As the title suggests, a discussion with a comrade currently engaged in physical labor in Japan about the recent Japanese House of Councillors election.
Like many countries around the world with bourgeois democratic forms, Japan’s parliament is also bicameral, consisting of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. The members of the House of Councillors are also elected by universal suffrage, with a term of six years, and half of the members are re-elected every three years. According to the relevant provisions of the Japanese Constitution, the status of the House of Representatives is clearly above that of the House of Councillors. If the two chambers vote differently, for example on passing budgets, treaties, or the appointment of the Prime Minister, the result of the House of Representatives prevails. The House of Councillors only has a certain balancing role; after the House of Representatives passes a resolution, if the House of Councillors does not pass the same resolution within 60 days, it is considered a veto, but the House of Representatives can still pass the resolution with a two-thirds majority. The House of Representatives can pass a vote of no confidence in the cabinet, which leads to the dissolution of the House and the resignation of the cabinet. The House of Councillors does not have this power.
However, since the members of the House of Councillors are elected by universal suffrage, the election also somewhat reflects the domestic economic situation in Japan and allows for a rough judgment of the future policy shifts of Japan’s monopolistic bourgeoisie. In this election, the ruling coalition composed of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito suffered a heavy defeat, losing its majority in the House of Councillors. Since Japan established its current political system in 1955 with the founding of the LDP, the ruling coalition has rarely lost its majority in the House of Councillors. Meanwhile, the far-right Japan Innovation Party and the centrist bourgeois Democratic Party of Japan significantly increased their seats. Here is a brief overview of Japan’s main political factions, which may not be very accurate or deep due to limited prior knowledge.
Main right-wing bourgeois parties:
- Liberal Democratic Party (LDP): The longest-standing and most powerful bourgeois conservative party in Japan post-WWII. It was established during a period of heightened class struggle after WWII, supported by U.S. imperialism and Japan’s domestic monopolist bourgeoisie, and has governed Japan for a long time. Its policies generally reflect the consensus of Japan’s monopolist bourgeoisie, including demands for constitutional revision, especially regarding the “right to self-defense,” and re-militarization of the economy. Economically, it favors tax cuts for monopolist capitalists; diplomatically, it relies on U.S. imperialism. Due to the electoral system of the House of Councillors, which does not rely solely on population, rural areas with fewer people but support from wealthy farmers can maintain a long-term majority.
- The LDP suffered a major defeat in this election, losing 19 seats out of 124, and thus lost its simple majority in the House of Councillors.
- Komeito: A bourgeois right-wing party that has long depended on the LDP, with policies similar to the LDP, so no further discussion.
- Japan Innovation Party & Japan Conservative Party: Bourgeois fascist parties, very new, with influence rising sharply after Japan’s long economic depression. Their leaders are mostly fascist advocates, some split from the far right within the LDP. They are monopolist bourgeoisie or support from small and medium bourgeoisie, very reactionary economically. Their policies are aligned with those of the U.S. Republican Party under Trump, France’s National Rally, Germany’s Alternative for Germany, and the UK’s Reform Party—advocating rapid militarization, revision of history, denial of the Nanjing Massacre and invasion of China and Korea, promoting “Japan First,” and demanding severe restrictions on foreign workers and immigrants, reducing welfare, and fostering anti-Chinese and anti-Korean sentiments. Currently, mainly bankrupt petty-bourgeoisie, incited by monopolist bourgeoisie, blame foreigners for their unemployment and bankruptcy, voting for these fascist parties. They gained 14 seats in this election.
- Japan Innovation Party: A national party mainly active in the Kansai region, especially Osaka, with policies similar to the LDP. No significant change in this election, holding 19 of 248 seats.
Moderate bourgeois reformist parties:
- Constitutional Democratic Party & Democratic Party of Japan: The largest opposition party and a splinter from the former, respectively. They advocate “constitutional protection,” oppose constitutional amendments regarding self-defense, and promote bourgeois pacifism. They implement minor bourgeois reform measures like reducing consumption tax, some gender equality initiatives, modest wage increases, and welfare improvements. When Noda Yoshihiko, the former Prime Minister and current leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party, was in power about ten years ago, he largely failed to implement these reforms, leading to public disapproval. Currently, the Constitutional Democratic Party holds 38 seats, unchanged; the Democratic Party of Japan has 22 seats, an increase of 13, making it the bourgeois party with the most seat gains besides the Japan Innovation Party.
“Left” three parties:
- Japanese Communist Party & Social Democratic Party: The JCP is an old revisionist party, and the SDP, formed from the Japan Socialist Party, is also old revisionist. Over recent decades, they no longer advocate “socialism through parliamentary struggle” and have degenerated into bourgeois reformist parties. They only sound more radical verbally, calling for the abolition of U.S. military bases, stopping nuclear wastewater discharge, revising Japan-U.S. security treaties, and advocating for more democratic rights, LGBT legalization, and better working conditions, betraying the proletariat and losing influence in Japan’s political life.
- The Japanese Communist Party suffered a heavy defeat, dropping from 11 to 7 seats; the Social Democratic Party barely maintained its 2 seats.
- Reiwa Shinsengumi: A recent bourgeois reformist party with policies similar to the two above, holding 6 seats.
Summary of some discussion points:
A: The House of Councillors election is over. The ruling coalition lost its majority in both chambers, but not by much. The so-called Japan Innovation Party did not win big; many new seats went to the bourgeois centrist Democratic Party of Japan. Overall, the change seems minimal. The LDP lost four seats; the Social Democratic Party has only two seats, unchanged.
The SDP originally had two seats, almost losing one, with a vote share just below 2%. Japan’s situation is similar to Germany, with nearly ten bourgeois parties in parliament, none dominating clearly, but the right wing is more prominent. This may be due to sharper internal divisions within the bourgeoisie and more intense class struggle.
B: Maybe Japan’s imperialist ambitions are revving up again? I remember Japan’s colonies were mainly in Southeast Asia, but now China is gradually encroaching. The far-right parties are promoting foreign threat theories, abolishing Article 9, and strengthening male dominance.
A: Policies before and after the election probably won’t differ much. The Constitutional Democratic Party is center-left, the Democratic Party is centrist, and the Japan Innovation Party only has 14 seats. The main gains are from centrist, center-left, and center-right opposition parties advocating for constitutional preservation and peaceful diplomacy. The LDP is a right-wing party; if the Japan Innovation Party had influence, it would be through monopolist bourgeoisie figures like Sano Satoshi. Japan probably won’t start a war; its food self-sufficiency is below 30%, and it is deeply integrated into the capitalist world economy, with weak military power, making war unlikely.
B: Looks like not much has changed, and the policies of the “center” parties are quite similar.
A: It seems so. Based on the two-chamber election results, Japan probably won’t see major policy shifts in the next few years. It might even be that the Democratic Party will eventually govern.
B: No real difference, just some lies. Looking at the policies of the Constitutional Democratic Party, they seem to follow a “populist” route, appealing to workers with promises to raise wages and stop harassment; to small capitalists with promises of revitalization funds; to local governments outside Tokyo with promises to change Tokyo’s polarization; and to rural industries with vague promises of revitalization. The Democratic Party’s policies are similar.
A: Typical bourgeois “center-left” reformism, deceiving with social reforms. The leader, Noda Yoshihiko, has a bad reputation, which keeps support low. The Democratic Party’s policies are similar, trying to attract those still hoping for reform amid the economic crisis.
B: Indeed, the worsening economic situation under the ruling class is reflected in politics, but the support for the bourgeois “center” parties is also related to the bankruptcy of small bourgeoisie.
A: That party mainly pulled some votes from right-wing supporters of the LDP, especially bankrupt petty bourgeoisie, who, incited by the monopolist bourgeoisie, blame foreigners for their decline.
B: Where did you see the vote splitting?
A: Just look at the seat changes. This time, the ruling coalition suffered a major defeat; the LDP and Komeito lost many seats, while the main gains went to the bourgeois reformist Democratic Party and the fascist-promoting Japan Innovation Party. Other minor parties saw little change. It’s mainly former LDP supporters switching.
B: It seems the Japan Innovation Party mainly promotes nationalism and the idea of waging war to oppress other nations and elevate Japan’s status. The ruling coalition’s defeat could also be seen as a form of division. Recently, Japan has made some reform moves, like abolishing the cooling-off period for women’s remarriage (marrying within 100 days of divorce to determine paternity), and some harassment measures, like allowing victims of sexual harassment to sue.
A: It’s clear that under economic crisis, petty bourgeoisie who once voted for the LDP or abstained are now divided; some still hope for social reforms from “center-left” parties, while others, incited by monopolist bourgeoisie and fascists, support fascism and vote for the Japan Innovation Party.
A: I think this election won’t significantly change Japan’s future policies because the policies of Japan’s monopolist bourgeoisie are basically fixed. They won’t seriously suppress foreigners (who are essential for consumption, work, and investment), and Japan’s economy is deeply integrated into the capitalist world, making independent war plans unlikely (it can’t even fully control its own resources). No party coming to power will fundamentally alter the policies of the monopolist bourgeoisie; the core is “whoever is elected, there will be no real change.” The main thing is the “temperature” of Japanese society.
B: We can strengthen repression of foreigners in Japan, especially workers. Recently, some laws targeting foreign crime have been enacted; I haven’t looked into details, but some are minor, like banning foreigners from exchanging driver’s licenses, and establishing a “Foreigners’ Orderly Coexistence Society” to address foreigner misconduct and crimes.
A: True, but I don’t think there will be major changes. Blaming foreigners for worsening life is mainly a petty bourgeois tactic, which is a minority. Given the current situation, even if the Democratic Party comes to power, policies probably won’t change much; they might even favor foreigners more (expanding exploitation of foreign workers). I feel that any policy changes regarding foreign labor will be minor.
B: Hard to say, the core of exploitation probably won’t change. For now, there won’t be big changes. Also, Japan’s various democratic movements still have some effect; despite the rise of nationalism and militarism, they haven’t led to rapid fascism.
C: I used to think over a quarter of manufacturing workers were foreigners, but I was wrong. According to this chart, 26% of foreign workers are in manufacturing, roughly 3% overall. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare’s 2025 data shows that as of October 2024, foreign workers increased by 12.4% year-on-year to about 2.3 million, a record high. In 2023, Japan’s total labor force (all aged 15 and over engaged in economic activities per ILO definitions) was about 69.34 million. But it should be higher, as the actual number of workers is probably over 70 million. The labor force in 2024 hit a record 69.57 million, close to 70 million. It includes those willing to work over age 15, including the unemployed seeking jobs.
A: A quarter is too many; if that’s true, there will be Chinese and Indonesians everywhere.
C: If it really is a quarter, then Japan shouldn’t be so submissive. Damn Japan.
or something? It doesn’t seem quite right to just release it like this.