The heinous crimes of the ambitious, conspiratorial, and warlord Peng Dehuai fiercely opposing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line

烽火Flame · July 19, 2025, 7:31pm

Heinous Crimes Committed by the Great Conspirator, Big Strategist, and Warlord Peng Dehuai in Opposing Chairman Mao’s Revolutionary Line

Peng Zei is a opportunist who participated in the Pingjiang Uprising. From the moment he infiltrated the revolutionary ranks until now, he has never ceased his evil activities against the Party, Chairman Mao, and Mao’s revolutionary line. During the Second Chinese Revolutionary War, he was a key supporter of two “Left” opportunist lines and was the main culprit in sabotaging revolutionary bases. On the Long March, he opposed Chairman Mao’s correct leadership and colluded with Zhang Wen Tian to carry out split activities. During the Anti-Japanese War, he acted as a cheerleader for Wang Ming’s right-leaning capitulationist line, willingly becoming a public enemy of the people and a dog of Chiang Kai-shek. During the Korean War, he repeatedly violated Chairman Mao’s orders and instructions, greatly reducing the victory that should have been ours.

After liberation, he engaged in conspiracy activities. He was not only the black boss of the Peng Gaorao anti-Party group but also organized a counterrevolutionary “Military Club” in 1959, colluding with anti-Party elements such as Huang Kexing, Zhang Wen Tian, Zhou Xiaozhou, and others at the Lushan Conference, openly attacking the Party and Chairman Mao with reckless aggression. After being dismissed from office, Peng Zei’s ambitions did not die; he traveled everywhere, collected materials, and continued to viciously attack the Party, its policies, and the great leader Chairman Mao. In 1962, he published an eighty-thousand-word revisionist book. Peng Dehuai has consistently opposed the Party and Chairman Mao, and opposed Mao’s revolutionary line. His crimes are numerous, and we must thoroughly expose and criticize him.

I. Crimes during the Second Chinese Revolutionary War

As early as 1922, the great leader Chairman Mao (then Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the CCP) personally established the first Party branch in Pingjiang. By 1926, a surging peasant movement had emerged in Pingjiang, led personally by Mao, with many backbone figures trained in the “National Peasant Movement Training Institute.” Before February 1928, guerrilla units commanded by comrades Xia Minghan and Luo Nachuan restored the Peasant Association, controlled surrounding rural areas, and fought the “February Pucheng” campaign with 200,000 people in February and the “Xiangping” campaign in May. They initially met the three conditions Mao proposed for establishing revolutionary bases, and the establishment of the Jinggangshan base directly influenced the revolution in Pingjiang. Under Mao’s leadership, with local organization support and the active efforts of comrades Huang Gonglue and others, the Pingjiang Uprising broke out. However, the big ambitious Peng Dehuai always regarded the Pingjiang Uprising as his “glorious” history and political capital, portraying himself as the “founder of the Pingjiang Uprising.” For example, the display at the Hunan Pingjiang Memorial Hall completely lacks Party leadership and only highlights Peng Dehuai’s achievements; Peng was pleased after seeing this. The display at the Military Museum also opposed including Comrade Huang Gonglue’s image.
In 1957, Peng held a symposium on the Pingjiang Uprising at San Zhumen, preparing for the 30th anniversary propaganda, shamelessly claiming: “The Pingjiang Uprising was successful; the Nanchang and Guangzhou uprisings failed; the Autumn Harvest Uprising was a peasant movement.” He exaggerated the role of the Pingjiang Uprising to elevate himself and gain political capital.
In December 1958, Peng told X××× that “when the country is in danger, people will thank those who rescue them,” shamelessly claiming himself as the savior of the people.
In February 1959, at the Military Scientific Research Conference, he said: “The Pingjiang Uprising marked the end of the revolutionary low tide and the signal of the revolutionary tide,” attempting to treat the Pingjiang Uprising as a separate historical stage. He also absurdly said: “Nanchang cannot represent Army Day; whether Army Day is ‘August 1’ or ‘September 9’ is worth considering,” trying to equate the Pingjiang Uprising with Army Day.
In April 1959, at the Military Scientific Research Conference, he shamelessly said: “To write about me, it can be like this: ‘Brave in fighting the enemy, a brave peasant son.’”
In April 1959, Peng prepared gifts for his overseas visit. When X××× asked him to order a wall tapestry based on the oil painting of the Nanchang Uprising in Tianjin, Peng immediately said: “Don’t send this painting,” and also said: “The Nanchang Uprising cannot represent Army Day.”
Before the Pingjiang Uprising, under Party organization leadership, Peng Dehuai’s troops already had a Party auxiliary organization—the Soldiers’ Committee—and had led soldiers to protest for pay. At that time, Peng was very afraid of mass movements and said: “If you protest for pay so fiercely now, it will be hard to handle if it turns into a riot. Take it slow!”
The Pingjiang Uprising was first initiated by Comrade Huang Gonglue on July 22, 1928, at Jiayi in Pingjiang, and was responded to by Communist comrades Deng Ping, Li Can, Huang Chunyi, and others in Peng Dehuai’s unit. On July 23, the uprising occurred. At that time, Peng was upset because he did not become a regimental commander and, due to his connection with Huang Gonglue, under pressure from the situation, he participated in the uprising with the “eight-legged” thinking. During the uprising, the Pingjiang County Committee organized tens of thousands of peasants to support the effort.
After the Pingjiang Uprising, Peng Dehuai seized the position of commander of the Red Fifth Army. He violated the decision of the Red Fifth Army Party Committee to abandon Pingjiang city and disperse the uprising troops to Beixiang and Dongxiang to mobilize the masses, arbitrarily changed the Party’s decision, and held out in Pingjiang for seven days. When the enemy launched a fierce attack with seven regiments, Peng transferred Huang Gonglue’s Fourth Regiment to fight the enemy head-on, suffering heavy losses. The regiment commander and Party representative Huang Chunyi heroically sacrificed, leaving the original 2,500 troops reduced to only 500. Peng lost the battle and falsely blamed Comrade Huang Gonglue.
After the Pingjiang Uprising, Peng fled east and west, committed murder and arson, burned all the houses in Gucheng District, launched night raids on Wanzhai, burned a street, and said: “Make a 30-li radius uninhabited, so the enemy dares not ‘encircle and suppress.’”
After the Pingjiang Uprising, Peng Dehuai violated the Party’s decision to purge unreliable old officers of the Red Fifth Army, looked down on Party representatives sent by the Provincial Party Committee—X×××—and only trusted old officers. Most of these old officers defected to the enemy. For example, two old officers he promoted to regimental commanders, one of whom planned to defect shortly after the uprising, and another defected during the 1932 Ganzhou campaign. Peng promoted an old officer to the director of the logistics department, but days after the uprising, he took all the military supplies of the Red Fifth Army (more than 30,000 silver dollars) and fled, causing great difficulties for the Red Fifth Army.
After the defeat at Pingjiang, Peng Dehuai did not go deep into the countryside to mobilize the masses but wandered around, causing repeated losses to the troops. The Xiang-E-Gan Five Counties Contact Conference decided to merge the Red Fifth Army with local guerrilla units into five columns to save the force. At this time, the enemy attacked Pingliu, and Peng only cared about fleeing personally, hurriedly taking two columns to escape to Jinggangshan. Because the Party organizations in Xiang-E-Gan were unaware of this action and did not hide it, the Party organizations and revolutionary masses in the area suffered heavy losses, with over 130,000 killed by the enemy. The Xiang-E-Gan Special Committee punished Peng Dehuai with Party discipline.
Upon arriving at Jinggangshan, Peng Dehuai was frightened by the temporary difficulties, saying: “Tearful people nose sour,” revealing his pessimism and disappointment about establishing the base.
In December 1928, at the Bailu Village Meeting, Chairman Mao decided to merge the Red Fifth Army with the Red Fourth Army and reorganize the Red Fifth Army into the 33rd Regiment of the Red Fourth Army. It was also decided that Mao would lead the original Red Fourth Army to establish bases in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, with Peng Dehuai remaining in Jinggangshan. When Mao went to the front line in January 1929, Peng unilaterally raised the banner of the Red Fifth Army, engaging in split activities and declaring himself as the army commander.
Given the situation at the time, Peng Dehuai could have held the Jinggangshan revolutionary base. Instead, he opposed Mao’s strategic idea of establishing revolutionary bases, dispersed his forces, guarded everywhere, adopted a passive defense, and left no opportunity for action. As a result, Mao left Jinggangshan just over ten days later, and the key fortresses—Huangyangjie, Bamianshan, and others—were occupied by the enemy. Peng, after losing the battle, was cowardly and abandoned Jinggangshan against Mao’s instructions to defend it, fleeing. Surrounded by enemies, after breaking out, only 380 of the Red Fifth Army remained, with half of the weapons lost. Mao’s carefully built Jinggangshan base was looted and burned by the enemy, suffering severe damage. Over a hundred wounded soldiers were all killed. This is a blood debt Peng Zei owes to the revolutionary people.
After losing Jinggangshan, Peng Dehuai moved south to meet Mao, fighting some victorious battles under Mao’s leadership, with the Central Committee providing ample supplies of personnel and materials. Later, Mao decided to let Peng lead his troops back to Jinggangshan. At this time, enemy forces in Jinggangshan, led by comrades Wang Zuo and Yuan Wencai’s guerrilla units, persisted in resistance and withdrew. The big ambitious Peng Dehuai, to expand his strength, resorted to warlord tactics, falsely accusing Wang Zuo and Yuan Wencai of “treason,” tricking them into gathering at Yongxin, and then swallowed their forces. Yuan Wencai was killed, and Wang Zuo was forced to drown himself.
In June 1929, the Chiang-Gui War broke out. The enemy’s strongholds faced internal conflicts, providing a great opportunity to develop bases. The Front Committee (with Mao as Secretary) instructed the Red Fifth Army to restore the Xiang-Gan border base, expand into the Guangdong-Gan border area, connect with Fujian border areas, and assist the Red Fourth Army in gradually establishing large bases across Xiang-Gan, Fujian, and Guangdong to promote a new revolutionary climax. However, in July, when enemies in Jiangxi re-entered the border area with a small force, Peng again fled in fear, taking local armed forces with him, which plunged the Xiang-Gan border struggle into difficulties and damaged the overall advantageous situation of armed struggle.
After the Sixth Plenary Session of the Party in 1930, the “Li San” (Li Lisan) adventurist line dominated. Peng Dehuai was an active supporter and implementer of Li Lisan’s line. Immediately after the plenary, Peng led the Third Army Corps off Jinggangshan and unexpectedly captured Changsha. Believing he could soon reunite with the Third Army Corps in Wuhan, he regarded Changsha as his rear, moved the rear organs there, and did not transfer the captured spoils. Due to the enemy’s fierce counterattack, the Third Army Corps withdrew on August 5, suffering heavy losses. Meanwhile, the enemy ceased internal fighting among warlords in Hunan and colluded to fight the Red Army, missing the opportunity to rapidly expand the base through warlord conflicts.
Because Peng Dehuai faithfully implemented the “Li San” line, the Hunan Soviet was established with Li Lisan as chairman (who never took office) and Peng Dehuai as vice-chairman.
In September 1930, during the second battle of Changsha, the enemy was well-prepared, holding on with twenty-one regiments, suffering heavy casualties. At this critical moment, Mao made a decisive decision to lift the siege, withdraw the troops to Liling to mobilize the masses, and develop toward Pingxiang, Yichun, and Ganjiang. At the Xiangjiang Conference in October 1930, Peng Dehuai, under the banner of the Li San line, insisted on “taking Nanchang and Jiujiang, cutting off the Yangtze River, and forming a left blockade of the Yangtze and a right threat to Nanjing,” viciously attacking Mao’s decision not to attack Changsha as “not implementing the central instructions” and “escapeism,” and conspired to seize the power of the Front Committee Secretary held by Mao and split the Red First Army. However, Mao’s patient work prevented Peng’s conspiracy from succeeding.
During the second battle of Changsha, Peng Dehuai decided to use the “fire ox formation” for attack. After the enemy counterattacked, the troops and masses suffered heavy losses. Peng blamed Commander Lu Yicai of the Fourth Division, claiming he did not complete the mission and labeled him as a “Trotskyist,” then executed Lu.
During the implementation of the Li San line, Peng Dehuai also actively promoted erroneous organizational lines, ruthlessly fighting and attacking comrades who disagreed with attacking central cities. For example, during the August 19, 1932, Party Congress in Pingjiang Changshou Street, Deng Ganyuan, the political commissar of the Eighth Army, opposed attacking Changsha and taking Wuhan. Peng accused Deng of “opportunism,” “fear of struggle,” and “violating the central strategy of active attack,” and dismissed Deng from his political commissar and Party committee secretary positions. Later, on August 19, 1932, at the Fifth, Eighth, and Sixteenth Army Party Congresses in Pingjiang, Deng again insisted that attacking Changsha was a military gamble, but Peng accused him of “sticking to his personality” and “personal opinions,” and ordered him to be examined for three months and removed from the Red Army for special training.
Peng Dehuai has always opposed Chairman Mao’s brilliant idea of “arming the masses and expanding local armed forces.” He swallowed up local armed forces everywhere. In 1930, the Party’s Fifth Army Front Committee and the Ganxi Southwest Special Committee issued a resolution demanding Peng Dehuai return the guns of certain local guerrilla units. After the battle at Lianhua Intersection, Peng seized surplus guns but did not distribute them to local armed forces or expand guerrilla units. Instead, he removed the gun bolts, buried the guns in oil drums, and only kept the gun bodies under the custody of the local Soviet. When his forces expanded, he would retrieve the guns for his own use. He also organized the Red Guard and once proposed slogans like “All guns should be concentrated in the main force.”
In autumn 1931, during the battle at Gaoxingxu, Jiangxi, neighboring troops issued orders. Peng asked the bugler Wan En, “What kind of call is that?” Wan replied, “I didn’t hear clearly.” Peng, acting as a warlord, immediately ordered Wan to be shot.
In November 1931, at the Jiangxi Southern Party Congress, under Wang Ming’s “Left” opportunist line, Mao’s positions within the Party and military were abolished, and Peng Dehuai, Wang Ming’s chief accomplice, was promoted and entrusted with important roles, becoming Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and later a candidate member of the Central Committee.
After the third anti-“Encirclement and Suppression” campaign in 1932, the “Left” opportunists opposed Mao’s proposal and insisted on attacking key central cities, aiming to seize one or two major cities to achieve an initial victory in one or several provinces. They decided to attack Ganzhou. Mao disagreed, but Peng Dehuai, supporting the “Left” line, firmly supported the attack and personally commanded it, resulting in heavy losses.
After the “Left” opportunists’ victory in the attack on Zhangzhou in 1932, they held the Ningdu Conference in August, viciously attacking Mao’s “Mao Zedong’s opportunism and guerrillaism.” Peng also went wild on the wrong path, attacking and opposing Mao fiercely. At this conference, Mao’s leadership positions within the Red Army were abolished, and Mao was expelled from the Red Army.
After the failure at Ganzhou, the Jiangkou Conference was held. The majority of the Central Bureau still insisted on attacking central cities. Mao opposed this wrong decision, advocating for establishing rural bases over a vast area, developing rural guerrilla warfare, mobilizing the enemy, and rallying the masses. Peng Dehuai strongly opposed Mao’s wise strategic idea, falsely claiming that the region between the Ganjiang and Minjiang rivers was “bitter,” and that “pigs are still being slaughtered with cannons.” He arbitrarily sent troops to the Xiang-Gan area to recruit soldiers, causing Mao’s strategic plan to fail.
During the Fifth Anti-“Encirclement and Suppression” Campaign, Peng Dehuai further promoted Wang Ming’s so-called “not losing a single inch of land,” “six-route dispersal,” and “protracted war” strategies, advocating fortress-to-fortress combat, and wrote an article titled “Tenacious Defense and Short, Sharp Attacks,” vigorously promoting Wang Ming’s line. In January 1934, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Party, Peng was elected as an alternate member of the Central Committee. The “Left” opportunists’ opposition to Mao’s correct leadership and line led to the complete failure of the Fifth Anti-“Encirclement and Suppression” Campaign.

II. Activities of Division and Split on the Long March

The Zunyi Conference established Mao Zedong’s leadership position in the Party. At that time, because the main force of the Red Army was weakened and exhausted, and the enemy was gradually concentrating on us, with Chiang Kai-shek personally commanding in Guiyang, launching a fierce attack, Mao decided to bypass the enemy and throw the enemy behind us while we moved ahead of them. At this critical moment, Peng Dehuai spread rumors among the troops about “military leadership errors,” claiming Mao “misdirected” and incited some to oppose Mao. During this period, Zhang Wen Tian often visited the Third Army Corps, discussing “military leadership errors,” and Peng and Zhang colluded in carrying out treacherous activities against Mao.
After the Zunyi Conference, the troops crossed the Chishui River northward but were blocked by the enemy. Mao resolutely led the Red Army to turn back and launched a second attack on Zunyi. Peng Dehuai repeatedly advocated for hard fighting, but Comrade Lin Biao firmly followed Mao’s instructions, maneuvering the troops around to attack the enemy’s flank, and achieved a great victory at Wujiang, turning the tide of the battle.
Peng Dehuai and Zhang Wen Tian attempted to create division within the Red Army by convening meetings to split the organization. Mao sharply criticized these acts of disunity and organizational sabotage, but Peng Dehuai not only refused to accept Mao’s criticism but also harbored resentment.
In August 1935, when Zhang Guotao caused a split, Peng Dehuai proposed using force to resolve the Fourth Front Army. Peng demanded the arrest of X×××, but Mao stopped him. Peng then secretly ordered the execution of “Red Dazhi” education director X×××, confiscated weapons from cadres of the Fourth Front Army, all under Mao’s prohibition. Peng’s actions reflected his bourgeois warlordist behavior.
In 1936, after crossing the grasslands, the First and Third Army Corps had fewer than 20,000 soldiers, with only a few thousand combat-ready troops. The Central Committee decided to merge the First and Third Army Corps and establish the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment. At this critical juncture, Peng Dehuai, to preserve his own strength and capital, colluded with Huang Kexing, frequently sowed discord among cadres, plotted splits, spread rumors, and slandered, claiming that the Third Army Corps was abolished. He falsely claimed: “The First Army killed members of the Third Army,” and boasted that the Red Army would “continue the Long March, enter Mongolia, and rely on the Soviet Union,” etc. He deliberately incited discord and aimed to split the Party for evil purposes.

III. Crimes during the Anti-Japanese War

In August 1937, the Central Committee held the Luochuan Conference. At that time, the Anti-Japanese War had broken out, but the Kuomintang and CCP had not yet cooperated, and the Kuomintang had not recognized our Party and Army. Under such circumstances, rushing to send troops eastward across the Yellow River to fight the Japanese head-on was a trap set by the Kuomintang to kill with a borrowed knife. Mao insisted on waiting for the Sino-Communist cooperation before deploying troops, and even then, only a single division (over 30,000 soldiers) was to be left to defend the border areas. Mao’s correct stance was fiercely opposed by Peng Dehuai, who insisted on withdrawing all troops to fight the Japanese, aiming to seize power from Mao.
At the Luochuan Conference, Mao proposed the strategic guideline of “independent and autonomous mountain guerrilla warfare, but not relaxing the advantageous mobile warfare.” Peng Dehuai openly opposed this, arrogantly producing a small booklet on military districts, advocating “mobile guerrilla warfare” as the main form and guerrilla warfare as auxiliary, and falsely claimed: “The enemy is being held in Shanxi, and the resistance in Shanxi is decisive for North China.” Mao criticized him afterward, and Peng falsely accused Mao of “sitting in Yan’an and being out of touch with reality.”
In December 1937, at the Party’s December meeting, Peng Dehuai actively supported Wang Ming’s capitulationist line and colluded with right-leaning opportunists to oppose Mao’s correct line:
- (1) Openly opposed Mao’s correct proposition that “resisting Japan must solve democracy and people’s livelihood.” Peng said: “In enemy-occupied areas, putting economic slogans alongside resistance slogans at the same time is wrong; some places only pay half rent, and distribute communal land, which is wrong.”
- (2) Proposed specific measures for Wang Ming’s capitulationist line of “all through united front, all through Kuomintang.” Peng said: “Our work method is generally independent, grassroots mobilization, without legal procedures, and we should use all legal means to reduce rent.”
- (3) Viciously praised and defended the Kuomintang, falsely claiming: “In Shanxi, the work with our allies is weak, even more relaxed than before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The discipline of our allies is poor, and their attitude is arrogant. The victory at Pingxingguan should be a joint victory of our allies and our army. Excessive blame on our allies is wrong.” He also said: “We fought more than fifty battles, providing strategic support, allowing our allies to rest and replenish. But we haven’t done everything to defend Taiyuan… The troop movements on the Jin-Tai Railway were too late… No aid was given to our allies in northwest Shanxi… The concept of preserving strength is very serious.”
- (4) Viciously opposed independent and autonomous guerrilla warfare. Peng said: “At that time, I felt that independent and autonomous guerrilla warfare was not good; we should change to mobile guerrilla warfare,” and also said: “Strategically, it should be mobile guerrilla warfare.”
In spring 1938, at the Linfen Conference, Peng Dehuai resolutely supported and implemented Wang Ming’s capitulationist line, systematically conveying Wang Ming’s “All obey the united front, all through the united front” program, and disseminating a large number of right-leaning capitulationist speeches:
- In the report “Current Situation of the Resistance and the Guidelines for Victory,” he accused the Central Committee of “not understanding the fundamental change in the Kuomintang,” “not enough unity, praise, and assistance to our allies,” and “overemphasizing partial resistance and comprehensive resistance, without grasping the principle that resisting Japan is above all else…”
- He also proposed: “The Kuomintang and CCP should cooperate long-term, jointly bear the responsibility of unified government and unified army,” “The Three Principles of the People and Communism have no distinction at this stage,” and “Establish a unified national defense government and national defense army,” openly opposing Mao’s principle of independence and autonomy within the united front.
Peng Dehuai vigorously protected Yan Xishan’s feudal regime, limited the development of our Party, and was willing to be a servant of the reactionaries:
- (1) Peng proposed: “First, do not undermine Yan Xishan’s wall; second, the Shanxi regime must be handed over to Shanxi people,” and “ordered” the 120th Division and the New Army not to develop and grow but to develop old armies. As a result, young people in northwest Shanxi were conscripted by Yan Xishan, while our army was mobilizing the masses in Jizhong, severely hindering the development and growth of our forces.
- (2) In 1937, the Eighth Route Army stationed in Linfen and Hongtong dispatched large numbers of work teams to mobilize the masses and expand the forces. Yan Xishan slandered these work teams for arresting people. Peng, fearing offending Yan Xishan, immediately ordered all work teams to be withdrawn within three days.
- (3) During Yan Xishan’s anti-Communist uprising in autumn 1939, Peng, passing by the “Decisive Third Vertical” (a unit), told responsible comrades: “Yan Xishan still wants to resist Japan; we should adopt a united attitude toward these old officers.” In December of the same year, Yan Xishan staged a coup, and all five regiments of the Decisive Third Vertical defected, with political cadres and Communist members all killed. Afterwards, Peng continued to reuse those who carried out his wrong policies decisively.
Vigorously promoted Wang Ming’s erroneous line. During his time in the Northern Bureau, Peng printed大量 copies of Wang Ming’s booklet “Struggling for the Further Bolshevikization of the CCP” (the program document of Wang Ming’s line), opposing Mao’s revolutionary line. He also required troops in Taihang and the Anti-Japanese University to study articles like Zhang Wen Tian’s “Dealing with People,” which were right-leaning capitulationist writings.
Peng not only faithfully implemented Wang Ming’s line but also vigorously flattered Wang Ming:
- Carried Wang Ming’s articles everywhere and showed people photos of Wang Ming in Moscow.
- In Changzhi in 1937, the chief of staff of the 115th Division brought back Wang Ming’s sinister instructions from Wuhan: “Let the Eighth Route Army hide the Party branches to facilitate cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek.” Peng Dehuai regarded this as an imperial edict and spread rumors about “important opinions from Wuhan.”
Extensively flattered the public enemy Chiang Kai-shek, willingly becoming a dog of Chiang’s bandit gang:

(1) On May 23, 1938, Peng said: “We should draw the correct conclusion based on the orders of Marshal Chiang and Commander Yan Wei… as our guideline for future joint efforts.”
(2) On January 20, 1938, Peng said: “Marshal Chiang’s speech to the senior generals on the Northwestern battlefield… a great call that can surely encourage the entire nation’s residents toward the glorious future of victory in the war of resistance.”
(3) On the same day, May 23, 1938, he also said: “Marshal Chiang is indeed the leader of the anti-Japanese resistance…”
(4) On July 7, 1940, at the memorial conference for the third anniversary of the Anti-Japanese War held by various sectors in Taibei, he said: “What facts prove that China will not perish? Because we have the wise leader Marshal Chiang to lead the resistance… The entire people are greatly inspired by Marshal Chiang’s unwavering will to resist Japan.”
(5) On July 22, 1940, Peng sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek: “Respectfully reaffirm my loyalty and resolutely support Your Excellency.”
(6) Peng said: “Marshal Chiang pointed out that ‘defending against communism’ is to perish China, which is truly an eternal truth…”
(7) Peng said: “Under Marshal Chiang’s leadership, our resistance continues with renewed vigor, growing stronger with each battle… Salute to the highest respect.”
(8) Peng said: “The grand群众 movement supporting Marshal Chiang is a direct blow to the Japanese invaders.”
(9) Peng said: “Without party affiliation, without occupation distinctions, regardless of gender or age, contributing everything to the sacred cause of ‘Victory in the Resistance and Nation-Building.’”
(10) Peng said: “We firmly support Marshal Chiang, he is a great national leader…”
(11) Peng said: “We are resolutely obedient to Marshal Chiang’s orders…”
(12) Peng said: “Our support for the great leader Marshal Chiang is completely unquestioning…”
(13) Peng said: “…to forever fly the national flag of blue sky, white sun, and red ground in Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Beiping, Tianjin.”
(14) Peng said: “The Central and Military Committees, under Marshal Chiang’s leadership, unanimously express their firm will to continue the resistance to the end…”
(15) Peng removed the phrase “resist to the end” from the slogan supporting Marshal Chiang, turning it into unconditional “support for Marshal Chiang.”

Vigorously protect Chiang Kai-shek, unilaterally initiate the ‘Hundred Regiments Campaign’:

In August 1940, without approval from the CPC Central Committee and Chairman Mao, he unilaterally launched the Hundred Regiments Campaign, prematurely exposing our military strength, causing the Japanese to abandon their attack on Chiang Kai-shek and instead focus on attacking our base areas. Our forces suffered heavy losses, and the base areas implemented the “Three Alls Policy.” As a result, Chiang Kai-shek personally awarded Peng Dehuai.
Peng himself admitted: “The Hundred Regiments Campaign was to break the pressure of the Japanese troops on Chongqing at that time,” and “We used the Hundred Regiments Campaign to support Chiang Kai-shek.”

Peng Dehuai actively promoted the surrenderist united front policy:

(1) Peng turned the united front into surrenderism, placing the basis of united front on the Nationalist army, and falsely claimed: “The core of the united front is to strive for 2 million friendly troops.”
(2) He cared for the Nationalist troops in every way: “Striving for friendly troops… is not to disintegrate the friendly troops… should be very close to the friendly troops.”
(3) Distorted the “Three-Three System,” handing over political power to landlords and big bourgeoisie: “Supporting the anti-Japanese war and democracy, landlords, bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and proletariat each occupy one-third of the political power.”
“The ‘Three-Three System’ government is a class cooperation, class equality democratic government,” “Today we do not support the big bourgeoisie, nor do we support the dictatorship of the Communist Party,” “Socialism is also not governed by the Party.”
(6) Opposed class struggle: “Class struggle must be confined within the scope of the united front,” “Emphasizing class struggle will only hurt both sides, like a fight between a snipe and a clam.”

Peng brazenly opposes Mao Zedong’s correct policy of developing progressive forces and isolating stubborn forces:

Under the banner of “striving for intermediate forces,” he listened to the complaints of “enlightened gentry,” attacked progressive masses, and even landlords demanded no rent reduction or interest reduction, falsely accusing cadres of “not understanding policies” and openly calling for protection.

Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi sang in unison, vigorously promoting bourgeois slogans such as “freedom, equality, fraternity,” opposing Mao’s “On New Democracy”:

On April 7, 1943, Peng delivered a speech on “Democratic Education” at a high-level meeting of the Taihang branch, arbitrarily promoting bourgeois “democracy”—namely “freedom, equality, fraternity”—and openly contradicted Mao’s “On New Democracy.”
In the second part of the report, he said: “What is the spirit of democracy? It is the spirit of ‘freedom, equality, fraternity.’” and praised: “Since the French Revolution, these have been the common slogans of democratic revolutions in various countries, advocated by progressive and justice-minded people.”
Peng said: “The so-called equality mainly refers to political equality and personal dignity at present, that is, no class, no gender, no ethnicity, no occupation, and equal status in politics.” He also said: “‘The prince commits a crime and the commoner is also guilty,’ such calls still exist in feudal times, and we should pay more attention to them in our democratic movement.”
He said: “People are equal in dignity; feudal ideas such as the ‘Three Bonds’ (ruler as subject, father as son, husband as wife) and the ‘Five Constants’ (ruler-subject, father-son, elder brother-younger brother, husband-wife, friend-friend) instill a sense of hierarchy among the masses, which is inequality.”
Peng also said: “Fraternity refers to the relationship between people… Within Chinese民族, there should be a high spirit of fraternity, which can strengthen unity and increase resistance. We should promote the spirit of ‘do not do unto others what you do not want done to yourself,’ and not take others’ suffering as our own happiness, and have compassion for others…”
He promoted: “The spirit of ‘freedom, equality, fraternity’ is the spirit of democracy. But true and thorough freedom, equality, and fraternity can only be realized under the socialist system… Our Communist Party must set an example and take the lead.”
At the February 8, 1943, military cadre meeting in Taihang, he delivered a report titled “Implementing Democratic Spirit in 1943,” stating: “Today’s Chinese democracy demands class equality; lack of democracy means class inequality. Our Party Central resolutely implements democratic policies and advocates class equality.”
Peng said: “We must deeply realize that if we, as Communists, do not possess the democratic spirit and substance of class equality ourselves, we cannot break the dictatorship of the ruling class.” He claimed that the “Three-Three System” is the “essence of democratic politics of class equality,” and criticized feudal等级制度, patriarchal制度, and宗派主义 within the Party.

Peng Dehuai stands on the side of landlords, big capitalists, and reactionary Kuomintang forces, distorting the Party’s policy of rent and interest reduction:

During his speech at the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area consultative conference, he said: “We advocate rent and interest reduction, and also advocate returning rent and interest. Implementing this policy will make landlords and peasants more united.”
He also falsely claimed: “We should analyze why some provinces fear death while others do not? Why can some armies fight while others cannot? The fundamental reason is the correctness of the policy.”

Peng viciously belittles Mao Zedong’s great military思想:

On August 16, 1945, in the “Xinhua Daily,” he published “Current Urgent Tasks,” falsely claiming: “Decisively abandon the habit of disunity and decentralization developed during long-term guerrilla warfare.”
He also said: “With the Soviet Union declaring war on Japan, the million-strong Red Army entered the Northeast with lightning speed, and within two days, the Japanese government surrendered to the Allies.” Completely omitting the strategic guidance role of the Chinese Communist Party and Mao Zedong.

Vigorously promote the establishment of a bourgeois dictatorship of “peaceful democracy” and “peaceful nation-building”:

(1) Peng said: “The political trends and demands of the Chinese people after the war are undoubtedly ‘peaceful nation-building’ and ‘democratic freedom,’ which are the basic forces determining the founding of New China after the war.”
(2) “The basic slogan of our Party after the war is ‘peaceful democracy.’”
(3) “The central task of China’s revolution today is resistance, closely linked with the peaceful democracy and freedom after the war.”
(4) “Our Party Central resolutely advocates implementing democratic policies and advocating class equality.”
(5) “Implementing the ‘Three-Three System’ behind enemy lines is the essence of democratic policies of class equality, not only practically meaningful but also serving as a model for the whole country.”
(6) “New Democracy is not proletarian dictatorship (because it is currently impractical), nor bourgeois dictatorship, but a联合民主专政 of several revolutionary classes during a certain period. It is fundamentally consistent with Sun Yat-sen’s old民权主义, which advocates four rights for the people, and at this stage, it is basically aligned with our New Democracy.”

III. During the Third Civil Revolutionary War Period

During the Liberation War, counter-revolutionary revisionists and warlords like Peng Dehuai, together with He Long, Xi Zhongxun, and others, controlled the Northwest and carried out a series of heinous activities against the Party and Mao Zedong.

After the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, Peng Dehuai and others established the Plain Army District, attempting to control the New Fourth Army through the Yu-Hu-Su military committee, depriving Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission of leadership. Mao promptly uncovered their conspiracy, criticized severely, but failed to succeed.
Actively promoted the surrender route of the “new phase of peaceful democracy” advocated by Khrushchev and Liu Shaoqi, falsely claiming: “After the victory of the war, the political movement and demands of the Chinese people will only be ‘peaceful democracy.’” He also falsely claimed that the social nature of New Democracy was “capitalist,” because “the economic system still belongs to the category of capitalism,” openly contradicting Mao’s scientific analysis of the nature and future of the New Democratic Revolution.
On November 17, 1946, when Chiang and Hu’s bandits launched a large-scale attack on the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area, Peng Dehuai still shouted: “We want democracy, we want China to become everyone’s,” stubbornly clinging to Liu Shaoqi’s “new phase of peaceful democracy.”
On November 30, 1946, Peng, shamelessly praising ×× and elevating ×× while slandering Mao Zedong, said: “The人民军队 you (referring to ××) created has become a strong force defending the interests of the people,” “The great人民事业 led by you will surely succeed.” He attempted to distort the leadership of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the Chinese revolution.
In the first half of 1947, violating Mao’s strategic deployment of “not rushing north to attack Yulin,” he launched two attacks on Yulin, both unsuccessful, disrupting the grand strategic layout. Mao personally commanded the operations to prevent serious consequences.
In autumn 1947, Peng again violated Mao’s principle of集中优势兵力歼敌, attempting to fight head-on with enemy forces of comparable strength, prolonging the confrontation in Yan’an. Mao ordered criticism; Peng reluctantly stopped but remained dissatisfied.
In the spring of 1948, during the Battle of Xifu, he violated the principle of “luring the enemy in deep,” advancing directly into enemy territory, leading to Hu Zongnan and Ma Bofang’s forces encircling and attacking our troops, who retreated from Baoji to Weibei Huanglong Mountain. The defeat was rooted in violating Mao’s military思想, but Peng blamed it on “poor preparation” and “liberalism,” underestimating the enemy.
In June 1948, in the “Spring Offensive Summary and Current Work Instructions,” he excessively praised the Kuomintang and landlord阶级, claiming: “Landlords, except for a few who fled, generally behaved benevolently, temporarily neutral; industrial and commercialists expressed support; most members of the Kuomintang and the Sanqing团 declared disassociation from reactionary organizations; security and自卫队 voluntarily disarmed and surrendered.” He lauded reactionaries to deceive cadres and masses.
In the Yichuan Campaign, he killed Hu Zongnan’s direct subordinate, the commander of the 20th Army Liu Xun, and captured his chief of staff Liu Zhenzhi and brigade commander Liu Ziqi. A year later, Peng had Liu Zhenzhi serve as the staff officer of the 9th Brigade, later becoming commander of the 25th Division, and Liu Ziqi became the logistics and military affairs minister of the First Field Army. He boasted: “Oppose the bourgeois class viewpoint,” and extensively promoted enemy cadres.
In multiple battles in the Northwest, he repeatedly made mistakes, suffered continuous defeats, yet kept boasting about defending Yan’an and liberating the Northwest as achievements. In fact, the victories in defending Yan’an and liberating the Northwest were entirely due to Mao’s brilliant command; under Peng’s methods, battles would have been impossible to win.
After the victory in the Liberation War, Peng proposed the reactionary idea of “consolidating the new democratic order for at least twenty-seven years,” aiming for capitalist restoration, faithfully implementing Liu Shaoqi’s revisionist路线, causing China to regress.
At a Northwest congress, Peng openly said he would coexist with landlords long-term, stating: “I think in the future, as society progresses, landlords’ lives will also improve, but they lack long-term vision.”
Protecting rich farmers and opposing land reform, he said: “…At that time, rich farmers followed the enemy and opposed us; now, after our basic victory, rich farmers turn to us. If they do not actively oppose or remain neutral, we will not move against them; they can produce peacefully, reducing resistance.”
Following Liu Shaoqi’s encouragement to develop capitalism, he said: “As long as you follow social development, as managers now, in the future when industry is nationalized and agriculture collectivized, you can still be managers.”
In the Party Congress report of the military region, he promoted the theory of class extinction, claiming: “The思想 of the peaceful camp is一致, the方向 is一致, and there are basically no contradictions. The Soviet Union has no阶级, and the interests of the entire country are aligned.”
He also opposed class education within the military, advocating “unity of资产阶级” through “democracy, freedom, and equality.”
Promoting cooperation with the bourgeoisie, he said: “To develop industry and advance toward socialism, we must cooperate well with the民族资产阶级. Good unity leads to rapid建设; poor unity results in many political and economic difficulties.”
Advocating for the care of bourgeois intellectuals and opposing平均主义, he said: “Caring for the生活 of newly enlisted intellectuals is to utilize their cultural talents; some comrades are dissatisfied, which is an错误 of平均主义.”
He also said: “Some cadres doubt and are dissatisfied with upper层分子 who have been分化 from reactionary堡垒, which is incorrect.”
In the report ‘On Several Basic Tasks,’ he did not analyze敌伪人员的阶级, but instead criticized the high警觉 of the PLA, saying: “It is wrong for some cadres to doubt the upper层分子 who have been分化 from reactionary堡垒.”
Promoting material incentives and implementing a ‘public-private兼顾’ policy, he said: “Production gains should be divided according to the principle of ‘public-private兼顾,’ half to the public, half to private; it can be saved, sent home, or used to establish families, benefiting both.”

V. During the Korean War (抗美援朝)

Before the Volunteer Army entered Korea, Mao Zedong had made meticulous arrangements, but Peng maliciously spread rumors: claiming “Mao Zedong has always been indecisive, causing the Volunteer Army to cross the river and then withdraw, but because the troops fought fiercely, I opposed withdrawal,” which is a vicious slander against Mao.
Mao clearly stated: ‘We should participate in the war, must participate, and the benefits of participation are enormous; not participating causes great losses,’ but Peng was intimidated by American accusations, shouting: “We only want to fight Chiang Kai-shek in Korea!” and even viciously said: “Let them (referring to North Korea) perish in two years!”
The entire Chinese people surged in the anti-American援朝热潮, but Peng slandered the志愿精神: openly in Korea, he said: “We did not come as volunteers!” vilifying the正义性质 of抗美援朝 and insulting the hero spirit of the entire people defending the homeland.
Our forces entered Korea just as the enemy was advancing recklessly, Mao decisively ordered: ‘Complete the battle deployment in a few days and annihilate the enemy,’ but Peng hesitated, fearing the enemy, and proposed: “Strive for time, prepare for counterattack,” delaying the opportunity for victory.
In the first battle, he did not seriously implement Mao’s instructions, resulting in a遭遇战, only forcing the enemy to retreat across the Chingchuan River, failing to annihilate large numbers of the enemy.
In the second battle, Mao personally ordered a troop to circle around to the德化方向, but Peng refused to carry out the order, severely affecting the expansion of the victory.
After the second battle, Mao ordered preparations for a third battle, emphasizing its重大政治意义, but Peng openly opposed, saying: “It has no political significance!” and, citing troop fatigue, proposed a “winter休整” (rest and recuperation) slogan. Mao issued four commands before it was reluctantly executed.
The third battle deployment was chaotic, and Mao’s战役部署 was not followed, leading to a chaotic retreat, and due to Peng’s unilateral撤回炮兵 and slow攻城汉城, the enemy escaped.
In the fourth battle, Mao advocated: ‘Retreat near the 38th parallel, lure the enemy to attack and annihilate them,’ but Peng disobeyed, failing to concentrate forces to annihilate the Maobianli U.S. troops, instead attacking the伪军 in 横城, allowing the main U.S. forces to escape.
In the fifth battle, Peng refused to follow Mao’s ‘delay and attack’ deployment, rashly attacking, aiming to destroy five divisions and three brigades, violating the principle of集中优势兵力各个歼灭敌人. During the second phase, disorganized撤退 led to enemy counterattacks, right-leaning逃跑, causing heavy losses—this blood debt is on Peng’s head!
After the campaign, Mao instructed: ‘Active defense, small victories, accumulate small wins into great victories,’ but Peng continued preparing for the ‘sixth campaign,’ which Mao stopped.
Mao criticized him: ‘He talks big, fights far, and fights hastily,’ but Peng complained: “Comrade Mao Zedong talks about possibilities, so he will never make mistakes.”
After the fifth campaign, Peng faced counterattacks and became pessimistic, sending a telegram to ××× crying: “Autumn wind is strong… Marx is not divine in heaven, I hope Brother Liang’s strategy will teach me.” He even claimed: “Even Marx cannot be relied on,” revealing extreme reactionary tendencies!
When the Air Force first entered Korea, Mao instructed: ‘Appropriate training and gradual combat,’ but Peng shouted: “Come and go without rejection, meet and fight immediately,” violating Mao’s instructions and rushing into air combat recklessly.
The Air Force took turns exercising according to Mao’s战略, but Peng heavily criticized: “The Air Force fights passively!” sabotaging the development of the Air Force.
While in Korea, Peng said: ‘You shout Mao Zedong’s slogan of ‘Long live,’ and he will live forever? He won’t even live to a hundred… this is idol worship.’ This is a vicious insult to Mao Zedong!
Reviewing the志愿军战史, Peng erased the words ‘under the leadership of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party,’ crossing out the six characters “Mao Zedong,” and placing a question mark next to “Mao Zedong’s brilliant leadership,” changing the “Premier Zhou’s statement” to “Chinese Government statement.”
Deleted all strategic instructions Mao gave for the first to fifth battles, removing the phrase “Mao Zedong’s brilliant decision-making, the Chinese people dare to fight the Americans.”
In the summary of the military corps leaders’ meeting on January 25, 1951, he did not mention Mao Zedong at all, attributing victory solely to the so-called “correct战役原则,” completely erasing Mao’s command from history!
Attacking Lin Biao to elevate himself, he said: “He is smarter than me, I am healthier than him, my fate is bitter, I crawl through mountain gorges everywhere.” Comparing himself to Lin Biao, revealing his ambitions.
In April 1951, returning from Korea, at Huairen Hall, due to trivial matters like ‘fried noodle diarrhea’ and ‘military uniform dyeing,’ he slammed Zhou Enlai: ‘Is the志愿军 not human, are they pigs? It’s patriotism that makes you want to kill two heads!’ Later, he said: “I狠狠×ed him.”
He even said: “Doing work is like a spring dog.”
Self-comparing with Lenin and Marx, claiming: ‘Compared to them, I am much worse, but only slightly worse than some comrades,’ arrogantly and shamelessly.

VI. Crimes after the Liberation and during the Lushan Conference

1. After the nationwide liberation, Peng Dehuai continued to implement Liu Shaoqi’s revisionist路线

Peng still advocated “consolidating the new democratic order for at least twenty-seven years,” supporting landlords and wealthy peasants, opposing land reform. He followed Liu Shaoqi, supported capitalism, and tried to lead China back to semi-feudal, semi-colonial old ways.

2. Protecting landlords and wealthy peasants in land reform, opposing their suppression

He said: “Most rich farmers have turned to us, not actively opposing us or remaining neutral… this allows them to cope with us to some extent. Meanwhile, not touching the rich farmers’ economy can let them produce peacefully, reducing resistance.”
He also said: “As society advances, landlords’ lives will be better than now.”

3. Vigorously promoting cooperation with the bourgeoisie

Peng said: “To develop China’s industry and move towards socialism, we must cooperate well with the民族资产阶级.”
He also said: “As long as you follow social development… now as managers, in the future when industry is nationalized and agriculture collectivized, you can still be managers.”

4. At the military district party congress, he promoted the theory of class extinction and opposed proletarian dictatorship

Peng said: “The思想 of the peaceful camp is一致, the direction is一致, and there are basically no contradictions. The Soviet Union has no阶级, and the interests of the whole country are aligned.”
He also opposed class education within the military, advocating “unity of democracy, freedom, and equality” to “unite the bourgeoisie.”

5. In handling enemy and pseudo-人员 and intellectuals, he promoted阶级调和主义

Peng said: “For newly enlisted intellectuals, to consider their emotions and utilize their talents, their生活待遇 should be cared for. Some comrades are dissatisfied, which is an错误 of平均主义.”
He also said: “Some cadres doubt and are dissatisfied with upper层分子 who have been分化 from reactionary堡垒, which is incorrect.”

6. Engaged in material incentives, implementing a ‘public-private兼顾’ policy

Peng said: “Production gains should be divided according to the principle of ‘public-private兼顾,’ half to the public, half to private; it can be saved, sent home, or used to establish families, benefiting both.”

7. After returning from the Korean War, he insulted and cursed Zhou Enlai

Due to trivial matters like “military uniform dyeing” and “eating fried noodles and diarrhea,” Peng slammed Zhou Enlai at Huairen Hall: “Is the志愿军 not human, are they pigs? It’s patriotism that makes you want to kill two heads!” Later, he said: “I狠狠×ed him.”
He even said: “Doing work is like a spring dog.”

8. Extreme arrogance, despising Mao Zedong, competing with Lin Biao for功劳

Peng said: “I am more聪明 than Mao, I am healthier than him, my fate is bitter, I crawl through mountain gorges everywhere.” Comparing himself to Lin Biao, revealing his ambitions.

9. In the historical revision of battles, he distorted and erased Mao Zedong’s brilliant leadership

Crossed out “under the leadership of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party” in the志愿军战史, removing “Mao Zedong” characters;
Placed a question mark next to “Mao Zedong’s brilliant leadership”;
Changed “Premier Zhou’s statement” to “Chinese Government statement”;
Deleted all Mao’s instructions for the five major campaigns;
In reports, only mentioned “concentrating forces to annihilate the enemy,” ignoring that these principles originated from Mao Zedong.

VII. Summary of Crimes and Ideological Essence

Peng Dehuai is a thorough反党分子,反毛分子, and资产阶级军阀野心家. From the Pingjiang Uprising, he started as a opportunist, always opposing Mao’s revolutionary路线, plotting to usurp the Party, the military, and the government, standing on the wrong路线 and hostile立场 at every major historical juncture.
He implemented ‘Left’ adventurism during the Red Army period, sabotaging revolutionary bases; during the Long March, he caused splits, opposed Mao’s command, and plotted to undermine central unity; during the抗战, he was surrenderist and pro-蒋反共; during the Liberation War, he attempted to implement capitalist restoration路线; during the抗美援朝, he disobeyed Mao’s orders, was arrogant and self-satisfied, and sought功劳 and篡位.
He is a key member of Liu Shaoqi, Wang Ming, Zhang Guotao’s anti-Party clique, and an active promoter and leader of the Khrushchev路线 in the military.
He constantly talks about ‘democracy,’ but actually promotes bourgeois democratic思想, spreading reactionary slogans like ‘freedom, equality, fraternity,’ openly opposing Mao’s ‘On New Democracy,’ attempting to overthrow the Party’s leadership and the foundation of proletarian dictatorship ideologically and politically.
He is an extreme个人主义, arrogant, self-comparing with Lenin, despising Mao, slandering Zhou Enlai, distorting revolutionary战史, modifying志愿军档案, erasing Mao’s contributions to抗美援朝, usurping the Party and people’s victory achievements, building monuments for himself, plotting to usurp the highest leadership of the Party and the state.
**He promotes revisionism路线, attacks revolutionary左派, protects landlords and wealthy peasants, advocates long-term合作 with bourgeoisie and共同统治, opposes土地改革 and socialist改造, and strives to阻挠 proletarian dictatorship and socialist建设.**7. His essence is that of a thorough counter-revolutionary, an enemy of the people, a mortal enemy of Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line, and the most dangerous class enemy within the Party and the people!

VIII. Thoroughly Liquidate Peng Dehuai’s Counter-Revolutionary Crimes

We must resolutely and thoroughly expose and criticize all of Peng Dehuai’s crimes, and politically, ideologically, and organizationally draw a clear line between him and the Party, the people, and Chairman Mao. The core should be the Central Committee of the Party with Chairman Mao at its head, and carry out an in-depth comprehensive struggle against Peng Dehuai’s counter-revolutionary line:

To politically eliminate the residual influence of Peng Dehuai’s line and thoroughly criticize his right opportunism and bourgeois military line;
To investigate and expose those connected with Peng Dehuai and those with similar erroneous tendencies, and resolutely clear them out;
To conduct a thorough ideological struggle to prevent Peng Dehuai’s anti-Party thoughts from breeding and spreading within the Party and the military.

Peng Dehuai’s crimes are glaring and numerous. He is one of the typical representatives of anti-Party, anti-Mao, and anti-People elements in the history of New China. We must take class struggle as the key link, arm our minds with class viewpoints and Mao Zedong Thought, and never forget the profound lesson of how class enemies infiltrated the Party!

前进Advance · July 20, 2025, 2:40am

Peng Dehuai, this dog warlord, really deserves to be shot, as he is specifically anti-Communist and extremely reactionary.