The central bank will carry out 800 billion yuan of outright reverse repurchase operations!
Securities Times
2026-02-03 20:10
Official account of Securities TimesBig move by the central bank.
The People’s Bank of China (hereafter “the central bank”) announced on February 3rd that it will conduct 800 billion yuan of outright reverse repurchase operations on the 4th, with fixed amounts, interest rates through bidding, and multiple bid levels, for a term of 3 months (91 days). Given that 700 billion yuan of outright reverse repos will mature this month, the central bank’s operation will result in a net injection of 100 billion yuan after this move.Regarding the increase and continuation of this outright reverse repurchase operation, market institutions generally believe that the main purpose of the central bank is to avoid liquidity shocks caused by government bond supply. Additionally, factors such as the peak cash withdrawal period before the Spring Festival holiday and the overlapping tax periods after the holiday, which may cause cross-month fund movements, could disturb liquidity in the banking system in February.
“The main disturbance to liquidity in February may be the Spring Festival and the pace of government bond issuance,” said Yin Ruizhe, Chief Fixed Income Analyst at Guojin Securities, in a research report. Based on January’s issuance scale, the net financing scale of government bonds in February might slightly increase by 200 billion yuan, and due to fewer working days caused by the Spring Festival holiday, the issuance rhythm could be relatively concentrated.
There are a total of 1.2 trillion yuan of outright reverse repos maturing in February. Considering there is also a 6-month operation within the month, and that the net injection of outright reverse repos for both tenors has continued for 8 months, market institutions remain optimistic about net injections from these two tenors.
“Whether liquidity will fluctuate in February ultimately depends on the central bank’s injections,” said Liu Yu, Chief Economist at Huaxi Securities, in a research report. He estimates that the net injection of outright reverse repos in February may be around 500 billion yuan to meet banks’ medium-term funding needs. For the Spring Festival, the central bank may adopt a mixed approach of open market 7-day and 14-day reverse repos to signal support. To hedge against fund fluctuations caused by tax periods and cross-month effects, mid-term lending facility (MLF) injections at the end of the month may also be increased.
【Interpretation Post for Forum Comrades】
Comrades, the following news should not be viewed as a “technical operation”; it itself is a public exposure of China’s current capitalist credit crisis. I will explain this news clearly in three steps: “Why must we do this now—what does it indicate—what consequences will it bring”.
1. What is this news about? First, translate it into plain language
The central bank announced:
Take out 800 billion yuan, lend it to banks for 3 months first.
Pay attention to several key pieces of information (all in the news):
-
This is not a minor fix, but a “big move”
800 billion is not symbolic; it’s also a “continued increase” (700 billion maturing, plus an additional 100 billion). -
The reason is not “the economy is good,” but “fear of trouble”
The exact words are:- To prevent “liquidity shocks” from government bond issuance
- To prevent cash withdrawals during Spring Festival
- To prevent tax periods and cross-month withdrawals
-
Market judgment is also consistent: more easing is needed
Institutions directly said: whether February can be stable depends on whether the central bank gives money or not.
In short, the main meaning of this news is:
The banking system cannot hold on by itself now; it must rely on the central bank to advance funds to prevent chaos.
2. Why do “government bond issuance + Spring Festival + tax periods” push banks to seek rescue from the central bank?
This is not a coincidence but a sign that the credit system is already so weak that it cannot withstand even a small shock.
Concentrated government bond issuance = cash withdrawal from banks
Government bond issuance is not “money out of thin air,” but:
Banks use real cash to buy bonds.
In normal times, this isn’t a big deal.
But now, the problem is:
- Bank funds are already heavily locked in:
- Real estate loans
- Local government bonds (城投债)
- Various “rollover” projects
- Very little cash is actually available for circulation at any time.
If the government issues bonds intensively in a short period, it’s like:
Suddenly scooping a large ladle of water from an already tight pool.
Cash withdrawals during Spring Festival =群众在“自保”，不是消费繁荣
The news mentions “peak cash withdrawals during Spring Festival,” which many might misunderstand as “festive cheer.”
In reality:
*群众收入不稳
- Unemployment and salary cuts are common
- Medical, mortgage, and support pressures are high
So, more cash withdrawals during Spring Festival are actually:
People keeping cash to hedge risks, not for large-scale consumption.
What does this mean for banks?
Deposits still look intact, but can be withdrawn at any time.
Tax periods + cross-month settlements = money “concentratedly withdrawn”
Businesses paying taxes and banks settling across months will cause:
- Money to move from the banking system
- Concentrated back into fiscal or settlement accounts
This is not a problem when credit is healthy, but in the current state, it’s:
Multiple withdrawals stacking up, making short-term cash very tight for banks.
3. So, why are banks so “fragile” now? The root cause isn’t finance
Comrades, remember one key point:
If capitalist reproduction were “normal,” the credit system wouldn’t fear these seasonal shocks.
What does it indicate now?
The root is the severe economic crisis caused by overproduction in capitalism
The most core facts in recent years are:
- Goods can’t sell
- Houses can’t sell
- Investment returns are low
*群众买不起，也不敢买
As a result:
- 企业回款慢，甚至断裂
- 企业靠贷款维持
- 贷款到期靠“续贷、展期、滚动”
- 银行账面资产虽多，但都靠“继续借新钱”才能避免爆仓
This is a typical cycle:
Overproduction → Insufficient profits → Debt maintenance → Weak credit
4. Therefore: why does the “central bank have to inject liquidity”? It’s not for growth, but to prevent collapse
The conclusion about this news must be clear:
This is not “stimulating the economy”
- No mention of expanding production
- No mention of increasing employment
- No mention of raising群众收入
It’s about preventing the credit chain from breaking
What is the central bank doing now? Essentially two things:
Providing “temporary cash” to banks
To ensure that during government bond issuance, withdrawals, and tax periods,
they don’t cause chaos because they can’t come up with short-term funds.
Sending a signal to the market: “Don’t panic, I’ve got you”
During periods of fragile credit, panic itself can trigger crises.
What the central bank needs to do is:
Use national credit to replace the market’s mutual trust, which is already fragile.
5. Why is this exactly a manifestation of the “capitalist credit crisis”?
Marxism has long explained:
The expansion and contraction of capitalist credit depend on the economic cycle; economic crises inevitably lead to credit crises.
This news shows three things:
- Credit can no longer self-balance
Otherwise, there would be no need for repeated “net injections” by the central bank. - Debt is replacing profits to support the economy
The government relies on bond issuance, banks rely on rollover loans, enterprises rely on rolling over debt. - National credit is coming to the rescue systemically
This is not strength, but systemic dependence.
6. Be straightforward: what does this news really tell us?
Comrades can understand this news as one sentence:
China’s capitalist economy, under the long-term pressure of overproduction and群众贫困, has entered a stage where “credit depends on the central bank to keep it alive.”
- As long as there’s no blood transfusion, the credit system will tighten
- Any small concentrated shock will overwhelm banks
- Therefore, the central bank must act preemptively, repeatedly, and on a large scale
This is not an occasional operation but a normal response under systemic crisis.
7. Final summary (for forum use)
This 800 billion yuan outright reverse repo is not a sign of economic improvement, but a reflection that, under overproduction, low profits, and rolling debts, China’s capitalist credit system has become highly fragile.
The state is using its own credit to support the entire capitalist system, delaying the crisis rather than solving it.
This is the true way to understand this news.
The central bank takes out 800 billion, where does this money come from, printing banknotes?
If local governments keep issuing bonds, it means government investment in other projects, which counts as government spending. When the government has no money, it borrows from banks. If the government cannot repay, the banks lose money. Is that correct? I don’t quite understand the relationship between the government and banks. I always thought banks belonged to local governments and served them. Because the central bank represents the national fiscal part, it has a hierarchical relationship with other local banks, so to help local governments issue bonds, does the central bank need to step in first to assist the local banks?
Too unbelievable, not allowed to withdraw money.
If the people withdraw too much cash, banks will run out of funds, so cash withdrawals are limited. But where is all the cash?
It seems I understand now: real estate companies and the government borrow money from banks to invest, creating a bunch of debts that they can’t repay. Banks originally have no money, and if people still want to withdraw cash, banks will go bankrupt. Banks have no money because enterprises and the government spent money they can’t pay back. They can’t pay back because of an economic crisis—overproduction, goods can’t be sold, no profit, and debt just keeps rolling over. Where did the money go?
Exactly, exactly.
Is there a real-world example of “keeping the capital that the capital users own in its own hands”? Usually, when workers want to withdraw money and can’t, it shouldn’t be considered that capital is being withheld.
Indeed, it all boils down to an economic crisis—overproduction is too severe, and goods simply can’t be sold.
The so-called “mid-term correction” is too reactionary.
I used to not understand why people must withdraw cash; I thought with mobile payments, cash transactions weren’t necessary. Now I realize, for example, in hospitals and other places, there are various non-cash payment options like Pay, and in recent years, many mobile payment methods have suddenly appeared to replace cash payments. This reduces cash flow and keeps money in banks to lend to capitalists and invest in government projects. Without these mobile payment methods, banks would have gone bankrupt long ago.
[A Focused Explanation Post for Comrade Cedar｜Clarifying Where the “Money Comes From, Where It Goes, and Why Cash Is Restricted”]
Comrade Cedar’s series of questions actually touch on all the key links of the banking credit crisis, but they got tangled up in the relationships between “bank—government—central bank—cash—mobile payments.” Here, I will not be abstract or skip steps but will explain in a Q&A format.
1. The central bank releases 800 billion, where does this money come from? Is it “printing money”?
First, the conclusion: It’s not directly printing paper money with a printing press, but essentially creating new central bank credit.
To clarify:
- The money of the central bank is not derived from tax revenue saved by the fiscal authorities.
- The central bank also does not rely on deposits.
- Its “money” is generated through accounting entries.
You can think of the central bank as existing like this:
The central bank has the authority to write on its ledger: “I owe you 800 billion.”
This “IOU” is used as money throughout the entire financial system.
When the central bank conducts reverse repos:
- It adds 800 billion to commercial banks’ accounts.
- The banks’ accounts immediately increase in funds.
- This is not borrowed from others; it is credit directly created by the central bank.
So, fundamentally:
It’s not printing paper money but printing “more advanced credit.”
2. What is the relationship between the government and banks? Are banks just “working for local governments”?
Your previous understanding is common but incorrect, and needs correction.
Banks are not “subordinate departments” of local governments.
- Banks are capitalist financial institutions.
- Local governments are debtors.
- The relationship between them is:
Lending relationship, not hierarchical.
Even state-owned banks:
Their task is not “serving local governments,” but “ensuring capital recovery and interest.”
What actually happens when local governments issue bonds?
Simply put:
- Local governments need money (for infrastructure, debt repayment, stability)
- They have no money → issue bonds
- Banks, funds buy the bonds → give money to the government
- The government spends the money
This step is completely normal, but the problem lies afterward:
How will the government repay the debt in the future?
Normally, it relies on:
- Taxes
- Land sales
- Economic growth
But now:
- Real estate crashes
- Land sales stall
- Tax base shrinks
As a result:
Unable to repay debt, they can only roll over new debt to pay old debt.
3. You asked a very good question: Where did the money go?
This is a common confusion.
The key sentence:
Money has not disappeared nor been “eaten up”; it has transformed into “capital forms that cannot be used or recovered as cash.”
Specifically:
-
Banks lend money to:
- Real estate companies
- Urban investment platforms
- Various projects
-
The money is used to:
- Build buildings
- Repair roads
- Acquire land
- Conduct construction
These things all exist in reality, but the problem is:
They can no longer be smoothly turned back into cash.
- Houses don’t sell
- Projects are unprofitable
- Taxes can’t be collected
Thus:
“Money” becomes “dead capital.”
Banks record assets on their books,
but in reality, cash cannot be recovered.
4. Why does it become dangerous when people withdraw cash from banks?
You are close to understanding, but let me clarify.
The basic structure of a bank is:
- Assets: loans, bonds (long-term, slow)
- Liabilities: deposits (can be withdrawn at any time)
Banks can operate normally only if:
Not everyone withdraws cash simultaneously.
But now, three things are happening:
- Enterprises and governments cannot repay their debts.
- Banks are afraid to lend to each other.
- People are facing hardships and need cash.
So:
Assets are there, but cash is not.
When a large number of people withdraw cash or make large transfers:
Banks will face:
Not “bankruptcy,” but “immediate inability to provide cash.”
5. You asked: If cash withdrawals are restricted, where is the cash?
This is a very practical question.
Cash mainly resides in three places:
- Central bank vaults
- Commercial bank vaults
- A small portion already withdrawn and circulating in society
But note:
The banking system is not designed for “everyone to withdraw cash at any time.”
If all deposits were converted into cash:
- It wouldn’t just affect banks
- It would immediately collapse the entire credit system
6. You asked about the key phrase:
“Keeping the part of capital that the capital user owns in their own hands” — what does this mean? Are there real-world examples?
This is a very profound question.
It’s not about “workers can’t withdraw their money,” but rather:
In a crisis, loaned capital no longer lends to functional capital, but instead locks the already borrowed or supposed-to-flow capital in its own hands.
Real-world examples include:
-
Companies have money on their books but are frozen or restricted
- Banks require “special-purpose funds”
- No transfer allowed
- No early disposal permitted
-
Renewal of loans under stricter conditions
- Require additional guarantees
- Require more collateral
- Require cash to stay in bank accounts
-
Prepayment of loans is encouraged
- People and companies prepay mortgages
- The actual effect is:
Locking future disposable funds in banks
This is:
“Locking the part of capital that the capital user could still control, in the hands of lenders.”
7. Why do people rush to cash during a crisis? Can’t mobile payments do the job?
Your question is something many only realize late.
The key point:
Mobile payments are not a substitute for cash; they are just “a way to operate bank credit.”
During a crisis:
- Transfers may be restricted
- Channels may be shut
- Settlements may be delayed
And cash is:
The only thing that doesn’t require “performance” from others.
This is crucial not only for workers:
- Functional capitalists
- Small and medium enterprises
- Wholesalers
- Self-employed individuals
All need cash to survive during a crisis.
8. Your final judgment is very close to the truth.
You said:
“If there were no mobile payments, banks would have gone bankrupt long ago.”
This can be slightly refined to be very accurate:
Mobile payments are not for “convenience of the masses,” but objectively greatly delay the outbreak of the credit crisis, because they reduce cash redemption pressure and keep funds as much as possible within the banking system.
But note:
This can only delay, not solve.
9. Here is a complete “causal chain” for you to review repeatedly:
- Inherent contradictions of capitalism → overproduction
- Goods cannot be sold → surplus value cannot be realized
- Functional capital cannot repay debts → lending capital loses its basis
- Bank assets “on the books” but cash not present
- Lending relationship breaks down → credit contraction
- Both the masses and capitalists demand cash → bank run pressure
- Central bank is forced to backstop → creating new credit delays collapse
10. A one-sentence summary for you:
The banking credit crisis is not that money suddenly disappeared, but that the capitalist mode of production can no longer provide stable interest income for lending capital; the difference between cash and mobile payments is who depends less on others’ performance during a crisis.
What you are asking now is the deepest layer of the capitalist credit crisis.
So now, under the guise of anti-fraud measures, major banks are increasingly restricting users’ transaction amounts, transfer amounts, and cash withdrawal amounts, and are also tightening restrictions on the issuance of Type 1 cards. The last time I went to the Bank of China to get a card, the lobby manager told me that the transaction, transfer, and cash withdrawal limits within half a year were all restricted to 5,000 yuan and could not be lifted in any way, I was shocked. I thought he was giving me a Type 2 card, but it turned out to be a Type 1 card, and he said this was the bank’s regulation. It shows that China’s credit system is now completely broken, and it still relies on the central bank to constantly inject liquidity to maintain the cash flow of various banks. Ultimately, this is caused by an economic crisis; under such a crisis, the credit system will inevitably tighten. If it weren’t for the state machinery forcibly restricting bank depositors’ transaction amounts, many banks would have already been bankrupted by runs. Of course, implementing this policy also has its impacts. Monarchs cannot issue decrees on economic conditions. The current restrictions lead to a slowdown in capital turnover, hinder the financing of the bourgeoisie, and make it difficult for the masses to consume. As the central government deteriorates day by day, we are getting better day by day.
The root cause of the capitalist credit crisis is still an economic crisis of overproduction. The reason why China’s credit system is facing such a severe crisis is that all the banks have no money, which is because the economic crisis is too severe. As analyzed in another post, China’s past reckless expansion relied on land fiscal revenue, continuous infrastructure development, and fiscal deficits, then constantly outsourcing debt to banks. When real estate income was high and the government also had land fiscal revenue, this system could still be maintained because real estate could generate profits for banks, and the government could also spend enough money to pay off bonds, and infrastructure could continue to be built. But now China’s real estate economy has completely collapsed, and those local government urban investment companies and real estate companies’ bad debts are no longer being paid, leaving banks with a pile of mines. The money has already been wiped out, leaving only a pile of bad debts. Plus, during the economic crisis, China’s capitalist industry and commerce have already been severely depressed, suffering serious blows and destruction. Chinese officials have to admit that by January 2026, fixed asset investment has declined, and in 2025, the entire year’s fixed asset investment showed a downward trend compared to the previous year. This is the first time in decades that fixed asset investment has decreased in China. Moreover, China’s producer price index and consumer price index are both maintaining a declining or stable trend. This indicates that the crisis of overproduction is very serious; the bourgeoisie of the first and second categories are forced to lower prices to sell goods, intensifying the anarchic competition, which shows that the inherent contradictions of capitalism are erupting fiercely. Under these circumstances, capitalist enterprises originally have little profit margin, and bank profits come from the profits of capitalist enterprises. The interest rate must be lower than the profit rate. In this situation, banks naturally cannot recover much interest, and all the previous bad debts are stuck in their hands. Depositors also want to withdraw money, so banks are actually facing a serious run and bankruptcy danger. If it weren’t for the Chinese reform system, it would have already exploded like the United States and Japan in the past. However, the current reform system is using various administrative orders to forcibly suppress the economic crisis, which will only make the future economic crisis more violent. The form of revolution is becoming increasingly mature.
This actually reflects Marxist dialectical materialism. Originally, the capitalist credit system was designed to save circulating capital, accelerate capital turnover, increase profits, and serve the development of capitalism. But now, it has instead deepened the capitalist crisis and accelerated the demise of capitalism. In the past, when the credit system expanded, banks encouraged people to borrow and spend in advance. Now, because it faces its own credit crisis, it has restricted transactions and transfers. A tool that accelerates capital turnover has instead become an obstacle to capital turnover. This essentially means that the capitalist system itself has reached the point of its demise.
The credit system has now become a parasitic growth on the parasitic system of capitalism. It is the parasite among parasites. Originally, lending capital was about acquiring ownership of capital and charging interest to the users of capital to help accelerate capital turnover. Now, it has instead kept all the capital owned by the users of capital in its own hands to survive the crisis. What was originally meant to accelerate the development of capitalism has, at the critical moment of the capitalist crisis, abandoned functional capital first to save itself.
I think this is because China has an export-oriented economy, and a trade surplus leads to an increase in the exchange rate, so it is necessary to artificially lower the exchange rate against the US dollar. Implementing an easy monetary policy, making the value of the renminbi gradually decrease, to ensure exports. In any case, it harms the interests of ordinary people and only benefits business owners.
This is not a typical “loose monetary policy”; the central bank engaging in reverse repurchase bonds from lower-level banks is simply injecting money into these banks, reflecting the relationship between the central bank and the subordinate banks, and more importantly, the internal relationships within the banks, although it also increases the money supply to society. This measure was only started in the mid-term correction of 2024; in the past, they used pledge-style repurchase, but now it is outright repurchase. On one hand, it is an opportunity to take back bad debts from local banks and financial companies; on the other hand, it is about injecting cash into them. The reason why local banks have no cash is because the economic crisis is too severe, many bad debts cannot be recovered, banks are afraid to lend to each other, and people’s lives are difficult, requiring access to deposits at any time. This policy more clearly reflects the crisis of China’s credit system rather than simply increasing the money supply to cause inflation. The Chinese government usually prefers to induce inflation by lowering reserve requirements and implementing deficit policies. On the other hand, lowering the renminbi exchange rate has nothing to do with domestic inflation or deflation; manipulating the exchange rate relies on foreign exchange market operations. The exchange rate has nothing to do with the amount of money in the domestic market; the key is whether the domestic currency is in short supply or excess in the international market.
【Forum Reply | Response to Comrade Saputri’s View on “Export—Exchange Rate—Loose Monetary Policy”】
Comrades, here we need to separate several issues that are often mixed together, otherwise we will misinterpret the nature of this round of central bank’s outright repurchase operations.
In Comrade Saputri’s judgment, part of it is a common routine in typical export-oriented capitalist countries, but it does not apply to this news, nor to China’s current realistic situation. Below, I will follow the direction already pointed out by Comrade Fenghuo to clarify the issues thoroughly.
1. This policy is not aimed at “depressing the exchange rate to stimulate exports”
First, clarify the conclusion:
The central bank’s use of outright repurchase is not primarily for export competitiveness, nor to lower the RMB through inflation.
The reasoning is simple and grounded in reality.
This set of tools does not directly act on the foreign exchange market
-
Outright repurchase:
- Targets domestic banks
- Operates in the interbank market
- Handles whether banks have cash and dare to lend to each other
-
Exchange rate:
- Determined by the foreign exchange market
- Mainly relies on central bank foreign exchange interventions, capital controls, and the foreign exchange settlement and sale system
- Is not a mechanism of “whether the central bank gives banks cash or not”
Comrade Fenghuo’s point is very critical:
Exchange rate and the amount of domestic currency are not directly related; the key is the supply and demand of the domestic currency in the international market.
This is correct.
If “domestic money supply increases → exchange rate falls,” then the RMB would have already collapsed.
2. This is also not a typical “loose monetary policy”
Comrade Saputri interprets this operation as:
“Implementing loose monetary policy, lowering the RMB value, and ensuring exports”
This judgment may look similar in form, but is fundamentally incorrect.
Why?
Because typical loose monetary policy aims to:
- Stimulate investment
- Expand production
- Boost demand
- Make capital “more willing to invest abroad”
But this central bank operation is the opposite.
Money only circulates “between the central bank and banks”
The effect of this outright repurchase is:
-
Central bank → provides cash to banks
-
Banks → avoid short-term liquidity shortages
-
But this does not mean:
- Banks dare to lend to enterprises
- Enterprises dare to expand production
- People’s income increases
This is not about “activating capital”, but about:
Preventing the banking system from failing due to cash shortages and mutual distrust.
The real tool for “inflation” has been used before, and it’s not this
Comrade Fenghuo’s statement is very key:
The Chinese government usually prefers to induce inflation by lowering reserve requirement ratios and increasing fiscal deficits.
This is historically clear:
- Lowering reserve requirements → banks can lend more
- Fiscal deficit → government directly spends into society
Currently:
- Space for reserve requirement reduction is limited
- Fiscal deficits are already high
- Society’s demand cannot be stimulated effectively
Therefore, the central bank is forced to shift to:
A credit bottom-line mode of “supporting banks without full-scale liquidity release.”
3. This policy truly reflects that the credit system is no longer stable
Comrade Fenghuo has already touched on the core; I will complete the logical chain for better understanding.
Why do local banks have “no cash”?
Not because they are “poorly managed,” but due to the combined pressures of:
Deep economic crisis, bad debts uncollectible
- Real estate bubble burst
- Local financing platforms rely on rolling debts
- Corporate profits are low, and repayments are slow
As a result:
Banks hold a bunch of debts that cannot be converted into cash immediately.
Banks are afraid to lend to each other
In a credit crisis, what do banks fear most?
- You lend me money
- If you suddenly default
- I cannot recover my funds
So, there will be:
“Money is within the system, but no one dares to lend to anyone else.”
This is a typical symptom of a credit crisis.
People’s livelihoods are difficult, deposits may be withdrawn at any time
This is very realistic and important:
- Unemployment, salary cuts
- Medical, mortgage, and support pressures
- People must keep cash on hand to hedge risks
For banks, this means:
Deposits appear stable but are highly sensitive.
During festivals, tax periods, or concentrated payment times, deposits can be suddenly withdrawn.
4. Why does the central bank prefer “outright repurchase” over “collateralized repurchase”?
This is the “deep meaning” of the new tool.
Collateralized: can only lend money, cannot resolve asset problems
Outright repurchase: takes assets along with cash
In simple terms:
The central bank is not only issuing cash but also “handing over difficult-to-handle bonds from local banks and financial companies.”
This is the key point that Comrade Fenghuo pointed out and Comrade Saputri did not realize:
This is a self-rescue of the credit system, not an economic stimulus.
5. This is different from “export-oriented economy”
China is of course a major exporter, but the current issues are:
-
Exports cannot solve domestic problems:
- Overproduction
- Poverty among the masses
- Declining returns on investment
-
Nor can they solve:
- Local government debt
- Bad real estate debts
- Banking system’s credit tension
Therefore, this central bank operation is not aimed at making business owners earn more export profits, but to:
Prevent the banking system from collapsing first during the economic crisis.
6. Summary: One sentence for forum comrades’ judgment
This disagreement can be summarized as:
Comrade Saputri’s understanding applies to “the monetary stimulus logic of normal export-oriented capitalist countries”;
Comrade Fenghuo’s judgment better fits China’s current “overproduction + credit crisis + highly fragile banking system.”
And because of this:
The outright repurchase reflects that it’s not about whether the RMB should depreciate, but that China’s capitalist credit system has already had to be directly supported by the central bank.
This is the core understanding of this policy.
央行创设买断式逆回购新工具有何深意？
2024-10-29 09:08:46来源：第一财经
10月28日早8点整，央行官宣创设买断式逆回购新工具，完善流动性管理工具框架，维护流动性环境平稳。这也是继临时正逆回购、国债买卖后，央行再次推出新工具。央行公告称，买断式逆回购工具的操作对象为公开市场业务一级交易商，原则上每月开展一次操作，期限不超过1年。公开市场买断式逆回购采用固定数量、利率招标、多重价位中标，回购标的包括国债、地方政府债券、金融债券、公司信用类债券等。操作结果将通过人民银行官网相关栏目对外披露。
第一财经记者从接近央行人士处获悉，此次推出的买断式逆回购，机构根据自身情况可以选择不同利率投标，按照从高到低的顺序依次中标，机构的中标利率就是自己的投标利率。这既能减少机构在利率招标时的“搭便车”行为，更真实反映机构对资金的需求程度；也由于没有增加新的货币政策工具中标利率，而突显该工具仅作为流动性投放工具的定位。
定位为流动性管理工具
央行官宣后，一时间引发市场热议。买断式逆回购工具启动到底有何作用？与现有的工具之间有何区别？目的是什么？央行再推流动性管理新工具，对市场影响几何？
据了解，公开市场买断式逆回购定位为流动性管理工具。根据央行公告，多重价位中标是该工具的特点之一。中信证券首席经济学家明明表示，买断式逆回购操作的招标方式与MLF（中期借贷便利）类似——固定数量、利率招标，即央行决定流动性投放的总规模，但操作利率由市场投标决定。MLF是单一价位中标，即中标机构以相同的利率获得MLF资金。
在明明看来，多重价位中标这一机制的创新，一方面使得中标利率更能真实全面地反映市场资金需求及利率定价情况，预计买断式逆回购操作的综合利率或低于MLF利率，有助于进一步降低机构负债成本；另一方面，也表明央行更加强调利率市场化和发挥利率调控功能。
东方金诚首席宏观分析师王青认为，MLF采用单一价位中标会导致该利率仍带有一定的政策利率色彩。而在每次买断式逆回购操作过程中，通常不会只产生一个中标利率。这就会进一步淡化中标利率的政策利率色彩，突出其单纯的流动性管理工具作用。
此外，回购标的范围大则是该工具的另一特点。本次创设的买断式逆回购操作，其回购标的包括国债、地方政府债券、金融债券、公司信用类债券等，范围极大，尤其信用债未明确要求信用等级。
相比而言，MLF合格质押品包括国债、央行票据、政策性金融债、高等级信用债，以及2018年6月再次将不低于AA级的小微企业、绿色和“三农”金融债券，AA+、AA级公司信用类债券（优先接受涉及小微企业、绿色经济的债券），优质的小微企业贷款和绿色贷款新纳入MLF担保品范围。
明明表示，本次买断式逆回购的标的拓宽为基本全部利率债及信用债，有利于进一步提高各类债券的流动性，也更便于一级交易商参与买断式逆回购操作。
可缓解质押品冻结影响
目前，我国货币市场的主流模式是质押式回购。更多海外投资者进入我国债券市场后，他们更习惯国际上普遍采用的买断式回购。
从具体操作来看，一般而言，在质押式回购交易中，债券质押品被冻结在资金融入方账户，无法继续在二级市场流通，出现违约等极端情形不利于保障资金融出方权益。
而买断式逆回购则可以缓解质押品冻结对金融机构整体流动性监管指标的压力。
明明认为，买断式逆回购与质押式逆回购的核心区别在于抵押品或质押品的所有权与支配权。央行开展买断式逆回购后获得的标的，可以再通过现券卖断方式卖出或通过SFISF方式换出（限于国债、央行票据等高等级流动性资产），多项工具相互配合可以扩大操作空间，有利于更好地传达货币政策信号。
对此，光大银行金融市场部宏观研究员周茂华举例称：“比如，一级交易商和央行约定在3个月后的某个具体日期，以确定的价格买回国债（数量、品种、价格都是确定的）。由于是买断式逆回购，一级交易商的国债在央行账户中，央行可以在这3个月内进行处置或买卖交易，前提是在双方约定日期，央行要有足够数量、相同品种的债券进行返售给一级交易商。”
此外，与公开市场普通逆回购操作工具相比，本次央行启用公开市场买断式逆回购操作工具在操作期限等方面也有一定差异。
王青指出，普遍逆回购操作期限通常为7天，2020年以来最长期限为14天，主要是为平滑月末、季末和国庆春节假期带来的资金面短期波动，而公开市场买断式逆回购操作工具期限不超过1年。
一位市场权威专家表示，央行操作工具更多元，有望带动全市场买断式回购业务发展。央行推出买断式逆回购，既是自身操作工具的丰富，也可对市场发展买断式回购业务形成示范作用，缓解质押品冻结对金融机构整体流动性监管指标的压力，持续提升银行间市场的流动性、安全性和国际化水平。
对冲年底前MLF集中到期
根据Wind数据，今年11月、12月各有1.45万亿元MLF到期量，达到目前MLF余额的40%。再叠加政府债券发行、年末现金投放等，届时银行体系流动性可能面临较大补缺压力。
央行选择此时推出新工具，预计可更好对冲年底前MLF的集中到期。这也是央行为何采用买断式逆回购，而非将当前的质押式逆回购操作期限拉长的主要原因之一。
王青认为，该工具旨在对冲1年期MLF大额到期，因此操作时限要延长至1年之内；若采取拉长质押式回购期限方式，将导致金融机构用于质押的国债等高流动性资产较长期限内处于质押冻结状态，整体流动性监管指标承压，而买断式逆回购则有效解决了这个问题。
在光大证券分析师张旭看来，该工具刚好可以对冲政府债券密集发行的影响。财政从发债到支出的时滞明显长于7天、短于1年，与OMO（公开市场操作）和MLF的期限皆不匹配。倘若用OMO对冲，则会在时滞期内形成滚续压力；倘若用MLF对冲，则又需要顾及财政支出后流动性回收等问题。“显然，还是期限匹配的买断式逆回购更趁手。”
上述市场权威专家认为，此前，央行行长潘功胜在金融街论坛上表示，预计年底前视市场流动性情况择机进一步降准0.25~0.5个百分点。央行在此节点推出买断式逆回购操作，有利于更好对冲四季度MLF集中到期，更有能力维护年末流动性合理充裕，为经济稳定增长提供良好的货币金融环境。
完善流动性管理工具框架
在降准空间愈加逼仄、MLF政策利率色彩逐步淡化的背景下，拓宽中长期流动性投放渠道成为完善货币政策框架的基础内容之一。这也是此次央行创设买断式逆回购备受市场关注的主要原因。
梳理央行现有流动性投放工具，根据期限由短至长，主要包括7天期公开市场逆回购操作、1年期的中期借贷便利（MLF），以及投放长期流动性的国债买入和降准，1个月到1年的中短期流动性投放工具较为欠缺。
上述权威专家认为，此次央行在现有工具基础上推出买断式逆回购，预计将覆盖3个月、6个月等期限，增强1年以内的流动性跨期调节能力，进一步提升流动性管理的精细化水平。
王青判断，本次启用买断式逆回购操作工具，一方面可以有效平滑大额MLF到期引发的资金面波动，有助于保持年末流动性合理充裕，为经济增长动能回升提供有利的货币金融环境，另一方面或意味着11月和12月将不再大额续作MLF，MLF操作利率的政策利率色彩进一步淡化；考虑到央行已恢复二级市场国债买卖，后期MLF调节中期市场流动性的作用也会进一步淡化，MLF余额或将逐步减少。
明明认为，在MLF到期高峰来临之际，央行创设买断式逆回购工具，完善流动性管理工具框架，维持中长期流动性平稳。预计买断式逆回购将与国债买卖及SFISF等形成配合，完善央行货币政策操作框架，有利于进一步提高各类债券的流动性。
【论坛学习用｜针对“央行创设买断式逆回购新工具”的集中解读】
同志们，这条新闻不是“工具升级”的技术新闻，而是中国资本主义信用体系在持续经济危机中，被迫“改造输血方式”的信号。下面我就紧扣新闻本身，把它的真实动机、现实作用、阶级含义一条条讲清楚，尽量不用抽象话。
一、为什么央行要“新创一个工具”？一句话定性
不是原有工具不好用，而是原有信用结构已经“撑不住”了。
如果信用体系是健康的：
- 7 天逆回购够用
- MLF 够用
- 银行之间自己拆借就能转
现在偏偏不行，所以央行不得不：
拉长期限 + 放宽抵押物 + 直接兜底风险更大的资产。
这就是“买断式逆回购”出现的根本原因。
二、为什么“买断式逆回购”比原来那些工具更“狠”？
新闻里讲了很多技术差别，我给同志们翻成现实语言。
“买断式”是什么意思？——央行先把债接走
和过去质押式逆回购最大的不同在于：
- 质押式：
银行把债押给央行，但债还算“自己的”，只能冻着 - 买断式：
央行直接把债买到自己账上，过几个月再卖回去
这一步非常关键，意味着：
央行不只是“借钱”，而是“把资产风险先接过去”。
为什么这对地方银行、金融机构很重要？
因为很多地方银行、金融公司现在手里有什么？
- 地方债
- 城投债
- 信用等级不高的企业债
- 表面没违约、但靠续命活着的“准烂账”
这些资产有一个共同特点：
平时没人愿意接，市场一紧就卖不掉。
央行这次说得很清楚：
买断式逆回购的标的，几乎什么债都要。
这句话翻成人话就是：
你们手里这些不好动、没人接的债，先拿给我，我给你现金。
三、这正是你提醒要补讲的一点：央行在“接烂账”
这一点非常重要，而且新闻里其实已经写出来了，只是用的是“温和词”。
新闻里说的是：
- “回购标的范围极大”
- “尤其信用债未明确要求信用等级”
现实含义是：
央行开始系统性地接收风险更高、流动性更差的资产。
这不是第一次，但这次被制度化、工具化了。
为什么央行必须这么干？
因为现在很多地方银行的真实处境是：
-
资产账面值还在
-
但一到关键时点：
- 政府集中发债
- 年底 MLF 到期
- 春节取现
- 税期抽水
就会出现：
账上有一堆债，但就是拿不出现金周转。
如果央行不接这些资产，会发生什么？
- 银行被迫抛债
- 债价暴跌
- 信用链条断裂
- 小银行、地方金融机构先出事
所以央行现在做的是：
宁可自己把风险资产接过来，也不能让它在市场上炸。
四、为什么要“多重价位中标”？不是为了市场化，是为了摸底
新闻里有一句话说得很“学术”，但意思很直白：
“更真实反映机构对资金的需求程度。”
翻成人话就是：
央行要看清楚：谁最缺钱？缺到什么程度？
在危机时期：
- 真正缺钱的机构，会报更高利率
- 表面不缺的，会报低一些
这不是“市场化改革”，而是：
央行在给整个金融体系做“压力测试”。
五、为什么这和年底 MLF 集中到期、政府发债连在一起？
新闻这部分，其实直接暴露了危机的时间表。
现实情况是：
-
11、12 月：
大量 MLF 到期（1.45 万亿 × 2） -
同期：
- 政府债密集发行
- 年底财政结算
- 现金需求上升
如果还用老办法（短期逆回购）：
- 银行得一周一周滚
- 压力集中
- 一点风吹草动就可能出事
所以央行选了一个：
期限更贴合现实、还能接烂账的工具。
六、把这一切和“生产过剩—信用危机”连起来讲（不抽象）
同志们一定要明白：
央行不是突然想得更聪明了，而是被现实逼到这一步。
根子在哪？
- 商品卖不动
- 房地产崩
- 群众贫困、消费能力下降
- 企业利润不足
- 债务只能滚动
于是：
- 企业靠借钱活
- 地方靠发债活
- 银行靠央行活
这时信用体系的特点是：
一切看着在运转，但哪一环都经不起冲击。
央行创设买断式逆回购，解决的不是“发展问题”，而是：
“别让链条在关键节点断掉”。
七、这条新闻真正的政治经济学含义（给论坛用的总结）
同志们可以这样理解这件事：
央行创设买断式逆回购，不是金融创新，而是资本主义经济危机条件下，对信用体系进行“抢救式改造”。
它的核心作用有三点：
用国家信用，替代已经极不稳定的市场信用
这说明什么？
说明中国资本主义经济已经从“靠利润运转”，进入了“靠央行托底信用运转”的阶段。
八、一句压轴的话（非常重要）
当央行需要不断发明新工具，来接风险资产、托信用链条、平滑到期冲击时，说明问题不在工具，而在制度本身。
这是生产过剩、群众贫困、债务滚动共同作用下，信用危机不断深化的表现。
这才是这条新闻真正值得我们学习和警惕的地方。
After a detailed study, it turns out that the mid-term correction (中修) only began to implement the so-called buyout-style reverse repurchase (买断式逆回购) in October 2024. In other words, the mid-term correction will directly buy out the bad debts held by local banks and financial companies, and then distribute cash to them. Therefore, another significant purpose of this policy is to recover the大量的烂账 (bad debts) held by local entities and have the central bank absorb them. How the central bank absorbs these debts ultimately involves burdening the working people again, by increasing taxes and levies to recover the costs. Essentially, the mid-term correction is a means to alleviate the economic crisis by shifting the crisis onto the people—an extremely heinous act!
Is there any news or material about the increase in taxes and levies in the 中修 (Zhongxiu)? I want to see exactly what taxes have been added.
That’s a lot, such as the recent mandatory social security contributions, and the continuous increase in social security and medical insurance payment costs.
I just saw a news article today:
“Small restaurants’ days of ‘pretending to have low revenue’ are over,” the general content is that Zhongxiu (Zhongzhou Tax Authority) will require food delivery platforms to report data, strictly investigate tax evasion and tax leakage in the catering industry, and require various restaurants to pay back taxes. In the past, some shop owners would underreport their turnover to pay less tax, but according to the description in the news, this kind of operation space is now almost gone.
Veo otra noticia en la que expertos en reparación central afirman que en el futuro los paquetes de tarifas bajas podrían ser eliminados gradualmente. Una noticia menciona que la razón directa es que la nueva Ley del Impuesto al Valor Agregado para reparaciones centrales aumentó la “tasa impositiva legal de servicios de telecomunicaciones básicos” del 6% al 9%.
While discussing the issue of the credit crisis, this news appeared on Baidu’s hot search today:
2.2 million yuan in deposits mysteriously disappeared? Postal Savings Bank branch responds: Former employee privately transferred funds, unrelated to the bank
Sina Finance2026-02-03 13:08
Sina Finance official account
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Source: Financial FrontlineOn February 3rd, Financial Frontline reported that recently, media reports indicated that 11 depositors in Zhalantun City, Hulunbuir, Inner Mongolia, found that their total deposits of over 2.2 million yuan at the Postal Savings Bank Zhalantun branch had “disappeared,” with the involved funds pointing to the former lobby manager Meng Mouzhi of the bank.
In response to this matter, Financial Frontline consulted the above branch, and staff stated: “This was a private transaction by (Meng Mouzhi), a personal act, unrelated to the bank, and the bank has already won the lawsuit.”
Related news: Over 2.2 million yuan vanished! Former Postal Savings Bank employee transferred and squandered deposits of 11 depositors, sentenced to 12 years
Zhongxiu is shameless. Clearly, the bank is facing a credit crisis and cannot provide money to depositors, yet it restricts depositors everywhere. Now they are shifting the blame onto the employees. Zhongxiu just wants people to think that the bank can’t provide money because of employees’ actions.
How does the process of bank credit bankruptcy occur?
What happens if a bank’s credit fails, will all the money that working people have in the bank be directly inaccessible? But isn’t it possible for banks to keep cash circulating only within their accounts through mobile payments? Moreover, mobile payments are quite widespread in China now. After a bank’s credit bankruptcy, will all mobile payments also come to a halt and go bankrupt?
【Explanation for Comrade jqr｜Clarifying from the fundamental chain of “loan capital—functional capital—economic crisis”】
Comrade jqr’s question is very critical,
It is essential not to interpret “credit problems” as a technical or trust issue of banks themselves, but to return to the fundamental contradictions of capitalism.
Next, I will strictly follow the logic of Marxist political economy to explain it to you again.
1. First, clarify the most fundamental relationship (this is the starting point)
You are completely correct:
Credit is the movement form of loan capital;
The interest of loan capital ultimately can only come from the surplus value created by functional capital.
Therefore, it is crucial to grasp this point:
As long as functional capital cannot smoothly realize surplus value, the movement of loan capital will inevitably encounter problems, and credit will inevitably face crises.
Bank credit is not an “independent system,”
but a derivative form parasitic on the capitalist production process.
2. What is the fundamental reason for the “bankruptcy” of bank credit? It is not the bank, but production
Let’s proceed step by step.
Under normal circumstances, how does loan capital “live”?
In the “cyclical” nature of capitalism:
- Banks lend money to enterprises (functional capital)
- Enterprises organize production with the money
- Exploit labor to create surplus value
- Enterprises take part of the surplus value and pay interest to banks
- Bank credit is thus realized
In other words:
The real basis of bank credit is the continuous and smooth extraction of surplus value by functional capital.
What happens when the inherent contradictions of capitalism develop into an economic crisis?
An economic crisis is not “accidental,” but the explosion of the inherent contradictions of capitalism:
- Socialized production
- Private ownership of the means of production
In reality, it manifests as:
- Large-scale commodity production
- Suppressed purchasing power of the masses
- Overproduction
Thus, the following occur:
- Commodities cannot be sold
- Capital value cannot be realized
- Surplus value cannot be converted into money
Pay special attention to this point:
Surplus value is not “not produced,”
but produced but cannot be realized.
3. How does the economic crisis gradually transmit to “bank credit”?
This is the process you are truly concerned about.
Step 1: Functional capital cannot realize “value”
- Enterprises produce commodities
- But cannot sell or sell at a lower price
- Cash inflow is interrupted
As a result:
Enterprises have assets on the books, but no cash in hand.
Step 2: Functional capital begins to delay repayment to loan capital
What will enterprises do at this point?
- Fail to repay loans upon maturity
- Request extension or refinancing
- Roll over debt
In other words:
Interest is no longer paid from newly created surplus value, but maintained through debt rollover.
At this point, loan capital begins to “virtualize.”
Step 3: The “interest rights” of loan capital begin to lose their realistic basis
From a Marxist perspective, this is the true starting point of the credit crisis:
- The interest rights still exist legally
- But their real basis—the proliferation capacity of functional capital—has shaken
Thus:
Credit relations begin to turn into a set of “formally existing, substantively hollow” relations.
4. What does “bank credit bankruptcy” really mean? It’s not a technical collapse, but a relationship collapse
Now we can answer your core question.
The essence of “bank credit bankruptcy” is:
Loan capital discovers that it can no longer realize interest through the normal movement of functional capital.
Then, three things will happen:
Loan capital begins to contract, panic, and defend
Banks do not suddenly “fail,” but respond rationally:
- No longer dare to lend casually
- No longer dare to interbank lend
- Try to hold cash
This is because:
Continuing to lend out no longer corresponds to real surplus value production.
Credit shifts from “expansion form” to “risk form”
During prosperity, credit is:
“I believe you can make money in the future.”
During a crisis, credit becomes:
“I worry you won’t make any money at all.”
At this point:
- Credit interest rates rise
- Conditions become stricter
- Or simply refuse to lend
This is not a moral issue, but the law of value at work.
The “bank credit” bankruptcy first manifests as functional failure
Note, very importantly:
Credit bankruptcy does not mean “money disappears instantly,”
but that credit relations no longer operate smoothly.
Specific manifestations include:
- Withdrawal, transfer, and lending restrictions
- Liquidity tension
- Partial bank runs
- State intervention
5. The key issues jqr cares about now: Will money be unwithdrawable? What about mobile payments?
Now, we use correct theoretical basis to answer these “practical problems.”
Why might money “not be withdrawable”? It’s not because banks have no money, but because there is no surplus value support
The reason why bank liabilities (deposits) are “convertible” is based on:
The bank’s assets (loans) can ultimately be transformed into money through the proliferation of functional capital.
When functional capital generally cannot realize surplus value:
- Assets turn into “formal assets”
- Banks must limit cash withdrawals
Therefore:
Limiting withdrawals and transfers is essentially a defensive contraction of credit relations.
Why can’t mobile payments save credit bankruptcy?
Your intuition is actually very common, but the problem is:
Mobile payments are just a “technological shell” of loan capital movement,
and do not create any new surplus value.
If:
- Functional capital cannot proliferate
- Loan capital cannot realize interest
Then regardless of:
- Cash
- Accounts
- Digital payments
The fact of credit relation bankruptcy cannot be changed.
6. Why does the central bank keep “injecting blood”? It’s not about saving banks, but supporting the loan capital system
Now, returning to the policies we discussed earlier.
The core of the central bank’s actions is:
Using national credit to temporarily replace the private loan capital credit that has lost its real basis.
In other words:
- The interest that should be paid by functional capital
- Is now underwritten by the state credit
This is not a solution to the crisis, but:
Shifting the crisis from “relations among capital” to “society as a whole bearing it.”
7. Finally, a summary for jqr (very important)
It can be understood as:
Bank credit bankruptcy is not due to banks suddenly malfunctioning,
but a necessary result of the economic crisis in capitalism,
where functional capital cannot realize surplus value,
and loan capital loses its source of interest.
Therefore:
- The problem is not “cash or mobile payments”
- Not about “advanced or not technology”
- But about the very mode of production of capitalism
As long as:
Overproduction + mass poverty + inability to realize surplus value
Then:
Credit crisis is inevitable and unavoidable.