurs in different locations, sealing, freezing, or even transferring assets of private companies and individuals from other regions—simply put, making excuses to arrest private enterprises and extort money.
For example, in the case of Guangdong Yijiankang Group: this Guangdong-based company achieved a revenue of 2.423 billion yuan in 2022 and applied to list in Hong Kong in June 2023. In October of the same year, police from Jiaozuo and Shangqiu in Henan Province, citing suspected fraud, dispatched over 1,600 officers to Guangzhou to conduct “oceanic fishing” on the group’s subsidiaries. The total involved amount was only over 600,000 yuan, yet the police froze 64 accounts related to the group’s subsidiaries. This forced Yijiankang Group to withdraw its Hong Kong listing application, leading to factory shutdowns, halted production, operational difficulties, employee wage delays, and paralysis of business activities, which have not yet returned to normal.
This concept was already seen in Chinese financial media as early as March last year, but the situation likely did not improve and drew wider attention after August. Relatively wealthy regions like Guangdong and Zhejiang are heavily affected by “oceanic fishing,” which they see as plundering their wealth by other provinces and are most willing to expose such cases.
A frequently cited internal report, “Guangdong Provincial Situation Internal Reference,” stated that in April last year, the Guangdong Provincial Situation Research Center wrote an internal report on illegal enforcement in other regions, noting that “in recent years, cities like Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta have become high-incidence areas for enforcement in other regions. For example, since 2023, nearly 10,000 enterprises in Guangzhou have encountered enforcement in other regions, most of which are private enterprises.”
According to the Financial Times, in 2024, 82 senior executives of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen were detained, about half of whom were detained in other regions or unknown locations—i.e., enforcement in other regions. The behavior of police from less developed regions “fishing” in wealthier provinces has become a point of contention among these provinces. There are even cases of economically developed provinces “fishing” for enterprises in less developed regions.
With official police involvement in such nearly extortionate activities, rogue elements within the police force have also found a shortcut for personal gain, participating in this dog-eat-dog struggle.
Since late May 2023, police officers Yang and Zhan from a county police station in another province, seeking personal illegal benefits, secretly carried police uniforms, handcuffs, and other equipment, driving to Zhejiang and Jiangsu, intending to extort money from entrepreneurs under the guise of handling cases.
On June 11 of the same year, they took entrepreneur Shen from his home in Wujiang, Jiangsu, claiming to investigate a case, but Shen escaped by jumping out of the car in Deqing County, Huzhou, Zhejiang, and reported the incident.
Initially, Deqing police suspected they might be impersonating police officers and prepared to investigate under the charge of “obstructing official duties,” but later found they were indeed judicial personnel.
Ultimately, Yang and Zhan were convicted of abuse of power, sentenced to eight months and seven months in prison, respectively.
This “oceanic fishing” behavior has also alarmed provinces with more enterprises than inland areas. For example, Yiwu, a major small commodity distribution center with countless micro and small enterprises, frequently suffers from enforcement in other regions. As a result, Yiwu police had to issue a notice stating, “For excessive enforcement or selective enforcement, Yiwu police will not support and will report wrongful cases to relevant departments, with the organizers bearing the corresponding legal responsibility.”
Similarly, police agencies in economically developed regions like Hangzhou issued notices specifically stating “External police are not allowed to illegally enter enterprises for case handling.”
They also require enterprises encountering “illegal case handling” to report to the police and record videos as evidence.
It is said that some developed cities have set up hotlines for private enterprises to seek help, advising them to call directly if external police disturb them.
The Zhejiang Procuratorate has investigated over 17,000 cases of sealed assets that have not been unsealed for more than two years, helping 123 enterprises unfreeze over 70 million yuan in accounts, unseal six properties, and release 20 vehicles.
Outside Zhejiang, regions like Guangdong, Fujian, and Jiangsu have also taken a firm stance against the chaos of “enforcement in other regions” and “oceanic fishing.”
Today, the rampant spread of “enforcement in other regions” and “oceanic fishing” reflects the worsening phenomenon of China’s regime being unable to sustain itself. The bourgeois regime needs to extort from private bourgeoisie to fill its increasingly depleted treasury. The impoverished fiscal situation forces the Nazi regime to not only oppress the working people through “taxation and requisition” to expand revenue but also to “scrape” the private bourgeoisie of the same class.
This behavior of the Chinese regime will undoubtedly deepen contradictions within the bourgeoisie, intensify conflicts between bureaucratic monopoly bourgeoisie and private bourgeoisie, and exacerbate conflicts among various local bourgeois regimes in China.
However, due to differences in internal class structure, strength, and relationships with the regime, the impact and benefits of “oceanic fishing” vary among different bourgeois factions.
Bureaucratic bourgeoisie, closely linked to the regime, often benefits from such “fishing,” while many private bourgeois enterprises are the victims.
According to regional divisions, bureaucratic bourgeoisie in less developed capitalist provinces often seize private wealth from more developed regions through “fishing.” Wealthier provinces’ bureaucratic bourgeoisie also use state power to “protect” their local private enterprises and even “fish” for enterprises in poorer provinces as a form of retaliation.
Thus, what unfolds before us is a peculiar struggle among “big dogs, small dogs, fat dogs, and hungry dogs,” a small but interesting gap, a contradiction that itches and pains. It also shows that China’s bourgeois regime is increasingly alienating the private bourgeoisie, with its ruling foundation shrinking—an ominous sign of its gradual loss of popular support and eventual demise.
The contradictions among bourgeois factions will only be eliminated with the demise of capitalism.
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