The introduction to the famous scholars can refer to Chapter 2, Section 6 of “Concise History of Chinese Philosophy.”
In “Zhuangzi · Miscellaneous Chapters · All Under Heaven,” Zhuang Zhou discussed twenty-one propositions of the famous scholars of that time. These propositions seem to violate common sense in daily life, but if one attempts to understand them using dialectical thinking, one can appreciate the naive dialectical ideas of the scholars. Below are speculative explanations of these twenty-one propositions.
The following are speculations on the dialectical viewpoints of the famous scholars, for reference.
(1) Eggs have hair. This means that oviparous animals can grow hair after birth (like chicks), indicating that the factors for hair growth are already contained within the egg when the animal is still inside.
(2) The three-legged chicken. A chicken has only two legs, but the concept of “chicken legs” is not identical to the physical chicken legs; the two physical legs plus the spiritual concept of “chicken legs” together form three legs.
(3) Ying has the world. “Ying” was the capital of the Chu state at that time. The world, i.e., the universe, is infinitely large; Ying is just a part of the world. The relationship between part and whole is interdependent and transformative. Although Ying is a limited part, without it, the world would be incomplete. Therefore, Ying contains elements of the infinite world, and it is correct to say that Ying contains the world because it is itself a part of the whole.
(4) Dogs can become sheep. This explores the relationship between concepts and the actual material reflection. People call a sheep “sheep,” but if the name “sheep” is assigned to a dog (e.g., naming a dog “sheep”), then although the dog remains a dog physically, the reflected concept is not “dog” but “sheep.” Thus, the first refers to the material dog, and the second refers to the conceptual sheep, illustrating that concepts reflect material reality and that the content of concepts can change.
(5) Horses have eggs. The scholars, based on naive dialectics, astutely guessed that all living beings share a common ancestor. Since horses are viviparous animals, like oviparous animals, they are of the same nature and can transform into each other. Therefore, viviparity and oviparity can mutually transform, and in a certain sense, horses can be said to be oviparous. Perhaps they observed horse embryos and inferred the relationship between viviparity and oviparity. Scientifically, this is partly correct because viviparity develops from oviparity, inheriting positive factors from eggs (such as embryos and membranes).
(6) Toads have tails. Toads are considered to have evolved from tailed tadpoles, so internally, toads must contain factors that initially gave them tails, and the tadpoles they produce also have tails. Although scholars could not understand genetics at the time, such speculation is dialectical and contains some correct elements.
(7) Fire is not hot. Here, “fire” refers to the concept of fire; physical fire is naturally hot, but the concept of fire is a mental construct that does not possess physical attributes like heat, so it is naturally not hot.
(8) Mountain entrances. This does not refer to the literal mountain pass but is a conclusion made by people. Scholars believe that the passages through mountains are not actual openings in the mountains but are defined for convenience. The mountain itself does not have true openings at the mountain pass; real mountain entrances are volcanic craters, fissures, caves, etc. This also explores the relationship between concept and material.
(9) Wheels do not always touch the ground. Although wheels roll over the ground, at any given point on the wheel, it is not always in contact with the ground. When it does contact, it includes the factors that make it leave the ground; otherwise, the same point would always be in contact, and the wheel could not turn. This criticizes metaphysics that claims wheels are always in contact with the ground and thus do not change, emphasizing the absoluteness of motion.
(10) Eyes cannot see. This means that the eye organ itself does not have the ability to see; in darkness or sleep, people are “blind with eyes.” It shows that it is not the eyes that see but the “spirit” or attention that perceives. Modern science confirms that visual information is processed by the brain; only the brain can interpret these signals. Even blind people with damaged eyes can “see” if their brains process visual information normally. This is a brilliant guess by the scholars.
(11) The pointer does not reach, and the end is not absolute. “Pointer” refers to contact; “end not absolute” means knowledge has no end. It implies that phenomena are not equivalent to the essence of things (e.g., the blind man touching an elephant), and human understanding is infinite (e.g., understanding of material structures). It distinguishes between phenomena and essence, acknowledging the infinite nature of human cognition—a dialectical viewpoint.
(12) Turtles are longer than snakes. Turtles and snakes are different animals; generally, snakes are longer than turtles. But if comparing the largest turtle with the shortest snake, the turtle is longer. Paleontological evidence confirms the existence of ancient giant turtles, which were much longer than snakes. This is one of the scholars’ early brilliant guesses, thousands of years ahead of modern paleontology. It explores the relationship between general and particular, showing that under special conditions, contradictions can shift and transform; turtles can be longer than snakes.
(13) A square cannot be a circle. “Square” refers to a ruler, “circle” to a compass. The idea is that straight and curved are mutually convertible; a ruler cannot produce a perfect square but only an approximation using countless tiny curves, and a compass cannot produce a perfect circle but only an approximation using countless tiny straight lines. In higher mathematics, calculus proves this: differentiation breaks curves into straight segments, and integration constructs curves from straight lines.
(14) A chisel cannot fit into a mortise. “Chisel” refers to the tenon and mortise joint, which can be seen as a hole; “mortise” is the tenon. Generally, people think that when a nail is hammered into a hole, it is surrounded by the hole; but scholars believe that no matter how tight, there will always be gaps between the nail and the hole, so the hole cannot fully enclose the nail. This indicates that the unity (connection) of contradictory sides is relative; the nail can be firmly inserted, but fundamentally, there are differences, and gaps still exist. The nail and hole are not completely one; there is no contradiction but differences and struggle.
(15) The shadow of a flying bird never moves. This means that the shadow cast by a flying bird does not move. Scholars say the shadow is produced by sunlight illuminating the bird; the bird is flying, but the shadow merely reflects the bird and has no ability to move independently. Its movement depends on the bird’s movement, so to the bird, the shadow is naturally stationary. This presents the dialectical idea that objects have both absolute motion and relative stillness.
(16) The speed of an arrow in flight, yet sometimes it does not move or stop. “The speed of an arrow” refers to a flying arrow, which is both moving and stationary. The reason is that without motion, the arrow would not change position in space; without rest, the arrow would lack a space for existence. The change in space itself loses its basis. This opposes Zeno’s metaphysical view, representing dialectical thought.
(17) A dog is not a “dog.” Similar to “dogs can become sheep,” if the concept describing a dog is replaced with another noun, then the dog is no longer “dog.” The first refers to the material dog; the second to the conceptual “dog.”
(18) The yellow horse, Lih cattle, and three. Similar to “three-legged chicken,” the material cattle and horse are two animals, but adding the concept “yellow horse, Lih cattle” makes three.
(19) White dog, black. Also explores the relationship between material and concept; the first is the material white dog, and the second is the conceptual “black.”
(20) A foal without a mother. This discusses change; a foal without a mother exists before it is born, but only after it loses its mother can it be called a “lonely foal.” The condition for being a “lonely foal” is precisely to have no mother! This refutes the metaphysical doctrine of unchangingness, illustrating that properties can change, and different properties imply different things.
(21) A one-foot staff, taken in halves daily, will never run out. This means that a one-foot-long staff, if halved daily, will always be inexhaustible, hinting at the infinite divisibility of matter.
