WeiQiao Group is a giant conglomerate engaged in textiles, aluminum, and thermal power businesses. Due to the enormous energy consumption of its various departments, it has been independently building power plants since the 1990s. After being required to de-list from the national grid system for safety reasons (meaning its factories’ power supply and self-owned power plants are not connected to the state grid but operate independently), it has long operated self-sufficiently. Therefore, it does not need to pay grid connection fees or contribute to various funds under different titles. Additionally, since it uses a thermal power plant, it produces high-temperature steam alongside electricity, which can supply its textile departments that require steam and also serve its high-energy-consuming electrolytic aluminum department (which requires 13,500 to 20,000 kWh of electricity per ton of aluminum). As a result, the entire enterprise’s production costs are very low compared to other companies, especially since its electricity costs have long been below two-thirds of those of other industry peers. According to a report by Dagong Global Credit Rating, “WeiQiao Group’s self-generated electricity costs from 2013 to 2015 were 0.29 yuan/kWh, 0.21 yuan/kWh, and 0.18 yuan/kWh respectively, and from January to March 2016, the self-generation cost was only 0.17 yuan/kWh,” while typical large electricity consumers pay over 3.5 yuan/kWh. This indicates that WeiQiao’s aluminum production can reduce costs by over 1,500 yuan per ton compared to peers, enabling it to earn extremely high excess profits. Taking advantage of its exemption from paying “electricity grid taxes,” WeiQiao has begun expanding its power business to earn monopoly profits. It is reported that its self-use ratio is about 34.76%, with the remaining electricity sold externally at 0.6 yuan per kWh—still cheaper than the national grid by 0.2 yuan—gaining a significant advantage. Therefore, the company’s profit margin is markedly higher than that of similar enterprises. For example, in 2016, WeiQiao Group’s aluminum division, Hongqiao Aluminum, achieved an annual profit of 7.2 billion yuan, while the state-owned aluminum companies larger than WeiQiao only earned about 1.9 billion yuan, nearly three times less.
As a private monopoly capital, WeiQiao is in an absolute struggle against the bureaucratic monopoly bourgeoisie represented by China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC). The struggle among monopoly capitalists is particularly destructive because both sides possess formidable strength. The State Grid Corporation of China (another smaller state-owned enterprise in the south) that has achieved absolute dominance in the power industry cannot tolerate the existence of this enterprise involved in power business, continuously attacking WeiQiao. In 2009, when WeiQiao attempted to supply power to Lizhuang in Huimin County, Shandong, the State Grid dispatched personnel to initiate large-scale armed conflict. Ultimately, in 2012, an agreement was reached requiring WeiQiao to sell its surplus electricity only to local merchants, with the rest integrated into the national grid and sold at the standard grid price. The on-grid electricity price for thermal power is about 0.3-0.4 yuan/kWh, far below WeiQiao’s external sales price. This agreement is essentially a loose pact dividing spheres of influence among monopolistic capitalists. Because China State Grid’s capital is enormous and backed by state power, it holds a dominant position, effectively depriving WeiQiao of profits from its power business unilaterally. Nonetheless, even so, CSCEC did not rest and sought to further control all electricity sales nationwide. In November 2015, CSCEC issued the “Guiding Opinions on Strengthening and Regulating Supervision and Management of Self-Provided Coal-Fired Power Plants,” requiring “enterprise self-owned power plants to bear and fully pay the government-established funds such as the Major Water Conservancy Projects Construction Fund, Rural Power Grid Repayment Fund, Renewable Energy Development Fund, Large and Medium Reservoir Resettlement Post-Construction Support Fund, and Urban Public Utilities Surcharge, among others, in accordance with laws and policies, and local governments are not allowed to arbitrarily reduce or selectively levy these.” Subsequently, a series of documents under the guise of “regulation” and “social responsibility” were issued, effectively demanding that enterprises like WeiQiao still pay various “electricity taxes” on their self-use electricity. WeiQiao strongly opposed and refused to pay these taxes in full.
Then, CSCEC invoked the “environmental protection” banner. In May 2018, it announced the “Shandong Province Implementation Plan for Feedback Rectification of the Central Environmental Protection Inspection Team,” claiming that 45 thermal power units with a total installed capacity of 16,895 MW were built illegally without environmental inspections, leading to the forced suspension of four units and the shutdown of eight, effectively curbing its power generation development. Later, CSCEC introduced more so-called “environmental protection policies.” In 2024, it officially implemented the “Interim Regulations on Carbon Emission Rights Trading,” imposing a “emission fee” of over 50 yuan per ton of excess CO₂. WeiQiao’s thermal power is a major source of carbon emissions, emitting about 1 kilogram of CO₂ per kWh, thus increasing costs by 0.05 yuan/kWh. In June this year, the Shandong government issued the “Notice on Printing and Distributing Policies to Strengthen and Stabilize the Economy and Promote High-Quality Development,” explicitly requiring WeiQiao to connect to the grid. In July, CSCEC issued the “Responsibility Weight for Renewable Energy Power Consumption,” mandating that electrolytic aluminum enterprises in Shandong must use 26.2% green electricity (from renewable sources) in their power consumption. Due to environmental constraints on renewable energy generation, the installed capacity of renewable energy must be more than twice the actual energy consumption share. Although WeiQiao has been increasing its renewable energy capacity in recent years, exceeding one-third, it still cannot meet CSCEC’s mandatory requirements. Consequently, on October 15, WeiQiao had to negotiate with CSCEC and agree to fully connect to the grid.
This incident exemplifies how CSCEC’s bureaucratic monopoly bourgeoisie suppresses private monopoly bourgeoisie. CSCEC’s close ties with state power give it far more means to suppress private capitalists’ development. Moreover, as a revisionist government, CSCEC often uses lofty phrases like “social responsibility” and “environmental protection” to justify its actions, disguising theft as righteousness. Under the guise of social responsibility, CSCEC demands power companies to pay various funds, which seem to be for “serving the people” or “developing environmentally friendly renewable energy.” In reality, these are malicious tactics to increase competitors’ costs and squeeze their markets. Once, these private capitalists had close ties with CSCEC. When CSCEC re-established capitalism, it allowed private capitalists to speculate, subcontract factories, and engage in core industries unrelated directly to state power, exploiting in the most brutal ways. WeiQiao’s founder, Zhang Shiping, built his wealth this way. He contracted textile factories, expanded rapidly, and even acquired the largest local state-owned textile factory, drastically lowering workers’ wages. He became the “Asian Cotton King,” praised by CSCEC as the “King of the Red Sea,” an “excellent and modest entrepreneur,” with only pickled radishes and peanuts as snacks. However, the collusion among capitalists is relative, and competition is absolute. As China fully imperializes, these private monopolists gradually become obstacles to the bureaucratic monopoly bourgeoisie, which consolidates market control. CSCEC then began using various means to suppress them. To this day, it has completely monopolized WeiQiao’s power business through monopoly sales.
Certainly, WeiQiao was pressured and ultimately compromised. But as a monopoly enterprise, it was not seriously harmed and is not a pitiable victim. WeiQiao still maintains a close relationship with CSCEC, receiving power at a low price of 0.35 yuan/kWh. WeiQiao also plans to relocate capacity to water-rich Yunnan, using cheaper hydropower to reduce costs, and is seeking to develop into renewable energy sectors for higher profits. After fierce competition, WeiQiao and the State Grid reached a compromise, with the latter maintaining its monopoly, and now they jointly exploit labor under this new basis.
The only ones truly harmed in this struggle are the working people. The “electricity tax” levied on WeiQiao by CSCEC is ultimately passed on to workers. Local residents can only use the high-priced power supplied by the national grid. CSCEC claims these taxes will be “used for the people,” but examining the projects shows otherwise: rural grid repayment funds (2 cents), Three Gorges Project construction fund (0.7 cents), urban utilities surcharge (1 cent), reservoir resettlement support funds (0.88 cents), renewable energy surcharge (0.1 to 0.4 cents), and so on. These funds are all products of CSCEC’s Keynesian policies. Building these infrastructures ultimately aims to reduce the costs for capitalists using electricity as a means of production, facilitate capital investment, and expand the market for the bourgeoisie—“for the people.” But which people? Only the bourgeoisie. These projects are used to generate surplus products for infrastructure capitalists and to siphon off part of the funds as bureaucratic bribes. The government loans these funds with interest, and all costs are lumped into “repayment funds,” borne by the working people—moreover, these forcibly collected funds are often further siphoned off as profit. The so-called “renewable energy electricity surcharge” is a tax designed to support the renewable energy bourgeoisie. Only the “reservoir resettlement support funds” in name are supposedly for the people, but after layers of deductions, what remains is negligible.
