On October 12th, intense border clashes erupted between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan claimed to have killed 58 Pakistani soldiers, occupied 25 military outposts, and injured 30 soldiers. Pakistan claimed to have killed over 200 Taliban fighters and occupied 19 outposts. Pakistan stated that such conflicts erupted because the Afghan Taliban repeatedly sheltered the “Pakistan Taliban” and carried out terrorist attacks against Pakistan. In fact, on October 9th, Pakistan conducted an airstrike on Kabul, ostensibly to eliminate the leaders of the “Pakistan Taliban.” However, both countries are more or less close to China, with Pakistan’s political, economic, and military ties to China being particularly deep. As for the Afghan Taliban, China was the first to send a diplomatic envoy, and later signed many economic agreements. Especially since China aims to bring Afghanistan into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor。8月21日，王毅前往喀布尔，提出要正式将阿富汗纳入“一带一路”战略，并计划在今年开展矿业投资。
It actually feels quite strange. China has built so much infrastructure and ports in Pakistan and provided so many loans; it should have controlled Pakistan a long time ago, but it still manages to maintain good relations on all sides.
I don’t really understand either, but it seems that Pakistan has always been somewhat wavering, having interactions with both the American and Russian empires. Or rather, imperialism is still competing within Pakistan, and the Chinese revisionists (中修) cannot fully control Pakistan.
First of all, the premise that “both are colonies belonging to the same colonial power” does not necessarily hold. It is doubtful whether China’s economic investment in Pakistan is sufficient to achieve control over Pakistan; more evidence can be found to prove this point. As for investment in Afghanistan, it is even less. Afghanistan’s economy is highly closed off; it was greatly reduced when the Taliban first came to power and has only recovered in recent years. Compared to some Southeast Asian countries, China’s investment in Afghanistan may be dozens of times less. China does not have the capability to mediate; a few months ago, the Taliban and Iran even had a border conflict, and China basically did not dare to intervene. Pakistan itself is also wavering between China and the United States. After a recent military conflict with India, although Chinese nationalists claimed that Chinese-made weapons performed brilliantly in the conflict, Pakistan first thanked Trump for his “mediation efforts” after the war and is preparing to buy more F-16s.
Secondly, the main issue lies in internal contradictions. The one who initiated the conflict this time is Pakistan. Pakistan’s internal contradictions are very sharp; the military dominates, and formal democracy is nominal. A few years ago, the democratically elected president Imran Khan was arrested and imprisoned following a conflict with the military. The people are very dissatisfied with Pakistan being ruled alternately by several major families for a long time, with the military also eyeing power, and have been protesting. Moreover, ethnic conflicts within Pakistan are also intense; the coastal region of Balochistan has long sought independence. Under these circumstances, the Pakistani military has always wanted to initiate external conflicts to divert attention. Compared to this, whether China is satisfied or not is a very secondary issue. After all, China has no solution to Pakistan’s internal contradictions; it has no military bases there, and economic investment cannot achieve control over Pakistan, so it can only watch helplessly.
I remember someone analyzed Pakistan’s situation before; the so-called “Pakistan Army” (巴铁) is not really that strong. Pakistan is still a semi-colonial country that swings between the two imperialist groups of China and the United States. I checked, and Pakistan’s main trading partner in exports is still the United States.
Based on news from a year ago and data from two years ago, Pakistan owes China $26.6 billion due to the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and other facilities, which is higher than any other country, with a loan interest rate of about 3.7%. Many projects are either abandoned or barely profitable, such as the Gwadar Port, which has almost no ships docking. Moreover, China Railway holds a significant stake, and this debt cannot be repaid through these projects. However, China Railway does not seem to directly use this debt to pressure Pakistan; instead, it often engages in debt restructuring to extend repayment deadlines.
